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MID-AMERICA
An Historical Quarterly
VOLUME XLI
1959
PUBLISHED BY
ff CP v£^
THE INSTITUTE OF JESUIT HISTORY •/v^O - '
. fit, Vpr ^
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO
CONTENTS OF VOLUME XLI
ARTICLES
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE
scholarship. Edward T. Gargan 3
BUSINESS AND CURRENCY IN THE OHIO
gubernatorial campaign of 1875. Irwin Unger .... 27
THE FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN
the united states, 1914-1917. Felice A. Bonadio ... 40
WILLIAM HICKLING prescott:
authors' agent. C. Harvey Gardiner 67
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND
Egyptian nationalism. David H. Burton 88
THE MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND
politics: a case study. D. Jerome Tweton 104
the waning prestige of lewis cass. Walter W. Stevens . . 114
THE NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE
impact of the sioux war, 1862. Robert Huhn Jones . . 131
POLITICAL WEAKNESS IN WISCONSIN
progressivism, 1905-1909. Herbert F. Margulies . . . . 154
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND
army reform. Bernard L. Boylan 173
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY: THE PROGRESSD7E
as municipal reformer. Roy Lubove 195
A professor in farm politics. Richard S. Kirkendall . . . 210
THE FIRST MISSOURI EDITORS'
convention, 1859. William H. Lyon 218
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN
with A moral. Robert W. Sellen 223
BOOK REVIEWS 59, 120, 187, 241
NOTES AND COMMENTS 62, 124
INDEX 245
/
c7WID-c^4MERICA
An Historical Review
JANUAR Y
1959
VOLUME 41
NEW SERIES, VOLUME 30
NUMBER 1
Published by Loyola University
Chicago 26, Illinois
•v f
c714ID-<^1MERICA
An Historical Review
VOLUME 41, NUMBER 1 JANUARY 1959
J
cTVIID-c^MERICA
An Historical Review
JANUARY 1959
VOLUME 41
NEW SERIES, VOLUME 30
NUMBER 1
CONTENTS
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE
SCHOLARSHIP ....
BUSINESS AND CURRENCY IN THE OHIO
GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875
THE FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1914-1917 .
BOOK REVIEWS
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Edward T. Gargan 3
. Irwin Unger 27
Felice A. Bonadio 40
59
62
MANAGING EDITOR
JEROME V. JACOBSEN, Chicago
EDITORIAL STAFF
WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
W. EUGENE SHIELS
RAPHAEL HAMILTON
PAUL KINIERY
PAUL S. LIETZ
Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History)
at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.
Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at
Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as
second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in
the United States.
Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should
be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial
offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.
c7WID-cylMERICA
An Historical Review
JANUARY 1959
VOLUME 41 NEW SERIES, VOLUME 30 NUMBER 1
Some Problems in Tocqueville
Scholarship
April 16, of this year will be the one hundredth anniversary of
the death of Alexis de Tocqueville. As a new century of Tocque-
ville scholarship begins there is need to recall some of the work
accomplished and to project the desirable direction to be taken by
future Tocqueville studies.1 In 1935 occurred the one hundredth
anniversary of Tocqueville's Democracy. It occasioned a great deal
of discussion of Tocqueville's position in modern thought, much
of it profound. Two products of that time now stand out, Pro-
fessor Pierson's crowning study Tocqueville and Beaumont in
America (1938), and Professor Albert Salomon's interpretive essay
"Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom," (1939) still the best in
its field.2 The latter in particular lent new stature to Tocqueville,
presenting him as the author of an image of man, which in our
modern plight, we welcome for its grandeur and power.
Three years ago another anniversary occurred, the centenary
of Tocqueville's L'Ancien Regime. But the picture this time is
rather different. Though many historical articles on this scholar-
statesman have appeared, they are often lacking in the precision,
depth and range which marked those of two decades ago.3 A
1 An earlier version of this paper with the title "Tocqueville and
the Aristocratic Retrospect" was read at the annual meeting of the
American Historical Association, December, 1956.
2 George W. Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America (New
York: Oxford, 1938) ; Albert Salomon, "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Free-
dom (A Trend Towards Concrete Sociology)," The Review of Politics, I
(1939), 400-431.
3 For a list of representative articles and books since 1935 see
Appendix infra 18.
3
4 EDWARD T. GARGAN
major exception is the publication in process in France of Tocque-
ville's work in a definitive edition.4 This monumental under-
taking, under the direction of J. P. Mayer, invites the historical
profession, once again, to ask what place it shall assign to Tocque-
ville in the study of modern society.
This is not an easy question. Opinions differ widely on his
role both in history and in the writing of history. The possible
choices offered here may be illustrated from an earlier and a more
recent judgement on Tocqueville's ultimate place in the tradition
of lasting scholarship. In the concluding paragraphs of his book
Professor Pierson, after estimating the limitations and "enduring
qualities" of the Democracy, felt free to write of Tocqueville that
his "was a mind that fell short of genius. But he had used it to
pioneer. And as a pioneer he would be followed and long
honoured. And this would be true despite his foreboding anxiety
and his failure to comprehend the whole thought of his time."5
This critical assessment, preceded by 776 pages of analysis,
may be compared with a recent and very brief indication of one
possible turn in the direction of Tocqueville scholarship. In a
humble and devoted evaluation Professor J. A. Lukacs in his
review of Tocqueville's Oeuvres completes, for the September, 1956,
issue of The Journal of Modern History, pleaded with his colleagues
to regard Tocqueville "as the greatest historical thinker of the past
four or five centuries. . . ."6 The differences implied here are
sufficient to suggest that the student of Tocqueville has before him
many avenues of investigation before the total character and
achievement of the man will be known. It is the purpose of this
paper to indicate some of the paths which these studies might take
and their possible historical significance.
4 Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, ed. J. P. Mayer. Edition
definitive (4 tomes; Paris: Gallimard, 1951-1958). Tome I, De la demo-
cratie en Amerique. Introduction par Harold J. Laski, 2 vols. Tome II,
UAncien Regime et la revolution. Introduction par Georges Lefebvre.
Fragments et notes inedites sur la revolution. Texte etabli et annote par
Andre Jardin. Tome VI, Correspondance anglaise. Correspondance d'Alexis
de Tocqueville avec Henry Reeve et John Stuart Mill. Texte etabli et
annote par J. P Mayer et Gustave Rudler. Introduction par J. P. Mayer.
Tome V, Voyages en Sicilc et Aux Etats-Unis. Texte etabli, annote et pre-
face par J. P. Mayer. Voyages en Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse et Algerie.
Texte etabli et annote par J. P. Mayer et Andre Jardin. Avertissement
par J. P. Mayer. 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958.
5 Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont, Tocqueville and Beaumont, 777.
6 J. A. Lukacs, reviewing Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes,
in The Journal of Modern History, XXVIII (1956), 284.
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 5
II
Future historical studies of Tocqueville might begin with a
kind of discourtesy toward this great and gentle historian — with
a deliberate decision to curb the enthusiasm provoked by his success
as a prophet. His uncanny talent along this line tends to bewitch
the historian. It is, in fact, almost impossible to read anything
of Tocqueville without coming under the spell of this enchanting
quality. Here one may* recall not only his famous and cruelly
accurate prediction of the totalitarian weakness inherent in mass
societies, but also his equally accurate prediction that the share-
holders of the Suez Canal were sure to lose their money, to be
ruined.7 Tocqueville was himself not uncritical of his compulsion
to prophesy. More than once he comments on the limits of this
art. During the crisis of 1848 he was particularly conscious of
this danger, and in the midst of his own prophecies he warned that
fundamental changes in the course of civilizations can be seen
only dimly by the generations approaching these events.8
Nevertheless there may be historians who are reluctant to
forego the image of Tocqueville as prophet. If so then their path
is clear. The relationship of profane prophecy to historical under-
standing is largely unexplored, and it is into this realm that they
are obliged to venture.
Ill
The historian who neglects Tocqueville the prophet to study
his unique creative personality need not be long in seeking problems
of sufficient complexity. He may begin with an analysis of the
astonishing maturity of Tocqueville's judgements even before he
made his voyage to America. This maturity is especially evidenced
in a series of letters reflecting his response to the July Revolution.9
Most men of twenty-five, even men of brillance, would, when
presented with a crisis of this dramatic character, have fixed their
attention on personalities and the riot of rumor which attends sud-
7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis
de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior from 1834 to 1859, ed. M.C.M.
Simpson, 2 vols., London, 1872, II, 142.
8 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, pub. Madame de Tocqueville, ed.
G. Beaumont 9 vols., Paris 1864-1875, V, 460-461. (Tocqueville to E.
Stoffels, April 28, 1850), cf. also ibid., VI, p. 151, Tocqueville to Mrs.
Grote, July 24, 1850.
9 Ibid., VI, 19-20 (Tocqueville to Edouard de Tocqueville, April 6,
1830), VI, pp. 5-6; Tocqueville to Edouard de Tocqueville August 9, 1829.
6 EDWARD T. GARGAN
den changes in governments. Not so Tocqueville. He was
primarily anxious to fit the Revolution into a wider pattern domi-
nated by the phenomena of class conflict.10 Beyond this he sought
to interpret the events of the spring and summer of 1830 against
the background of his already developing views on the fundamental
character of modern civilization.11 Professor Pierson has, of course,
traced some of the sources for this breadth of inquiry and con-
ceptualization in his account of Tocqueville's family and environ-
ment.12 There is still room, however, for a further scrutiny of his
formative years.
Such a work might seek, among other things, to reconstruct
Tocqueville's appreciation of the period of the Restoration. The
achievement of this time contributed decisively to Tocqueville's
earliest conviction that the aftermath of the French Revolution
could continue to be a time of positive and steady growth in
political stability and liberty. In an unpublished letter sent from
Cincinnati in December of 1831, Tocqueville insisted that those
living in an epoch of transition leading to greater freedom or to
despotism could yet draw upon the great accomplishments in the
time since 1791. 13 It was, he thought, an "incontestable fact" that
"immense progress" had been made in the practical intelligence
and translation of the ideas of liberty.14 The Restoration was seen
as giving France the fruits of fifteen years of freedom.15 Identify-
ing the source of his optimism, which was not American, Tocqueville
confessed :
I do not know if we are destined to be free, but that which is certain is
that we are infinitely less capable of being so than we were forty years
ago. If the Restoration had endured ten more years, I believe that we
would have been saved; the habit of lawfulness and of constitutional forms
was completely penetrating our manners.16
Given this view of France's history, Tocqueville was prepared to
welcome and praise in the Democracy such habits more perfectly
developed in America.
10 Yale Tocqueville Mss, A VI, Tocqueville to Stoffels, August 26, 1830.
Hereafter this collection will be cited as Y.T. Mss.
11 Y.T. Mss. A VI, Tocqueville to Stoffels, April 21, 1830.
12 Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont, 13-25.
13 Y.T. Mss B.I. a. (2), Tocqueville to Hippolyte de Tocqueville (?),
December 4, 1831.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 7
IV
The relationship of Tocqueville's experience in America to the
construction and final format of his Democracy has been acutely
exhibited by Professor Pierson. We do not yet have, however, a
definitive edition of the Democracy based on an exhaustive use of
all the notebooks, correspondence, drafts and the working manu-
script of the Democracy in the Yale Tocqueville collection.17 The
significance of this difficult task can not be overestimated.
In imitation of Professor Pierson's book there are many ad-
ditional aspects of the Democracy to be investigated through the
use of the numerous manuscripts. Here a most important problem
is that of identifying more precisely the sources of Tocqueville's
legion of generalizations on the spirit of the modern age, which
make up the substance of the enigmatic second part of the Democ-
racy. The reader of this concluding volume is often at a loss to
account for the scope and boldness of the all-inclusive deductions
which enhance Tocqueville's reputation as a seer. One recalls
his confident assurance that in France the individual committed to
the race for material happiness who breaks down under the pressure
of this game will commit suicide whereas in America he will merely
go insane.18 Here it may be inferred that Tocqueville's develop-
ment of this generous distinction rested in part on statistics which
he gathered from the press and journals of his day. I do not
know the precise source for this idea, but there are other more
well known aspects of Tocqueville's fundamental views which can
for illustration be traced to some of their origins.
The notebooks in which Tocqueville wrote and literally scratched
out his germinal ideas and the drafts for the second part of the
Democracy contain innumerable leads to the often prosaic genesis
of his grand theories. To begin with a minor example, in the
Democracy, when treating of the centralization of government,
Tocqueville took the occasion to fix a point by noting the central-
izing success of the reigning pasha of Egypt.19 The notebooks
indicate that the basis for this comparison was no erudite literature
but an article which Tocqueville read in the Revue des deux Monde s
17 G. W. Pierson, "The Manuscript of Tocqueville's De la democratie
en Amerique," The Yale University Library Gazette, XXIX (1955), 115—
125 (postscript 178).
18 Tocqueville, Oeuvrcs completes, Mayer ed., I, pt. 2, p. 145, De
la democratic en Amerique.
19 Ibid., 307.
8 EDWARD T. GARGAN
for the first of March, 1838. 20 In Tocqueville's hands this article
of passing significance on Mohammed Ali became a "symptom of
the times."21 The drafts further reveal that his fundamental
critique of the centralizing compulsion of modern governments
rested in large part in his personal dissatisfaction with the day-to-
day decisions of the government of Louis Philippe as it tried to
come to grips with the issues growing out of the increasing indus-
trialization of France. On the thirtieth of June, 1837, he observed
with ironic distaste the language of the journal he Steele, for the
previous month, in which it had encouraged the idea that the
government should not only maintain the railroads but also the
metallurgical resources of France.22 Such ideas were, he noted,
the natural results of democratic passions, accomodating in an
industrial society the aggrandizement of the central power. With
this material he projected an image of the states of the future as
enormous industrial enterprises dominating the life and capitaliza-
tion of industry.23
On this same subject, on May 27, 1837, while thinking through
the theme of centralization, Tocqueville recorded the gist of a con-
versation with Adolph Thiers. In their talk Thiers told Tocqueville
that while serving on a commission to consider a railroad from
Lyons to Marseilles, "he had finished by convincing all the members
of this commission that the great public works ought always in
France to be built at the expense of the State and by its agents."24
To this Tocqueville added "Do not forget that when I come to
speak of the ultra-centralizing tendency of our day."25 The recon-
struction of many of Tocqueville's most prescient generalizations
is thus open to the historian willing to piece together the fragments
of his notebooks. Such a work of reconstruction will not lessen
the genius of Tocqueville, but it will make possible significant
distinctions between those generalizations issuing from his imagina-
tive logic and those ideas more concretely dependent upon his close
observations of the history of France in the first decade of the
July Monarchy.
20 Y.T. Mss C.V. g. "Brouillons des chapitres de la second partie
de la Democratie," Cahier II, p. 136. For the article cf. Augusta Colin,
"Lettres sur l'Egypte — Administration territorials du pacha," Revue des
deux Mondes, XIII (1838), 655-671.
21 Y.T. Mss. C.V. g., 136.
22 Ibid., 123.
23 Ibid.
24 Y.T. Mss C.V. d. "Paquet No. 5," 30.
25 Ibid.
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 9
Tocqueville's correspondence during these years also contributes,
as it to be expected, to an understanding of the roots of his com-
pelling generalizations and predictions. Here one of the most im-
pressive aspects of Tocqueville's work is his portrait of the psy-
chological make-up of the average man in a democratic society.
Tocqueville, as is well known, was disheartened by the self-centered
egotism he saw as a predominant feature of modern man. This
is a theme interwoven throughout the final volume of the Democracy.
Yet it was not the citizens of Syracuse, Philadelphia, or Boston
who confirmed Tocqueville in this view, but rather his own neigh-
bors in Normandy. In June of 1838 Tocqueville sent a fretful
letter on this subject to Royer-Collard, in which he complained that
although he held in sincere and even warm affection his fellow
countrymen, their passive egotism oppressed him to the point of
despair.26 Their absorption in their narrow personal concerns,
their incapacity for commitments beyond those of self-interest, made
them, Tocqueville regretted, "honest men, but poor citizens."27
To this lament Royer-Collard replied that Tocqueville's ill-humor
towards his neighbors was unjust. For "your Normans — they are
France, they are the world," and he added that they were dominated
by the prudent and intelligent egotism of the men of their age.28
Do not, the famous Doctrinaire advised, waste any of your time
burning incense before this idol, disengage yourself, think and write,
go back to your books as if you were alone.29 Tocqueville took this
advice, and in time his ennui in the Normandy countryside was trans-
lated into one of the major conceptions of his life. It is certainly a
tribute to Tocqueville's genius that this and other similar impres-
sions, which might have remained merely the chronic complaint
of a sensitive mind, gave, when developed and incorporated into the
Democracy, a portrait of the individual citizen in modern society
which has become universally accepted.
V
Tocqueville's inability to tolerate mediocrity in his own environ-
ment was but one reflection of the enormous demands which he
made upon himself. These heroic burdens, before the Democracy
26 Leon d'Estresse de Lanzac de Labarie, "L'Amitie de Tocqueville
et de Royer-Collard," Revue des deux Mondes, LVIII (1930), 899. Tocque-
ville to Royer-Collard, June 22, 1838.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., Royer-Collard to Tocqueville, July 31, 1838.
29 Ibid.
10 EDWARD T. GARGAN
was finished and in one sense before it was begun, compelled Tocque-
ville to seek a political career of the first importance. This aspect
of Tocqueville's life has likewise been inadequately studied. Yet
the necessity for such an analysis can hardly be overstated. Tocque-
ville brought to this career all of his aspirations to found the new
society, which he believed he had assisted in but one vital fashion in
his Democracy. There is a glimpse of his virtual passion to aid that
society in a reminder placed in his notebooks for 1840: "Far from
wishing to halt the development of the new society, I strive to
bring it forth."30
In 1837, the year he first tried and failed to enter the Chamber
of Deputies, Tocqueville freely discussed the scope of his ambition,
confessing: "I admit that a great reputation acquired by honest
means has always seemed to me the most precious thing in this
world, and the only thing worth the sacrifice of one's time, one's
fortune, and even the price of one's life."31 When Tocqueville was
finally successful in the campaign of 1839, that victory was pre-
faced by an appeal to the electors of the arrondissement of Valognes
affirming without mitigation the intention of his career:
There is now in France, and I am not afraid to say, in Europe, another
man who has made clearer in the most public manner that the ancient
aristocratic society has disappeared forever, and that it only remains for
the men of our times to organize progressively and prudently the new
democratic society on its ruins.32
At the end of his public career Tocqueville had yet to acknowledge
the force of that political life. While struggling to begin his history
of the French Revolution, he tried to explain to a friend something
of the tension involved: "I should like to be able to find a work
for my mind far from public affairs," he wrote, "but that is easier
to desire than to do. Politics is like certain women who have, so
they say, the power to move and trouble one long after they are
no longer loved."33 And again in the next to the last spring of
his life, two years after his L' Ancien Regime had received a mag-
so Y.T. Mss C.V.K. "Paquet No. 17 ler Cahier," 44. Fragments, idees
que je ne puis placer dans l'ouvrage(mars 1840)."
31 Leon d'Estresse de Lanzac de Labarie, 893, Tocqueville to Royer-
Collard, August 30, 1837.
32 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, Beaumont ed., IX, 224, "Circulaire
Addressee aux Electeurs de l'Arrondissment de Valognes."
33 Ibid., VI, 173, Tocqueville to the Comtesse de Circourt, February
14, 1851.
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 11
nificent reception, Tocqueville still felt obliged to write, 'There is
no happiness comparable to political success. . . ."34
The study and interpretation of Tocqueville's presence in the
world of affairs will be greatly aided by the forthcoming publica-
tion of his political writings and discourses. To appreciate this
coming material fully, we need a day-to-day construction of Tocque-
ville's political activity, something that has never been done. This
demands an accurate account of his circle, and even more important,
a close study of his voting record, both under the Monarchy and
during the Second Republic.
When we have in detail such a record, it will be possible to
penetrate a little further the problem of his lack of success as a
parliamentarian. Tocqueville was inclined to trace this disappoint-
ment to his unwillingness to be a party man and to the more austere
personality he exhibited in public. He was also willing after 1851
to suggest that the intellectual can never permanently affect the
course of history in the theatre of action.35 This later interpretation
is a tempting one, but it leaves unresolved why this should be so in
every case. The danger here is allowing one's sympathy with
Tocqueville to suggest that he was above his time, beyond its
spiritual compass.
There is in fact in Tocqueville's writing, outside of the Democracy,
almost a lacuna with regard to the broader problems of legislative
practice. He had, it is true, certain fixed ideas such as a realistic
appreciation that this activity involved immersion in petty and
unspectacular detail, and a strong distaste for a unicameral legis-
lature. His consideration of the problems of representative govern-
ment does not, however, match the attention given to these matters
by the political thinkers of the Restoration.
The historian conscious of Tocqueville's now classical stature
as a great moralist is tempted to subscribe to Tocqueville's belief
that the spiritual and moral direction of any government more
decisively determines its achievements than does the specific struc-
ture and content of its laws. Another task is to measure the effective-
ness and strategic pertinence of this emphasis in the critical historical
situations in whch Tocqueville participated. In the opening session
of the Chamber of Deputies in January of 1848, while the tension
34 Tocqueville, Correspondence and Conversations, II, 207.
35 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, Beaumont ed., IX, 117-119. "Dis-
cours a La Seance Publique Annuelle (3 Avril, 1852) de L'Academie des
Sciences Morales et Politiques."
12 EDWARD T. GARGAN
leading to the insurrection of February was mounting, Tocqueville
considered it has greatest responsibility to exhort his colleagues and
the government in the highest moral tones. And even after that
Revolution became a reality, he clung to the belief that his moral
appeal was what the situation most demanded. His appeal was
indeed impressive as Tocqueville concluded:
Legislative changes are called for. I am very ready to believe that
these changes are not only useful but necessary; thus I believe in the useful-
ness of electoral reform, in the urgency of parliamentary reform; but I
am not so senseless, gentlemen, as not to know that it is not laws them-
selves which determine the destinies of peoples ; no, it is not the mechanism
of laws that produces the greatest events of this world; it is the very spirit
of government. Keep the laws, if you wish, although I think you would
be very wrong to keep them; keep even the men, if that pleases you: for
my part, I make no objection to this. But in God's name, change the
spirit of government, for, I repeat, this present spirit will lead you to
the abyss.36
It is possible to surmise that those who heard Tocqueville's mov-
ing words were touched. It is also possible to surmise that those
who had heard Tocqueville give a similar address six years earlier,
and had listened to his expressions of the same sentiment many
times in the intervening years, were at a loss to know from his
remarks how they might act, in the pressing hours that remained, to
halt a Revolution.37 Without lessening the worth of Tocqueville's
preoccupation with the moral climate of politics, the historian may
find here a partial explanation for the fact that in Tocqueville's
entire political commentary it is virtually impossible to find ten
men in public life whom he could respect. This conscious superior-
ity helps to explain not only Tocqueville's limited career, but also
is of some assistance in explaining why one of the greatest interpreters
of the modern age could have only a qualified impact on his
contemporaries.
Yet Tocqueville's consuming passion to help found the new age
could have been counted on to bring him past the normal irritation
which men of rare talent experience when dealing with lesser
men. His failure to achieve an impressive political success lies not
so much in his lack of skill in the art of politics but rather in his
attitude toward the commanding social problems of his age. The
author of the Democracy could be expected to endorse the movements
36 Ibid., IX, 535, "Discours Prononce a la Chambre des Desputes."
37 For Tocqueville's earlier discourse in which he admitted that he
gave a kind of "sermon" cf. ibid., IX, 374-388.
1 f
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 13
for political reform proposed during the life of the July Monarchy.
Similarly, under the pressure of events creating the Second Republic,
he supported, though with reservations, the introduction of such
measures as universal suffrage. Tocqueville was not, by the time
of the Republic, unique in this posture, and it could earn him no
great rewards. He chose, however, during the Republic to adopt
an attitude towards the extension of the social obligations of the
state which did mark him out. He became one of the bitterest
and most vigorous critics of the proposal to interpret the Revolution
of 1848 as involving a great social reform to be initiated and im-
plemented by the Republic.
Here it is well known that Tocqueville took this attitude because
of his conviction that socialism was inherently totalitarian.38 Dur-
ing the Republic he therefore contributed in no small measure to
a division between moderate Republicans and Social Democrats
which made possible the victory of Louis Napoleon over the Republic
itself. This event forever terminated Tocqueville's political pros-
pects. At critical moments during this struggle Tocqueville was
aware of the implications of this division, and yet he could not in
conscience act otherwise.
The evolution by Tocqueville of a stern, inflexible critique of
socialism is a problem which invites major historical attention. Such
an analysis will involve delineating Tocqueville's precise knowledge
of the socialist theories of his age. It will also require attention to
the moment of Tocqueville's development when he began to fix his
view on socialism as the phenomenon most to be dreaded in his
struggle against the Leviathan. This decision is closely related in
the structure of Tocqueville's thought to his study of the French
Revolution. In 1842, when reviewing a book dealing with a system
of parole and assistance for those released from prison, Tocqueville
sharply challenged the author's suggestion that the State would be
the best agency to administer such a service.39 On the contrary,
he insisted, Charity ought ever to retain its "independent aspect. . . .
even in its capriciousness."40 Moving then to the heart of his
criticism, he asked if the author did not make too much of the
misery of the poor classes. Had not the Revolution of '89, he
queried, made a great contribution to this question. The Revolution
38 Edward Gargan, Alexis de Tocqueville: The Critical Years 18^8-1851,
Washington, 1955, 121.
39 Tocqueville, Oeuvres Completes, Beaumont, ed., IX, 52-54. "Dis-
cours Fair a L'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, le 4 Juin, 1842."
40 Ibid., 58.
yf'
14 EDWARD T. GARGAN
had equalized the tax burden, destroyed privileges favoring the
concentration of wealth in single hands, and multiplied "infinitely"
the chances which enabled one to move from poverty to a "com-
fortable position, even to being rich."41
Tocqueville was to qualify this praise of the social accomplish-
ment of the Revolution by admitting that all problems were not
solved. There is, however, in his writing on this question a prefer-
ence for seeing the alleviation of want as a provisional matter
approachable through charity of the benevolent type. This is
consistent despite assertions which would indicate a broader view.42
His inner position is nowhere better indicated than in discussion
in 1851 with Nassau William Senior on the poor laws of England.
After hearing Senior's views, Tocqueville declared:
There is one point, however, on which I have not been able to make up
my mind. It is the great question as to the right to relief, whether we
should or should not say as a matter of law nobody shall starve. If we
give this right, we must, of course, make this relief disagreeable; we must
separate families, make the workhouse a prison, and our charity repulsive.43
On the social question central to the history of the Second Republic,
Tocqueville was thus compelled to occupy the position of a devas-
tating critic rather than that of the architect of positive plans.
An additional reason for this response to socialism is also to
be found in another of his basic views concerning the Revolution.
He was convinced that the breakup of the Old Regime was possible
because its aristocracy had decisively sponsored the philosophes
in creating a climate directed at their own destruction. Tocqueville,
determined not to imitate the conduct and folly of Enlightenment
thinkers, refused to support the revolution of his time. From the
viewpoint of this historical analogy, his fierce critique of socialism,
his unwillingness to be its Montesquieu, offer a considerable ex-
planation for the failure of socialism in the nineteenth century.
VI
The coup d'etat of December 2 was an unhappy fulfillment of
Tocqueville's constant anxiety over the life expectancy of the Second
Republic. Louis Napoleon's success now confirmed Tocqueville's
old fear, that of the two currents issuing out of the French Re vo-
ir Ibid., 59.
42 Ibid., VI, 151, Tocqueville to Mrs. Grote, July 24, 1850.
43 Tocqueville, Correspondence and Conversations, I, 204-205.
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 15
lution, the one directed towards a freer society and the other aimed
at creating a new despotism, the darker forces should prevail.
Tocqueville was now forced into the political retirement that
made possible his return to historical study and writing. Anticipat-
ing the defeat of the Republic, Tocqueville had already in 1849
begun to re-examine his conception of the continuing Great Revo-
lution, and to search for the confidence necessary to write its
history. He found that trust in part by a practical assessment of
his own political accomplishments, concluding that his experience
as a man of affairs had prepared him in a unique manner to
understand history as one who had shared in its making. He
further recovered his sense of dedication to the scholar's vocation
by celebrating the idea that when the ultimate play of history is
done, the role of the majestic and original thinker far surpasses
the place of those who merely "speak the speech" and "saw the
air" on history's stage.44
The noble discipline which Tocqueville brought to the task of
writing his history is reflected in a beautiful letter he wrote in
response to a plea for encouragement from his old friend Gustave
de Beaumont, whose public career, like Tocqueville's, was ended
on December 2. Beaumont had written in March of 1852 describ-
ing his efforts to work. Each morning he arose early, went to his
desk, picked up his pen, and arranged his writing materials, only
to find that his depressive reaction to the political events of the
hour paralyzed his intellect and his will to work.45 Tocqueville,
who was now getting well into his subject, nevertheless hastened
to assure Beaumont that he too was not unaffected by their situation.
He wrote:
Every day I spend three or four hours in the library on the rue de Richelieu.
Despite all this effort to distract myself, I am ceaselessly aware of a
bitter sadness which overcomes me, and if I let myself be surprised by it,
I am lost for the rest of the day. The life which I am leading would seem
to be very pleasant, but the sight of my country, which I glimpse above
my books, breaks my heart.46
As the months went on, Tocqueville gained increasing insight into
44 Gargan, Alexis de Tocqueville, 180-195, 235-237.
45 Y.T. Mss D. II, "Paquet No. 11 5th Cahier, 41, Beaumont to Tocque-
ville, March 9, 1852.
46 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, Beaumont ed., VI, 85., Tocque-
ville to Beaumont, May 1, 1852.
16 EDWARD T. GARGAN
his grand problem, whereas Beaumont continued to send pitiful
letters of admiration and envy.47
Unlike Beaumont, Tocqueville was able to continue and com-
plete his masterpiece on the Old Regime, and to penetrate pro-
foundly the development of the Revolution, because he regained
in studying the scene something of the optimism toward the destiny
of France and Europe which he had nearly surrendered in the last
moments of his political career. That optimism is the more re-
markable because Tocqueville brought to his study of the Revolu-
tion a sharpened and concrete political sense more conducive to
skepticism than faith. The events of 1848 march unseen on
every page of his history. His exciting analysis of the struggle
between the Parliaments and the King, for example, in which he
presents the Parliaments as unwittingly preparing their own demise,
is an almost exact replica of his reflections on the role of the
Opposition to Louis Philippe's Government in blindly inviting
the Revolution of 1848.48 Again, Tocqueville's attention to the
moment when the Revolution ceased being a single harmonious pas-
sion directed against the old order and became a class struggle is
also to be traced to his earlier examination of the class struggle
which was intrinsic to the history of the Second Republic.49
In the process of constructing his history of the French Revolu-
tion, Tocqueville never surrendered his right to cast a glance for-
ward at the folly and even cowardice of his own generation. He
was encouraged to do this by the redeeming experience of his dis-
covery that perhaps never in the history of humanity had mankind
such pride in itself and in its destiny as in the moment when it
approached and commenced that Revolution of 1789.50 Tocqueville
found here the commitment beyond self for which he had searched
all his life. This discovery brought a tranquility to Tocque-
ville's life which he had never experienced. Writing of his work
some months before VAnc'ten Regime was published, Tocqueville
described his day to Gobineau in a manner echoing Machiavelli's
description of his own habits during the composition of the Prince:
47 Y.T. Mss D. II, 49, (Beaumont to Tocqueville, April 24, 1852), 54,
Beaumont to Tocqueville, June 25, 1852.
48 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 53-78. L'Ancien
Regime Fragments et Notes Inedites; Tocqueville, Souvenirs, ed. Luc Mon-
nier, Paris, 1942, 135.
49 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 71-72; Tocque-
ville, Souvenirs, 135.
SOME PROBLEMS IN TOCQUEVILLE SCHOLARSHIP 17
I spend the morning in my study where I work seriously, the afternoon in
the fields where I watch over work of another kind. . . . The time passes
with prodigious rapidity; I have never had it pass for me in a more agree-
able manner. It is foolish not to know well the art of living when life
is so advanced.50
Tocqueville's happiness in his work and in his evocation of the
spirit of the Revolution in turn enabled him a year before his life
ended to reject and condemn Gobineau's prediction of the inevitable
decline of the West.52 The study of Tocqueville's historical thought
which remains to be done must have as its keystone Tocqueville's
reply to Gobineau. For that reply, with its impassioned affirma-
tion in the ability of democratic societies to be free, was written
at the moment when Tocqueville was approaching in his history
the despotic center of the Revolution. Given this faith, one may,
like Beaumont, envy the historian who will provide us with a full
portrait of Tocqueville as historian.
In summary, there is great need of a "definitive" biography of
Tocqueville.53 That biography should reflect the spirit character-
istic of Tocqueville when he confessed to a friend: "My dominant
feeling . . . when I find myself in the presence of another human
being no matter how humble his position, is that of the original
equality of the species, and from then on I am concerned less perhaps
to please or to serve him than to not offend his dignity."54
50 Tocqueville, Oeuvres completes, Mayer ed., II, pt. 2, 23, 131-134.
51 Tocqueville, Correspondence entre A. de Tocqueville et Arthur de
Gobineau, 1843-1859, ed. L. S. Schemann, Paris, 1909, 49, Tocqueville
to Gobineau, November 13, 1855.
52 Ibid., 305-309, Tocqueville to Gobineau, January 14, 1857, 311-314,
Tocqueville to Gobineau, January 24, 1857.
53 The biography of Tocqueville by J. P. Mayer, Alexis de Tocqueville,
New York, 1940, is an important work. It is not, however, a definitive
biography.
54 Louis de Lomenie, "Publicistes modernes de la France. Alexis de
Tocqueville," Revue des deux Mondes, XXI, 1859, 402-428.
J
Appendix
Books ana Articles on Tocqueville since 1935
1933
Charles, J. E., "Monsieur de Tocqueville," Opinion, V (Septem-
ber, 1935), 687-695.
Chinard, Gilbert, "Alexis de Tocqueville," French Review, IX
(December, 1935), 101-110.
Laski, Harold J., "Alexis de Tocqueville and Democracy," in
Fossey John Hearnshaw (ed.) The Social and Political
Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian
Age. London: Harrap, 1935.
Leroy, Maxime, "Alexis de Tocqueville," Politica, I (No. 4,
August, 1935), 393-424.
Pierson, George Wilson, "On the Centenary of Tocqueville's
Democracy in America,'' The Yale University Library
Gazette, X (October, 1935), 33-38.
Roz, Firmin, "Cent ans apres. A. de Tocqueville et 'La Demo-
cratic en Amerique,' " Revue des deux Mondes, XXVIII
(July, 1935), 152-167.
Salomon, Albert, "Tocqueville, Moralist and Sociologist," Social
Research II (November, 1935), 405-427.
Schumann, M., "Pages anthologiques: le centenaire de la
'Democratic en Amerique,' " Nouvelles Litteraires, XIII
(October 12, 1935), 3.
1936
Chevrillon, Andre, Fortunat Strowski and Firmin Roz, Alexis
de Tocqueville et les Etats-Unis. Paris: Editions France-
Amerique, 1936.
Pierson, George Wilson, "Alexis de Tocqueville in New
Orleans, January 1-3, 1832," Franco-American Review
I (June, 1936), 25-42.
Schieffer, Theodor, "Ein Denker wider seine Zeit: Alexis de
Tocqueville," Hochland, XXXIII (1936), 305-318.
Simon, G. A., Les Clarel a I'epoque de la conquete d'Angleterre
et leur descendance dans la famille CI ere I de Tocqueville.
Caen: Societe d'Imprimerie de Basse-Normandie, 1936.
18
APPENDIX 19
1937
Bradley, Phillips, "A Century of Democracy in America,"
Journal of Adult Education, IX, II (January, 1937), 19-24.
Lingelbach, William E., "American Democracy and European
Interpreters," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography, XLI (January, 1937), 1-25.
Roeder, Elvire von, "Zur Gengenwartsbedetutung der politischen
Shriften von Alexis de Tocqueville," Neupbilogische
Alonatsschrift (Leipzig), Zeilschrift fur das Studium der
Angelsachsischen und Romanischen Kulturen, VIII (Janu-
ary, 1937), 47-48.
Saunier, R., "Le pays de Alexis de Tocqueville," Revue Politique
et Litteraire (Revue Bleue), LXXV (July 3, 1947), 459-
460.
Stoke, H. W., "De Tocqueville's Appraisal of Democracy — Then
and Now," South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXVI (January,
1937), 14-22.
1938
Josephson, Matthew, "A Century after Tocqueville," Virginia
Quarterly Review, XIV (Autumn, 1938), 579-595.
Ohaus, Werner, Volk und Volker im Urteil von Alexis de
Tocqueville. Berlin: E. Ebering, 1938.
Pierson, George Wilson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America.
New York. Oxford, 1938.
1939
Chichiarelli, Ezio, "Note sul pensiero politico francese del
secolo XIX; Alexis de Tocqueville," Annali di Scienze
Politiche, XII (December, 1939), 1-76.
"Democracy Which Way?," Historical Bulletin, XVIII (May,
1940), 80.
Salomon, Albert, "Tocqueville's Philosophy of Freedom (A
Trend Towards Concrete Sociology)," Revieiv of Politics,
I (October, 1939), 400-431.
1940
Mayer, Jacob Peter, Alexis de Tocqueville: A Biographical
Essay in Political Science, translated by M. M. Bozman
and C. Hahn, New York: Viking, 1940.
1941
Chichiarello, Ezio, Alexis de Tocqueville, Saggio Critico. Bari:
G. Laterza e Figli, 1941.
20 APPENDIX
1942
Angell, Robert C, "Tocqueville's Sociological Theory," Soci-
ology and Social Research, XXVI (March-April, 1942),
323-333.
Chinard, Gilbert, "Alexis de Tocqueville et le Capitaine Basil
Hall; un episode des relations Anglo-Franco- Americaines,"
Bulletin de I'Institut Francais de Washington, No. 15,
(December, 1942), 9-18.
Fernandez, Ramon, "Tocqueville," La Nouvelle Revue Francaise,
LVII (December, 1942), 724-734.
Schapiro, J. Salwyn, "Alexis de Tocqueville, Pioneer of Demo-
cratic Liberalism in France," Political Science Quarterly,
LVII (December, 1942), 545-563-
Smith, Louis, "Alexis de Tocqueville and Public Administra-
tion," Public Administration Review, II (Summer, 1942),
221-239.
Smith, T. V., "Hindsight on de Tocqueville's Foresight," The
Universities Review, IX (Autumn, 1942), 19-26.
Wilson, Francis G., "Tocqueville's Conception of the Elite,"
The Review of Politics, IV (July, 1942), 271-286.
1943
Chinard, Gilbert, ed., Sainte Beuve, Thomas Jefferson et
Tocqueville. Princeton: Princeton University Press and the
Institut Francais de Washington, 1943.
Schalk, Fritz, "Tocqueville's Erinnerungen," Romanische For-
schungen, LVII (1943), 275-289.
Tavernier, Rene, "Souvenirs, par Alexis de Tocqueville," Con-
fluences III (February, 1943), 220-221.
1944
Bray, Rene, "Tocqueville et Charles Monnard, contribution a
l'etude des sources allemandes de 'L'Ancien Regime et
la Revolution,' " in Lausanne Universite de Faculte des
Lettres, Melanges d'histoire et de litterature offerts a
Monsieur Charles Gilliard. Lausanne: F. Rouge, 1944.
1945
Bradley, Phillips, Introduction to Tocqueville, Democracy in
America. 2 vols. New York: Knopf, 1945, I, viii-c.
Copans, Simon J., "Tocqueville's Later Years: A Reaffirmation
of Faith," "The Romanic Review, XXXVI (April, 1945),
113-121.
APPENDIX 21
"Democracy: Time for a Change?" Newsweek, XXV (April
16, 1945), 93-94.
Guerard, Albert, "Tocqueville on Democracy," New Republic,
CXII (April 30, 1945), 594-595.
Legrand, J., "De Tocqueville and the 'Gentleman,' " Notes
and Queries, CLXXXIX (December 29, 1945), 278.
Mayer, Jacob Peter, "Alexis de Tocqueville," Times Literary
Supplement, (June 16, 1945), 283.
Neuclares, F. Carmona, "El viaje de Alexis de Tocqueville a
America del Norte en 1830," Revista de las Indias, LXXV
(October, 1946), 557-575.
"Remarkable Foresight of the Frenchman de Tocqueville,"
Christian Science Monitor Magazine, (April 21, 1945), 13.
A Symposium of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America.
("Burke Society Series," No. I), ed., William J. Schlaerth,
S.J. New York: Fordham University Press, 1945.
1946
Caboara, Lorenzo, Tocqueville (Democrazia e Liberta nel
Pensiero de Alexis de Tocqueville). Milan: Hoepli, 1946.
"Design of Providence," Time, XLVII (August 5, 1946), 28.
Lewis, Wyndham, "De Tocqueville and Democracy," Sewanee
Review, LIV (October, 1946), 557-575.
Marshall, Margaret, "Notes by the Way: (Alexis de Tocque-
ville's Discussion of Cultural Matters)," Nation, CLXII
(February 2, 1946), 170-172.
Read, Herbert, "De Tocqueville on Art in America," Adelphi,
XXIII (October-December, 1946), 9-13.
Wach, Joachim, "The Role of Religion in the Social Philosophy
of Alexis de Tocqueville," Journal of the History of Ideas,
VII (January, 1946), 74-90.
Wright, Benjamin F., "American Government and Politics of
Democracy in America," The American Political Science
Review, XL (February, 1946), 52-61.
1947
Gargan, Edward T., "On de Tocqueville's Democracy ; Reply
to W. Lewis," Sewanee Revieiv, LV (April, 1947), suppl.
6-7.
Tolles, Fredrick B., "Tocqueville on American Destiny," Chris-
tian Century, LXIV (December 3, 1947), 1480-1481.
22 APPENDIX
1948
Gerratana, Valentino, "Tocqueville nel '48," Societd, IV (Janu-
ary-February, 1948), 181-195.
Gorla, Gino, Comment o a Tocqueville: L'Idea dei Diritti,
Milan: Giuffre 1948.
Hollis, Christopher, "Property and Revolt: A Discussion of
Proudhon and Tocqueville," Tablet, CXCII (October 23,
1948), 263-264.
Menczer, Bela, "An Earlier Attempt at a Western Union (Re-
view of: "The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville),"
Month, CLXXXVI (December, 1948), 300-308.
Wasser, Henry, "Alexis de Tocqueville and America," South
Atlantic Quarterly, XLVII (July, 1948), 352-360.
1949
Cabrera Marcia, Mario, La idea Political de Alexis de Tocque-
ville, Mexico, 1949.
Correal, Sebastien, "Reapparition de Tocqueville," Mercure de
France, CCCVI (June, 1949), 366-368.
Schmitt, Carl, "Historiographia in nuce: A. de Tocqueville,"
Revista de Estudios Politicos, XXLIII (January, 1949),
603-606.
1950
Bergstrasser, Ludwig, "Alexis de Tocqueville, Kritiker und
Verteidiger der Demokratie," Monat, II (1950), 608-620.
Callier, Camille, Lettres du Colonel Collier: Rome et les Etats
Pontificaux sous l' Occupation Etrangere, ed. A. B. Duff
and M. Degros, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950.
Leroy, Maxime, Histoire des Idees Social es en Prance; Vol. II
De Babeuf a Tocqueville. Paris: Gallimard, 1950.
Pouthas, Charles, "Un observateur de Tocqueville a. Rome
pendant les premiers mois de l'occupation francaise (July-
October, 1849)," Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento,
XXXVII (1950), 417-430.
Schmitt, Carl, "Existentielle Geschichtsschreibung: Alexis de
Tocqueville," Universitas, V (1950), 1175-1178.
Taylor, Alan John Percival, From Napoleon To Stalin: Com-
ments on European History. London: Hamish Hamilton,
1950.
APPENDIX 23
Virtanen, Reino, "Tocqueville and William Ellery Channing,"
American Literature, XXII (March, 1950), 21-28.
— "Tocqueville on a Democratic Literature," French Review,
XXIII (January, 1950), 214-222.
1951
Beloff, Max, "Tocqueville and the Americans," Fortnightly,
CLXXVI (September, 1951), 573-579.
Collins, Henry "Marx and de Tocqueville; Reply to A. J. P.
Taylor," New Statesman and Nation, XLII (September
22,1951), 312.
Hawgood, John A., "Friedrich von Roenne, A German Tocque-
ville, and his Reports from the United States in 1848
and 1849," University of Birmingham Historical Journal,
III (1951), 79-94.
Marker, Johannes, "Alexis de Tocqueville und Deutschland,"
Deutsche Rundschau, LXXXVII (October, 1951), 887-
893.
Rougier, Louis, La lecon de Tocqueville," Nouvelle Revue de
I'Economie Contemporaine, XII (July, 1951), 35-39-
Schoeps, Hans Joachim, "Realistische Geschictsprophetien un
1850 (Behandelt Donoso-Cortes, Alexis de Tocqueville,
und Bruno Bauer)," Zeitschrift fur Religions-und Geistes-
geschichte, III (1951), 97-107.
Taylor, Alan John Percival, "Books in General (Aesthetic
Pleasure from the Play of Ideas: Tocqueville)," Neiv
Statesman and Nation, XLII (September 8, 1951) , 257-258.
Zemmach, Ada, "Alexis de Tocqueville on England," The Re-
view of Politics, XIII (July, 1951), 329-343.
1952
Gojat, Georges, "Les corps intermedials et la decentralisation
dans l'oeuvre de Tocqueville," in R. Pellaux ed., Liberal-
isme, Traditionalisme, Decentralisation, Cahiers de la Fon-
dation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Paris: Colin, 1952.
Leroy, Maxime, "Tocqueville est-il actual?," Preuves, II (June,
1952), 72-74.
Pergolesi, Ferruccio, "Alexis de Tocqueville e Fattualtia. della
sua storiografia politica," Rivista di studi politici inter-
nazionali, XIX (April, 1952), 107-148.
Philo, Gordon, "Alexis de Tocqueville, the Prophetic Histor-
ian," History Today, II (November, 1952), 770-777.
24 APPENDIX
1933
Barth, Niklas, Die Idee der Freibeit und der Demokratie bei
Alexis de Tocqueville. Aarau: Keller, 1953.
Dehove, Gerard, "La sociologie politique de Tocqueville dans
L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution' et sa contribution a
l'intelligence des systemes economiques," Cabiers de
l' Association 'Internationale des Etudes Francaises, Nos.
3-5 (July, 1953), 127-142.
Jacoby, Henry, "Thomas Hobbes und Tocqueville," Zeitschrift
jiir die gesamte Staatswissenscbaft, OX (1953), 718-725.
Kirk, Russell, "The Prescience of Tocqueville," University of
Toronto Quarterly, XXII (July, 1953), 342-353.
Stackelberg, Jiirgen von, "Bemerkungen 2ur Sekundarliteratur
liber Alexis de Tocqueville," Romanistisches Jabrbucb, VI
(1953-1954), 183-190.
Mayer, Jacob Peter, "Tocqueville as a Political Sociologist,"
Political Studies, I (June, 1953), 132-142.
1934
Alpatov, M. A., "Les Idees politiques d'Alexis de Tocqueville,"
in Questions d'Histoire II. Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle
Critique, 1954, first published as "Politeiceskie vzgljady i
istoriceskaja teorija A. Tokvilja," Izvestija Akademii nauk.
S.S.S.R. Seriiaistoriiifilosofii, VI (fasc. 4, 1949) 336-355.
Brodersen, Arvid, "Themes in the Interpretation of America
by Prominent Visitors from Abroad," Annals of the Amer-
ican Academy of Political and Social Science," CCVC
(September, 1954), 22-26.
Burckhardt, Carl J., "Alexis de Tocqueville," Merkur, VIII
(December, 1954), 901-912.
Frescaroli, Antonio, "Rileggendo Tocqueville," Vita e Pensiero,
XXXVII (May, 1954), 269-276.
Martel, Andre, "Tocqueville et les problemes coloniaux de
la Monarchic de Juillet," Revue d'Histoire Economique
et Sociale, XXXII (April, 1954), 367-388.
Pierson, George Wilson, "The Manuscript of Tocqueville's De
la democratic en Amerique," The Yale University Library
Gazette, XXIX (January, 1954), 115-125 (postscript 178).
Spring, Elsbeth, "Tocquevilles Stellung zur Februarrevolution,"
Scbweizer Beitrage zur Allge?neinen Geschicbte, XII
(1954), 50-98.
APPENDIX 25
Taylor, Alan John Percival, "Die Masse als Schreckgespenst:
Zur Neuauflage von Tocqueville's 'Democratic en Amer-
ique,'" Monat, VI (January, 1954), 60-68.
Weiller, Jean, "Alexis de Tocqueville. De la Democratic en
Amerique," Revue d'Histoire Economique et Sociale,
XXXII (January, 1954), 214-216.
1955
Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, Four Studies in French Romantic His-
torical Writing. ("The Johns Hopkins University Studies
in Historical and Political Science," Series LXXI, No. 2.)
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.
Fabian, Bernhard, "Die sogenannte definitive Ausgabe von
Tocqueville's Democratie en Amerique," Archiv fur Kul-
turgescbichte, XXXVII (H. 3, 1955), 358-363.
Gargan, Edward T., Alexis de Tocqueville: The Critical Years
1848-1851. Washington: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1955.
Goldstein, Doris Silk, Church and Society: A Study of the Reli-
gious Outlook of Alexis de Tocqueville. Dissertation,
Bryn Mawr College, 1955.
Heroux, Maurice, "De Tocqueville, Prophet of Democracy,"
Cidture, XVI (December, 1955), 363-374 and XVII
(March, 1956), 10-24.
Lefebvre, Georges, "A Propos de Tocqueville," Annates His-
toriques de la Revolution Francaise, XXVII (October-
December, 1955), 313-323.
Mayer, Jacob Peter, "Tocqueville Prophet de l'Etat moderne"
Critique, XII (September-October, 1955), 883-892.
Uhde-Bernays, Hermann, "Tocqueville anlasslich seines 150.
Geburtstages," Deutsche Rundschau, LXXXI (1955),
715-727.
1956
Barth, Hans, "Alexis de Tocqueville und das 20 Jahrhundert,"
Civitas, Monatsschrift des Schweizeriscben Studentenvereins
XII (1956), 3-11.
Kessel, Eberhard, "Das Tocqueville-Problem: Eine Auseinander-
setzung mit der neuesten Literateur," Jahrbuch fiir Amerika-
studien, I (1956), 168-176.
26 APPENDIX
Mueller, Iris, John Stuart Mill and French Thought. Urbana:
University of Illinois, 1956.
Utzinger, Ernst, "Der Prophet des Massenzeitalters und die
Gemeinde freiheit: Alexis de Tocqueville," Schweizer
Monatshefte, XXXVI (1956-1957), 376-379.
1937
Andreas, Willy, "Jubilaum eines beriihmten Buches. Tocque-
villes L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution," Zeitschrift fur
Religions-und Geistesgeschichte, IX (1957), 232-245.
Fabian, Bernhard, "Alexis de Tocquevilles 'Souvenirs': Bemer-
kungen aus Anlass der deutschen Erstiibersetzung," Archiv
fur Kulturgeschkhte, XXXIX (1957), 103-111.
Fabian, Bernhard, Alexis de Tocquevilles Amerikabild: Gene-
tische Untersuchungen iiber Zusajnmenhange mit der
zeitgenossischen, insbesondcre der englischen Amerika-
Interpretation. (Beihefte z. Jahrb. £. Amerikastudien, I)
Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1957.
Mayer, Jacob Peter, "Les Voyages de Tocqueville et la Genese
de Sa Sociologie Politique," La Nouvelle Revue Francaise,
V (February, 1957), 372-384.
Meyers, Marvin, "The Basic Democrat: A Version of Tocque-
ville," Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (March, 1957),
50-70.
Spitz, David, "On Tocqueville and the Tyranny of Public Senti-
ment," Political Science, IX (1957), 3-13. Also in Spitz,
David, Democracy and the Challenge of Power. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 46-57.
Sylvain, Robert, "Relations d' Alexis de Tocqueville avec la
catholiques Americains," La Revue de L'Universite Laval,
XI (February 1, 1957), 471-486.
1958
Mayer, J. P., "Alexis de Tocqueville und Karl Marx," Geist
und Tat, XIII (1958), 16-20.
Mayer, J. P., "Tocqueville's Travel Diaries," Encounter, X
(March, 1958), 54-60.
Edward T. Gargan
Loyola University, Chicago
Business and Currency in the Ohio
Gubernatorial Campaign of 1875
The specie resumption controversy of the reconstruction period
has generally been treated as a battle between a vaguely defined
business-creditor interest centered in the East and a western farmer-
debtor group. In recent historiography the return to specie pay-
ments in January, 1879, has been placed alongside the protective
tariff, railroad land grants, and internal improvement legislation in
the program of a triumphant postwar industrial capitalism.1 His-
torians have often emphasized the moral fervor of the inflation
movement and have portrayed the greenback leaders as idealistic and
inexperienced crusaders for the rights of the small farmer oppressed
by the power of big business.2
In reality western agrarianism is only one thread in the tangled
skein of greenback politics. There is evidence to show that western
businessmen frequently supported soft money policies out of fear
of the deflationary consequences of specie resumption. It is also
clear that greenback politicians on occasion recognized and at-
tempted to exploit this apprehension for political purposes. In one
such instance, moreover — the Ohio gubernatorial campaign of 1875
— the leading greenback politicians were themselves businessmen
who viewed the return to sound money as a threat to their own
vital economic interests.
Local economic conditions played an important role in the 1875
political contest. By the Seventies Ohio had become an important
industrial state, third in the nation in the number of its manufac-
1 See, for example, Howard K. Beale, The Critical Year, New York,
1930, 144-145, 236ff.; Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American
Civilization, Revised Edition, New York, 1944, II, 105-114, 330-333; Matthew
Josephson, The Politicos, New York, 1938, 20, 39, 188-193; Paul Studenski
and Herman Krooss, Financial History of the United States, New York,
1952, 161; Louis M. Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism, New
York, 1947, 386-387. Among these writers only Professor Beale takes
notice of business opposition to resumpton, but he views this as an occasional
aberration, concluding that: "manufacturers generally sought contraction of
the currency along with an increase of tariff rates." See Beale, 278.
2 See, for example, Fred Emory Haynes, Ja.mes Baird Weaver, Iowa
City, 1919, passim; Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America,
1865-1878: A History of American Life, Vol. VIII, New York, 1928, 166-
167; Solon J. Buck, The Agrarian Crusade: The Chronicles of America,
Vol. XLV, New Haven, 1920, 77-98.
27
28 IRWIN UNGER
turing establishments, and fourth in the size of its industrial labor
force and the total value of its manufactures. The state was
especially prominent in heavy industry. In 1872 it was second to
Pennsylvania in steel rail and pig iron production, while in the
census year 1879-80 Ohio blast furnaces employed 8,900 workers
compared with Pennsylvania's 13,000 and New York's third place
of 2,500. In the same census period the state's bituminous coal
production followed closely behind that of second place Illinois.3
But this impressive industrial machine was hard hit by the long
depression that followed the financial collapse of September, 1873.
Railroad construction in the nation reached a trough for the decade
in 1875, and the suppliers of railroad iron in Ohio suffered se-
verely. In the Mahoning Valley of the northeast, the mining areas
of the Hocking Valley, and the manufacturing region adjoining
the Ohio River, industrial activity fell off rapidly after 1873.
Prices for "no. 1 hot-blast charcoal" iron declined almost fifty
per cent in the three years following the panic, and scores of
Ohio furnaces shut down, throwing thousands out of work. In
the mining regions coal lands worth ten million dollars in 1872
had fallen in value to six million by 1877. Cash was so difficult
to procure in the coal districts that miners who remained employed
were often forced to submit to a "truck" or "scrip" system of
wage payment.4
The widespread industrial distress had important political con-
sequences. Greenbackism had swept over Ohio in several waves
in the Sixties,5 but had largely abated in the following decade. The
depression served once more to make inflation politically attractive,
and on the eve of the 1875 gubernatorial campaign it was revived
as a political issue by a faction within the Ohio Democracy.
The leaders of this group were largely new to the Democratic
party. Recent converts from the ranks of pre-war Whiggery in
a number of instances,6 they had not, in one editor's colorful phrase,
3 See the Railroad Gazette, VII (October 2, 1875), 408; and United
States Bureau of the Census, Tenth Census, 1880; Census of Manufacturers,
passim.
4 Rendigs Fels, "American Business Cycles, 1865-1879," American
Economic Review, XLI, No. 3 (June, 1951), 347-348; Ohio Secretary of
State, Annual Report for 1875, 35; Chicago Daily Tribune, October 14, 1875;
Ohio Bureau of Labor Statistics, First Annual Report for 1877, 116-117.
5 Reginald C. McGrane, "Ohio in the Greenback Movement," Mississ ppi
Valley Historical Review, XI, No. 4 (March, 1925), 526-531; Clifford H.
Moore, "Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896," Ohio Archeological and
Historical Publications, XXXVII (1928), 244-266.
6 See the Cincinnati Commercial, July 2, 1875.
CURRENCY IN OHIO GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875 29
"been Democrats long enough to let the dirt accumulate under
their nails."7 Men like Thomas Ewing, Jr., Samuel F. Gary, and
Robert Schilling, complained Congressman Michael Kerr, were
"not democrats at all, in any just sense."8 Ambitious for leader-
ship, the newcomers hoped to use inflation to seize political power.
A successful greenback platform would consolidate their hold on
the party in Ohio and would, perhaps, enable them to dictate the
Democratic presidential nomination in 1876. If the money issue
proved a vote-getter in the fall canvass, the Cincinnati Commercial
warned conservative Democrats, the inflationists would "occupy
and possess" the Democratic political organization. The next step
would see "the worse elements . . . loosed," and the 1876 national
campaign would be fought on the currency issue.9
Business considerations also drove the inflationists. Ewing
was deeply involved in mining and railroad promotion. During
the early Seventies the former Union general and his brothers,
Charles and Hugh, had invested heavily in railroad stock and central
Ohio coal and iron properties.10 Later in the decade the Ewings
expanded their interests to include the manufacture of railroad
iron and speculation in western silver lands.11 The panic was a
cruel blow to the Ewing fortunes and for the remainder of the
decade, General Ewing, hoping to realize something for the family
properties, fought every attempt to restore the specie standard. He
particularly detested the Republican sponsored Resumption Act of
1875, believing that "if that infernal law were repealed or
amended" the family "coal and iron lands would sell at once."12
Cary too, was a promoter of western mining lands, and during the
campaign was accused of fraud in connection with his Colorado
silver speculations.13 The leaders of the Ohio Democracy, the
7 This was the description of the Democratic Cleveland Herald, also
quoted in Clifford Moore, "Ohio in National Politics," loc. cit., 295-296, n. 19.
8 Kerr to Manton Marble, Manitou Springs, Colorado, September 1,
1875, in the Marble MSS., Library of Congress.
9 Cincinnati Commercial, July 15, 1875. For similar views see also the
Cleveland Leader, October 7, 1875. During the campaign the Cincinnati
Enquirer, chief organ of the inflationist Democracy, as if to confirm Repub-
lican charges, spoke with anticipation of an inflationist Democratic ticket
against Grant in 1876. See the Enquirer, September 9, 1875.
!0 Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Hugh Ewing, Lancaster, O., July 29, 1871
and November 17, 1871, in the Ewing Family MSS., Library of Congress.
11 Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Charles Ewing, Columbus, O., July 14, 1873,
ibid.; and William Thomas Hutchinson, Cyrus Hall McCormick, New York,
1935, II, 195.
12 Thomas Ewing, Jr., to Charles Ewing, Lancaster, August 13, 1877,
Ewing Family MSS.
13 Cincinnati Commercial, June 17, 1875.
30 IRWIN UNGER
Cincinnati Commercial could charge with considerable justice,
"want flush times to gamble in, knowing the wreck must come,
but confident of their ability to save themselves."14
At the June Democratic convention in Columbus the resolutions
committee had proven subservient to Ewing and his followers, and
over the protest of the Cleveland Democracy,15 accepted an infla-
tionist platform. Ewing had apparently been aided by an under-
standing with Governor William Allen, an old time Jacksonian
sound money man who now had presidential ambitions.16 When
the platform was reported to the convention it carried the Governor's
endorsement and was adopted without an open floor fight.17
Immediately after, Allen was renominated and Cary was given
second place on the ticket.
The financial plank of the Democratic platform attacked the
most vulnerable spot in the Republican record, the 1875 Resumption
Act. This measure, which provided for redeeming the wartime
greenbacks in gold on January 1, 1879, had been "railroaded"
through the Forty-third Congress by the Republican caucus.18 Its
passage had been shortly followed by a sharp currency contraction
which had produced widespread alarm among businessmen.19 This
Republican legislation, the Democratic platform charged, had "al-
ready brought disaster to the business of the country," and now
threatened it with total "bankruptcy and ruin." The contraction
14 Ibid., October 1, 1875.
15 The Cuyahoga County Democratic Convention had, on June 12,
adopted a sound money financial plank. Chicago Daily Tribune, June
13, 1875.
16 Reginald C. McGrane, William Allen, A Study in Western Democracy,
Columbus, Ohio, 1925, 219, 250ff.
17 New York Daily Tribune, June 21, 1875. The religious question
just raised by the Republicans at their state convention was probably
an important factor in conservative Democratic acquiesence in the soft
money plank. This issue stemmed from the previous legislative session
when John J. Geghan, an Irish Democratic member of the lower house,
introduced a measure authorizing Catholic chaplains at state hospitals and
penal institutions. This measure, passed by the Democratic controlled
General Assembly reputedly under Catholic pressure, had done much to
stir up the latent nativism of a large segment of the electorate. The Repub-
licans clearly intended to make "no Popery" an important part of their
campaign, a fact that did much to reconcile sound money Democrats to the
Ewing financial plank. See Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes and His
America, New York, 1954, 272-273, for details of this issue.
18 Concocted in the Republican Senatorial caucus largely to avoid a
party breach over the currency issue the bill was passed by a strict party
vote. In the House, for example, the majority was composed of 134
Republicans to 2 Democrats. Congressional Record, 43 Congress, 2 session,
318-319
19 Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency, 187 U, viii;
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, XX, No. 522 (June 26, 1375), G04.
CURRENCY IN OHIO GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875 31
policy must be abandoned, and, in a clause which clearly opened
the door to unlimited monetary expansion, the platform demanded
that the volume of the national currency be adjusted "to the wants
of trade."20
The gubernatorial campaign which followed the conventions21
attracted nationwide attention. The Chicago Tribune observed that
not since the Lincoln-Douglas Senatorial contest in Illinois had the
American public been so interested in a local political canvass.22
Neither Allen nor Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes was
deemed worthy of such attention, but the public had accepted the
Ohio inflationists at their own estimate. If the greenback won in
Ohio, the conservative New York financial weekly, the Financier,
announced, there was a strong likelihood that the inflationists
would carry the Democratic national convention in 1876.23 The
results, moreover, would have an important bearing upon the
nation's financial future. "Give the inflationists success in Ohio
on the 12th of next month," declared one newspaper, "and the
inflation feeling will be overwhelming in the next House of
Representatives. " 2 4
Despite this latter prospect the Republicans at first tried to
ignore the money issue. National chairman John Binney advised
the party leaders in Ohio as late as September that it would be
"unwise to make the currency issue a prominent part of the can-
vass." Prudence demanded that it be kept an "open question on
which Democrats and Republicans are divided in opinion."25
Local Republicans, including candidate Hayes, sought at first to
avoid taking a stand on the Resumption Act.26
However, evasion became increasingly difficult. While the
Republicans waved the rather worn bloody shirt, the Democrats
were rapidly making the financial question the leading issue of the
campaign. Day after day Democratic speakers played on the
20 The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events
of the Year 1875, New York, 1877, 606-607.
21 The Republican state convention had convened in Columbus just
a few days before the Democrats.
22 Chicago Daily Tribune, September 6, 1875.
23 The Financier, VII (September 25, 1875), 212-213. See also the
Terre Haute Express, quoted in Forrest William Clonts, "The Political
Campaign of 1875 in Ohio," Ohio Archeological and Historical Quarterly,
XXXI (1922), 40.
24 Cincinnati Commercial, September 13, 1875.
25 Binney to E. W. Keyes, quoted in Horace Samuel Merrill, The
Bourbon Democracy of the Middle West, 1865-1896, Baton Rouge, 1953, 107.
26 See John Quincy Smith to John Sherman, Oakland, O., October 8,
1875, in the Sherman MSS., Library of Congress.
32 IRWIN UNGER
anxieties of businessmen and laborers caught in the worst economic
slump in two decades. The Republican Resumption Act would
mean "general and inevitable bankruptcy and ruin," asserted Ewing.
"The threat of forced resumption . . . had paralyzed all enterprise,
and checked all adventures," former Senator George Pendleton
claimed.27 "The mines are not worked . . . manufactures have
ceased to run, laborers are out of employment, rents have fallen
one third." Total industrial stagnation would be the inevitable
consequence of the Republican resumption policy.28
Out in the hustings, in the industrial towns of Ironton, Shawnee,
Lancaster, Galion, Upper Sandusky, Circleville, Wilmington and
Tiffin, Ewing told of "shrinking values, reduced manufactures and
trade, . . . suffering among laborers, and bankruptcy among pro-
ducing and trading capitalists." — The Republican contraction had
destroyed business and "the cry of want was going up from every
industrial center in the land."29 At Wilmington he pleaded elo-
quently for the young capitalism of the Mississippi Valley. What
manufacturer, he asked, could withstand the jolt of the sixty per
cent contraction promised by the Resumption Act? Business could
not be conducted without borrowed money, especially in the newer
western areas, what businessman could borrow "when he knows
that in addition to the interest he pays, seventeen per cent, has to
be added for the difference between greenbacks now and gold on
the first of January 1879?" It was the older men in the East who
were lenders of money accumulated over a long business career.
The young energetic businessmen who combined the money of the
"non-producer" with their skill and talents for the production of
goods would be the ones to suffer by the contraction.30
It was soon evident that the Democratic line of argument was
being favorably received in the industrial regions. George W.
Morgan of the inflationist Cincinnati Enquirer observed:
A great revolution is going on in . . . the manufacturing and mining dis-
tricts. . . . Businessmen, generally, are awakening to the fact that the real
issue is between dead capital on the one side, and active capital and labor
on the other. Our platform is therefore freed from unmeaning phrases,
27 Speeches of Governor William Allen, . . . George H. Pendleton, . . .
A. G. Thurman, . . . Thomas Eiving, . . . Samuel F. Cary, . . . Before the
Democratic Ratification Meeting ... June 17, 1875, Columbus, 1S75, 6-10.
28 Ibid., 6.
29 Speech of Gen. Thomas Ewing Delivered at Ironton . . . , 4-10.
30 Joint Discussion Between Gen. Thomas Ewing of Ohio and Gov.
Stewart I. Woodford of New York on the Finance Question, 9.
CURRENCY IN OHIO GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875 33
and the consequence is that thousands of businessmen are uniting with us
on business grounds.
Henry Blanding of Zanesville, one of the leading ironmasters of
southeastern Ohio, Morgan reported, was canvassing the state for
Allen. The Blanding brothers had always been Republican, and
their defection would "bring with them a powerful following of
men who think as they do."31 In Mahoning County, "leading
Republicans engaged in the iron business," Judge Rufus P. Ranney
predicted, would "pronounce in favor" of the Democrats.32 By
mid-September Cary too was prophesying large Democratic gains
among workers and capitalists in the coal and iron districts.33
The Republicans knew that Ewing and Cary were not alone
among Ohio businessmen in fearing "forced" resumption. The
depression and falling prices made easy money appealing to many
Ohio industrialists and the Hayes leaders had evidence that they
would have a difficult fight to hold the mill owners to their tradi-
tional party affiliations. The Republican Congress that passed
the Resumption Act, one Ohio manufacturer wrote to Congressman
James A. Garfield, "piled another mountain of distress" on top of
that produced by the panic. His firm's losses in the previous two
years, this Cleveland businessman asserted, had "been not less than
50,000$ annually in bad debts and from depreciation in selling
power of our products" as a consequence of the measure. Only the
bankers, he complained, had profited from the rapid "shrinkage
of values" of the last few years.34 In the East the papers were
reporting that the Democrats would win the vote of "manufacturers
and businessmen who had incurred risks, had notes to pay, and
look[ed] to inflation as their only hope to unload."35
The Republicans were deeply disturbed by the prospective loss
of the business vote. By late June Hayes was conceding in a
letter to Senator John Sherman that the tariff and the national
finances would be "controlling subjects" in industrial Ohio.36
Soon after, Hayes wrote apprehensively of an impending visit of
Republican inflationist William "Pig Iron" Kelley to Ironton in
31 Morgan to Samuel J. Randall, Mt. Vernon, O., August 19, 1875, in
the Randall MSS., University of Pennsylvania Library.
32 Reported in George W. Morgan to William Allen, Cleveland, 0.,
July 4, 1875, William Allen MSS., Library of Congress.
33 New York Daily Tribune, September 14, 1875.
34 W. C. Andrews to Garfield, Cleveland, O., October 4, 1875, Garfield
MSS., Library of Congress.
35 Neiv York Daily Tribune, September 13, 1875.
36 Hayes to Sherman, Fremont, O., June 29, 1875, the Sherman MSS.
34 IRWIN UNGER
the southern industrial region.37 "Doubtless there are localities
where our position on the currency will be damaging," but on the
whole, he asserted with more determination than real conviction,
the Republican endorsement of sound money must help. "At any
rate," he concluded lamely, "we are right."38
Paralyzed at first by the effective Democratic assault, the Repub-
licans soon rallied and set about reinvigorating their campaign.
By late summer the implications for national politics and the
national finances of a Democratic victory had become abundantly
clear, and from outside the state Republican stalwarts and sound
money Independents alike hurried to enter the Ohio battle. "The
whole power of the Administration was used against us," wrote
Congressman Milton I. Southard. Never before, he later recalled,
had there been "such a determined effort" to defeat the Democracy
in a local election.39 Senator George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts,
a former Secretary of the Treasury, came to Ohio and threw his
financial prestige behind the Republican platform.40 Massachu-
setts' junior Senator, Henry L. Dawes, Senator John Ingalls of
Kansas, and Congressman Eugene Hale of Maine stumped the
state for the sound money cause.41 "The Republicans," Ewing
reported in mid-September, were "spending money freely" to sup-
port this "great effort."42 Carl Schurz was dragged back from a
European visit by the entreaties of Charles Francis Adams, Jr.,
Murat Halstead, and other former Liberal-Republicans who knew
Schurz's power to charm the voters among his fellow German-Amer-
icans and his influence with the educated independent voter.43 Ohio
37 Although a Republican, Kelley favored an easy money policy. At
this point his motives were partly personal since he had important iron
investments in Ohio which had been hard hit by the slump. More important,
however, Kelley had for years been the chief spokesman in Congress of
the Pennsylvania ironmasters who, like their Ohio counterparts, were
fearful of "forced" resumption. For Kelley's Ohio investments see Ohio
Secretary of State, Annual Report for 1875, 431. For the currency atti-
tudes of the Pennsylvania iron interests see my unpublished Columbia
University doctoral dissertation, "Men, Money, and Politics: the Specie
Resumption Issue, 1865-1879," passim.
38 Hayes to John Sherman, Fremont, 0., July 5, 1875, the Shei-man MSS.
39 Southard to Samuel J. Randall, Zanesville, O., November 15, 1875,
the Randall MSS.
40 Neiv York Daily Tribune, September 18, 1875.
41 Ibid., October 6, 1875.
42 Ewing to Samuel J. Randall, Lancaster, O., September 14, 1875,
the Randall MSS.
43 George Hoadly to Carl Schurz, Cincinnati, September 24, 1875, in
the Schurz MSS., at the Library of Congress. See also Frederic Bancroft,
(ed.), Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz,
New York, 1913, III, 157-1G1.
CURRENCY IN OHIO GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875 35
Republicans rapidly took heart and for the first time prepared to
face the currency issue squarely. By early September Hayes, former
Governor Edward Noyes, Sherman, Garfield, and Thomas Young,
nominee for Lieutenant Governor, were on the stump striking out
boldly against the "rag baby."44
Until a month before election day, however, Democratic vic-
tory still appeared certain. In late September Washington observers
were predicting that nothing could stop the Allen forces.45 But
Democratic prospects faded as the contest entered its last weeks
and the supreme Republican effort began to tell. In Cincinnati,
on September 27, Schurz made his first campaign address to a
crowd that overflowed Turner Hall.46 In quick succession he made
six more scheduled speeches, both in English and German, to large
and enthusiastic audiences.47 Republican mass meetings in various
parts of the state became increasingly exuberant as election day
approached. One at Warren in the Reserve was attended by some
twenty- five thousand Ohioans who listened to speeches by Noyes,
Garfield and Senator Ben Wade; applauded the fifteen brass bands
that blared patriotic music; goggled at maneuvering artillery and
fire companies; and marched in procession carrying banners in-
scribed "In Hayes we Trust, In Allen we Bust," and "Allen and
Cary, Not a Vote Nary." The rally was, a visiting Chicago reporter
wrote, one of the most colossal affairs in the political history of
the state.48
The rest of the Republican battery of campaigners, both the
imported and domestic varieties, were out in force in the weeks
before the October election date.49 The campaign entered a new
phase as the Republicans sought to awaken middle class fears of
anarchy and confiscation. "Inflation means the repudiation of all
debts public and private, the utter destruction of credit, and a long
lapse toward barbarism," pronounced Murat Halstead's Cincinnati
Commercial^ "A vote for the Democratic ticket is encourage-
44 New York Daily Tribune, September 4, 1875; ibid., October 6, 1875;
Chicago Daily Tribune, September 6, 1875.
45 See the manuscript diary of James A. Garfield, entry for Septem-
ber 22, 1875, in the Garfield MSS.
46 The full speech was reported in the Chicago Daily Tribune of
September 28, 1875.
47 Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, New York, 1908,
III, 362-363; Chicago Daily Tribune, October 5, 1875; and the Neiv York
Times, October 1, 1875.
48 Chicago Daily Tribune, September 24, 1875.
49 See the New York Daily Tribune, October 6, 1875.
50 Cincinnati Commercial, September 12, 1875.
36 IRWIN UNGER
ment ... to communist revolution," the Cincinnati Gazette shouted.51
Every man with a home mortgage who voted for Allen and inflation
was, it was asserted, voting for foreclosure of that mortgage.52
The inflationists were inciting class war. Cary's speeches were
"calculated to do the greatest possible mischief in stirring up strife
between what he is pleased to call 'classes' of the people."53 The
Democratic campaign reminded the Gazette of the period of the
French Revolution "when such men as Cary, Ewing, Pendleton, and
Kelley rose to the surface . . . appealing to the masses against prop-
erty and capital."54 The Hayes papers made much of Kelley's
"intemperate" address to the mill operators at Ironton. The
Pennsylvania Congressman, resented the more for his Republican
affiliations, was accused of wishing "to set up a division of classes,
to divide the laboring class from the rest, and to persuade the
workingmen that their interests were hostile to the rest."55 The
Commercial in its issue of August 9 featured a four-column Nast
cartoon depicting Kelley releasing a "rag baby" jack-in-the-box
as he brandished a "bullionist heart" on a spear, while above and
around his head was inscribed "Vive la Guillotine," "Tremble
Tyrants," "the Sans Culottes are coming," and "more greenbacks
or death."56
The Republicans skillfully played upon all the social prejudices
that permeated late nineteenth century mid-western America. The
Democrats and their platform were disreputable, dishonest, and
immoral. Cary was taken to task by the Republican press for
"dirty harangues," in one of which, it was alleged, he had charged
the daughters of "rich men" with "curvature of morals,"57 In an
address at Marion in August Hayes asserted that "overtrading and
fast living" always accompanied the sort of currency scheme
cooked up by the Democracy.58 The Democrats, Schurz told his
Cincinnati audience, were attempting to force the state of Ohio
to endorse a financial policy "which, if followed by the National
Government . . . would make our political and business life more
than ever a hot-bed of gambling and corruption, and plunge the
country into all those depths of moral . . . bankruptcy and ruin , . .
51 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, October 12, 1875.
52 Cleveland Leader, October 5, 1875.
53 Cincinnati Commercial, August 4, 1875.
54 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, August 4, 1875.
55 Ibid., September 7, 1875.
56 Cincinnati Commercial, August 9, 1875.
57 Ibid., August 8, 1875.
58 Cincinnati Daily Gazette, August 2, 1875.
CURRENCY IN OHIO GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875 37
which never fails to follow a course so utterly demented in its
wickedness." To entrust to any government the power to increase
or decrease the national currency at will, as the inflationists in-
tended, would have disastrous consequences. "The private fortune
of every citizen is placed at the mercy of the government's arbitrary
pleasure" by such a course. No business venture would be safe,
no contract secure: only speculators and promoters would gain.
"The rings would thrive and honest men would pay the cost."59
By the last days of the campaign the political prospects had
drastically altered, and by early October the Democrats had begun
to lose confidence.60 And in the end the Republican effort was
successful. First returns on October 13 were indecisive, but by the
16th the victory of Hayes was clearly established. The Republican
margin of victory was narrow, however, with Hayes receiving
297,817 votes to Allen's 292,273. Only five thousand votes sep-
arated the candidates out of a total of almost six hundred thousand
cast.61
The defeated Democrats indulged in much post-election soul-
searching. The Ohio hard money faction believed the defeat a
just punishment for the party's desertion of traditional sound finan-
cial principles, and cursed Allen, Ewing, and the rest of the in-
flationist leaders.62 The inflationists, on the other hand, blamed
the "treachery" of the eastern hard money Democrats. The New
York World, organ of Samuel Tilden and August Belmont, had
attacked Allen violently, and during the campaign had been cir-
culated as a Republican campaign document.63 These "eastern
gentlemen," the Cincinnati Enquirer promised, "will not be for-
gotten. They have built up a good account which will be settled
in good time."64
Doubtless the most important single factor in the defeat was the
successful mobilization of middle-class urban Protestant opinion
against the inflationists. The contest brought out the largest vote
of any election in the state's hisory, 65 and it was Cleveland, Columbus,
and Cincinnati, the centers of "trade and culture," that gave the
59 Chicago Daily Tribune, September 28, 1875.
60 See the New York Daily Tribune, October 6, 1875.
61 Ibid., October 23, 1875.
62 Ibid., October 14, 1875.
63 New York Herald, December 2, 1875, quoting the Cincinnati Enquirer.
December 2, 1875.
64 Enquirer, October 13, 1875.
65 Clonts, "The Political Campaign of 1875 in Ohio," loc cit., 86.
38 IRWIN UNGER
Republicans their majority.66 The Ohio fight, the New York Times
remarked, was "won in the cities, the larger towns, and the populous
intelligent counties where daily newspapers, good schools, and
speakers like Schurz [and] Garfield . . . got in their good work."67
In particular the urbanized and commercial northern tier of the
Western Reserve, a part of the state settled by New Englandcrs
and retaining much of the Yankee ethical approach to political
affairs, turned out in force for Hayes.68 Ashtabula County, "the
most Puritanical part" of Ohio, lamented the Democratic Chicago
Times, carried the Reserve for the Republicans.69
The political puritans had also rallied to the cause of "honest"
finance. The Liberals, the clean government men and independents
who had voted for Horace Greeley in 1872, apparently voted for
Hayes three years later. Carl Schurz, observers were certain, had
succeeded in getting out the old Liberal vote. "If it had not been
for that crout-eating Greeley-ite," wrote one peeved Pennsylvania
Democrat, the state would assuredly have gone for Allen.70 To the
Germans and the independents Schurz had made the campaign into
a crusade for the middle-class virtues, and they responded at the
polls. The margin of victory in Ohio was small, independent Henry
Adams wrote an English friend, "but every man of that five thou-
sand was one of us."71
Nevertheless the inflation platform had not been a total failure.
The soft money slogans were indeed successful in converting hard
times into Democratic votes in the industrial districts. As the dis-
patches reporting the news of Democratic defeat pointed out, the
party had made advances over the 1873 gubernatorial race in the
coal and iron regions. In the manufacturing towns of Steubenville,
Youngstown, Canton, and Wooster substantial gains for Allen were
66 New York Daily Tribune, November 1, 1875.
67 New York Times, October 14, 1875.
68 Cleveland Leader, November 21, 1875.
69 Quoted in ibid., November 26, 1875.
70 J. M. Cooper to Chauncey Black, Harrisburg, Penna., October 21,
1875, in the Jeremiah S. Black MSS. at the Library of Congress.
71 Henry Adams to Charles Milnes Gaskell, Beverly Farms, Mass.,
October 15, 1875, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Letters of Henry Adams,
1858-1891, Boston, 1930, I, 272. It is difficult to find confirmation for
the impressionistic material concerning the independent vote. A compari-
son of county returns for 1872 and 1875 does indicate, however, that in
the two urban centers of Cleveland and Cincinnati large majorities for
Liberal-Republican Greeley in 1872 were converted into large majorities
for Hayes in 1875. In normally Democratic Columbus the Allen majority
was considerably below that of Greeley in 1872. The county returns may
be found in Ohio Secretary of State, Annual Report for 1875.
CURRENCY IN OHIO GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1875 39
scored.72 Pennsylvania Democrats, scanning the Ohio returns for
a forecast of their own state campaign, noted that the inflation
platform had carried the Ohio mining districts.73
It is impossible to determine conclusively from the available data
the voting pattern of the ironmasters and coal operators of Ohio.74
But it is difficult to believe that some of the very real antagonism
to deflation among the state's manufacturers during the fall of 1875
was not transformed into Democratic votes. The voting preferences
of the state's industrial leaders are not, however, as interesting as
the nature of the contending forces in the 1875 canvass. Far from
being spokesmen of agrarian debtors, the Ohio inflationists accepted
the dominant business ethic of the Gilded Age and pitched their
soft money appeal to western industrial aspirations. Nor were the
financial conservatives the minions of industrial capital. In the
1875 contest the sound money forces were compelled to marshal
the respectable commercial and professional middle-class to counter-
act the strong inflationist inclinations of the leaders of Ohio in-
dustry.
Irwin Unger
University of Puerto Rico
Mayaguez
72 New York Daily Tribune, October 13, 1875.
73 J. M. Cooper to Chauncey Black, Harrisburg, Penna., October 21,
1875, in the Black MSS.
74 An analysis of the six leading coal mining counties and the nine
leading iron and steel producing counties of the state does, in fact, reveal
substantial Democratic percentage gains over the previous state contest.
But there is no way of determining the vote of the mine operators or
the ironmasters from this data since their numbers could not have been
great enough to affect the voting percentage substantially.
The Failure of German Propaganda
in the United States, 1914-1917
Since German propaganda was primarily directed toward the
American of German descent, the United States, prior to its entry
into the European conflict, would seem to have been a fertile field
for the operation of an effective propaganda movement. With
the aid of Spencerian sociology and Darwinian biology, the Anglo-
Saxon dogma, then current in the United States, "became the chief
element in American racism in the imperial era."1 Like other
varieties of racism, Anglo-Saxonism was a product of modern nation-
alism and the romantic movement, rather than an outgrowth of
biological science.2 Many Americans readily agreed with James
K. Hosmer, the author of Short History of Anglo-Saxon Freedom,
who believed that the primacy of the world lay with the Anglo-
Saxon race. "English institutions, English speech, and English
thought," said Hosmer, "are to become the main features of the
political, social, and intellectual life of mankind."3 The implications
of the Anglo-Saxon cult gave way to a hostile attitude by native
Americans toward their immigrant population.
While the patterns of American nativism cannot be dealt with
in this paper, it is generally accepted that native Americans greatly
resented what they believed to be the non-Americanization of the
three most important racial groups of nineteenth-century immigra-
tion, namely, the Germans, Italians, and Poles, in that order. This
antagonism hindered the process of assimilation because it weakened
an old bond of understanding, if not of union. Into the world of
American Protestantism millions of non-Protestants were pouring,
unprovided with new ways of life by an American society itself
perplexed and drifting.4 The advocates of immigration restriction
insisted that the immigrant's nationality and special national loyalties
persisted for many generations even when the individual descendents
1 Eichard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, Boston,
1955, 172.
2 Stow Persons ed., Evolutionary Thought in America, New York,
1956, 439.
3 Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 174. For a more elaborate treatment:
of the Anglo-Saxon cult, see Josiah Strong. Our Country: Its Possible
Future and Its Present Co'isis, New York, 1912, 180-222.
4 D. W. Brogan, The American Character, New York, 1944, 102.
40
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 41
of the original immigrants were almost completely assimilated.
This nationality, they declared, was contradictory and inconsistent
with American nationality.5 Writers of the American scene were
quick to point out that the one thing vainly asked for in New York
City "is a distinctly American community."6 As elements of the
so-called "new immigration" streamed into the United States after
the Civil War, the various national groups not only conflicted with
native Americans, but also with each other, causing periodic crises
within the American community.7 The inevitable reaction on the
part of native Americans was the establishment of defense organiza-
tions.
The "nationalist nineties" saw the growth of numerous ad hoc
nativist organizations like The National League for the Protection
of American Institutions, The American Protective Association, and
the Immigration Restriction League. The nation-wide growth of
Anglo-Saxon nativism, whose activities mirrored the history of
popular xenophobia, tended to corrode the traditional American
confidence in assimilation and homogeneity.8 Prewar sentiment,
surrounded by myth and emotionalism, left the American people
psychologically unprepared to achieve national solidarity. The Ger-
man invasion of Belgium strengthened nativist sentiment and opened
wide cleavages along nationalist lines. As Merle Curti has observed,
"Hatred of the enemy across the sea was extended to German-
Americans at home in the name of loyalty to the nation."9 The
use of the German language was forbidden in the pulpits and schools
of Montana. In Iowa, the governor ruled that German could not
be used on street cars, over the telephone, or anywhere else in
public.10 Even before America's entry into the war, there had been
attacks upon things German. After Wilson's decision to intervene,
the cries of hate rose to a crescendo. As two historians have pointed
out, "Names of towns and individuals were changed. The lowly
hamburger became the liberty sandwich, and sauerkraut was called
liberty cabbage. Hymns, symphonies, and operas of German origin
5 Henry Pratt Fairchild, "The Melting-Pot Mistake," in Immigration;
an American dilemma, ed. Benjamin Munn Ziegler, Boston, 1953, 23-25.
6 Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half Lives, New York, 1957, 15.
7 John Tracy Ellis, American Catholicism, Chicago, 1955, 101.
8 John Higham, Strangers in the Land; Patterns of American Nativism,
1860-1925, New Brunswick, N. J., 1955, 183.
9 Merle Curti, The Roots of American Loyalty, New York, 1946, 227.
10 H. C. Peterson and Gilbert C. Fite, Opponents of War, 1917-1918,
Madison, Wisconsin, 1957, 195-196.
42 FELICE A. BONADIO
were looked upon with suspicion. And then, of course, there was
hatred of the German language."11
From press surveys it appears that of 367 American newspapers,
105 favored the Allies and 20 the German cause. The other 242
were neutral. Community sympathies were given as pro-Ally in
189 cases, pro-German in 38, and 140 divided. In both cases, the
Middle West was more favorable toward the German cause than
the East or the South.12 American intervention, itself a product
of political, economic, and cultural forces, showed evidence of the
weight of ethnic loyalties, not least so in the case of President
Wilson himself. Even before 1917, the question of participation
had already aligned factions into respective camps who fought to
determine the course of national policy. As one eminent American
historian has said, "The conflict that ensued brought to the fore
questions of the nature of group loyalties that, until then, had
largely been taken for granted."13 This division of group loyalties
would seem to have insured the success of German propaganda.
But, much to the chagrin of its agents, the American "melting pot"
continued to function despite the division in national loyalty.
Since the atmosphere in the United States "made it impossible to
risk exacerbating public opinion by any acts of sabotage,"14 the
representatives of Germany in the United States did what they
could to organize an information service to present the German
point of view to the American public. A propaganda committee
was formed with the support of a number of German organiza-
tions and of the German language press.15 A German propaganda
mission headed by Dr. Heinrich Albert and Dr. Bernhard Dernburg
arrived in the United States shortly after the outbreak of v/ar,
and the German government opened an information bureau on
Broadway, in New York City. From this office came press releases,
interviews, lectures, movies, and other devices to mold public opinion
in favor of the Central Powers. "German propagandists," says
Carl Wittke, "supported pacifist and antiwar organizations, worked
closely with the Irish, bought the New York Daily Mail, and dis-
tributed news reports favorable to Germany to the American press."16
11 Ibid., 195.
12 William P. Slosson, The Great Crusade and After; 1914-1928, New
York, 1930, 10-11.
13 Oscar Handlin, The American People in the Tiventieth Century,
Cambridge, 1954, 113.
14 Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 36.
15 Ibid., 32-33.
16 Carl Wittke, The German-Language Press in the United States,
Lexington, Ky., 1957, 238.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 43
The columns of the German-American press were opened to
the consuls of the German government stationed in the United
States, "and these officials availed themselves of this vehicle in
order to publish not only official communications to German
citizens, resident in the United States, but also to communicate on
the war."17 Another instrument of German propaganda was the
public lecture platform. Professor Eugen Kiihnemann, an exchange
professor from the University of Breslau who had lectured at Harvard
and Wisconsin, and was still in the United States, "was converted
into public lecturer" whose duty it was to travel all over the coun-
try making public addresses on the causes and issues of the war.18
We must make a distinction here between the German-language
press and propagandist instruments subsidized by the German gov-
ernment solely for the use of propaganda purposes. That the
German-language press and the German element was "pro-German
during the first three years of the war was to be expected, and
during the period of American neutrality, "it was just as legal and
reasonable to be pro-German as it was to be pro-Ally."19 That
many Germans, in their desire to refute slanderous accusations —
especially in view of the tendency to canonize the Allies in the
United States — "occasionally overstepped the bounds of discretion
and common sense is also quite understandable."20
There is also evidence that propagandists from Germany re-
ceived considerable cooperation from the various branches of the
German-American Alliance, a defense organization representing
more than a million and a half members.21 The German-American
Alliance was never really understood in Germany. Absurd com-
ments upon its activities in the German press, and extravagant
claims as to its political power, "managed to do considerable harm
when they found their way (often via London) into the United
States."22 Commenting upon the June 8, 1916 edition of the Chi-
cago Abendpost (which openly admitted the activist tendencies of
the National German-American Alliance) a critic of the Alliance
stated that the propaganda was directed against the prevailing
17 Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, Columbus,
Ohio, 1936, 9.
18 Ibid., 9-10.
19 Carl Wittke, We Who Built America, New York, 1939, 259-260.
20 Ibid., 260. See also Wittke, German-Americans and the World
War, 12.
21 Clifton James Child, The German- Americans in Politics 191A-1917,
Madison, Wisconsin, 1939, 30.
22 Ibid., 177.
44 FELICE A. BONADIO
Anglo-Saxon culture; its mission, according to the Baltimore
Deutsche Correspondent, was that of "preventing the now incipient
Anglicizing of the American people, of seeing that the race of men
issuing from the melting-pot be no Anglo-Saxon, but a purely
American race [Germanoriented, to be sure] having its own history,
its own politics, its own culture, its own philosophy of life, its own
way of thinking and feeling."23 At the beginning of 1915 there
was talk of establishing a daily newspaper in the English language.
However, Charles L. Hexamer, the president of the National
German-American Alliance, had already expressed satisfaction (on
the part of the Alliance) with George Sylvester Viereck's English
weekly, The Fatherland.2* Indeed, Hexamer's position was well
taken, for The Fatherland was probably the most important and
effective instrument for the spread of German propaganda in the
United States.
George Sylvester Viereck was a devoted worker in the German
propaganda movement.25 His English weekly The Fatherland,
"became perhaps the most outspoken German propaganda sheet
in America." As one of the few papers which received financial
aid from the German Government, it built up a large circulation
among the German-American element. Some of the German-
language papers frankly admitted that The Fatherland was sub-
sidized by the German Government and "saw no reason to apologize
for this arrangement."26 A letter from Alexander Konta to Dr.
Bernhard Dernburg in March, 1915, is one of the earliest records
explaining the purpose of this weekly. The weekly, said Konta,
would be "a discreet appeal to every German society in the country
for support by its members." A national daily circulation of
500,000 copies would tremendously impress the man in the street.
"Politically, the transaction would have to be handled with the
utmost delicacy. No suspicion of the influence behind it should
be allowed to reach the public."27 If zeal and devotedness are
any criteria, then Viereck and his Fatherland were more than equal
to the task.
The immediate task of The Fatherland was to explain away
the German invasion of Belgium. Germany's situation in regard
23 Frank Perry Olds," 'Kultur' in American Politics," Atlantic Monthly
(September, 1916), 383-384.
24 Child, German-Americans in Politics, 29.
25 Walter Millis, Road to War, New York, 1935, 207.
26 Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, 23.
27 Slosson, The Great Crusade, 6-7.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 45
to Belgium, said Viereck, was "that of a young giant surrounded
on all sides by an impregnable iron wall and having through the
one side an easy means of escape."28 Before the war there had
already existed, without any cause from the German side, a fanat-
ical hatred in Belgium for the Germans. Belgium had already
been mobilized. Moreover, continued The Fatherland, "the most
unbelievable persecutions of Germans had taken place, women and
children were killed by the most cruel tortures, in a way only
thought possible at the Congo in the darkest of Africa, perhaps,
but never in Europe."29 Today, said the propaganda sheet, we
know the cause of it. An agreement existed between England,
France, and Belgium to attack Germany by way of Belgium.
Hence, Belgium "had to pay for it."30 Indeed, to support this
claim, The Fatherland reported the discovery of important docu-
ments in the archives of the Belgium General Staff, revealing con-
clusively that Belgium was a designing party to a preconcerted
conspiracy to crush Germany. The plan, of English origin, and
sanctioned by Lieutenant-General James Griers, Chief of the British
General Staff, set in motion an expeditionary force of 100,000
men to invade Germany. From these official documents, said
Viereck, "it requires a peculiarly warped mental attitude to gather
the conclusion that Belgium was not hand-in-glove with England
and France in a colossal conspiracy to destroy the German Empire."31
It is highly significant that The Fatherland mitigated this bellig-
erent attitude concerning the Belgium invasion, for it indicates the
difficulty that Viereck had in equating the violation of Belgium's
neutrality with the traditional American abhorrence of militarism
and treaty violation. Germany's position must be understood,
pleaded The Fatherland in 1917. She had always fulfilled her
treaty obligations in the past. Belgium was of supreme military
importance in a war with France; and, if such a war occured, it
would be a matter of life and death. "Germany feared that, if
she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In the face of
this suspicion, there was only one thing to do."32 The invasion
of Belgium, then, was a matter of defense.33 Since Germany's
28 The Fatherland, September 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 8, p. 5.
29 Ibid., September 14, 1914, vol. I, no. 6, p. 2.
30 Ibid., August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 7; December 30, 1914, vol.
I, no. 21, p. 14.
31 Ibid., November 4, 1914, vol. I, no. 13, pp. 10-11.
32 Ibid., January 17, 1917, vol. V, no. 24, p. 395.
33 Hugo Munsterberg, The War and America, New York, 1914, 8-9. See
also The Fatherland, November 29, 1916, vol. V, no. 17, p. 263.
46 FELICE A. BONADIO
neighbors begrudged the prosperity of The Fatherland, which re-
sulted from the development of her agricultural and industrial
resources, "Germany had to spend a vast part of its material and
mental income in a hard preparation for defense."34 As a counter
to the Belgium atrocity stories, The Fatherland told its readers of
1620 murders committed by the Russians in East Prussia simply
from "the bestial lust of blood and torture."35 Such brutality,
continued the weekly, was a decided difference from the "restraint"
which the Germans always exercised.
Despite this attempt to convince non-Germans that the Belgium
invasion was a defensive measure, little or no success was gained in
this direction. It offended American sensibilities in areas of thought.
Progressivism, the prevailing body of social thought in the forma-
tive years of the twentieth century, ran counter to the defensive
theme expressed by German propagandists. As a collection of
loosely connected and not always consistent ideas, progressivism
shared the belief in social legislation, the extension of political
democracy, and the restoration of individual rights.36 Not least
important in the philosophy of progressivism was the belief in a
fundamental moral law. The invasion of neutral Belgium, with
its corollary, the doctrine of a "scrap of paper," violated a sacred
obligation. To deny that contracts are sacred was to deny the
ruling philosophy of America. Moreover, the invasion of Belgium
came at a time when the moral law was being much emphasized
in American social ideas. It had provided the background for the
Progressive crusaders who were seeking to overcome the evils of
capitalism and political corruption. "In such an age, when hope
in a new and better day ran high the invasion of Belgium seemed to
be denial of morality and a reversion toward some new dark age."37
Behind the appeal to the defensive theme stressed by German
propagandists lay the assumption that a nation must make its de-
cisions wholly upon the basis of what it considers to be its best
interests. If a nation's activities cannot be restrained by a moral
law, the nation in fact must be a law unto itself.38 Secondly, the
invasion of Belgium offended, however inconsistent, the traditional
34 Miinsterberg, The War and America, pp. 4-5. See also Hugo
Miinsterberg, The Peace and America, New York, 1915, 181.
35 The Fatherland, August 23, 1916, vol. V, no. 3, p. 36.
36 Merle Curti The Growth of American Thought, 2nd Ed., New
York, 1951, 623.
37 Ralph H. Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought,
New York, 1956, 391-392.
38 Ibid., 391.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 47
American suspicion of militarism and things military. Such a
suspicion was observed as early as the eighteenth century by the
French historian, Alexis de Tocqueville.39 Some indication of
the strength of this anti-militarist feeling may be seen by the diffi-
culty which the "preparedness" movement encountered. The two
chief champions of the movement, in its early stages, General
Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt, won the day only through
skillful leadership, ample financial backing, and the glamour of
parades.40 Evidence exists which shows that Viereck was cogni-
zant of this failure, because he hastily revised the Belgium theme
and redirected it toward the German-American element.
The die is cast, said The Fatherland; the most highly cultured
people of all times are engaged in a death struggle with jealous
and semi-barbaric foes. The death struggle between the Slav and
the Teuton is not merely a struggle for territory or commercial
supremacy as many superficial observers seem to believe, but a
conflict of principles, "a struggle ultimately of the highest ideals
known to the human race against the low and sordid aims of
races merely veneered with culture."41 Europe, then, was not
waging a war against German imperialism, but against German
culture; and it was perfectly plain to The Fatherland that German
culture depended upon her military power. "Were it not for
German militarism, German civilization would long since have
been extirpated. For its protection it arose in a land which for
centuries had been plagued by bands of robbers, as no other land
had been."42 The real causes for the war lay in the fact that
England, "a nation of shop keepers," worshipped the god of
materialism, while Germany steadily adhered to its ancient venera-
tion of the eternal values of life. Consequently, "it should be
the sacred duty of all thinking men to do everything possible to
prevent the crippling or the downfall of the German Empire ... in
the interest of higher civilization ... so that a world catastrophe
may still be prevented."43 The destruction of the German people
39 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Oxford ed., London,
1953, 527.
40 George E. Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Move-
ment, Madison, Wisconsin, 1947, 304-316; John M. Blum, The Republican
Roosevelt, Cambridge, 1954, 155. For contemporary observations on Theo-
dore Roosevelt and "preparedness," see The Autobiography of William
Allen White, New York, 1946, 507.
41 The Fatherland, August 24, 1941, vol. I, no. 3, p. 7.
42 Ibid., November 11, 1914, vol. I, no. 14, p. 4.
43 Ibid., August 31, 1914, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 6-7.
48 FELICE A. BONADIO
would be a return to the Dark Ages — to a civilization that makes
material values end in themselves.
All Europe except Germany has been steadily sinking to a plane of crass
materialism, which has been resisted successfully in the Fatherland by the
vehement warnings of the best of the nation. In the case of England and
France the degeneration has been so thorough-going that certain of their
pseudo statesmen has [sic] betrayed Western culture to the Oriental. Ger-
many may finally succumb, for she stands at bay to a yelling pack determined
on her destruction. . . . Idealistic Germany, conscious of being the standard
bearer of values that might easily be lost forever to civilization, could never
tamely submit to become like, effeminate Italy, merely a Niobe of culture.
Hence, no true friend of culture can view with approval or indifference
the unparalleled crime against civilization involved in this ruthless advance
of the Slav on the Teuton. The only ray of hope in the present emergency
lies in the complete preparation of the powerful German nations for the
struggle.44
The corollary to this defense-of-culture theme was usually a
critical appraisal of American foreign policy, stressing American
intervention in Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. History was
used to equate the American seizure of California and Texas
with the Belgium invasion. "In this respect," said The Fatherland.
"the American eagle differs not a whit from the German eagle."45
The failure, of course, with this phase of German propaganda,
was the fact that it was based upon the cultural forces prevalent
in the older immigration. Until 1850 the German immigrants had
taken the political and economic freedom of the country for
granted.46 To be sure, the early German immigrant had every
intention of retaining Old-World customs and traditions.47 But
after 1850, a new type of German immigrant appeared on the
American scene. The "forty-eighters" came to the United States
after the collapse of the German revolution. They soon became
caught up in the absorbent powers of the new land, and quickly
began to integrate themselves into the realities of American life.
"At no other period did America receive a wave of immigrants
with so much political consciousness and idealism."48 Thus, the
44 Ibid., loc. cit., 7.
45 Ibid., August 30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 59.
46 Marcus Lee Hansen, The Atlantic Migration; 1607-1860, Cam-
bridge, 1951, 148-149.
47 Albert B. Faust, The German Element in the United States, 2 vols,,
New York. 1909, vol. II, 377-475.
48 Dieter Cunz, "The German-Americans: Immigration and Integra-
tion," Twenty-eighth Report of the Society for the History of the Germans
in Maryland, Baltimore, 1953, 33.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 49
new type of immigrant was more interested in social legislation,
prohibition, woman's suffrage, and civil service reform, rather
than directing all his energies to the strengthening of cultural
bonds with the Fatherland.
The most colossal blunder committed by The Fatherland, how-
ever, was the condemnation of British materialism and the conse-
quent exaltation of Germany's adherence to the development of
the "higher life." The naturalized voter might be without funds
or land, he might inhabit a slum tenement, but no matter how
miserable his surroundings he was a capitalist at heart. As the
foremost historian of American immigration has observed, "The
hope that brought him across the Atlantic did not fail him; and
the possession by others of wealth and leisure spurred him on to
secure the same advantages for himself and his children."49 The
German immigrant never questioned the fundamentals of capitalism.
He was a man of enterprise, determined to reap the harvest of a
free economy. In short, he was more anxious to emulate American
capitalists than to preserve the philosophy of Goethe or the music
of Wagner.
Another avenue of attack used by German propagandists was
a skillful exploitation of American colonial history and traditional
anti-British sentiment. The Fatherland was careful to point out
that British propaganda emanated from a "Tory" press. Even
the new edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica was denounced as
"a distorted, insular, incomplete and aggressively British reference
work, the use of which constituted a fatal intellectual danger to
America."50 Charles J. Hexamer, president of the National
German-American Alliance, declared that the American nation
should burn the Declaration of Independence as well as the Consti-
tution. What was needed was, "a new Declaration of Independence
of the American Press against the yoke of international English
news service and against the dictation of England in our editorial
sanctums."51 The readers of The Fatherland were reminded that
they were more completely under the domination of England than
at any time since the Revolution, and practices which led to the
War of 1812 were acquiesced in by the State Department.52 The
Fatherland stressed repeatedly the fact that America had rebelled
49 Marcus Lee Hansen, The Immigrant in American History, Cam
bridge, 1948, 85.
50 Wittke, German- Americans and the World War, 12.
51 The Fatherland, November 11, 1914, vol. I, no. 14, p. 7.
52 Ibid., December 9, 1914, vol. I, no. 18, p. 9.
V
50 FELICE A. BONADIO
against England and not Germany. It was England who had
flirted with the Southern Confederacy and attempted to ignore the
Monroe Doctrine in Venezuela. Even in the Spanish-American
War public opinion in England was bitter against the United
States.53 When England barred the International News Service
and refused the latter both mail and cable facilities for news dis-
patches to America, The Fatherland exploited the American worship
of a free press. This stupidity of the British, it said, "will lead
to a new Declaration of Independence from Great Britain."54 The
most extravagant encomiums, of course, were reserved for the
Revolutionary leaders.
A recurrent theme was that George Washington fought the
same enemy against whom Germany was now fighting — an enemy
who wantonly attacked the United States in 1812 and who looted
and burned the White House. Washington, continued The Father-
land, along with many other patriots of the American Revolution,
like Steuben, Muhlenberg, Herkimer, and Count von Wittgenstein,
fought against the enemy who is Germany's enemy today. "Would
George Washington, would Abraham Lincoln be found on the side
of England against Germany, if they were alive today?" concluded
the weekly.55 The Fatherland further recalled to its readers that
it had been Frederick the Great who had "alone recognized the
United States of America as entitled to a place in the family of
independent nations."56 The speech of James Madison, made in
June of 1812, in which he condemned Great Britain for interfering
with the rights of American commerce and navigation led The
Fatherland to comment that Great Britain was the same in 1916
as she was in 1812. "It is deplorable," continued the article, "that
we do not have more of the Americans with red blood in their
veins like President Madison today."57
The presidential campaign of 1916 was especially fertile for
this exploitation of the Revolutionary War. The real interests
and issues of the campaign had been side-stepped, declared The
Fatherland. How much longer will we permit the British to black-
list our merchants, loot our mails and blockade our commerce with
53 Ibid., October 28, 1914, vol. I, no. 12, p. 8; November 25, 1915,
vol. I, no. 16, p. 11; November 1, 1916, vol. V, no. 13, p. 194; October 25,
1916, vol. V, no. 12, p. 186.
54 Ibid., October 25, 1916, vol. V, no. 12, p. 186.
55 Ibid., December 30, 1914, vol. I, no. 21, p. 11.
56 Ibid., November 4, 1914, vol. I, no. 13, p. 6; August 24, 1914, vol.
I, no. 3, p. 10.
57 Ibid., November 1, 1916, vol. V, no. 13, p. 198.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 51
neutral countries? it asked. But for the struggle of Americans
of German descent to arouse the "spirit of '76," these issues would
seem to have been as "dead as the mummy of Cleopatra." It
was the "Minute Men" of 1916, added The Fatherland, who were
struggling gallantly to uproot the British conspiracy and keep the
real issues in the open.58 Even the British, said the weekly, were
beginning to realize that the opposition of the German-Americans
"with sterling Americans of other stock in whom the spirit of
1776 still survives blasts her last hope of dragging the United
States into the war on the side of the Allies."59 Along with this
latter theme usually went a praise for the famous German-American
politician Carl Schurz and his emphasis on neutrality and avoidance
of European conflicts.60 The irony in this line of attack by the
German propagandists lay in the fact that it appealed to a heritage
in which the first generation had no part, and which was only
dimly apparent to the second. Surely, Americanization was well
under way, even though language and community customs were
slow in disappearing. Clearly, the Revolutionary philosophy and
the "spirit of '76" would appeal to a much later group of immi-
grants' desccndents.
A more vigorous theme used by The Fatherland was the
identification of Wall Street and England with a world-wide con-
spiracy to subvert American ideals. The war, said Viereck, bene-
fited no one except England and Wall Street.61 The attack usually
centered on J. P. Morgan,62 Elihu Root, and George H. Putnam.
"Let it be remembered," said The Fatherland, "that Root and his
Allies are seeking to carry out the terms of the secret treaty between
this country and England. . . . Root and his Confederates are trying
to deliver the United States bound hand in foot into the keeping of
England."63 For The Fatherland, the conspiracy motif could serve
both in domestic and international politics which happened to
be unfavorable to the course advocated by Viereck. Thus, New
York City was described as a scene of a terrific war between
58 Ibid., November 8, 1916, vol. V, no. 14, p. 218; August 30, 1916,
vol. V, no. 4, p. 58.
59 Ibid., October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, pp. 170-171.
60 Ibid., September 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 8, p. 118; October 18, 1916,
vol. V, no. 11, p. 170.
61 Ibid., February 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 26.
62 Ibid., August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 6.
63 Ibid., December 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 21, p. 329; August 30, 1916,
vol. V, no. 4, p. 53; August 16, 1916, vol. V, no. 2, p. 21; March 7, 1917,
vol. VI, no. 5, p. 73; February 14, 1917, vol. VI no. 2, p. 26.
52 FELICE A. BONADIO
capital and labor. The Wall Street banking group was portrayed
as seeking to crush unionism as it sought to involve the United
States into war with Germany.04 When Woodrow Wilson broke
off diplomatic relations with Germany, Viereck urged his readers
"who refuse to participate in the desperate conspiracy hatched in
London" to write to the President and urge neutrality.65 A German
should never forget, explained The Fatherland, that the United
States was ruled from London.60
Again, it is apparent that German propaganda had failed to
advance with the growth of American political thought. The
conspiracy theme had been much used by the agrarian Populists of
the 1890's, many of whom actually believed in a vast conspiracy
of a financial group operating between London and Wall Street.67
But by 1914, the philosophy of Populism was moribund. The ad-
vent of Wilson's "New Freedom" meant the rooting out of all
evil within finance capitalism — hence, Wilson's trust busting. For
the German propagandists to have centered their artillery on such
a rechauffe of past agrarian contentions as an international economic
"conspiracy" betokened their vast ignorance of the fact the Pro-
gressivism had done much to re-establish free enterprise.68
An even more difficult obstacle for German propaganda to
overcome was the common American belief that Germany's political
system was undemocratic. The Fatherland attempted to obviate
this ideological stumbling block by attacking not only the two
American political parties,0 9but by criticizing the theoretical founda-
tions of the American political system as well. America's political
system was called "the worst and clumsiest system in the world."70
On the other hand, said Viereck, the war had realtered the internal
life of Germany, as expressed in her political parties. The Con-
servative, Liberal, and Social Democratic parties were described as
being in a state of evolution, ushering in progressive forces, so that
when peace returned, "a liberal reconstruction of national life"
was anticipated for a new democratic, and free Germany.71 What
64 Ibid., September 20, 1916, vol. V, no. 7, p. 102.
65 Ibid., February 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 19; September 27, 1916,
vol. V, no. 8, p. 122.
66 Ibid., August 31, 1914, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 4-5.
67 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, New York, 1955, 73-74.
68 Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 1910—
1917, New York, 1954, chap. IX, passim.
69 The Fatherland, March 14, 1917, vol. VI, no. 6, p. 83.
70 Ibid., December 13, 1916, vol. V, no. 19, p. 298.
71 Ibid., April 25, 1917, vol. VI, no. 12, pp. 196-197.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 53
was the secret of Germany's progress? asked The Fatherland. The
answer, instinctively known to every true German, was simply that
in the Fatherland the will of the people was instantly ascertained
and put into action by a single, responsible government. The United
States, continued Viereck, had already experimented with the same
governmental principle without realizing that it was the very prin-
ciple making for German progress. This system, continued The
Fatherland, had no name, but could be called a "polyocracy." Be-
cause of its complexity, this system was imperfectly understood even
by the German people. Thus, according to The Fatherland, the
German Empire was not a monarchy but a confederation. The
Kaiser was nothing more than "a psychological emperor, and not
a real emperor."72 In reality, the German Empire was a Republic,
with its real power located in the will of the people as represented
by the Bundesrat. The Kaiser actually had very little power.
This misapprehension of his real position is the source of much error in
judging Germany's relations to the country. Bismarck, too, looms much
larger in America than he does in Germany, while the Bundesrat, the true
power of the empire, is only known as a legislative term.73
The secret, then, of German progress was to be found in the powers
of the Bundesrat, in which were united the executive, legislative,
and judicial functions. The American government could benefit
if it too would establish a Bundesrat. Such a system was vastly
superior to the American system because the will of the people was
always carried out. "In short, the Bundesrat system may be termed
a polyocracy, or a government of the many. Essentially, it is an
aristocracy on good behavior, an aristocracy holding its job at the
pleasure of a democracy."74
This attempt to dispel the charges of an undemocratic govern-
ment characterized by the autocratic will of the Kaiser had little
effect on the German-Americans. There were various causes for
Old-World emigration, and, certainly, the political factor cannot
be denied. But the freedom sought by the immigrant was primarily
economic freedom. The aspiration of the rank and file of immi-
grants was to take advantage of the opportunities of free enterprise
and, in turn, to preserve the fruits of such an economic system.
Hence, the political system they found in America (which operated
so as to ensure the continuance of the economic system) was the
72 Ibid., January 13, 1915, vol. I, no. 23, pp. 6-9.
73 Ibid., loc. cit., 9.
74 Ibid., January 20, 1915, vol. I, no. 25, pp. 8-9.
54 FELICE A. BONADIO
one they wished to embrace. As a result, the weight of immigrant
political influence had been felt on the side of conservatism. They
had little desire to level down the gradations of society. Usually,
they were democrats, but only in the sense that "they believed that
the American brand of government would facilitate the acquisition
of property and position and would protect them in what they had
acquired."75 Thus, the immigrant was quite satisfied with the
American political system as he found it and had little desire to
change its form.
Various other devices were used by The Fatherland to further
the German cause. Germany was pointed to as a great humanitarian
state, and the work of Dr. Rudoff Veretow in pathology was used
again and again to exemplify Germany's altruism.76 Germany was
portrayed as the champion of humanity, a champion who believed
in the "ethical justification of a sacred war."77 To a religious
nation, The Fatherland declared that next to the United States "the
Church in Germany has made the greatest progress in modern
times."78 When an explosion destroyed an estimated $7,000,000 worth
of munitions in New York Harbor, The Fatherland was disposed to
see "the Hand of God" in the affair. It was significant, said the
weekly, that the force of the explosion shattered every window in
the bombproof office of J. P. Morgan. Nor was it without impor-
tance that the schrapnel from the explosion "severely shook the
Statue of Liberty to its very foundations."79 In defense of the Ger-
man submarine attacks on American commerce, The Fatherland
revealed that the English had employed Americans to sail on
English vessels for $27.50 a month.80 Moreover, The Fatherland
recalled, during the War of 1812 the British "hand-sank" American
shipping, disregarding international law.81 Finally, the German sub-
marine was pictured as actually helping American commerce, for it
was destroying English commercial supremacy. Thus, the German
U-boat was likened to the Southern parasite, "in that slowly and
inexorably it has consumed the strength of Britain's economic
fabric."82 However, the most important of all propaganda efforts
75 Hansen, The Immigrant in American History, 80-82.
76 The Fatherland, August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 6-7; September
6, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 67.
77 Ibid., September 23, 1914, vol. I, no. 7, p. 14.
78 Ibid., November 25, 1914, vol. I, no. 16, p. 8.
79 Ibid., August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 10.
80 Ibid., November 8, 1916, vol. V, no. 14, p. 216.
81 Ibid., September 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 71.
82 Ibid., September 13, 1916, vol. V, no. 5, p. 83. See also August
30, 1916, vol. V, no. 4, p. 51, and August 9, 1916, vol. V, no. 1, p. 9.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 55
was that of furthering the cleavage between the immigrant groups
and native Americans.83
The German- American, said The Fatherland, looked upon Ger-
many as his mother and America as his bride. Consequently, he was
as proud of his mother as he was of his bride. "His attitude toward
his bride is not determined by the demands of his mother. "S4 German
propaganda thus concentrated on exploiting the cultural ties between
the German- American and his forefathers in the Old World. "I
can assure you," said The Fatherland, "that the German cause can
be greatly assisted in other countries, especially in America, if one
always proudly acknowledges one's German sentiments, supports
the German ideal of culture, and especially promotes the preserva-
tion of the German language."85
On his trip abroad in 1916, Louis Viereck, the staff corre-
spondent, commented on the similarity between Austrians in Europe
and the Germans in America. Even the region of the Danube
reminded him of the Mississippi basin. His argument seemed to
be that, after all, the Germans in Europe and America were members
of the same race, and had preserved their language and national
traits. Moreover, in addition to the common language and customs,
the Lutheran church bound the German-Americans to their mother
country. "As good Hungarian citizens, as the Saxons undoubtedly
are, they will never let any one rob them of their traditional German
traits, as well as German customs to be found all over the world."86
The implications of this propaganda are obvious. Like the "good
Hungarian citizens," the German-American should not have aban-
doned his nationality, let alone his customs and language.
The duty of the German- American was elaborated by the National
German-American Alliance at the Washington conference of Jan-
uary 30, 1915. It was said that evidently it was "the mission of
the German-Americans to bring their adopted country, misled and
misrepresented by its newspapers, back to authentic Americanism."87
Consequently, the duty of the German-American was to make him-
self a factor in the United States.88 German-American sympathizers
were encouraged to organize and to send speakers to every city and
town. Local German societies were advised to rent theaters and
83 von Papen, Memoirs, 35.
84 The Fatherland, October 18, 1916, vol. V, no. 11, p. 164.
S5 Ibid., November 18, 1914, vol. I, no. 15, pp. 11-12.
86 Ibid., December 6, 1916, vol. V, no. 18, pp. 277-278.
87 Ibid., February 10, 1915, vol. II, no. 1, pp. 10-11; December 2,
1914, vol. I, no. 17, p. 5.
88 Ibid., November 18, 1914, vol. I, no. 15, p. 14.
56 FELICE A. BONADIO
hire speakers to "counteract the influence of the English press."
The American people should be "educated" to the true causes and
meaning of the war. "Organize," warned The Fatherland, "before
it is too late."89 Pamphlets should be circulated for distribution.
Singlehanded, little could be accomplished, said The Fatherland;
but, by uniting local associations the sympathizers of Germany could
exercise the balance of power and bring the American people to
their senses.90 The national consciousness of the Germans in the
United States, said The Fatherland, was one of the most significant
results of the war. The latest sign was the founding of the German
Glee Club at Cornell University. This Glee Club, said the weekly,
"has now become the nucleus of an intense German spirit," and it
urged the movement to spread to other universities.91 The Father-
land, however, was more interested in the immigrant groups.
For the benefit of the Irish immigrants, The Fatherland declared
that Germany would not give up Belgium until England relinquished
Ireland.92 Germany's chief aim in the war was the freedom of the
seas, and this freedom depended on the deliberation of Ireland. The
Fatherland, continued the weekly, did not discover the plight of
Ireland until 1913; consequently, she could not come to an under-
standing with England until the fate of Ireland was settled. If
the Irish Revolution should ever break out again, Germany would
not only recognize Ireland's independence but would also send
money and men. But, more important, the Irish struggle was of
special significance to the German-Americans because "if Germany
were crushed, the hopes of Ireland would be crushed likewise."
If Ireland remained in fetters, our hopes for Germany would be blighted.
We are one with the Irish. The Irish are one with us. . . . The Fatherland
and its readers feel that the cause of the Central Powers and the cause of
Irish freedom are one.93
Even the Jewish element was not ignored. The Fatherland
reminded its Jewish readers that the Russian Czar had taken justice,
law, and property away from his Jewish population. On the other
hand, in Germany, the Jew had been accorded every privilege and
right offered to Christians. One thing was certain, said The Father-
land, and that was that "the Jews throughout the world are a unit
89 Ibid., September 23, 1914, vol. I, no. 7, p. 10.
90 Ibid., January 27, 1915, vol. I, no. 25, p. 3; November 25, 1914,
vol. I, no. 16, p. 9.
91 Ibid., December 16, 1914, vol. I, no. 19, p. 7.
92 Ibid., December 27, 1916, vol. V, no. 21, pp. 346-347.
93 Ibid., October 4, 1914, vol. V, no. 9, P. 138; August 16, 1916,
vol. V, no. 2, p. 26.
FAILURE OF GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE U. S., 1914-1917 57
in their opposition to Russia."94 The Fatherland hoped, therefore,
that by appealing to the ethnic loyalties of the Irish and the Jews
it could create a unified pressure group within the United States,
unfavorable to the Allied cause.
The futility of this attempt to solidify the immigrant elements
in the United States lay, of course, in the belief held by the German
propagandists that the German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants were
similar to "the good citizens" of German descent in Hungary.
Despite, however, the antagonism between the immigrants and a
certain element of native Americans, the "melting pot" continued to
function. The American offspring of the older generation turned
their once powerful group-consciousness into more nationalistic chan-
nels. The sons of the immigrants had no memory of Old-World
places, causes, or of village solidarity. The old affiliations of the
German, Irish, and Jewish immigrants had no meaning for this
second generation, save as a kind of patriotism. Gradually, tra-
ditional customs were lost; the lines in the immigrant press concern-
ing village life slowly faded, then disappeared completely, replaced
by news of the immigrant's new home. Parents found it more con-
venient to send their children to public schools. The immigrant
theatre also vanished from the American scene, irretrievably sup-
planted by the new (and national) medium of the motion picture.
Thus, in these, and in numerous other ways the immigrants were
adjusting to the American environment as the American environment
was, in turn, growing accustomed to their presence. This assimila-
tive process which the immigrants experienced has been well
analyzed by Oscar Handlin:
The old coat disintegrates. Its rugged homespun had come along; its solid
virtues had taken the strain of the full way since the old tailor had put his
labored stitches into it. The new is one of many, indistinguishable from
the rest. Cheaper, it transforms the wearer; coming out the factory gate
he is now also one of many, indistinguishable from the rest.95
Thus, the ultimate failure of German propaganda was the failure
to recognize the influence of the American "melting pot" and its
ability to assimilate the one into many.
Felice A. Bonadio
Graduate School
Yale University
94 Ibid., August 24, 1914, vol. I, no. 3, p. 14; September 6, 1914, vol. I,
no. 5, p. 3; September 14, 1914, vol. I, no. 6, p. 11.
95 Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted, New York, 1951, 196-197.
Book Reviews
Gabriel Richard, Frontier Ambassador. By Frank B. Woodford and Albert
Hyma. Detroit (Wayne State University Press), 1958. Pp. xxviii,
160. Illustrated. $4.50.
This work of two distinguished scholars is certainly refreshing among
the biographies of American clerics. In fact the reviewer would like to
nominate it for a Pulitzer Prize. Professors Woodford and Hyma summoned
their highest gifts to produce a model of the art of historiography. The
assembling and marshalling of materials matches a writer craftsmanship
of high quality. In the approach, and preceptivity of judgment both as to
episode and to overall location of the subject, a discerning reader will dis-
cover both a story of moment and an ornament to the most demanding
library. Striking are the pains taken for exactness, sharp delineation,
absolute fairness, and full appreciation of genuine worth.
Gabriel Richard played a part of no small measure in building our
early Northwest. Author opinion has it this way: "Of all the pioneers
[of Michigan], he is, perhaps, the best remembered; certainly the most
beloved." Born in the Gironde of France in 1767, Richard emerged into
manhood and priesthood as the Revolution lit the twin flames of ardor
and passion. Not by his choice — for he would gladly have gone down
with other heroes — but at the direction of his Sulpician superiors, he took
ship at Honfleur on April 9, 1792, to follow his predecessor missioners
of the preceding centuries. For the next forty years he would fulfill
his title of "Frontier Ambassador."
A scholar himself, self-destined for professional life, he found his
first situation in the area recently won by George Rogers Clark. In 1798
Bishop Carroll ordered him to the Detroit region, his headquarters from
then onward in the dual apostolate of pastor and maker of a society. In
both he served with spotless sacerdotal reputation, though he twice knew
what is meant to look out from behind the bars, once as a locked-up enemy
of the British in the War of 1812, again as a priest convicted for doing
his duty in publicly ousting a member of his congregation for notorious
marital infidelity. No short account can do justice to his contribution in
the making of America, nor explain his enduring honor among his people.
For long the only clergyman in the entire territory between Lake Huron
and the Mississippi, he did his religious duty almost as a matter of course.
Every Sunday for years he lectured to large groups of people outside his own
faith. Schools were to him the basis for both heaven and earth. There he
generated the parochial system and the district public system. He is honored
as co-founder and— for years — teacher, and vice-president of the legally
organized university of Michigan, at first called by his co-worker, Repre-
sentative Woodbridge, the "Catholepistemiad." In the fire of 1805 that
wiped out the little city, he led the forces that saved the people and restored
the municipality. When war came he stoutly refused foreign allegiance.
Facing Indian threats, he won over the Redman to friendship by help in
trouble and by his schools and priestly dedication. The university story in
itself is a saga of understanding and energy.
58
BOOK REVIEWS
59
When in 1823 he broke down his distaste and agreed to run for election
as Delegate to Congress, his motive was to unite the French settlers or
Canadiens with the westward-moving frontier. In that campaign he learned
how unfair competitors can be, but he held to his aim and won such benefits
as land-distribution and construction of important roads, particularly over
the old Sauk trail to Chicago. The Labadie incident caused him great
unhappiness, but again he stuck to justice and constitutional principle and
preferred jail to paying damages assessed at the instance of a famous name
that quit his parish in a pique. Denied the bishopric, though it had been
at first awarded by papal decision, he refused to stop his forward motion,
and his last service for the cholera-stricken populace brought him to death
on September 13, 1832.
The printers have given Richard a highly artistic setting. A large
page, seven by ten, set with Linotype Granjon and Bulmer Display faces,
and an imposing group of engravings and other illustrative material done
in offset, present the reader with a gem of typography. Bibliographical
citations will attract a student to go further in this revealing narrative. The
index is meticulous, and thorough. And, for one who wants to know where
he is as the story moves along, good maps identify each central topic of
geography.
W. Eugene Shiels, S.J.
Xavier University, Ohio
From Community to Metropolis. A Biography of Sao Paulo, Brazil. By
Richard M. Morse. University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1958.
Pp. xxiii, 341. Illustrated. $7.50.
This is an elaborated, English version of Professor Morse's study pub-
lished in Portuguese translation in 1954 for the occasion of the fourth
centennial celebration of the founding of Sao Paulo. The author began
his work in Brazil in 1947 and after long research concludes that "the
fastest growing city in the world" should not be called "the Chicago of
South America" nor even likened to Chicago except in some very superficial
aspects. Despite its remarkable growth in population to more than
3,000,000, its dynamic progress in building, and its leadership in industry
in all Latin America, Sao Paulo is different from all other cities from a
sociological viewpoint, while in spirit it has emerged as a nucleated metrop-
olis, fundamentally agrarian and patriarchal, with a distinctive culture that
can be characterized only as Paulista.
To arrive at his major conclusion Dr. Morse had to reach many minor
conclusions, twenty-one, to be exact, which became the subjects of the
twenty-one chapters and the reasons why Sao Paulo is so different. Such
individual studies required an enormous amount of reading to gather evi-
dence for his verdict. The evidence is generously quoted in the text and
summarized in a selective bibliography of thirty-two pages chiefly of source
materials. Besides the written authorities Dr. Morse calls upon his own
observations and conversations with the city's leaders in his effort to com-
prehend their minds and aims. All the research was done according to
pattern to discover why such great industrial and cultural progress could
60 BOOK REVIEWS
have been made by the metropolis "within a plantation economy, within a
Roman Catholic, patriarchal, and tradition-bound culture, and in a country
indifferently blessed with the resources for industrial development. ..."
(Introduction, xiii)
The chapters are broken into four parts. Part I describes briefly the
colonial community of Sao Paulo from the time of its founding by the
Jesuits in 1554 through the period of national independence under Dom
Pedro I. Part II, reveals the escape of Sao Paulo from community status
and self-subsistent economy to cityhood, especially after Dom Pedro II
became Emperor. There was a cultural quickening, some material progress,
and the rise of the coffee industry in the state of Sao Paulo with all the
premonitions of eventual monoculture status, not only for the city and state
but for the whole of Brazil. Part III brings out, chiefly by quotations, the
development of the railroads, the era of positivism, the economic and
physical expansion of the city and state, the coming of the immigrants, and
the middle class life. Part IV, in five chapters, describes "The Metropolitan
Temper," "Industrialism," "The Metropolis as Polis," "Modernism," and
"The Anatomy of the Metropolis."
The book has value as a pattern of study which can be followed by
researchers preparing biographies of other cities. It contains also a wealth
of information for the general reader. It will stimulate discussion and
interpretations of the data gathered over the years by Professor Morse.
Scholars will be happy with the bibliographical notes at the end of each
chapter, which give descriptions of author's and materials, and with the
long selective bibliography mentioned above. The index and illustrations
are quite satisfactory.
Jerome V. Jacobsen
Loyola University, Chicago
Efforts of Raymond Robins Toivard the Recognition of Soviet Russia and
the Outlawry of War, 1917—1933. By Sister Anne Vincent Meiburger.
The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C, 1958.
Pp. ix, 225. Paper cover, $2.50.
Historians and publicists have already contributed a mass of literature
concerning Soviet Russia and its many facets. However, there is still much
that can be done to remove the Soviet Union from the category of an
enigma. Perhaps it is in the area of American-Russian relations that further
research and study can contribute most to a better understanding of the
Soviet Union and the current struggle between the West and the Soviet
bloc of nations.
This need is partly met by the scholarly work of Sister Anne Vincent
Meiburger. The author makes no attempt to write a definitive biography
of Raymond Robins, a central figure in American-Russian relations from
the administration of Woodrow Wilson to that of Franklin Delano Roose-
velt. On the contrary, she attempts to present "an exposition of Robin's
efforts, after World War I, to bring about the United States recognition of
Soviet Russia and the outlawry of war by international agreement."
Raymond Robins, social worker, religious enthusiast, and politician,
was a self-made man who championed the cause of the poor and down-
fc2«*
BOOK REVIEWS 61
trodden. He was an idealist motivated by the highest ideals of human
service. In his efforts to serve his fellow man he was not hindered by
racial or national barriers. Following his appointment to the American
Red Cross Commission sent to Russia by President Woodrow Wilson in
July, 1917, he seized the opportunity to be of service to the Russian people,
"to help them find their way from Czarism to democracy and a better
standard of human living." His unrestrainable idealism accounted for much
of his efforts toward the recognition of Russia and the outlawry of war.
It was his burning ambition to eliminate social injustice of all kinds from
the face of the earth. He was a visionary who believed (rather naively)
that Lenin's program advocating the establishment of a new and worldwide,
classless society, would ultimately culminate in the establishment of a better
standard of living for the Russian masses, a type of utopia.
Robins' efforts toward the United States recognition of Russia included
his attempts to influence presidents, congressmen, and the general public.
He was tireless and relentless in his campaign to influence the administrations
of Presidents Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge to establish American economic
relations with the Soviet regime. Such cooperation, he hoped, would be
a stepping stone to the complete recognition of Soviet Russia. However,
his efforts and pleas did not produce the desired results. Meanwhile, a
combination of circumstances caused Robins to lose some of his enthusiasm
for United States recognition of Russia after January, 1924, only to be
revived in 1933, at the time of his second trip to the Soviet Union.
It is difficult to ascertain to what extent Robins was influential in the
recognition of Russia in November, 1933. He did present arguments in
favor of recognition to members of President Roosevelt's cabinet and the
"brain trust." Furthermore, Roosevelt did grant Robins an interview be-
fore the arrival in Washington of the Soviet foreign commissar, Maxim
Litvinov. However, the President had made the decision to recognize Soviet
Russia prior to conferring with Robins. Thus it would be an exaggeration
to conclude that Robins played the decisive role in this change in United
States policy toward Russia.
Robins was also one of the foremost peace advocates of the 1920's.
He believed that outlawry of war was something to offer the American
people in lieu of the League of Nations. However, it is interesting to
observe that he had no part in the initiation of the Kellogg-Briant Pact which
was regarded as the climax of the movement.
Apparently, there was no direct connection between Robins work toward
outlawry on the one hand, and recognition of Russia on the other. The
author was unable to uncover evidence to support the suspicion that Robins
and the advocates of recognition were using the outlawry of war as a facade
behind which to maneuver in order to achieve their real objective — recog-
nition of the Soviet regime.
Sister Meiburger has made an excellent contribution to a better under-
standing of the various forces at work — pro and con — concerning the be-
lated acceptance of an historical fact, namely, the Soviet regime in Russia.
Gilbert C. Kohlenberg
State Teachers College
Kirksville, Missouri
Notes and Comments
A call for help comes from Dr. J. Leon Helguera. He has
been awarded a grant from the John Boulton Foundation of Caracas,
Venezuela, for the purpose of research in the sources of Venezuelan
history in the United States and Canada. This Foundation has in
project in an advanced stage the compilation and publication of all
the extant manuscript correspondence and papers of the leaders
of the revolt against Spain in the northern provinces of South
America — Francisco de Miranda, Simon Bolivar, Antonio Jose de
Sucre, and Jose Antonio Paez. Confronted with the enormous task
of gathering the manuscripts which are scattered over the hem-
isphere in the original or in copy, Dr. Helguera asks the cooperation
of archivists, librarians, scholars and private collectors, who might
know of the location of the desired materials. Communications
should be addressed to him at Post Office Box 5243, State College
Station, Raleigh, North Carolina.
* * * #
"The French Jesuits and the Idea of the Noble Savage," by
George R. Healy of the Bates College faculty, is an interesting study
appearing in the April, 1958, The William and Mary Quarterly.
In their attacks upon the existence of God and upon Christianity
the French rationalists of the eighteenth century argued that men in
their natural state, primitive men, could get along well enough with-
out the encumbrances of European culture and religion. As proof
they pointed to the American Indians, whom they glamorized as brave,
noble, and physically perfect, even as was done in the Leather
Stocking Series and is done at present in Western novels and in
Western television shows. Mr. Healy finds that while the Jesuit
missionaries of New France, living amid the squalor of the Indian
villages and suffering death and torture at the hands of savages,
did not subscribe to the "nobility" of the savage from the natural
point of view, they did consider him as a human, with a soul, and
therefore noble in the eyes of God. The pbzlosophes, however,
used parts of the voluminous Jesuit writings on the Indians to
establish the myth of the noble Indian.
62
■■mil— HIBmrnmniiuimn
NOTES AND COMMENTS 63
"Edmundo O'Gorman and the Idea of America," by Edwin C.
Rozwenc of Amherst College, appeared in American Quarterly,
Summer, 1958. This is a penetrating article revolving around the
(question: What is America and What is an American? First Mr.
Rozwenc indicates how Frederick Jackson Turner's hypothesis
pointed to the significance of the frontier and influenced all his-
torical thinking in this country but failed to answer the question.
Herbert E. Bolton in his famous "Epic of Greater America" ex-
tended the name to all the lands and islands of North and South
America and included all peoples of the continents among Amer-
icans. O'Gorman, the Mexican thinker and historian, saw a rela-
tion between Bolton's idea of America and Hegel's "humiliating
thesis" on America and has taken up cudgels against both Bolton
and Hegel in his own inimitable way. The extent of O'Gorman's
attack and its validity is well explained in this article beginning
with Columbus's idea of the New World, Vespucci's concept and
Waldseemiiller's christening.
* *
The Journal of the History of Ideas, June, 1958, carried among
other interesting articles two on Charles Darwin. Maurice Mandel-
baum's "Darwin's Religious Views" traces the evolution of the
scientist's beliefs from the strict orthodoxy of the Anglican Church
to a helpless agnostic state of mind, stranded somewhere between the
arguments of Theists and Atheists. Alvar Ellegard in "Public
Opinion and the Press: Reactions to Darwinism," by a novel ap-
proach endeavors to estimate the actual percentage of the reaction
of people and press to Darwin's Origin of the Species for the twelve
years following its publication in 1859. By one method of computa-
tion he finds that 46c/o were against Darwinism, and by another
method 58% were against Darwinism.
* *
Of interest to those investigating the Indian place-names is
Wheeling: A West Virginia Place-Name of Indian Origin, by Delf
Norona. This is a lithoprinted, paper-bound brochure of thirty-
eight pages. It is Publication No. 1 of Oglebay Institute, Mansion
64 NOTES AND COMMENTS
Museum, Oglebay Park, Wheeling, West Virginia, and Publication
No. 4 of the West Virginia Archeological Society, Moundsville,
West Virginia. It may be obtained at either of these addresses.
After citing numerous authorities on the early site of Wheeling and
on Indian linguistics, Mr. Norona concludes that the name is from the
Indian Weel-ink or Weel-unk, meaning "The place where a [human]
head is located." The last two pages of the brochure on "Wheeling
and Ranonouara," are by M. H. Deardorff, who explains the
Huron, Mohawk and Onondaga words for the place.
* *
Authors of Liberty, by John Coleman, Illustrated by C. Edward
Beach, was published in the late 1958 by Vantage Press. Mr. Cole-
man as a journalist, a columnist, and most recently on radio pro-
grams, has constantly endeavored to bring about "a better under-
standing of the American way of life." In this book of 244 pages
he has brought together in informal papers many of the "national
shrines, sanctuaries, monuments, and memorials," each introduced
by an eloquent quotation. Among the forty-eight more important
illustrations of the American way of life selected by Mr. Coleman
we find: "The First Americans," the Indians whose memorial is
the chiseled figure of Crazy Horse; Williamsburg, Mi Vernon,
Monticello, and the battlefields from Yorktown to the present; the
American immortals in the Hall of Fame; the national parks; the
national athletic heros; the leaders of industry and science; the
democratic traditions; the underworld; and the circus. Under these
general headings practically every phase of American life and all
significant sites are mentioned. The list price is $3.75.
J
HMSNfflaSEH
lTWID-^MERICA
An Historical Review
APRIL
1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 2
Published by Loyola University
Chicago 26, Illinois
c7WID-o4MERICA
An Historical Review
VOLUME 41, NUMBER 2 APRIL 1959
c7WID-cylMERICA
An Historical Review
APRIL 1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 2
CONTENTS
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT:
AUTHORS' AGENT C. Harvey Gardiner 61
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND
EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM .... David H. Burton 88
THE MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND
POLITICS: A CASE STUDY . D. Jerome Tiveton 104
THE WANING PRESTIGE OF LEWIS CASS . . Walter W '. Stevens 114
BOOK REVIEWS 120
NOTES AND COMMENTS 124
MANAGING EDITOR
JEROME V. JACOBSEN, Chicago
EDITORIAL STAFF
WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL RAPHAEL HAMILTON
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA PAUL KINIERY
W. EUGENE SHIELS PAUL S. LIETZ
Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History)
at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.
Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at
Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as
second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in
the United States.
Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should
be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial
offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.
c7WID-o4MERICA
An Historical Review
APRIL 1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 2
William Hickling Prescott:
Authors' Agent
As a centennial tribute to Prescott, this article is an excursion
into mid-nineteenth century American intellectual history, wherein
the prominent writer, as he aids fellow American authors, con-
tributes to the internationalization of the nascent American litera-
ture. Before his death on January 28, 1859, in the years of his
literary maturity, while the public was avidly reading his multi-
volume histories and his publishers impatiently awaited his unfin-
ished manuscripts, ever generous William Hickling Prescott repeat-
edly assisted friends desirous of marketing their literary wares.
The aid which he extended Madame Calderon de la Barca
was but the logical outcome of Prescott's continuing concern about
that lady's knowledge of Mexico. They had been friends in Boston
before Scotch-born Frances Inglis had married Spanish diplomat
Angel Calderon de la Barca, likewise before Prescott had seized
upon the conquest of Mexico as his own special historical theme.
Hence it was natural for the Boston writer to keep in touch with
so charming a female correspondent once she moved over the
terrain connected with his historical protagonist Hernando Cortes.
One of many Spaniards overjoyed at Prescott's pursuit of Spanish
historical themes, Angel Calderon de la Barca was himself dedi-
cated to furthering the Bostonian's search for manuscripts, illus-
trations, and scholarly connections.1 As Angel's wife, Fanny would
have assisted Prescott; as the historian's personal friend, she had
added reason for identifying herself with his projects.
1 Roger Wolcott (ed.), The Correspondence of William Hickling Pres-
cott 1833-1847, Boston and New York, 1925, 24, 84, 92-93, 111, 113. The
diplomat's intended translations of successive works by Prescott never
materialized.
67
68 C HARVEY GARDINER
With long, warm friendly letters of Prescott and both Calderons
moving as regularly as the mails permitted between Boston and
Mexico City, it soon became apparent that Fanny Calderon's range
of interests and her colorful and engaging accounts, compounded
of history and geography as well as contemporary society, could
supplement Prescott's own knowledge of Mexico in such fashion
as to enrich his detail-laden writing.
On August 15, 1840, by which time the Calderons had spent
eight months in Mexico and Prescott more than two and a half
years on the conquest of Mexico, the author put a series of queries
to the diplomat's lady:
By the bye, will you be good enough to inform me whether there are
any descendants of Montezuma or of the Tezcucan line of monarchs now
living in Mexico? Should you visit Tezcuco I hope you will give me some
account of the appearance of things there. And I wish you would tell
me what kind of trees are found on the table land and in the valley. In
describing the march of the Spaniards I am desirous to know what was the
the appearance of the country through which they passed. . . .
After imaginatively spinning himself onto the Mexican scene,
the color-conscious writer from the far northern clime, especially
intrigued by the tierra caliente, continued, "Is not the road bordered
with flowers and the trees bent under a load of parasitical plants
of every hue and odour? I should like to get a peep into this
paradise."2
Invited to do so, as the historian refused to accede to repeated
urgings to visit Mexico and see things for himself, Fanny Calderon
penned the phrases that gave Prescott the desired peep, along with
much else that made Mexico more meaningful to the chair-borne
traveler of Boston.
"As for the appearance of the country in the tierra caliente,"
she replied, "you may boldly dip your pen in the most glowing
colours. . . ."3 In addition to endorsing Prescott's disposition to
color, she also supplied him with infinite detail.
"Many thanks to you, my dear Madame Calderon, for . . . the
rich description you have given me . . . ," he countered. "It was
what I wanted."4 In certain passages of Prescott's Conquest of
Mexico one meets Fanny's contributions.5
2 Ibid., 150.
3 Ibid., 169-170.
4 Ibid., 186.
5 William H. Prescott, History of the Conquest of Mexico, 3 vols.,
New York, 1843, I, 5-9 342; III, 98-99, 332.
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 69
In such fashion a well known author became aware of the
powers of observation and the literary skill of a friendly corre-
spondent, who in one particularly rambling epistle had declared,
"I am afraid you will think I am going to write you a volume,
upon the Mexican manners and customs. . . ."6 Perhaps it was
then, possibly earlier, surely not much later, that Prescott came
to expect a volume from Fanny's pen.
In addition to those addressed to him, Prescott was aware of
Fanny Calderon's letters to her family in the United States. What
the letters had meant to him and to them might, it was conjectured,
be converted into an interesting and instructive experience for a
larger, less intimate audience, the reading public. It required
some effort to convert the private letters into public reading
material, but such did occur largely because Prescott "strongly
recommended that they should be given to the world."7
The third logical step for the man who first had partially
inspired the letter writing and then had insisted upon publication
was that of helping to find a publisher. In Boston this was a
routine matter, with an arrangement speedily worked out with
Little, Brown and Company, the recently-founded firm that was
happily issuing edition after edition of Prescott's Ferdinand and
Isabella^
While the American edition of the Calderon letters was being
readied for the public, the search for an English publisher got
underway. In a day in which American authors dedicated special
attention to the matter of winning European approbation, such
effort was especially to be expected for Madame Calderon's manu-
script in consideration of her own British background and Pres-
cott's established reputation abroad. If satisfaction with his Ameri-
can publisher explains the submission of Madame Calderon's manu-
script to Little, Brown and Company, it was dissatisfaction with
his English publisher that caused him to ignore Richard Bentley
at this time.
6 Wolcott, Correspondence, 133.
7 Madame Calderon de la Barca (Henry Baerlein, ed.), Life in
Mexico during a Residence of Two Years in that Country, New York,
[1931], xxiv.
8 Between August, 1838, and late 1842 this Boston publisher had
issued seven printings of Prescott's work. For the sequence of Prescott's
own publications, see the present writer's William Hickling Prescott: An
Annotated Bibliography of Published Works, Washington, Library of
Congress, 1958; for Prescott's relations with his publishers, see the
present writer's Prescott and His Publishers, Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale, 1959.
70 C. HARVEY GARDINER
Having met Charles Dickens in Boston early in June, 1842, on
which occasion Prescott's suspicions regarding Bentley were en-
larged and Dickens' offer of assistance in publishing circles was
extended,9 it was not unnatural for the historian to turn to the
novelist. After identifying Fanny Calderon, describing her Mexican
experience and evaluating her writing, Prescott wrote, "The favour
I have to ask of you is that you will allow me to send her manuscript
to you, and that you will offer it to a responsible London pub-
lisher to print on the best terms he will offer." Prescott hoped
that near simultaneous publication in England and America might
come early in 1843.10
The complete freedom of action accorded Dickens in the over-
ture of late August was maintained in Prescott's mid-autumn
communication. The American would willingly confirm any publish-
ing arrangement that the Englishman might make for the Calderon
manuscript.11 On December 1, 1842, Prescott sent Dickens a pre-
publication copy of the text of the first volume, with all of the
second volume promised by the beginning of 1843.
With the author's name concealed and only her initials given, a
concession to her husband's insistence upon the demands of diplo-
matic etiquette, Prescott's signed preface played a more significant
role than usual in recommending the work to the public. The
presumed power of Prescott's modestly phrased one page endorse-
ment is evident in words which he addressed to Dickens: "The
publishers may make use of the Preface in advertising the book. . . .
They will do so here."12
As he forwarded the remainder of the Calderon manuscript to
Dickens later in December, Prescott indicated that "Now that I
have read the book through more thoroughly I think it must have
success."13 At the end of January, 1843, Prescott informed Dickens
that he would be happy to receive any sums that Chapman & Hall,
the English publisher of her work, might have for Madam Calderon.
As for the American reception of the travel book, the Bostonian
reported: "It has had an excellent sale here. . . ."14
London, likewise, could report the favorable reception of the
book, by both reviewers and reading public. In early March, as
9 Wolcott, Correspondence, 309-310.
10 Ibid., 315-316.
11 Memo dated November 14, 1842, of letter from Prescott to Dickens,
William Hickling Prescott Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society (here-
inafter cited as P-MHS).
12 Wolcott, Correspondence, 323.
13 Ibid., 328.
14 Ibid., 329.
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 71
Chapman & Hall paid Madame Calderon, via Prescott, the twenty-
five pounds agreed upon for the early copy of the American
edition, the London publisher expressed two wishes, neither of
which materialized: another work from the Calderon pen and
an opportunity to publish Prescott in England.15
Meanwhile there was one more assist that Prescott could give
Fanny Calderon's literary labor: he could review it in a major
publication. Although the tempo of his own labors had increased
and his outlook had so changed as to consider review writing an
utterly worthless endeavor, Prescott seized the opportunity "to
give the work a life here."16 The Boston-based North American
Review, foremost literary organ in America and the publication in
which virtually all of Prescott's onetime welter of reviews had
appeared, was the ideal medium. For the January, 1843, issue,
which appeared simultaneously with Fanny's book — just as an
earlier issue had perfectly paralleled and extensively reviewed
Prescott's first book in January, 1838 — Prescott composed a review
of more than thirty pages. A treatise on travel literature in general
and Calderon's Life in Mexico in particular, it was a statement
of the prejudices and inabilities of most such authors and praise
of the understanding and abilities of the author of Life in Mexico.
Numerous and lengthy quotations were offered, the better to
support the reviewer's enthusiasm, illustrate the book's nature, and
whet the reader's appetite. Apologetically concluding his essay
with the hope that he had indicated the wealth and variety of the
work, Prescott insisted that it contained the best spirited portraiture
of Mexican society to be found in a travel book.17
From beginning to end, Prescott had done everything he could
to assist Madame Calderon de la Barca with the publication of
Life in Mexico. The verdict of history so heartily endorses the
worth of the work18 that appreciation also is due him without
whose efforts it probably might never have materialized.
* * *
Six years later Prescott was at the height of his fame: his
Conquest of Mexico had appeared in December, 1843, the potpourri
15 Chapman & Hall to Prescott, March 3, 1843, P-MHS.
16 Wolcott, Correspondence, 329.
17 [William H. Prescott], "Madame Calderon's Life in Mexico," North
American Review, LVI (January, 1843), 137-170.
18 Reprinted, abridged, and translated repeatedly in the century since
its initial appearance, Life in Mexico has known and continues to know
an appeal unrivalled by any other travel account of independent Mexico.
72 C. HARVEY GARDINER
of his literary essays and extended review articles had become a
book in 1845 and two years later, on June 22, 1847, his Conquest
of Peru had reached the hands of the reading public. Acclaimed
on both sides of the Atlantic, with his works translated into sev-
eral languages, Prescott took a brief rest from the literary labors
that had consumed his attention almost uninterruptedly for two
decades and in the course of early 1849 again took occasion to
peddle the penned product of one of his friends.
Young Samuel Eliot was a Bostonian with multiple claims upon
the attention of William Hickling Prescott. Himself a graduate
of Harvard, Eliot was son of William Havard Eliot and nephew of
Samuel Atkins Eliot, both of whom were and had been literary and
social intimates of Prescott since the days of the founding of Club
back in 1818.19 Possessed of literary interests which included a
projected multi-volume history of liberty, young Eliot, in his late
twenties, became the object of Prescott's special attention when,
in 1849, the first part of his history was ready for publication.
With the passage of years that had included the release in
England of four of his own works through the house of Richard
Bentley, much of the disgruntlement that had punctuated Prescott's
earlier relations with his English publisher had yielded to a mellow-
ing trans-Atlantic friendship increasingly evident in the personal
portions of the voluminous correspondence that once had been
business-like only in tone. Accordingly Bentley became the final
piece in the three-piece mosaic consisting of author, agent, and
publisher.
"My friend and townsman Mr. Samuel Eliot," the historian
wrote the publisher, " has been enaged for sometime in the com-
position of an historical work of which he has now completed
two volumes. He wishes to have the book brought before the
English public at the same time that it appears here and I have
mentioned you to him. ..."
Sensing that Bentley would make his own appraisal and reach
his own decision, Prescott wasted few words recommending either
the writer or the work. "Mr. Eliot is a young man who has a
high reputation among us for his talents and literary acquisitions.
The work submitted to you is of a comprehensive nature, and — from
19 George Ticknor, Life of William Hickling Prescott, Philadelphia,
1895, 52.
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 73
the glance I have had of it — shows scholarship and careful medi-
tation ... he sends out the printed proofs. . . ."20
Eliot's writing evidently pleased Bentley because Prescott, ever
one to keep an eye on the announcements of forthcoming publica-
tions in England, soon gave the matter his further attention: "I
see you have advertised Mr. Eliot's work, and I hope you will
not be the loser by it."21 Eliot's History of the Liberty of Rome
emerged from Bentley's hands on July 2, 1849, in two garbs, with
the price of the two volumes twenty-eight shillings in octavo and
five shillings in quarto.22
Early the following year Bentley informed Prescott that the
Eliot work had not had any success. Reflecting upon that unfor-
tunate state of affairs, the publisher mused that it might have
been otherwise had the book known, along with a more attractive
title, some felicitous editing by Prescott's able hand. Suggestive
that Bentley sustained no loss was his willingness to publish Eliot's
History of the Early Christians, part two of his project, on Septem-
ber 26, 1853. Though revised and republished in America, Eliot's
work was not the masterpiece in its field that Madame Calderon's
swiftly became.23
* * *
Two years passed, during which Prescott, for a variety of rea-
sons, continued to remain largely outside the routine of productive
scholarship. In the spring of 1850 he mustered sufficient courage
to undertake the trip that fulfilled his oft-made promise to visit
England. For more than three months, from early June until mid-
September, historian Prescott was lionized by British society in a
manner unrivalled by any other private American citizen. As he
capitalized upon the past achievements that spelled literary fame
for him in England and hurriedly cast an eye to the future while
speeding through Holland, the land so significant to his promised
history of Philip the Second of Spain, it was a momentous season
back home, that one in which Clay, Webster, Calhoun and others
20 Prescott to Richard Bentley, February 9, 1849, Richard Bentley
Papers, Harvard University (hereinafter cited as B-HU). Eliot's work
was published by G. P. Putnam of New York in 1849.
21 Prescott to Bentley, April 20, 1849, B-HU.
22 [Richard Bentley and Son], A List of the Principal Publications
Issued from New Burlington Street During the Year 18U9, London, 1897,
unnumbered p. 29.
23 Bentley to Prescott, February 7, 1850, P-MHS. A representative
negative estimate of Eliot's work may be found in "Retrospective Survey
of American Literature," The Westminister Review, LVII (January,
1852), 159.
74 C. HARVEY GARDINER
heatedly debated the issues contained in successive segments of the
Compromise of 1850.
At mid-century, as Prescott paused in his historical produc-
tion, another Bostonian, Francis Parkman, make his meteoric rise.
Though both Parkman and Prescott were physically handicapped,
intensely interested in history, and came of wealthy and socially
prominent families, the differences between them were also note-
worthy. Prescott was old enough to be Parkman's father; their
subject matter differed greatly both in time and space; and many
of their approaches to historical method as well as their styles of
writing showed marked dissimilarity. However, with the breadth
of interests that characterized Prescott's intellectual life, it was in-
evitable that he would know and formulate an estimate of the man
who had published Oregon Trail in the late 1840's and had his
History of the Conspiracy of Pontiac ready for the press with the
dawning of the next decade.
One of Prescott's intimates, Parkman's old history professor
Jared Sparks, read the manuscript in March, 1850, and reported
favorably on it. In June the Reverend George E. Ellis, another long-
term acquaintance of Prescott, undertook to find an American
publisher for Parkman. Garbed in an array of optional and equally
clumsy titles, the well-written work on a secondary American his-
torical theme was received coolly at Harpers where the Prescott
precedent suggested that an author should have his work stereo-
typed at his own expense before entering into negotiations with a
publisher. After the rebuff in New York, Parkman had his manu-
script stereotyped, contracting later for its publication by Little,
Brown and Company.24
Like many other American authors of his day, Parkman desired
simultaneous publication in England and America. To assist his
young friend beyond the Atlantic, Prescott wrote Richard Bentley:
My friend Mr. Parkman, of this city, proposes to send out by this
steamer the proofsheet of a new work of his relating to the occupation
of this country by the French, and their intercourse with the Indians.
His work leads him largely into an account of these sons of the forest,
for which, as you are probably aware, he is better qualified than any good
writer among us by his residence with them. I have seen some hundred
and fifty pages of the book, and it seems to me to be written with much
spirit, with many picturesque descriptions and stirring incidents — told in a
skilful manner, that I should think would engage the interest of the
24 Mason Wade, Francis Parkman, Heroic Historian, New York,
1942, 306-308.
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 75
reader. The rare materials from which the story is drawn gives it still
higher value in an historical view. I cannot tell how much curiosity the
English reader would feel in this portion of American History, or how far
such a work would be a good book in the sense of the trade. I believe,
from the specimen I have seen, it will prove a good book in every other
sense, and as such, if you think it for your interest — of which you are
much the best judge — I hope you will be able to make some arrangement
with Mr. Parkman for the publication of it.25
This was not Bentley's introduction to Parkman. Indeed the
London publisher had so enthused over the Oregon Trail that he had
published an edition of it, only to find that the English reading
public did not share his enthusiasm.26 Now, a few years later,
as Prescott brought the two together once more, his was essentially
a job of reestablishing Bentley's enthusiasm. Prescott's letter surely
helped on that score, for his own enthusiasm was so fulsome as
to be contagious.
Thanking Prescott for bringing author and publisher together,
Bentley quickly warmed to Parkman's new book. He wrote:
I have looked into it, and am much interested by the picturesque narrative.
I judge that others will not fail to be interested in his work, and there-
fore in my letter to him by this packet I have acquainted him that I accept
with pleasure the offer he has been so good as to make me of publishing
it in England.27
Published in America in September, 1851, and released in Eng-
land by Bentley somewhat earlier on August 21, the History of the
Conspiracy of Pontiac, in two volumes, priced at 21 shillings, was
no success beyond the water, for Bentley disposed of only 153 copies
of a 500-copy edition in a period of twelve months.28 Nevertheless,
and despite the English reaction to Parkman, Prescott had helped
to put another historical masterwork before a larger audience.
* * *
In the spring of 1852 Prescott's helping hand was extended in
behalf of an author who neither needed nor sought his assistance.
Published initially in weekly instalments in the National Era be-
tween June 5, 1851 and April 1, 1852, the abolitionist novel, Uncle
25 Prescott to Bentley, May 20, 1851, B-HU.
26 Wade, Parkman, 299.
27 Bentley to Prescott, June 19, 1851, P-MHS.
2§ Wade, Parkman, 308; and [Richard Bentley and Son], A List of
the Principal Publications Issued from New Burlington Street During
the Year 1851, London, 1902, unnumbered p. 57. However, English reviews
supported Bentley's judgment; see "Contemporary Literature in America,"
Westminister Review, LVII (January, 1852), 167-168.
76 C HARVEY GARDINER
Tom's Cabin, seemingly did not attract Prescott's attention until
released in book form in Boston on March 20, 1852, by publisher
John P. Jewett.
The "puff" he tried to give it was unnecessary in the whirl-
wind of acclaim rapidly bestowed on Uncle Tom's Cabin. "Three
thousand copies were sold the very first day, a second edition was
issued the following week, a third on the first of April," wrote the
the author's son, "and within a year one hundred and twenty
editions, or over three hundred thousand copies of the book, had
been issued and sold in this country."29
Ten weeks after this auspicious American debut in book form,
Prcscott penned Richard Bentley:
. . . my object in writing to you now is to mention a book I have lately
been reading, and which has had an immense circulation in this country —
"Uncle Tom's Cabin." It is a novel in two volumes written by a lady, the
wife of a Calvinistic divine, who lived many years in the Southern States,
and has exhibited in this novel the character of our South and the social
condition of slavery. It is sketched with great strength and truth of color-
ing, in scenes very touching — some of them comic — and the whole story
written in a very piquant attractive manner. I know nothing of the writer
personally; but it has occurred to me more than once that the book could
not fail to be popular in England; so that I have already sent two copies
to friends there.
If you wish it, I suppose you can get a copy of the American book-
sellers— Putnam's for instance — in London. Or if you desire it, I will
send you one.;i0
Bentley was much interested and Prescott played middleman in
the fruitless exchange that developed. When the publisher, hoping
for a second book to exploit the popularity of the writer's name,
penned an expression of his interest, Prescott forwarded it to Mrs.
Stowe, who, in turn, wrote the historian a letter laden with queries
about foreign copyright. Relaying Mrs. Stowe's word that she had
another work in progress, Prescott quoted her to Bentley, "And
as far as I know, I think I would like to engage Mr. Bentley as
publisher, although I am not yet prepared to enter into immediate
negotiation." The historian informed both the novelist and the
publisher that he stood ready to assist, should they prefer to com-
municate through him.31
"9 Charles Edward Stowe (comp.), Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe
compiled from Her Letters and Journals, Boston and New York, 1889, 160.
30 Prescott to Bentley, June 6, 1852, B-HU.
31 Id. to Id., October 11, 1852, B-HU; and Bentley to Prescott, October
26, 1852, P-MHS.
HHBHHKHtillHBfllHIHmfl
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 77
By late November it was evident that Prescott had not brought
author and publisher to terms, for he wrote Bentley, "I am sorry
that my correspondence with Mrs. Stowe has had no better result,
as I see her next work advertised by some publisher — I forget whom
— in the English papers." In a parting word about her to Bentley,
Prescott offered a succinct single sentence judgment: "Her literary
adventure is a miracle, for in a twinkling 'Uncle Tom' has shot
up into a celebrity equal to that reached by the best of Scott's
novels, while in point of literary execution merely, it is not equal
to the worst."32
English publishers, seizing the opportunity to accord an Amer-
ican author the treatment so often dealt English writers on this side
of the Atlantic, produced a confusion of pirated editions of the
famed novel. Within twelve months of its initial appearance in
England, which incidentally antedated Prescott's first letter to
Bentley about it, Uncle Tom's Cabin passed through forty editions
at the hands of eighteen different London publishers.33
A few years later, by which time both the historian and the
novelist were under contract to Phillips, Sampson and Company of
Boston, their literary paths casually crossed once more. From his
autumn retreat at Pepperell, Prescott, on October 4, 1856, penned
Mrs. Stowe a letter of appreciation for the copy of her novel Dred
which publisher Phillips had forwarded to him. Among his reac-
tions to the book, he insisted, "But Nina, to my mind, is the true
hero of the book, which I should have named after her instead of
"Dred."34 Prescott was not alone in his opinion and on occasion
the book was reprinted under that suggested title.
* * *
In the latter part of 1853 Prescott, calling the attention of both
English reader and English publisher to a work by George S. Hil-
lard, repaid numerous kindnesses extended him by another longtime
friend. Hillard, reviewing Prescott's first book for the Boston
Courier, had declared:
The first qualities in an historical work are accuracy and thoroughness, and
these it possesses to an extent which leaves nothing to be desired, and puts
32 Prescott to Bentley, November 26, 1852, 852, B-HU.
33 Stowe (comp.), Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe, 190. Many of these
editions are listed in The English Catalogue of Books published from
January, 1835 to January, 1863, London, 1864, 740-741. Bentley published
a 3s. 6d. edition on September 29, 1852; see [Richard Bentley and Son],
A List of the Principal Publications Issued from New Burlington Street
During the Year 1852, London, 1903, unnumbered p. 61.
34 Stowe (comp.), Life of Harriet Beecher Stowe, 311.
78 C. HARVEY GARDINER
it upon a level with Gibbon's Rome and Hallam's Middle Ages. It is
undoubtedly the most learned historical work that has appeared in our
country. . . . That it will take a permanent rank, as a classic, in the language,
may be predicted with perfect confidence.35
Two days later Prescott, reveling in the reception given his Ferdinand
and Isabella, stamped Hillard's praise "as much to my taste as any-
thing that has appeared."36 Six years later, in a long and beauti-
fully phrased article for the North American Review, Hillard re-
viewed the Conquest of Mexico and in so doing placed additional
laurels upon the literary brow of his friend.37
With the passage of years, during which he practiced law,
travelled widely and maintained his interest in literature, Hillard
came to pen his Six Months in Italy. Prescott's enthusiasm for the
work led him to press for English reception of it on two fronts.
In mid-September, 1853, he sent copies of the work, accompanied by
a praise-laden letter, to his friend Mrs. H. H. Milman, wife of the
English literary critic.38 Another England-bound copy of Hillard's
book went to publisher John Murray. Prompted by the harsh
realities that stamped the Italian theme as hackneyed, Murray
initially entertained serious doubts. However, his study of the book
so convinced him that Prescott's praise of it was justified that he
hastened, without further ado, to reprint it in an English edition
of 1,000 copies. Writing Prescott of his course of action, which
included promise of half profits for the author, the publisher asked
the historian to inform Hillard of the conditions on which he had
reprinted the work.39
Time proved that this product of the author's travels of 1847-
1848 was another Prescott-backed winner because in less than three
years it knew five American editions. Long accepted as a standard
work among travelers' guide books, it eventually appeared in more
than twenty editions.
* * *
Within the small class in which Prescott graduated from Harvard
in 1814 was modest, gentle Thomas Bulfinch. After a brief teach-
ing career, bachelor Bulfinch turned, in his later adult life, to clerk-
ing in the Merchants' Bank of Boston. However, he never turned
35 Boston Courier, January 4, 1838.
36 Ticknor, Prescott, 109.
37 North American Review, LVIII (January, 1844), 157-210.
38 Ticknor, Prescott, 360.
39 John Murray to Prescott, December 8, 1853, P-MHS.
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS* AGENT 79
his back on his literary interests. Maturing late as a writer, Bul-
finch dotted the 1850's with successive titles which he offered the
reading public, with fables, legends, chivalry, and mythology com-
manding his attention.
With one volume behind him, Bulfinch had another ready for
some publisher's consideration when Prescott, on December 28,
1853, addressed Bentley:
A friend of mine, Mr. Bulfinch, of this town, has now in the press
a work relating to Ancient Mythology so explained and illustrated as to
adapt it to the use of families — which is rather a delicate task. Mr. B.
has already produced a volume which has met with much commendation;
and from what I know of his character and abilities I cannot doubt that
his forthcoming work will be well adapted to the purposes for which
it is designed.
As Mr. Bulfinch is desirous of being put in communication with an
English publisher, I have thought I could not do better than by intro-
ducing him to you, and I shall be most happy if when you have seen
his work, you shall find it so well suited to the English market as to allow
of your publication of it.40
Less than a week later, while reporting his own progress on
the first two volumes of Philip the Second, Prescott adverted to
Bulfinch in a manner which suggested that qualms of conscience
prodded him. He had written the earlier letter at Bulfinch's
request and indeed expected his friend to produce a fine book
but one thing he plainly wished known was the fact that he had
never seen the work.41
Bulfinch's book seemingly was not published immediately in
England, by Bentley nor anyone else, but The Age of Fable, the
item concerned, did prove to be Bulfinch's finest work. His effort
to widen the audience for mythology knew considerable success, with
the work passing through several editions and gaining a reputa-
tion that still classes it as a standard reference in its field.42
Between Prescott and Boston-born John Lothrop Motley stretched
a slender, yet significant, intellectual relationship. Motley, much
the younger, was born the year that Prescott concluded his formal
education at Harvard. Like Prescott, Motley traveled abroad, di-
40 Prescott to Bentley, December 28, 1853, B-HU.
41 Id. to id., January 2, 1854, B-HU.
42 A. Johnson et al (eds.), Dictionary of American Biography, 21
vols., New York, 1928-1944, III, 247-248.
80 C. HARVEY GARDINER
vided his intellectual interests between literature and history, came
of a family of means and outlook which permitted his concentration
on not overly remunerative intellectual endeavors, and, finally,
centered his historical interests upon a theme far removed from
the American scene.
The intellectual paths of the two men first came together in
the late 1840's. Motley had begun collecting materials about
1846 for a history of the Netherlands, at which time Prescott was
concluding his Conquest of Peru. Despite the fact that he had
neither studied nor written as yet on the period of Philip the
Second of Spain, Prescott's long-range intentions already included
that subject in his ultimate array of historical studies. For years
book dealers, diplomats, and scholars had laboriously been drawing
together the materials upon which Prescott would eventually base
his study of late sixteenth-century Spain.43
Interested in the Dutch sector of Spanish history in that and
the following century, Motley found himself in a position similar
to that in which Prescott had been in 1838-1839 in reference to
Washington Irving and the conquest of Mexico. Then Irving,
Prescott's senior in years and reputation, had graciously stepped
aside to allow the Bostonian complete freedom of action in his
exploitation of the Mexican theme. Indeed Irving had given
Prescott some assistance as well as much encouragement.44
As Prescott had manfully approached Irving, so Motley came
to Prescott. Whereas Prescott had corresponded with Irving,
Motley took his case to Prescott in person. In 1847, at which
time their personal acquaintance with each other was slight,45
Prescott and Motley discussed their hopes and plans. Pleased and
cooperative, Prescott saw no reason why Motley should not proceed
with his project. The generosity of the senior historian was doubly
evident as he offered his junior any books which he owned that
pertained to Motley's research. For Prescott it was but a small
kindness extended; for Motley it was so momentous a gesture that
43 Wolcott, Correspondence, passim and Clara Louisa Penney (ed.),
Prescott, Unpublished Letters to Gayangos, New York, Hispanic Society
of America, 1927, passim illustrate this activity with basic correspondence.
See also the present writer's article, "Prescott's Most Indispensable Aide:
Pascual de Gayangos," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIX
(February, 1959), 81-115.
44 Ticknor, Prescott, 156-163.
45 With Motley publishing romances in this period, their contacts
probably were simply within the whirl of Boston society; see Susan and
Herbert St. John Mildmay (eds.), John Lothrop Motley and His Family,
London and New York, 1910, 28.
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS AGENT 81
it constituted a turning-point in his life.46 Almost a decade passed
before either man published a book related to the theme of their
overlapping interest.
Pre-publication problems occupied both Prescott and Motley
in the autumn of 1855. Promise of the most lucrative contract that
he had ever known had led Prescott to turn from Harpers to
Phillips, Sampson and Company of Boston. Nonetheless his part-
ing from the New York house, his publisher for more than a
decade, was friendly. When Thomas Motley, Jr., in the absence
of his author-brother, John Lothrop, who was still in Europe,
decided to peddle that historian's wares in New York, Prescott
obligingly addressed a warm letter of introduction on his behalf
to the Harpers.
As he has been living in the midst of the scenes he describes, and with
the best materials at his command," Prescott wrote of John Lothrop Motley,
"his works cannot fail to be of the most authentic character. Although
I have not seen the manuscript, yet I cannot doubt, from his high parts
and brilliant and attractive style, that his book will be one of great interest
and importance. I hope therefore that you will give it a careful examin-
ation, and that he will be able to make an arrangement with you which
will be satisfactory to both.47
Three months later, on December 10, 1855, Prescott's American
publisher issued the first two volumes of his Philip the Second.
Like other histories by Prescott, this was preceded by a lengthy
prefatory statement of his theme, the materials upon which he
had based it, and words of appreciation to scholars who had assisted
him. Cognizant of his co-worker's forthcoming work, Prescott
wrote: ". . . the Revolution of the Netherlands, although strictly
speaking, only an episode to the main body of the narrative, from
its importance well deserves to be treated in a separate and inde-
pendent narrative by itself." Amplifying this point in a footnote,
he continued :
It is gratifying to learn that before long such a history may be ex-
pected— if indeed it should not appear before the publication of this
work — from the pen of our accomplished countryman Mr. J. Lothrop
Motley, who during the last few years, for the better prosecution of his
labors, has established his residence in the neighborhood of the scenes
of his narrative. No one acquainted with the fine powers of mind possessed
by this scholar, and the earnestness with which he has devoted himself
46 Ticknor, Prescott, 259-261.
47 J. Henry Harper, The House of Harper — A Century of Publish-
ing in Franklin Square, New York, 1912, 140-141.
82 C. HARVEY GARDINER
to his task, can doubt that he will do full justice to his important but
difficult subject.48
Sensing a good publishing prospect in the offing, Bentley
pounced upon the proffered bait. He hurriedly wrote to Prescott:
In a note in the preface to your new history, you mention that Mr. Motley
is engaged on a history of the Netherlands. Has that gentleman published
his Work? If not, may I ask whether he is at Boston? In that case
probably he would do me the favor to negotiate with me for it, if you
would kindly ask him.49
Early in the spring of 1856, less than five months after the ap-
pearance of Prescott's latest work, Motley's Rise of the Dutch
Republic appeared in both America and England. In America the
Prescott assistance was all the more meaningful because Motley's
work was accepted and published by the Harpers. In England Pres-
cott's role was less noteworthy. There Motley had trouble finding
a publisher, as nothing came of Bentley's early enthusiasm. John
Murray declined to publish the work; and finally the author was
forced to bring it out through Chapman at his own expense.50
Prescott also helped Motley to that equally significant literary
commodity, the reading public. The phenomenal sale of the Rise
of the Dutch Republic, 17,000 copies during the first year of its
publication in England, derived from many factors, most important
of which was the inherent worth of the work.51 However, one
cannot discount entirely, nor assess fully, the significance of Pres-
cott's assistance. The free advertising and boundless praise in
his Philip the Second certainly helped to ready the reading public
for Motley's work. In addition, the latter basked, to some extent,
in the reflected interest that the well-known Prescott had estab-
lished for its theme through his own writing.52
As the success of Prescott's Conquest of Mexico had under-
scored the Tightness of the decision by which Irving had stepped
aside, so Motley's achievement underscored the worth of the de-
cision that had welcomed a co-worker and quasi-competitor to the
field which Prescott had staked out for his own historical digging.
Motley had his American publisher send a presentation copy to
Prescott, who acknowledged it in a heart-warming letter dated
48 William H. Prescott, History of the Reign of Philip the Second,
King of Spain, 2 vols., Boston, Phillips, Sampson and Co., 1855, I, xii.
49 Bentley to Prescott, November 23, 1855, P-MHS.
50 Mildmay, Motley and Family, 57-58.
51 George William Curtis (ed.), The Correspondence of John Lothrop
Motley, 2 vols., New York, 1889, I, 190.
52 For Motley's awareness of this, see Mildmay, Motley and Family, 53.
HHHHHnHBHtttfl
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 83
April 28, 1856. Among a succession of friendly sentiments and
words of praise, possibly the finest constituted those which read,
"... you have more than fulfilled the prediction which I had made
respecting your labours to the public. Everywhere you seem to
have gone into the subject with a scholarlike thoroughness of re-
search, furnishing me on my own beaten track with a quantity of
new facts and views. . . ."53 In a very real sense Prescott's con-
tinuing study of Philip the Second probably was enriched by Motley's
work. Even in this limited realm of author relationships, all had
not been unilateral, for through Prescott surely gave Motley greater
assistance than he received from him, it was a relationship possessed
of reciprocal advantages.
* * *
In mid-spring 1858, less than a year before his death, Prescott
initiated what was probably his last literary assistance to a fellow
author. This time the recipient of his attentive support was a
friend and neighbor of long standing, John Gorham Palfrey.
Boston-born Palfrey, almost exactly Prescott's age, had graduated
from Harvard in the class of 1815, along with their mutual friend
Jared Sparks. Palfrey's interests included a range of intellectual
endeavors for he was successively clergyman, editor, politician,
and historian. Like Prescott, Palfrey had a long-term identifica-
tion with the North American Review, both contributing to it
during the editorship of Sparks. In 1835 Palfrey bought the
publication and operated it successfully until 1843, when he sold
it. During those years Prescott published seven items in the
Palfrey-owned organ.54
Recovering from his apoplectic stroke of February, 1858, and
leisurely putting the third volume of his Philip the Second through
the press at a moment when national depression tempered any
author's enthusiasm for launching his literary product, Prescott,
penning a letter to Richard Bentley on a multiplicity of subjects,
wrote:
A friend of mine, Dr. Palfrey . . . will publish this autumn the first volume
of a History of New England Puritans, in a couple of volumes, I believe.
53 Curtis, Correspondence, I, 191. In the spring of 1857 Prescott
was busy inducing his Spanish friend and aide Pascual de Gayangos to
assist Motley with his continuing research; see Penney, Prescott, Unpub-
lished Letters, 126-127.
54 Dictionary of American Biography, XIV, 169—170; and William
Charvat and Michael Kraus, William Hickling Prescott; Representative
Selections, New York, [1943], cxxxii-cxxxiii.
84 C HARVEY GARDINER
It will, I doubt not, be an able and learned book. Whether the theme
will interest the English reader you can judge better than I.55
Six weeks later Prescott's correspondence with Bentley found
him returning to Palfrey:
This note will be handed to you by my friend Mr. Bowen, formerly
the Editor of the North American Review and now a professor in Harvard
University, Cambridge. Mr. Bowen wishes to converse with you about a
historical work of our mutual friend Mr. Palfrey, of Cambridge, with
whose literary reputation you are doubtless acquainted and of whom I wrote
to you in my last. I shall be glad if it suits your views to make an
arrangement with Mr. Palfrey for the publication of his book. It cannot
fail to be an important one, as the writer has explored the best sources
of information to which he has had free access, in England as well as
here, and his ability and thorough scholarship eminently fit him for the
task. Mr. Bowen, however, can give you many more particulars about
Mr. Palfrey's work and the progress made in it than I can; and I will only
add that we have no critic among us whose opinion on a subject of this
nature is entitled to greater weight than that of Mr. Bowen.56
In mid-August, at which moment Prescott initiated negotiations
looking forward to the sale and publication of the third volume
of his Philip the Second, the gentleman-scholar of Boston could
still preface a letter dealing with such compelling personal in-
terests with expressions of concern about his friend's manuscript.57
Failing to effect an arrangement between Palfrey and Bentley,
Prescott turned in his friend's behalf, just as he had several years
earlier in pursuit of his own interests, from Bentley to Routledge.
On December 9, 1858, within seven weeks of his death, Prescott
wrote a laudatory covering note to accompany the synopsis of the
history of New England which Palfrey sent for Routledge's con-
sideration.58 Prescott could do no more; he lay in his grave
before Palfrey's work finally found a London publisher.59
Between the early 1840's and the closing weeks of his life,
Prescott extended, for a variety of reasons, special assistance to these
55 Prescott to Bentley, May 3, 1858, B-HTJ.
56 Id. to id., June 18, 1858, B-HU. Bowen had reviewed Prescott's
Conquest of Peru in the North American Review, LXV (October, 1847),
366-400.
57 Prescott to Bentley, August 13, 1858, B-HU.
58 Prescott to Routledge, December 9, 1858, P-MHS.
59 Published in London in 1859, the first two volumes of Palfrey's
masterwork were issued by Low; see The English Catalogue of Books...
183 5-1 863, 580.
fcT^ ™11I""M"™M"^™M™MM "^MM""""""1"1 iiiMi«iiiimimni^^M^»^— ^^«Mii||m
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 85
eight: Madame Calderon de la Barca, Samuel Eliot, Francis Park-
man, Harriet Beecher Stowe, George S. Hillard, Thomas Bulfinch,
John Lothrop Motley, and John Gorham Palfrey. What opened
this facet of the historian's intellectual life?
Did Prescott try to facilitate the publication of their works
because of penetrating appraisals he had made? Admittedly he
knew and was much interested in the Calderon de la Barca theme
and, after reading her work thoroughly, endorsed it in superlative
terms. But for the fuller array of works, it can be said he neither
knew the themes nor the specific works in minute detail. He
freely admitted that he had but glanced at Eliot's writing on Roman
liberty. Aside from the demands of his own work schedule, one
suspects that Prescott's unfamiliarity with the theme constituted a
basic reason for his not giving the work more attention. Parkman's
subject, despite its parallels to his own Mexican and Peruvian
studies thematically and stylistically, was unfamiliar to him. Pres-
cott based his very enthusiastic endorsement of Parkman on a
reading of a minor part of the book. Of Stowe's subject Prescott,
never known to have traveled south of the Potomac, knew little,
but had thought much. Once he had read Uncle Tom's Cabin, it
was kinship of spirit that drew from the historian the unsolicited
urge to aid the already successful novelist. The Whig historian,
who counted anti-slavery spokesmen like Daniel Webster and
Charles Sumner among his warm personal friends and long-term
correspondents, was a stanch adherent to the abolitionist philosophy
of his age.60 Love of Italy, rather than knowledge of Hillard's
manuscript, probably prompted the historian's support of that work.
Never did Prescott's request that Bentley consider Bulfinch's work
on mythology include any assurance that he had seen, much less
read and approved, the work. With Motley working on a theme
close to his heart and doing so in the workman-like fashion that
further endorsed the eventual product of his labors, Prescott,
without laying eyes on the work, paid Motley's history an unusual
compliment as he praised it in anticipation. Of Palfrey's work
on the history of their mutually beloved home area of New Eng-
land, Prescott said nothing suggestive of real acquaintance with the
penned product of his friend. In the analysis of subjects involved
60 Illustrative of this aspect of Prescott's nature is Fulmer Mood
and Granville Hicks (eds), "Letters to Dr. Channing on Slavery and the
Annexation of Texas, 1837," New England Quarterly, V (July, 1932),
587-601.
86 C. HARVEY GARDINER
and Prescott's knowledge of them in general and of the specific
writings in particular, no common denominator of concern emerges.
Apparently the historian's endorsements derived more basically
from personal friendship than from scholarly evaluation. With a
single exception all the authors were New Englanders by birth,
most of them Bostonians. And the lone non-New Englander,
Madame Calderon de la Barca, was a Bostonian by adoption.
Though the ingredients of which the various friendships were
compounded varied somewhat, some similarities and patterns do
appear. Bulfinch and Palfrey, writing on themes vastly removed
from Prescott's own interests, were fellow-Bostonians and fellow-
Harvard graduates of the same age as the historian. Motley,
Eliot, and Parkman, all Bostonians and Harvardmen, were of
another generation, the oldest of the trio born the year Prescott left
Harvard and the youngest twenty-seven years his junior. Hillard,
another Harvard man, fell between these groups in point of age.
Plainly the friendships, derived in part from social and economic
circles, transcended narrow age categories because of the common
element of intellectual endeavor related to creative writing.
Prescott's letters calling the attention of publishers to the works
of his friends invariably identified them clearly as such. Quite
probably, even as he did everything humanly possible to win
initial consideration for the labors of his friends, Prescott said
as little as he did about the works concerned because he might
have felt that his judgment would be discounted by the publisher.
In the name of friendship Prescott went the limit; on the score
of literary worth he often refrained from offering any comment,
much less judgment. Loyal to his friends, Prescott seemed intent
upon helping them breach the barrier of publisher indifference.
Interestingly and logically related is the fact that Prescott never
bothered to assist any person a second time.
Charged, in the choice of his own historical themes, with being
out of step with the surging nationalism of his day,61 Prescott, in
his interest in the contemporary literary products of numerous
fellow Americans, exhibited his peculiarly patrician pattern of
nationalistic sentiment.
For other writers in other periods and other American com-
munities such widespread, almost indiscriminate, endorsement of
61 Vernon Louis Parrington, The Romantic Revolution in America
1800-1860, New York, 1927, 438-439.
iiniuiiiwiimmBwnnnn^-— "»—"■"■
WILLIAM HICKLING PRESCOTT: AUTHORS' AGENT 87
one's friends would undoubtedly include a considerable number
of literary second-raters and duds. For Prescott, ensconced in
the wealth of mid-nineteenth century literary life of Boston, it was
otherwise, because he, in his casual, rather than consciously pursued
role of authors' agent related himself to the emergence of some
of the most noteworthy titles of the period. With the exception
of the work by Eliot the literary products of all the authors that
Prescott assisted rose to such levels of eminence that they are in-
variably classified as standard authorities, if not masterworks.
C. Harvey Gardiner
Southern Illinois University
Theodore Roosevelt and Egyptian
Nationalism
On March 14, 1910, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, fresh
from the African game-trails, arrived at Khartoum in the Sudan; by
the end of the month he and his party had cleared Egyptian waters
for Naples and the next leg of the famous "Teddyssey." During
this fortnight sojourn in Egypt and the Sudan Roosevelt found
himself in searing contact with the developing problems of im-
perialism and nationalism in the Middle East. These were prob-
lems which, not unnaturally, he was confident he had sure and
useful knowledge of, and thus he was prompted to deliver a number
of speeches in the nature of both impromptu remarks and formal
addresses concerning British policy for administering these colonial
areas.1 An examination of these Egyptian speeches2 reveals in a
singular fashion that Roosevelt was unable to appreciate the large
implications of the tensions steadily mounting between the imperi-
alist powers and colonial peoples.3 His contradictory attitude was
based on a conflict between the best interests of the imperialists
and the nationalists as he understood Egypt and its future. Long
a student of Egyptian affairs4 Roosevelt's first-hand observations
of the people of the Nile exposed him to young nationalism in the
1 Roosevelt's principal biographers have devoted attention, in varying
detail, to the Egyptian episode. See e.g., Henry F. Pringle, Theodore
Roosevelt, New York, 1956, 360-362; William R. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt,
An Intimate Biography, Boston, 1919, 320; Joseph R. Bishop, Theodore
Roosevelt and His Times, 2 vols. New York, 1920, II, 184, ff. wherein
is reprinted the extensive account Roosevelt wrote of his African-European
tour in the form of a letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan.
2 Roosevelt made three formal speeches on the Egyptian question:
"Peace and Order in the Sudan" (Khartoum, March 16, 1910) ; "Law
and Order in Egypt" (Cairo, March 28, 1910) ; "British Rule in Africa"
(London, May 31, 1910). These addresses are reprinted in full in Theodore
Roosevelt, African and European Speeches, New York, 1910, hereafter
cited as Speeches. In addition to the foregoing Roosevelt also made a
number of shorter talks to various groups in the Sudan and Egypt. The
texts of these talks in so far as they are extant have been gathered from
various sources.
3 See in particular Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the
Rise of America as a World Power, Baltimore, 1956. For example, Beale
comments: "He seems never to have comprehended that the more success-
fully Britain, America and the other powers 'civilized' their colonial peoples,
the more certain became the overthrow of the world power he joined
Britain in seeking to impose." Ibid, 170.
4 Ibid., 164.
88
IBMBMBW
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 89
raw. The experience was confusing for him. And the result was
that his public pronouncements became exhortations to the native
population to be better and more useful citizens of their country
(not better subjects or wards of the British Crown), and admoni-
tions to the British "to govern or to go" from Egypt.
The interplay of this contradiction is worth examination for
several reasons. It demonstrates clearly that Roosevelt had no well
thought-out concept of the relationship of imperialism to national-
ism as he applied his judgment to a particular case with which
he was for a time in contact. This was doubly unfortunate in
view of his role as one of the American empire builders and be-
cause of the moral authority which as an ex-president he wielded
on the popular and official mind at home and abroad. Isolation
of the imperialist dilemma of liberty and order is also valuable
because it exemplifies the confusion sown in the receptive minds
of a would-be national people. Charges of hypocrisy and of demo-
cratic cant easily could have been levelled at Roosevelt by any
Egyptian leader acquainted with a fair proportion of what he said
concerning Egypt and the Sudan. The depth of Western confusion
over the nature of imperialism and its ultimate fruits may be meas-
ured by the good intentions of Roosevelt in speaking; he sincerely
believed in what he said about liberty and order, whatever con-
tradiction might be implicit therein. It is helpful to bear this con-
sideration in mind because it dramatizes one of the sources of dis-
trust between the Powers and colonial peoples.
The Egypt of 1910 like other areas of the colonial world was
experiencing the birth pangs of modern nationalism.5 It was a
nationalism its advocates sought to fructify in a national self-
government. When so cautious a critic as Lord Cromer6 could
write seriously of rendering "the native Egyptians capable of
eventually taking over their share in the government of a really
autonomous community,"7 nationalist opinion, not surprizingly, was
demanding independence from the control of Europeans forthwith.
5 For the Egyptian background see: George Antonius, The Arab
Awakening, New York, 1938; Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt,
2 volumes, New York, 1908; John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations,
1800-1953, London, 1954; E. W. P. Newman, Great Britain in Egypt,
London, 1928; George Young, Egypt, London, 1927.
6 Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer (1841-1917), Agent General in Egypt,
1883-1907.
7 Cromer, Modern Egypt, II, 569; Cromer in his concluding chapter
entitled "The Future of Egypt," emphasized the necessarily gradual
assumption of self-government by the Egyptians and the need to prepare
the native populations to assume power, II, 563-571, passim.
90 DAVID H. BURTON
It was a nationalism that in a large sense was expressed in terms
of "Egypt for the Moslems." It was a nationalism whose extremist
elements did not scruple at political murder.8 On February 10,
1910, Boutros Ghali Pasha, the Prime Minister and a Copt who
had a long record of amicable relations with the British Agency,
was assassinated by a young Moslem fanatic.9 Nationalist agita-
tion for a time threatened to disrupt the political balance among
Khedive, middle class, and British officialdom which ruled in
Egypt. In the backwash of this smoldering unrest aggravated by
assassination Theodore Roosevelt arrived in the Sudan.
To the task of pronouncing policy for a restive Egypt Roosevelt
brought a firm preconception of the beneficence of European im-
perialism, and particularly that of Great Britain.10 His was a
somewhat idealized conception of imperialism as the great civiliz-
ing agency for the backward peoples of the world. He termed it
"Democratic Nationalism," while some like-minded Britishers spoke
of it as "Democratic Imperialism."11 It was something he could
believe in, he wrote to Sir Percy Girouard, the governor of Nigeria,
with whom he discussed it while stopping at Nairobi,12 though he
8 The nationalists included moderate and extremist elements. Ex-
tremist opinion was expressed through various secret terrorist groups as
well as through newspapers like El Lewa. The Constitutional Reform
League of Egypt was typical of the moderate factions.
9 By name Ibrahim Nassif al Wardani, a member of the secret
terrorist group "The Mutual Brotherhood." He was apprehended, brought
to trial April 21, 1910, found guilty of the assassination and executed
June 28, 1910.
10 This same idea is evident in the following excerpts from his
public addresses. "I doubt whether in any other region of the earth
there is to be seen more progress, the genuine progress, made by the
substitution of civilization for savagery than what we have seen in the
Sudan in the past twelve years." "Peace and Justice in the Sudan,"
Speeches, 3. "I have just spent nearly a year in Africa. While there I saw
four British protectorates. I grew heartily to respect the men whom
I there met, settlers and military and civilian officials. . . . Your men
in Africa are doing a great work for your empire, and they are also
doing a great work for civilization." "British Rule in Africa," ibid, 159.
See also The New York Times, March 16, 1910, 1.
11 Roosevelt to Sir Percy Girouard, July 21, 1910, Roosevelt Mss.
Roosevelt took his role as witness to events very seriously. "As Sir
Edward Grey (whom I greatly like and who thoroughly understands
matters) wrote me that I am in the position of an actor who is right
in the front of the stage in the full glare of the footlights, but who
has no assigned part to play." Roosevelt to Lady Delamere, September
22, 1910, ibid. See also Sir George Otto Trevelyan to Roosevelt, October
21, 1911, Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt, II, 184.
12 Roosevelt to Sir Percy Girouard, July 21, 1910, Roosevelt Mss.
See also Roosevelt to Arthur Lee, August 16, 1910, ibid.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 91
was not always convinced of what the outcome would be.13 Such
doubts did not, however, cause him to feel that the attempt to impart
the blessings of Western progress to the backward areas should not
be made. A striking insight into Roosevelt's attitude in this re-
gard is evident from an address he delivered to a Methodist Con-
ference in Washington, just before he left office in 1909. In
these remarks he pointed out:
There is one feature in the expansion of the peoples of the white or
European blood during the past four centuries which should never be lost
sight of by those who denounce such expansion on moral grounds. On
the whole, the movement has been fraught with lasting benefit to most
of the people already dwelling in the lands over which the expansion
took place. . . . Occasionally although not very frequently, a mild and kindly
race has been treated with wanton, brutal and ruthless inhumanity by
the white intruders. . . .
There have been very dark spots on the European conquests and
control of Africa; but on the whole the African regions which during
the past century have seen the greatest cruelty, degradation and suffering,
the greatest diminution of population, are those where native control
has been unchecked. The advance has been made in the regions under
European control or influence. . . ,14
In short, Roosevelt's mind was cast in the imperialist mold.
But it was an imperialism that aimed ultimately at lifting up the
non-white races, improving their living conditions, enabling them
to have a fuller life. In this great work of human improvement
the role of responsible self-government was a crucial one. Roose-
velt's domestic political career had been devoted lO raising the
standards of American life through responsible government, and
it is not unexpected that very often in Africa he found himself
uttering the same preachments that he had made in America to
emphasize this vital need, though the social circumstances of the
two peoples were strikingly dissimilar. Many Africans, perhaps
13 Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, ibid.
14 The Washington Post, January 19, 1909, 1-2. Lawrence F. Abbot
relates the following curious anecdote that throws added light on Roose-
velt's understanding of the fruits of civilization and the progress of man-
kind. The ex-president was inspecting some Egyptian ruins when it
took place. "One series of carvings presented the picture of a law court
in which a witness was being horribly tortured in the presence of the
judge to extort a confession. 'I wish,' said Colonel Roosevelt, 'that those
pessimists who believe that civilization is not making steady progress
could see this carving. Here is a king portraying as one of the virtues
of his reign a state of vicious cruelty which would not have been tolerated
by Tammany Hall in its worst days of corruption.' " "Mr. Roosevelt in
Egypt," Outlook, XCIV (April 30, 1910), 979-982, especially 981.
92 DAVID H. BURTON
likewise oblivious to these differences, welcomed the ex-president
as an apostle of constitutional government.15
For the enthusiastic young Egyptian who heard Theodore
Roosevelt as the voice of one of the great nations, it would have
been impossible not to have glimpsed a vision of the new Egypt,
the new nation, of which the ex-President spoke and which in
truth he exhorted his listeners to help create. Basic to the new
Egypt was a new, westernized Egyptian, an individual who was
capable of helping himself and thereby performing the work of a
good citizen. Roosevelt wanted to see the graduate of Egyptian
schools
prepared to do his work in some capacity in civil life, without regard
to any aid whatever received from or any salary drawn from the Govern-
ment. If a man is a good engineer, a good mechanic, a good agriculturist,
if he is trained so that he becomes a really good merchant, he is, in his
place, the best type of citizen.16
This was the way of Europe and America and it must be the way
of Africa.17 One hears distinct echoes of Roosevelt's classic Ameri-
can plainsman as he encourages the youth of the Nile to become
"men who will be able to shift for themselves, to help themselves
and to help others, fully independent of all matters connected with
the Government."18 ' 'There is only one way a man can perma-
nently be helped, and that is by helping him to help himself ",
he warned the young people of Africa.19 The active life of con-
15 "We Egyptians anticipated the arrival of the ex-President of the
United States with great pleasure and impatience, for all Egyptians be-
lieved him the best representative of the great American nation, and
they still consider that the Americans are the greatest nation in civilza-
tion of the present time and that they are the best friends of liberty in
as much as in that country constitutional principles have received their
widest development." Sheikh Ali Youssef, "Egypt's Reply to Colonel
Roosevelt," The North American Review, CXCI (June, 1910), 729.
16 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," Speeches, 5. Even in Lord
Cromer's time the educated Egyptian relied heavily upon governmental
employment. Thereby evolved a considerable pressure group for expanded
subsidies to the very people who were among the most vocal nationalists.
At the Luxor Mission The New York Times quoted Roosevelt as saying
that he wanted education "directed at making a man able to care for
himself and for those dependent on him." The New York Times, March
24, 1910, 4.
17 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," Speeches, 6.
18 Ibid, 5-6.
19 Roosevelt at the Luxor Mission, The New York Times, March 22,
1910, 5.
mmti
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 93
stant growth and increasing knowledge, the stock-in-trade of shib-
boleth of "T.R." at home, was readily declared to a people yearning
to assert itself. He asked the members of one audience at Khartoum,
for example, not to close their minds or books once school had
been left behind, but to keep training, keep educating themselves
so that instead of standing still, great progress, "good work, better
work" could be accomplished.20 This was a familiar Western creed
which as practiced in Europe and the United States had contributed
much to the making of the nation-state.
One of the truly decisive means available to the Egyptians
for bringing about a new nation was education. Roosevelt's views
of the worth of training people sufficiently so that they might help
themselves have already been indicated. But he also took occasion
to remind the Egyptians of the function of education in the larger
sense, and the place of the University as the best means of express-
ing a country's ideals. For one thing they must not simply imitate
Western universities; rather, Roosevelt entreated, you must "copy
what is good in them but test in a critical spirit whatever you take,
so as to be sure that you take only what is wisest and best for your-
selves."21 A critical spirit of inquiry, however, was not calculated
to enhance British popularity in many quarters of the Egypt of
1910 ; but Roosevelt failed to relate theory and facts as a first step
toward a logical and coherent attitude on the Egyptian question.
That he had in mind a University whose impact should be felt in
many phases of the peoples' lives is amply borne out by the fol-
lowing words of the Cairo address at the National University:
This university should have a profound influence on all things educa-
tional, social, economic and industrial throughout this whole region, be-
cause the very fact of Egypt's present position is such that this university
will enjoy a freedom hitherto unparalleled in the investigation and testing
out of all problems vital to the future of the people of the Orient.22
It was to be a University "fraught with literally untold possibilities"
for the good of the country.23
Closely tied to the free National University advocated by Theo-
dore Roosevelt was the privileged status of the country's press.
Western struggles for liberty very often had revolved around free-
dom of the newspapers to criticize the government. Roosevelt, good
20 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," Speeches, 9.
21 "Law and Order in Egypt," ibid, 19.
22 Ibid., 17.
23 Ibid., 16.
94 DAVID H. BURTON
democrat that he was, would not insist upon a free press for Euro-
peans and Americans and a muzzled press for native peoples.24
At Shepheard's Hotel where he stayed while in Cairo he held a
press interview to which were invited representatives of the local
newspapers. Some fourteen native editors attended; suitably
enough the group reflected various shadings of nationalist political
opinion. In discussing their responsibility as editors Roosevelt
addressed them very much as he would have spoken to a similar
gathering of newspapermen in the American midwest:
I always tell the newspaper men in my own country that they are using
one of the most formidable weapons of modern life, and that it is vital
to see that they use it for good purposes and not for bad purposes.
The correspondent or editor of a newspaper is in reality a public
servant.25
Yet a free press in Egypt would have certainly included elements
agitating for the withdrawal of British forces from the country and
the establishment of a national government. Many Egyptian editors
would have felt remiss in their duty as public servants to have
written otherwise. According to a first-hand account furnished by
Ali Youssef, editor of El Garida, one of the moderate nationalist
organs, Roosevelt quite expected that any rebuke he should choose
to give the nationalists over the death of Boutros Pasha would
receive some adverse comment from the press.26 Yet, as an Ameri-
can nutured on the tradition of an uncontrolled press this did not
disturb him. On the contrary, it was natural to him. In Africa
as in America! His vision of the modern Egypt included as a mat-
ter of course a responsible press free to criticize.27
The kind of society in which the modern Egyptian should expect
to find himself was a Western one in many of its aspects. Before the
24 The Press Law of 1881 enabled the Government to suppress news-
papers for criticism unfavorable to government policy. This law was
put into effect after the death of Boutros Pasha.
25 The New York Times, March 28, 1910, 1. The Daily Mail (Lon-
don), March 28, 1910, 5, carried a glamorized account of the same in-
terview.
26 Ali Youssef has quoted Roosevelt at the press interview as re-
marking: " 'I do not want newspaper men to dictate to me. I am going
to speak tomorrow in the Egyptian University. Wait till you hear what
I shall say and then say what you wish to say.' " "Egypt's Reply to
Colonel Roosevelt," loc. tit., 732.
27 Professor Nathaniel Schmidt, Chairman of the Department of
Oriental Languages and Literature at Cornell University and himself
a long time resident of Egypt remarked in criticism of Roosevelt's Cairo
address: "'As for freedom of speech, they have got to have it. It is
in the blood.' " The New York Times, March 31, 1910, 5.
IHMMIMMIMH
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 95
National University Roosevelt insisted on the practical, technical,
industrial foundation of a healthy country. "The base, the founda-
tion of healthy life in any country, in any society, is necessarily
composed of men who do the actual productive work of the country,
whether in tilling the soil, in handicrafts, or in business. . . ."28 The
economic objective of the modern Egyptian should be, in other
words, the development of a nation of productive workers who
could by their own efforts add to the security and welfare of their
country. In this regard he reiterated that his doctrine for Ameri-
cans and for Africans was one and the same.29
Still other attributes of a great community modeled on Western
lines Roosevelt urged on his Egyptian audiences. One of these
was a Christian respect for womanhood. Stopping at the Luxor
Mission on his way to Cairo he commented favorably on the train-
ing given the native girls at the Mission school. The women as
well as the men must be elevated to a new status based on respect
for the individual. This could be achieved in part by instructing
the girls in the domestic arts to be sure, but neither should their
literary education be neglected.30 Another Western idea discussed
briefly by Roosevelt was premised on what he considered sound
American experience. This was a mutual respect for the religious
beliefs of all Egyptians. Moslems, Copts, and Jews were mingled
with native converts to Protestant and Catholic Christianity. Learn
to live together regardless of religious differences was the practical
advice he offered to overcome the dangers inherent in this situa-
tion.31 Nor must the Egyptians allow their government to become
dominated by the military. "Woe to the people whose army tries
to play a part in politics," Colonel Roosevelt admonished the new
Egypt.32 Control by a military junto would preclude the erection
of the very kind of society that he wished for his listeners ; generals
too frequently had been the death of freedom and criticism. Ali
Youssef for one was in agreement.33
It was an easy matter for the Egyptians to accept Roosevelt's
encouragement of their nationalistic ambitions. Americans were
the exemplars of freedom and prosperity from whom they had
28 "Law and Order in Egypt," Speeches, 23.
29 Ibid, 23-24.
so The Times (London), March 24, 1910, 5; The New York Times,
March 24, 1910, 4; "Mr. Roosevelt in Egypt," loc. cit., 981.
31 "Peace and Justice in the Sudan," Speeches, 6.
32 The Times (London), March 18, 1910, 5.
33 "Egypt's Reply to Colonel Roosevelt," loc cit., 730.
96 DAVID H. BURTON
learned much, without paying tribute of suffering and humiliation.34
A remarkable example of the nature of the feelings of the Middle
East peoples for Americans is to be seen in a testimonial presented
to the former president by a Committee representing the Syrian
community of the city of Khartoum. The document is eloquent of
the aspirations which motivated the inhabitants of their part of the
world, whether in Syria, Turkey, the Sudan or Egypt. In part it
read :
The chief reasons which the Syrians have to be grateful to America are
the introduction of a system of free education or of education on terms
within the means of the masses, and the broad and liberal lines of American
policy in welcoming immigration. . . .
Schools were opened in almost all important centres of Syria, a print-
ing press was established at Beirut, and a genuine yearning for the ac-
quirement of knowledge animated the whole population . . . instilling into
the minds of the rising generation the true principles of liberty, and in-
spiring them with American, English and French ideals of life.35
Roosevelt without doubt proudly accepted this accolade from a
grateful people. After all these were the ideals of life he cherished
as civilized man's highest expression. There were no better models
to guide native peoples in reconstructing their societies for the
future.
As for the present Roosevelt concerned himself with the fact
and as he saw it with the necessity of British control in Egypt and
Sudan. In turning to examine in detail this defense of the British
occupation it is well to remember that the ex-president visited the
area at a time when feelings of political unrest were rife with
violence. To match the murder of Boutros Pasha there was
Denshawai, of terrible memory.36 At the time it might well have
seemed that the final crisis in Anglo-Egyptian affairs was at hand.
34 "Moreover, Egyptians have a greater liking for Americans than
for Europeans because they consider that they have not been harmed by
Americans, while at the same time they are getting the same benefits
from the American civilization that they gain from Europe. . . . The
Americans are, in fact, the only real teachers who taught the Egyptians
honestly and did not interfere in politics." Ibid, 729.
35 "Address Presented to Colonel the Honorable Theodore Roosevelt
by the Syrian Committee of Khartoum," March 17, 1910, Roosevelt Mss.
36 In 1906 at Denshawai a British officer was killed by villagers dur-
ing a misunderstanding over hunting privileges in the area. Three death
sentences and several floggings were ordered by a Special Court and sub-
sequently were carried out. Popular reaction among the Egyptians was
violent in denouncing this judgment and penalty. Boutros Pasha had
served as president of the Special Court.
II— !!■■■»■ IMMMMIIIII I flIIMMJIl* ■*■"'■■■■■ I' —»■-—— -TJffl
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 97
The incumbent Agent General, Sir Eldon Gorst,37 was not made of
the stern stuff of Lord Cromer, and the Liberal ministry at London
was divided as to its policy for Egypt between imperialists and little
Englanders. Very probably these circumstances worked to intensify
Roosevelt's antagonism to the nationalist political factions and
make more pronounced the contradictions discernible in "Demo-
cratic Nationalism."
There were two major reasons in Roosevelt's thinking why Great
Britain must not be disturbed in her occupation of the Nile prov-
inces. Britain was a vessel of civilization, carrying Western ideas
across the world. In each of his major speeches on the Egyptian
question,38 in extemporaneous remarks delivered to informal
groups,39 and in his private correspondence,40 Roosevelt tirelessly
insisted upon Britain's historic role as the agent of Western cul-
ture. Equally important was his conviction that the Egyptians were
themselves incapable of self-government at the time, and the continu-
ance of British power was its logical complement. According to
Rooseveltian criteria it would be years, generations perhaps, before
this deficiency would be overcome. Writing to Sir George O. Trevel-
yan he characterized nationalist agitation as centering in two groups:
"... Levantine Moslems ... of the ordinary Levantine type, noisy,
emotional, rather decadent, quite hopeless material on which to
build, but also not really dangerous as foes"; and second "the real
strength of the nationalist movement . . . the mass of practically
unchanged bigoted Moslems to whom the movement meant driving
out the foreigner, plundering and slaying the local Christian, and
a return to all the violence and corruption which festered under
37 Sir Eldon Gorst (1861-1911), Consul General for Egypt, 1907-1910.
38 Speeches, 3, 26-27, 159.
39 "He gave two little addresses, one to the boys in the Government
school, and the other to the principal merchants. Upon each he urged
the necessity of doing everything in their power to perpetuate the present
rule of peace and justice in the Sudan. To the merchants he said:
'Uphold the government which has given you prosperity and upon which
your further prosperity depends.'" The Times (London), March 17, 1910,
5. In commenting upon the Gordon College as an example of a great
civilization institution Roosevelt exclaimed: "'Think of it! The sons
of the Khalifa El Mahdi are studying in a college which perpetuates
the name of the man originally responsible for the destruction of their
father's power.' " The New York Times, March 16, 1910, 4. See also
The Times (London), March 18, 1910, 5, for an account of Roosevelt's
address at the Egyptian Officers' Club.
40 Roosevelt to Sir Percy Girouard, July 21, 1910, Roosevelt Mss.
Roosevelt to Lady Delamere, September 22, 1910, ibid. Roosevelt to Sir
George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, ibid.
98 DAVID H. BURTON
the old style Moslem rule, whether Asiatic or African."41 Under
such circumstances the Egyptians, however keen they might be for
self-government at once, could not be trusted with it. Years of
further political apprenticeship under British direction would have
to intervene.42 The fullest expression of Roosevelt's doubts about
immediate Egyptian self-rule is contained in the speech before the
National University, the same address with so much encouragement
to the spirit of nationalism. In part, the audience was advised:
. . . the training of a nation to fit it successfully to fulfill the duties of
self-government is a matter, not of a decade or two, but of generations. There
are foolish empiricists who believe that the granting of a paper constitu-
tion, prefaced by some high sounding declaration, of itself confers the
power of self-government upon a people. This is never so. Nobody can
'give' an individual 'self-help'. . . . With any people the essential quality
is to show, not the haste of grasping after a power which it is only too
easy to misuse, but a slow, steady, resolute development of those substantial
qualities such as love of justice, love of fair-play, the spirit of self-reliance,
of moderation, which alone enable a people to govern themselves.43
In the light of the foregoing analysis it is not unexpected that dur-
ing the course of his journeying along the Nile Roosevelt frequently
was heard to insist upon the wisdom of maintaining British power
there, and that in his final address on the future of Egypt delivered
in London he called for a strong arm to rule. In these passages
of his speeches he assumed the attitude of a hard-fisted soldier
intent on keeping order, rather than that of a patient colonial
administrator concerned with demonstrating the reality of British
justice. The "thing, not the form" was vital; it was England's
"first duty to keep order."44
On the evening of his arrival in Khartoum Colonel Roosevelt
was entertained at the palace of the Governor-General. His host
41 Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, ibid.
(Italics added)
42 An extreme version of Roosevelt's estimate of the level of Egyptian
political maturity is included in the following news story: "At Tantah
Colonel Roosevelt was reminded that it was the spot where in 1882
the Moslems pulled the Christians out of the trains and massacred them.
'Yes,' said Colonel Roosevelt, 'and that is just what should happen again
if they had self-rule in Egypt.' " New York Evening Journal, March 31,
1910, 21. Although one may hesitate to give credence to this report
in that its chief source is the somewhat sensational Evening Journal the
ex-president would in effect say the same thing in his London address;
it is also necessary to point out that whether authentic or nor, the story
circulated among the Egyptians. See "Egypt's Reply to Colonel Roose-
velt," loc. .cit, 736.
43 "Law and Order in Egypt," Speeches, 24-25.
44 "British Rule in Africa," ibid, 171.
iiiMHiiimi—™""— — ■—■
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 99
was Slatin Pasha,45 the Sirdar, the senior British military officer
in the Sudan, and his fellow diners were British military and civil
officials. Roosevelt was not to speak formally, but in the course
of the dinner conversation the subject of the assassination of Boutros
Pasha was brought up. He was asked what he would have done
had he been the Agent General. The reply forthcoming is a force-
ful example of Roosevelt's "tough" policy as a reaction against
extreme nationalist pressure to achieve self-government.
It is very simple. I would try the murderer at drumhead court-martial. As
there is no question about the facts, for his own faction do not deny
the assassination, he would be taken out and shot; and then if the home
government cabled me, in one of their moments of vacillation to wait
a little while, I would cable in reply: 'Can't wait the assassin has been tried
and shot.' The home government might recall me or impeach me if
they wanted to, but that assassin would have received his just deserts.46
This conversational remark largely sets the tone for all of Roose-
velt's more formal addresses when his theme gravitated to the
rights of the Egyptians for immediate self-rule. Many of the British
audience were pleased to have this "tough" answer and he was
urged to speak out for law and order whenever possible.47 Two
days later in a formal address before British officialdom at the
Sudan Club Roosevelt paid tribute to the work of the British and
insisted that any attempt to dislodge them from their Nile occupa-
tion would be criminal.48 As he was to remark later in London,
self-government in the hands of the Sudanese had been the self-
government of the wolf -pack,49 a situation no civilized power could
permit to continue unchecked. Native press reaction to these
opinions concerning the political future of Egypt and her people
was high-lighted by repeated demands for local autonomy and even
a warning to Roosevelt that he should not dare to speak out again
in a pro-British vein.50 Nothing daunted, next day upon invita-
45 Rudolph Carl, Baron Slatin, (1857-1932), Austrian-born Inspec-
tor-General of the Sudan, 1900-1915.
46 Lawrence F. Abbott, Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, New
York, 1919, 154-155. Italics in original.
47 Ibid., 155.
48 The Times (London), March 18, 1910, 5.
49 "British Rule In Africa," Speeches, 165.
50 For a personal reflection concerning the political stir that "Peace
and Justice in the Sudan" created and threats made against Roosevelt
see R. S. McClernahan to J. C. O'Laughlin, March 27, 1910, Roosevelt
Mss. McClernahan was with the American Presbyterian Mission, Assuit,
Egypt; O'Laughlin was a Chicago Tribune correspondent assigned to
the Roosevelt tour of Africa and Europe.
100 DAVID H. BURTON
tion he addressed the Egyptian Officers club where nationalist feel-
ing was understandably strong. Slatin Pasha had asked in advance
that the native officers be urged to maintain "their absolute and
unflinching loyalty to English rule" and Roosevelt "very gladly"
consented to do so.51 In the speech that followed the officers
were warned of the dangers of involvement in politics.
The soldier who mixes politics with soldiering becomes a bad politician
and a poor soldier. In the Spanish War, most of the men in my regi-
ment differed from me in politics. I didn't care a particle. I knew they
felt so long as they were in uniform, that their duty and pride bade them
to be soldiers and nothing else, and that they devote all their thoughts,
will and energy to working for the greatness of the flag under which
they fought.52
This loyalty to British rule at the expense of national aspirations,
with the curious analogy of the Spanish war only adding a note
of obscurity, must have seemed ill-founded to many of the native
officers. It tends to emphasize once more that Roosevelt frequently
did not relate theory to the facts at hand. That he was inclined
to persist in his illogical attitudes is illustrated by events shortly
after his Officers' Club talk, when two days later at Assuan he
repeated his warnings about the dangers of mixing politics and
soldiering to a group of native officers informally gathered to greet
him.53
The unsettling effect that Roosevelt's widely circulating opinions
were having upon the Egyptians may be judged from Sir Eldon
Gorst's initial desire that he say nothing of the assassination of
Boutros Pasha in his scheduled speech to the National University.
This Roosevelt refused to do and his outspoken opposition apparently
convinced Gorst that some good could come of an admonition to
the Egyptians to forego violence in their feud with Great Britain.54
Thus, while the greater portion of this address was devoted to
praise and encouragement of the University with the nationalistic
appeal already discussed, it also included a stinging rebuke to the
assassins:
51 Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, Roose-
velt Mss.
52 The Times (London), March 18, 1910, 5.
53 Ibid., March 21, 1910, 5.
54 Roosevelt to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, October 1, 1911, Roosevelt
Mss., Gorst wrote: "how glad I am that you consented to speak to these
people. If anything can bring them into a more reasonable frame of
mind your words should have that effect." Gorst to Roosevelt, March
26, 1910, ibid.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 101
All good men, all men of every nation whose respect is worth having,
have been inexpressibly shocked. . . .
The type of man which turns out the assassin is a type possessing all the
qualities most alien to good citizenship. . . . Such a man stands on a pinnacle
of evil infamy.55
Perhaps this publicly administered reprimand was the most strik-
ing phase of the address, given the circumstances of tension and
bad feeling. British approval certainly was not lacking, Roosevelt's
words having been edited and approved in advance by both Gorst
and Wingate.56 But Almo, one of the organs of the Constitutional
Nationalists, seemed to think that Roosevelt had also come out
for more self-government for the Egyptians.
Some criticism is due to the bad translation [it told its readers] made in
reference to the strategic position of Europe, which seemed to indicate
that he [Roosevelt] desired England always to remain in Egypt. [But]
he has insisted that the Egyptians are as fit for a Constitution as the people
of Turkey, which movement Mr. Roosevelt has approved.57
It depended upon which part of the speech was studied, and by
whom. The Cairo address is of critical significance in this examina-
tion of the nature of Roosevelt's "Democratic Nationalism" in that
the logical clevage in his thinking is so unmistakable within the
passages of a single speech. This factor helps to rule out the inter-
pretation that he may have arrived at Khartoum with a false im-
pression of the civilizational level of the Nile peoples, only to be
convinced shortly of the position that continued British occupation
was both blessing and necessity. Nor is there evidence from other
sources that Roosevelt's estimate of the Egyptian potentiality for
self-rule was altered by his personal experiences with the peoples
there. Both these considerations re-emphasize a confusion of theory
and reality that is part of this Egyptian particularization of the
Weltanschauung of "Democratic Nationalism."
Perhaps the most widely known of Theodore Roosevelt's
speeches on the Egyptian question is "British Rule in Africa," de-
55 "Law and Order in Egypt," Speeches, 26.
5 6 Sir Reginald Wingate to Roosevelt, March 30, 1910, Roosevelt
Mss. Sir Reginald Wingate to Roosevelt, June 8, 1910, ibid. (Wingate
was British Governor-General in the Sudan.) The Times correspondent
reported that Roosevelt's speech was "heartily welcomed here [Cairo] by
the British, French and those natives who have large interests which
would be affected by a change in the system of government. It is hoped
that it may help to convince the United States and the continent that
British occupation is the only guarantee of order and financial stability."
The Times (London), March 31, 1910, 9.
57 The New York Times, March 30, 1910, 3.
102 DAVID H. BURTON
livered at the Guildhall in London on May 31, 1910, on the occasion
of granting the freedom of the City of London to the former presi-
dent. There is little in it susceptible of favorable interpretation
by the nationalists. It has been termed the "govern or go" address
which is an apt summation of its most forceful passage:
Now either you have the right to be in Egypt or you have not; either it
is or it is not your duty to establish and keep order. If you feel that you
have not the right to be in Egypt, if you do not wish to establish and keep
order there, why then, by all means get out of Egypt. If, as I hope, you
feel that your duty to civilized mankind and your fealty to your own
great tradition alike bid you stay, then make the fact and the name agree
and show that you are ready to meet in very deed the responsibility which
is yours
58
The dangers of self-government for a people such as the Egyptians
had been demonstrated amply in the Sudan, Roosevelt pointed out.
Under Sudanese rule "great crimes were committed . . . crimes so
dark that their very hideousness protects them from exposure. . . .
Then the English came in; put an end to independence and self-
government which wrought this hideous evil, restored order, kept
the peace and gave to each individual . . . liberty. . . ."59 And so
must it be in Egypt. For Roosevelt the murder of Boutros Pasha
was conclusive of this. "... The attitude of the so-called Egyptian
Nationalist Party in connection with this foul murder has shown
that they neither were desirous nor capable of guaranteeing even
that primary justice, the failure to supply which makes self-govern-
ment not merely empty but a noxious farce."60
As has been pointed out, "British Rule in Africa" was consistent
in its appeal for an indefinite continuation of the British occupa-
tion. May it be argued in consequence that this speech represented
the matured convictions of Theodore Roosevelt on the question of
Egypt, and as such marks the high plateau of a consistent policy
pronouncement by him after confusion among the foothills of
conflict and unrest in Egypt itself? Two conditions tend to dis-
courage this conclusion. One is the rather brief period of time
elapsing between the date of the Cairo address (March 28) and
that of the London talk (May 31). This interim, it should be
kept in mind, was taken up with an almost constant round of public
appearances, formal receptions and social functions from the draw-
58 "British Rule In Africa," Speeches, 171.
59 Ibid., 165.
60 ibid., 170.
.■
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM 103
ing rooms of Vienna to the common rooms of Oxford. Roosevelt
probably had little opportunity for the kind of serious reflection
by means of which political attitudes of the most significant sort
are refined and crystallized. A second consideration is the all
British audience that was his in London; successful politicians are
by instinct sensitive to the moods and prejudices of their listeners.
The Guildhall address had firmly placed Roosevelt in the camp
of the imperialists in the popular mind — the popular Anglo-
American mind. But there was that "new Egypt" of which he had
spoken and his native audiences quite understandably might have
been most influenced by those phases of his talks that emphasized
the national potential of their country. The total meaning of
Roosevelt's words was such as to indicate that his own attitude
was confused and inconsistent. He had brought to his task of pro-
nouncing a British policy for Egypt a profound faith in the great
worth of self-government and a perplexing belief that nationalism
by definition was a monopoly of the West. It is clear from his
speeches that he was no friend of Egyptian self-rule; yet he had
preached eloquently to the people of their country and what each
might do to strengthen it. A productive economy, a self-reliant
population, a spirit of free and critical inquiry — all these things he
had wished for Egypt. Modern nations have been built on no less.
Even as he was excoriating the Levantine Moslems — "noisy, emo-
tional, rather decadent" — he was in search of a people on which
to build. With disarming clarity had Roosevelt himself, as though
by accident, revealed the nature of the dilemna ot Western im-
perialism, and the conflict in his own "Democratic Nationalism"
that was a microcosm of it.
David H. Burton
St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia
The Midwestern Immigrant and
Politics: A Case Study
Historians have long neglected to study the role of the Mid-
western immigrant groups in politics. General statements concern-
ing the political allegiances and voting behavior of the various
foreign-born groups have been made by both careful scholars and
casual observers. Yet, there have been few, if any, "grass roots"
investigations to support these conclusions. This study attempts to
answer three questions: (l) Did the politicians view the immigrant
group as a force in politics? (2) Was there a pattern to immigrant
voting? (3) To what extent did ethnic group identity influence
the immigrant vote?
North Dakota serves well as an area for this study because of
the high percentage of foreign-born in its population and because
the immigrant population was divided into three distinct geographi-
cal sections. The election of 1900 was chosen because at that time
the foreign-born population was at its greatest strength. Also, in
1900 the issue of imperialism was raised — in part to sway certain
ethnic group votes.
Historical Background
In 1890 North Dakota's population had been 182,000, while
ten years later there were 319,000 people in the state.1 North
Dakota showed the greatest percentage increase of the Great Plains
states for the ten year period, a notable increase caused by the great
influx of immigrant groups.2 Of the total population in 1900,
133,091 were of foreign origins with the Norwegians, Germans,
and Canadians making up the three largest groups.
The Norwegians, numbering 30,206 in 1900, comprised 9-5 per
cent of the state's population.3 This national group found its
principal area of settlement in the eastern counties of the state.
Norwegians started migrating to the United States as early as 1825,
but the main flow began after the Civil War when more than
1 Census Reports, I, Twelfth Census of the United States, "Popula-
tion," Part I, Washington, 1901, 33. Hereafter cited as Twelfth Census.
2 C. F. Kraenzel, The Great Plains in Traiisition, Norman, University
of Oklahoma Press, 1953, 138.
3 Twelfth Census, 732-734.
104
MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND POLITICS: A CASE STUDY 105
100,000 came between 1866-1873. A second great movement of
Norwegians to America took place between 1879 and 1889 when
over a quarter of a million arrived.4 Although there were many
reasons for this exodus from the Old Country, Einar Haugen best
sums them up as "the hope for social betterment."5
It was not long until the Norwegians within the United States
began to move westward as the tide of immigration increased. By
the 1870's they had pushed across Minnesota into the Red River
Valley. A decade later these people were dominant in the eastern
part of North Dakota.6
The Germans made up another ethnic group of importance in
North Dakota at this time. There were two distinct national groups
of Germanic origin — the "Reich" Germans and the "Ruzlaends"
or German-Russians. At the close of the nineteenth century, there
were 14,179 German-Russians and 11,546 Germans in the state;
together they comprised over eight per cent of the population.7 The
"Reich" Germans were those Germans who migrated to the United
States from Germany. The primary cause of their migration was
"undoubtedly economic"; however, the disturbed political condi-
tions in western Europe provided another motive.8 The first Ger-
mans to move into the Midwest settled in Wisconsin and southern
Minnesota. As more and more Germans came into the area, their
ethnic frontier was extended into parts of North Dakota. The
"Reich" Germans were scattered over the whole state, but their
greatest concentration was in Morton, Oliver, and Mercer counties
located in the Missouri Valley area.9
The German-Russians were not Russian in origin, but Germanic.
These people left Germany for the area around the Black Sea
during the years of unrest in Europe between the Seven Years
War and the fall of Napoleon. Catherine II and Alexander II
4 Ingrid Semmingsen, "Norwegian Emigration to America During
the Nineteenth Century," Norwegian- American Studies and Records, XI
(1940), 68-70.
5 Einar Haugen, "Norwegian Migration to America," Norwegian-
American Studies and Records, XVIII (1954), 2; For general discussions
about motives for immigration see: Carlton Qualey, "Pioneer Norwegian
Settlement in North Dakota," North Dakota History, V (October, 1930),
21-22; Carl Wittke, We Who Built America, The Saga of the Immigrant,
New York, 1939, 264-265.
6 Carlton Qualey, "Pioneer Norwegian Settlement in North Dakota,"
North Dakota History, V (October, 1930), 16.
7 Twelfth Census, 734-736.
8 Wittke, We Who Built America, 188.
9 Jesse A. Tanner, "Foreign Migration into North Dakota," "Collec-
tions of the State Historical Society of North Dakota, I, (1906), 131-135.
106 D. JEROME TWETON
of Russia offered them religious freedom, tariff-free trade, self-
government, military exemption, loans and other rights if they
would make Russia their home. The immediate cause of their
movement to the United States was the cancellation of many of
these rights including military exemption. It was not long until
thousands of eligible men and their families left the Black Sea
region for America where they found new homes in the agricultural
Midwest.10 In North Dakota the German-Russians settled in the
central and southern areas of the state.
Before the Europeans began finding homes in North Dakota,
French and English Canadians had crossed the international bound-
ary to settle in northern North Dakota. The Canadian-born popu-
lation reached its peak in 1900 with 25,004 people, or nine per
cent of the state population. This ethnic group dominated those
counties bordering Canada — Bottineau, Rollette, Towner, Cavalier,
Pembina, and Walsh.11
The Immigrant ana the Campaign
The immigrant was the center of attention in the North Dakota
campaign of 1900. Since the ethnic groups were a potential po-
litical power, both parties attempted to win their votes. Two
editorials, one in the Republican Lakota Herald and the other in
the Democratic Devils Lake Free Press, keynoted the state campaign
when they implied that the aim of both political parties was to
capture the votes of the immigrant population. The Lakota Herald
believed "it was plainly evident . . . that the so-called German vote
will occupy a good share of the attention of Bryan Democrats,"12
while the Devils Lake Free Press contended that "the Republicans
will endeavor to hold the normally Republican Norwegians and
at the same time work on the Germans."13
The Democrats, as the Lakota Herald suggested, placed their
main emphasis upon convincing the Germans that their party
was "the party which stood for the high ideals of liberty and
peace that the Germans did."14 In attempting to bring the German
voters into the Democratic column the Democrats advanced the
argument that the Republican party was the party of "imperialism."
10 Ibid., 199; Wittke, We Who Built America, 311.
n Leon H. Truesdell, The Canadian Born in the United States, New
Haven, Yale University Press, 29; Twelfth Census, 732-734.
12 Lakota Herald, July 6, 1900.
13 Devils Lake Free Press, July 13, 1900.
14 Ibid.
MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND POLITICS: A CASE STUDY 107
The Bathgate Pink Paper, one of the two Democratic daily news-
papers in the state, illustrated this when it declared: "The Repub-
lican party's stand on imperialism and ultimate militarism is against
all in which the German of today believes."15 The Democrats
also argued that the Republicans' friendship toward England had
"entangled us in an unwritten alliance with Great Briatin, Ger-
many's rising rival"; they further reasoned that "no loyal citizen
of the United States of German birth can longer support the Re-
publicans."16 Bryan's party felt that the German had come to this
country to escape "what the Republicans now push down his throat —
militarism concealed in imperialism."17
The Democrats also tried to secure German votes by nomina-
ting a German, Max Wipperman, for the governorship. The im-
portance of selecting a candidate for governor who would appeal
to the ethnic population was illustrated by National Democratic
Committeeman I. P. Baker who wrote: "While at our state con-
vention we could not find a good strong Scandinavian, we did
find a good strong German to run . . . , and as the German vote
is quite numerous ... I think we can elect him."18
Wipperman's role in the campaign was to "make flying trips to
speak at German gatherings," to "organize Germans into Democratic
clubs," and to "overcome Republican charges" in order to "bring
the German and German-Russian population under Democratic
control."19 The Democrats believed that they could win the gov-
ernorship by using a German candidate to lure the German vote.
The Republicans did not concentrate as much effort on winning
the German vote as did the Democrats. Yet to counteract the in-
fluence of Wipperman in German areas, they established a German-
language newspaper, Die Wacbt am Missouri, which carried Repub-
lican views throughout the German counties.20 Recognizing the
advantage of having this important ethnic group represented on the
15 Bathgate Pink Paper, as quoted in Church's Ferry Sun, July
20, 1900.
16 Yankton Press and Dakotan, July 18, 1900. This paper, printed
in South Dakota, was widely circulated throughout the German areas in
southern North Dakota.
17 Wahpeton Times, July 13, 1900.
18 I. P. Baker to Richard Petti grew, July 28, 1900. I. P. Baker
Papers, North Dakota Historical Society Library, Bismarck, North Dakota.
Hereafter cited as Baker Papers.
19 I. P. Baker to Max Wipperman, November 2, 1900; I. P. Baker
to Thomas Kleinogl, August 15, 1900; I. P. Baker to William F. Foye,
October 22, 1900; Baker Papers.
20 Dickinson Press, July 15, 1900.
108 D. JEROME TWETON
party ticket, they nominated a German, Ferdinand Leutz, for the
position of Commissioner of Insurance.21 It was also alleged that
the Republicans had "taken ten to twelve kegs and a number of
cases of beer into a German community to make a drastic effort to
capture the German vote there."22
On the other hand, although the state Republicans were "of the
opinion that the Norse and other Scandinavians were always and
would always be Republicans,"23 they attempted to secure the votes
of this important ethnic group for their party. This plan to center
the campaign upon the Norwegians and other Scandinavians rested
upon Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota, who was described as
the "most popular man in the United States with the Scandinavian
population."24 Nelson was especially popular in the Red River
Valley for he had supported legislation which was or would have
been beneficial to that region. The Republicans, therefore, wished
to have Nelson come into North Dakota to plead the Republican
cause with his fellow Scandinavians.25
While Nelson was visiting the Red River Valley area, a dele-
gation of North Dakota Republicans asked him to come into North
Dakota to address a rally to be held in Grand Forks. In a spec-
tacular incident Nelson vowed he would never speak for the Re-
publicans of his sister state while it was dominated by political
bossism.26 Republican hopes to use Nelson were crushed. Knowing
that this incident could cost them Scandinavian votes, the Republi-
cans tried to keep the matter out of the press.27
On the other hand, the Democrats took full advantage of the
Republican blunder. The Bathgate Pink Paper warned the Scand-
inavian voters that they should follow Nelson's advice and not
support the Republican machine.28 In order to capitalize upon this
21 Mandan Pioneer, July 13, 1900.
22 I. p. Baker to Max Wipperman, November 2, 1900. Baker Papers.
23 Devils Lake Free Press, August 18, 1900.
24 W. Jewell to Solomon Comstock, October 1, 1900. Solomon Corn-
stock Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society Library, St. Paul, Minne-
sota.
25 R. W. Farrar to Knute Nelson, October 10, 1900; G. S. Norgaard
to Knute Nelson, September 22, 1900; Porter J. McCumber to Knute
Nelson, August 28, 1900. Knute Nelson Papers, Minnesota State Historical
Society Library, St. Paul, Minnesota. Hereafter cited as Nelson Papers.
26 "Why Not Speak in North Dakota?"— clipping dated October 22,
1900. Nelson Papers.
27 Of the Republican newspapers surveyed for this study not one
reported the Nelson incident.
28 Bathgate Pink Paper as quoted in the Grand Forks Plaindealer,
October 26, 1900. Other Democratic papers that emphasized the Nelson
incident were: Grafton News and Times, October 19, 1900; Grand Forks
Plaindealer, October 25, 1900.
MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND POLITICS: A CASE STUDY 109
situation, the Democratic campaign headquarters had "several
thousand of Nelson's anti-Republican remarks printed in Norwegian
and Swedish and circulated in Scandinavian areas of the state."29
From this evidence it is clearly seen that the political parties
believed that the ethnic group could become a powerful weapon in
the winning of an election. It was felt that control of one or more
of the major immigrant groups was essential to victory at the polls.
The only major ethnic group not strongly concentrated upon was
the Canadian. It may have been that the Republicans believed that
these people were a lost cause because they had previously supported
Democratic candidates with few exceptions.
Voting Behavior of the Immigrant
The election of 1900 retained Republican William McKinley in
the White House. In polling the largest plurality in Republican
history, he received 7,218,491 votes or 51.7 per cent — a slight in-
crease over 1896. The defeated William Jennings Bryan got
6,358,071 or 45.5 per cent of the vote.30 In North Dakota there
was a greater Republican landslide than in the United States as a
whole; McKinley 's 35,898 votes represented 62 per cent of the
votes cast, while Bryan polled 20,531 or 35.5 per cent of the state's
ballots — 10 per cent less than on the national level. Also, Mc-
Kinley' s 1900 total in North Dakota was 7 per cent greater than
it had been in 1896, while Bryan's was 7.2 per cent below his pre-
vious showing.31
The Republicans swept every state office with the candidate for
governor, Frank White, capturing 59 per cent of the votes as com-
pared to Democrat Wipperman's 38 per cent. White carried all
but three counties in recording the greatest Republican state victory
since statehood.32 The immigrant groups, as well as the native
population, seemed to support the Republicans in 1900.
Of the three major ethnic groups the Canadians comprised one-
fourth of the total foreign-born population. This group was
dominant in the counties adjacent to Canada — 30 per cent in Pem-
bina, 29 per cent in Cavalier, 21 per cent in Bottineau, 19 per cent
29 I. P. Baker to Thomas Kleinogl, October 22, 1900. Baker Papers.
30 Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, Stanford
University, Stanford University Press, 1934, 7-9.
31 Legislative Manual, 1897, (Bismarck: Tribune Printers, 1897), 104;
Legislative Manual 1901, (Bismarck: Tribune Printers, 1901), 126.
32 Legislative Manual, 1901, 128.
110 D. JEROME TWETON
in Rollette, 15 per cent in Walsh, and 9 per cent in Towner.33 In
1896 this section of the state gave the Democrats and Bryan a
sizable margin of victory, but in 1900 these Canadian counties
repudiated the Democratic party and gave McKinley the majority
of the votes with a great percentage increase over the previous
election.34 It certainly appeared that the Canadians cast their bal-
lots as a mass protest against the Democrats.
This abrupt reversal of political allegiance was probably caused
by two factors. First, in their attempt to win German votes, the
Democrats had pursued an anti-English attitude. They attacked the
Republicans because they had formed an "unwritten alliance with
Great Britain."35 This action lost the Democrats many of the
Canadian immigrant voters who maintained close ties with Canada
and the English tradition. Secondly, many Canadians would not
support a party that sympathized with the Boers in South Africa.
While Bryan was campaigning in the Canadian countries of North
Dakota, he seriously blundered when he attacked England's imperia-
listic policy in South Africa.36 This incident undoubtedly drove
Canadian voters into the Republican ranks.
It was the German immigrant population that during the cam-
paign received the most attention from the political parties. While
both parties sought to woo this ethnic group into their columns,
it was the Democratic party which most vigorously tried to win
German immigrant support by raising the issue of imperialism and
by nominating a German for the governorship. The election results
proved that the Democratic belief that a German running for the
position of governor would carry the German counties was mis-
taken. Although Wipperman ran 3 per cent ahead of Bryan, he
was able to win only three counties — Richland, Oliver, and Walsh.
No doubt he was able to win Richland because it was his home
county. Although he did carry the German county of Oliver, there
were thirteen other heavily German counties that he did not carry.
In Mcintosh county (46 per cent German) White defeated Wipper-
man 602-181, while Wipperman was beaten in Mercer county (37
per cent German) by a vote of 22 1-8 3.37
Although it was believed that Wipperman would be able to aid
the national Democratic ticket in German regions, Bryan was unable
33 Twelfth Census, 732-734.
34 Legislative Manual, 1901, 126-128.
35 Yankton Press and Dakotan, July 18, 1900.
36 Grafton News and Times, October 3, 1900.
37 Legislative Manual, 1901, 128.
t^g^gggnKBKi^mMamaBlBammm™inmnBi&BMKmaiKvmimaKmiimsimmatinunmiiw*KaMMMi*mita»mtmaM\ iiii^^Mgmam
MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND POLITICS: A CASE STUDY 111
to win a single county. He did, however, improve his 1896 average
in the German counties of Emmons (34 per cent German), Stark
(21 per cent German), and Pierce (14 per cent German). The
only areas where Bryan gained strength over his 1896 performance
were German counties. He lost no more than 5 per cent of 1896
percentage in the counties of Morton (37 per cent German), Mercer
(37 per cent German), Stutsman (13 per cent German), and
Mcintosh (46 per cent German).38 Perhaps Bryan was able to
maintain his strength because Wipperman was the gubernatorial
candidate. Also, undoubtedly some Germans feared the "unwritten
alliance with Great Britain" and Republican imperialism. The
important factor is that the Democrats were able to maintain their
power in many German areas while all other ethnic groups turned
to the Republicans.
The largest ethnic group was the Norwegian. Since first coming
to the United States they had been a strong element of the Republi-
can party.39 In the election of 1900 in North Dakota this immigrant
group remained solidly in the Republican party. Such strongly
Norwegian counties as Traill (26 per cent Norwegian), Griggs
(22 per cent Norwegian), Nelson (19 per cent Norwegian), and
Grand Forks (14 per cent Norwegian) gave McKinley a greater
percentage of their votes in 1900 than in 1896. 40 This trend was
also illustrated on the precinct level. In Norway precinct of Traill
county McKinley defeated Bryan 43-16, while Norway precinct of
Nelson county supported McKinley, 67-10. 41 The Knute Nelson
incident caused few Norwegians to bolt their traditional party.
Although one writer has contended that these Norwegian im-
migrants "brought with them from Norway a tradition of rural
socialism, a political heritage which they found little reason to
discard in their new homeland,"42 there is little evidence to sup-
port such a conclusion. Traill county (26 per cent Norwegian),
the most heavily dominated by the Norwegian ethnic group, cast
:>nly .8 per cent of its ballots for Debs on the Socialist ticket, while
Griggs and Steele counties (each 22 per cent Norwegian) gave
38 Ibid., 126.
39 George Stephenson, "The Mind of the Scandinavian Immigrant,"
Norwegian-American Studies and Records, IV (1929), 72-73.
40 Legislative Manual, 1901, 126.
41 Ibid., 161, 170.
42 Jackson K. Putnam, "The Role of the NDSP in North Dakota
History," North Dakota Quarterly, XXIV (Fall, 1956), 116. Note: NDSP
neans North Dakota Socialist Party.
112 D. JEROME TWETON
the Socialist only .2 per cent of their vote.43 McHenry and
Ward counties in the north-central part of the state were the centers
of Socialist strength. In neither were the Norwegians the dominant
group. The Norwegians in 1900 remained faithful to the Repub-
lican party.
Conclusion
From this study of immigrant groups and their part in an
election, two main points may be drawn. First, politicians of the
day believed that there was political strength in the ethnic group.
Secondly, there was an evident pattern to immigrant voting. This
second conclusion might suggest that ethnic group identity was
a factor that influenced the immigrant vote.
The contention that politicians thought the ethnic group to
be politically important needs no further elaboration. The efforts
of the major political parties to capture the immigrant vote serves
as sufficient evidence; the immigrant vote was the main concern
of the campaigners. The observation that there was a voting
pattern to the foreign-born vote that followed ethnic lines has been
amply documented. However, the conclusion that group identity
might have been a factor determining the vote needs clarification.
Although some writers have suggested that ethnic group identity
was the sole factor influencing the vote in areas of large foreign
population, this can be seriously challenged. Certainly economic
conditions played a key role in molding the voting mind. The year
1900 was prosperous in North Dakota. Wheat prices reached fifty-
eight cents a bushel as contrasted to thirty-eight in 1896 when
McKinley was first elected. Corn, oats, barley, as well as wool
prices made similar advances. Rising land prices coupled with a
decline in mortgage indebtedness made it evident that better times
had arrived under the Republicans.44 Prosperity swayed many
votes into the Republican column.
The role of group identity, however, can not be completely
disregarded; it was a factor, although not the factor. The complete
reversal of Canadian political allegiance illustrates the immigrant
in mass protest as a group — be it against Democratic anti-English
attitudes or Democratic depression. The fact that Bryan was able
to maintain his strength in traditionally German areas indicates that
43 Legislative Manual, 1901, 126.
44 Fargo Record, VII (January, February, March, 1901), 4; Larimore
Pioneer, June 15, 1900; LaMoure Chronicle, December 29, 1900.
MIDWESTERN IMMIGRANT AND POLITICS: A CASE STUDY 113
group identity could have been an influencing force. No doubt
there were those Norwegians who cast a Republican ballot because
their fathers had done so before, or because the candidate was a
Johnson or an Olson.
Thus, it appears that group identity did play a role in the
voting of the immigrant. But it was only one force among many
that influenced not only the immigrant vote, but also that of the
native American.
D. Jerome Tweton
University of Oklahoma, Norman
The Waning Prestige of Lewis Cass
Milo Quaife said that "the memory of Cass has been allowed
to sink into obscurity and neglect. Considering the role he played,
few Americans have received less attention at the hands of writers
of history."1 Many historians would agree that Cass has been
largely forgotten — even in Michigan. The following appeared in
the Detroit Collegian:
While he achieved a creditable record as governor, as a national figure,
Lewis Cass was the conventional politician and achieved little which en-
titles him to renown.
Perhaps the most authentic and reliable estimate of Lewis Cass is
that of the late Professor Channing of Harvard who wrote that he "had a
great reputation in his day, although the reason for it is somewhat in-
distinct at the present time."2
What influence did Cass wield during his long political career?
When was his power greatest? When did it decline?
Cass, of course, enjoyed a great deal of prestige because of the
important political offices which he held.3 He was highly re-
spected within the Party. Andrew Jackson wrote to Cass in 1843:
"Having full confidence in your abilities and republican princi-
ples I invited you to my cabinet, and I never can forget with what
discretion and talents you met those great and delicate questions
which were brought before you whilst you Presided [sic] over
the Department of War. . . ."4
Polk, too, had respect for Cass, who had been gracious in the
loss of the Democratic nomination to him in 1844. Cass had even
campaigned enthusiastically for Polk in Michigan. Hewlett stated
that "on May 6 [1846], on the basis of dispatches from General
Taylor, Polk called a meeting of his top advisers: Vice-President
i Milo M. Quaife, "Some Reflections Concerning the Papers of Lewis
Cass," 1 ; Manuscript in the Lewis Cass Papers. Burton Historical col-
lection, Detroit Public Library.
2 E. R. Skinner and Bryan Rust, "Question the Greatness of Lewis
Cass," Detroit Collegian, January 17, 1934.
3 He was governor of Michigan Territory, 1813-1831; Secretary of
War, 1831-1836; Minister to France, 1836-1842; Democratic presidential
candidate, 1848; United States Senator, 1845-1857; Secretary of State,
1857-1861.
4 Letter from Andrew Jackson to Lewis Cass, July 8, 1843, as
quoted in General Lewis Cass, 1782-1866, Norwood, Mass.: Plimpton Press,
1916, 24.
114
THE WANING PRESTIGE OF LEWIS CASS 115
Dallas, Secretary of War Marcy, Secretary of State Buchanan, and
Senator Cass."5 Two years later Polk wrote to the Michigan
Senator: "I need not assure you, that I shall be most happy if at the
close of my term I can surrender the Government into your hands."6
When Cass failed to win the presidency in 1848, Polk informed
him:
I am glad to learn from you, that it is possible that you may accept
a re-election to the Senate and be in Washington this winter. My opinion
is that under the circumstances of your position you ought not to hesitate
to accept an election to the Senate. The whole Democratic party, I am
sure, would be highly gratified to see you again a member of that body,
where you would have the opportunity as you have heretofore so ably done,
to reindicate and maintain the course of the Democratic policy.7
The Detroit Advertiser, vehemently anti-Democratic, stated: "It
cannot be denied that in point of talent, influence, and distinguished
reputation Gen. Cass is immensely above all other Loco Focos
who are talked about for that office [Senate seat from Michigan]."8
The National Whig, a pro-Taylor paper in Washington, said that
although "opposed to many of Governor Cass' political doctrines,
we have regarded him as one of the ablest statesmen of the country,
and we are rejoiced that he will have a seat on the floor of the
Senate during President Taylor's term. . . ."9
Perhaps the prestige of the Michigan Senator was never higher
than when he returned to the Senate in 1849:
In 1849 Cass came to Washington not only well-known but as a man
of great prestige and dignity. It was no longer necessary for him to carry
his opinions to others; younger men would now come to him for the
benefit of his judgment and experience. His political career had reached
its climax just one year before in the Presidential race. Now with ambition
mellowed and spirit tempered by many political conflicts, Cass virtually
'retired' to the Senate. He had made his mark; he was willing to leave
5 Richard G. Hewlett, "Lewis Cass in National Politics, 1842-1861."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of
Chicago, 1952, 84. "I desire to see you for a few minutes this morning
if it shall be convenient for you to call." Letter from James K. Polk to
Cass, March 30, 1846. Lewis Cass Papers, William L. Clements Library,
University of Michigan.
6 Letter from James K. Polk to Cass, August 24, 1848. Lewis Cass
Papers. "To see General Cass in the White House is and has been for
years the chief political desire of my heart." Letter from James K.
Polk to Lucius Lyon, November 4, 1848. Ibid.
1 Letter from James K. Polk to Cass, November 26, 1848. Ibid.
8 Detroit Advertiser as quoted by the Hillsdale Gazette, February
1, 1849.
9 Washington National Whig as quoted by the Hillsdale Gazette,
February 1, 1849.
116 WALTER W. STEVENS
the petty strivings for position to younger men. He refused appointment
to any of the standing committees of the Senate. Leaving the preparation
and presentation of bills to others, Cass was content with a pointed ques-
tion on routine problems; with a few words to clear the air and soothe
the nerves in times of crisis; with a voluminous, learned, set speech on
great issues before the Senate. By remaining aloof from work-a-day func-
tions of the Senate, Cass was able to achieve something of the role of the
elder statesman, one who could be called on when the problems of state
became too big for ordinary men. If he was not of this calibre, at least
he was able to convey that impression to many people in 1850. 10
For several years previous to and subsequent to the apogee of
his political career in 1848, Cass enjoyed great respect and prestige.
The Ann Arbor Signal of Liberty stated that "as an individual we
have respect for the General."11 The Baltimore Sun, alluding to
Cass, remarked in 1852: "There is an inate dignity in some men,
which cannot be eclipsed even by what would appear as grotesque
in other persons."12 The Hillsdale Gazette affirmed: "No one,
it is believed, has the strong hold on the nation's affections that
Gen. Cass has. His whole career is public and without reproach."13
The owner of the Detroit Free Press in 1853 was W. F. Storey.
Charles Perry said of him:
In the conduct of his paper he gathered an able staff around him
and ruled them with an iron discipline. He respected no man's opinions
with the possible exception of those of Lewis Cass. He declared that he
wanted no friends, as having friends would hamper his freedom in printing
the news.14
Harper's Weekly referred to Cass as a "monumental figure. No
man has filled so large a place in American history. Many presi-
dents will rank, in after times, beneath Clay, Webster, Calhoun,
Marcy, and Cass."15 From another quarter Cass was honored:
. . . the Indians who as late as the last council in Detroit, of the Chippewas,
Ottawas, and Pottawatomies July 25, 1855, testified their respect for and
confidence in him by abandoning their discussion, flocking about him,
1° Hewlett, "Lewis Cass," 166-167. "During his second term in
the Senate, 1851-1857, Cass dominated if he did not completely control
the foreign policy of the Democratic Party." Ibid. A ball was given in
honor of Cass on February 22, 1851, at Tammany Hall.
11 Ann Arbor Signal of Liberty, July 15, 1844.
12 Baltimore Sun as quoted by the Detroit Free Press, September
15, 1852.
13 Hillsdale Gazette, January 8, 1852.
14 Charles M. Perry, "The Newspaper Attack on Dr. Tappan,"
Michigan History Magazine, X (1926), 499.
15 Harper's Weekly, April 11, 1857.
THE WANING PRESTIGE OF LEWIS CASS 117
grasping his hand and saluting him as an old and valued friend when he
unexpectedly entered the council room.16
Apparently there was a rapid decline in the influence of the
Michigan statesman when he was forced to leave the Senate. Even
the friendly Detroit Free Press admitted: "More than any great
statesman alive does he [Cass] occupy the position of a disinherited
patriot."17 Between 1844 and 1855, the Free Press had anticipated
the stump engagements of Cass by announcing his itinerary as
well as naming the other Democratic speakers appearing on the
program with the Michigan Senator. During these years, the
name of Cass invariably led the list: "Gen. Cass, Gov. Felch, and
Gov. McClelland. . . ,"18 Beginning in 1856, however, the same
journal began to report: "Speeches by Breckinridge, Dickinson,
Preston, Cass and Felch. . . ,"19 "No longer to be reckoned with
as a power in the West, Cass was virtually forgotten in the Dem-
ocratic strategy which preceded the Cincinnati Convention of
1856."20
The historian has looked in vain for any expression of Cass' opinion
on the momentous issues of 1858, 1859, and I860. ... As a cabinet officer
[Secretary of State], he was forgotten to a degree that hardly seems pos-
sible. Even the Michigan Democracy disowned him. In the state con-
vention which met in Detroit in June, I860, a delegate moved that Cass,
who was in the city, be invited to attend the convention as a guest; but
after a brief discussion the motion was tabled and forcotten.21
The active political career of Cass came to an end when he
resigned the position of Secretary of State. Stripped of the respect
and prestige which for years had been his as head of the Democratic
party, his return to Michigan was a sad affair. Cass was, in
effect, going home to die after a long political life which had been
marked with misfortune. He had been defeated for the presidency
in 1848; the nation had condemned his popular sovereignty thesis
after its ignominious failure in Kansas in 1856; he had been repu-
diated by his own state and forced out of the Senate during the
same year; and he found himself in 1861 in a position which left
him no alternative but resignation. Moreover, "he now saw simul-
16 Thomas W. Palmer, Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd
session, 2002.
17 Detroit Free Press, January 11, 1856.
18 Ibid., October 19, 1852.
19 Ibid., September 7, 1856.
20 Hewlett, "Lewis Cass," 279.
21 Ibid., 291.
118 WALTER W. STEVENS
taneously with the defeat of his party which he loved, the country
which he had served, going rapidly, he believed, to inevitable disso-
lution and destruction."22
In 1889, W. F. Poole suggested to the Houghton-Mifflin Com-
pany,23 which was publishing a series of biographies dealing with
great American statesmen, that Andrew C. McLaughlin24 be asked
to do the life of Lewis Cass. John T. Morse, editor of the States-
men Series, replied that the series was closed.25 Later Morse
changed his mind. His letter to McLaughlin casts some light upon
the subject of the prestige of Cass at the time, twenty-three years
after his death:
Several months ago it was suggested to me that you might like to
write a life of Cass for the American Statesmen Series. It did not, at the
time, fall in with my plan to include Cass in the Series, but upon further
consideration I am inclined to revise this decision. The political growth
and characteristics of the Northwest are not depicted in any volume as
yet, and I think that this leaves a hiatus which I ought to fill. It is rather
for this purpose than because Cass himself seems to me, as an individual,
to deserve to be included, that I have made up my mind [to] add his
biography. ... I say this only in order to show you the motive which I
should like to have you bear in mind in writing the book, if you undertake
it. I do not conceive that Cass did much in the way of shaping the policy,
or controlling the fortunes of the country, or in creating public opinion;
therefore his personality should not be the dominating interest of the
book, as in the case of Jefferson and Hamilton.26
A granddaughter of Cass informed McLaughlin that her mother
was pleased about the fact that an historian was going to write
22 William E. Chandler, Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd
session, 2007.
23 "I have just written a letter to Houghton-Mifflin and Co., warmly
commending the paper you read at Washington, and advising them to
ask you to prepare a life of Gov. Cass for the series of 'American States-
men.' " Letter from W. F. Poole to A. C. McLaughlin, January 14, 1889.
Andrew C. McLaughlin Papers. Michigan Historical Collections, Uni-
versity of Michigan.
24 McLaughlin was a professor of history at the University of Mich-
igan. He had read a paper in Washington entitled "The Influence of
Governor Cass on the Development of the Northwest," which had con-
siderably impressed W. F. Poole. Although McLaughlin was a Repub-
lican, his subsequent book presented Cass as a truly great statesman.
This is the only biography of Cass that has been done by a professional
historian.
25 Letter from John T. Morse to James J. Angell, January 15, 1889.
Andrew C. McLaughlin Papers.
26 Letter from John T. Morse to Andrew C. McLaughlin, April 16,
1889. Ibid.
THE WANING PRESTIGE OF LEWIS CASS 119
a biography of her father. Heretofore, said Elizabeth Cass God-
dard, "everything relating to him that has been published has
been for some political purpose, and therefore most unsatisfactory."27
The political career of Lewis Cass spanned fifty-five years,
one of the longest on record. Perhaps Cass deserves no more
recognition than he is receiving. There are some, however, who
disagree. Quaife said that Cass was "the peer in character, patriot-
ism, and ability of any of his contemporaries. . . ,"28 Dwight L.
Dumond declared categorically: "He was the greatest statesman
that Michigan ever produced."29
Walter W. Stevens
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
27 Letter from Elizabeth Cass Goddard to Andrew C. McLaughlin,
August 29 (no year provided). Ibid.
28 Quaife, "Some Reflections," 1.
29 Statement from a lecture by Dwight L. Dumond, January 1957,
at the University of Michigan.
Book Reviews
Illinois Internal Improvements, 1818-1848. By John H. Krenkel. Torch
Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1958. Pp. 252. $4.00.
This book represents a thorough treatment of Illinois's participation
in the internal improvement craze which swept the country in the late
1820's and 1830's. Dr. Krenkel deals expertly with all phases of the
extravagant program including a detailed analysis of the beginnings of
the system, the feeble and unsuccessful efforts of private enterprise to
construct the improvements, the law of 1837 committing the state to build
the projects, the administration, construction, and financing of the system,
the ensuing financial disaster, and the eventual liquidation of the state debt.
Dr. Krenkel writes sympathetically of his subject, and with a com-
plete knowledge of it gained through extensive research in newspapers,
government documents, collection of letters, and other archival material. The
book is carefully footnoted, well indexed, contains a series of helpful
appendices and a folding map showing the proposed system in 1838. This
study, originally a doctoral dissertation, is not intended for the layman.
The author's straightforward and concise style, however, makes a difficult
and complex subject easy to read and understand. Certainly the topic
will never need to be rewritten, and the monograph serves as a valuable
and basic study for a more extensive treatment of the internal improve-
ment "extravaganza" during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.
The shortcomings are minor ones and those which are likely to
appear in most books. Mentioning those detected in no way lessens the
importance of the work. The fact that there is only one item listed in the
bibliography published in the last twenty years is not so much the fault
of the author as the neglect of historians to do research in this fruitful
area. Dr. Krenkel obviously drew a bit too heavily on certain chapters
in the Frontier State written by Theodore Calvin Pease. Some repitition
was noted such as occurs on pages 49-50 repeated to some extent on
pages 75-76, and on page 197 repeated on page 213. In summary it can
be said, however, that the book is a useful addition to the history of
Illinois during the Jacksonian era.
Gene D. Lewis
University of Cincinnati
Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782—1810: The In tend ant System in the
Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. By John Lynch. University of
London, The Athlone Press, London, and Essential Books, Fair Lawn,
New Jersey, 1958. Pp. xi, 335. 42s.
The impact of the intendant system from the time it was superimposed
on the Spanish colonies has been a subject of continuing interest to his-
torians. Professor Lynch, of the University of Liverpool, previously demon-
120
wunanunaaM
BOOK REVIEWS 121
strated his research and ability in this area in his article "Intendants and
Cabildos in the Viceroyalty of La Plata, 1782-1810," (HAHR, XXXV,
August 1955). In the present volume he expands the theme set forth in
that article and analyzes the effect of the intendant system on the viceroy,
the exchequer, public administration, the Indian, and the audiencia, con-
cluding with an analysis of the intendant and the revolution.
The early chapters are concerned with the general changes in adminis-
trative structure in the colonial system from Philip V through Charles III,
and with the "stepchild" province of the Rio de la Plata from its founda-
tion until the establishment of the viceroyalty in 1776. Indicating that the
interest of the crown in creating a new viceroyalty arose essentially from
Charles Ill's fear of Britain and Portugal, Professor Lynch sees the in-
tendants introduced as an additional aid to assure internal order and security.
Geographic and personnel problems were thorny, the latter especially so,
as the time-worn prejudice against the Creoles still remained, ". . . for they
lacked the mode of thinking . . . prevalent in Spain . . . ," and the difficulty
of obtaining competent Spaniards proved so enormous that from time to
time they had no alternative but to engage a "native."
When he considers the relationship of the intendants to the viceroy,
Professor Lynch writes a most interesting chapter. How could the division
of power implicit in the intendant system harmonize with the stature and
prestige of the viceroy? His narrative of the struggle between Viceroy
Loreto and Superintendent Sanz might seem to indicate that harmony
was not to be expected because of intrinsic differences in the systems. How-
ever, Professor Lynch is careful to point out that this and other conflicts
which existed were primarily conflicts of personalities and not of insti-
tutions. The newness of the viceroyalty in this area should have insured
the compatible growth of the two systems and, with certain modifications
of jurisdiction, there seemed no intrinsic reason why harmonious and
efficient administration could not have been obtained.
In the attempted financial reorganization, high hopes were held for
increased revenue from mines and taxes as well as for increased efficiency.
However, patronage, sale of offices, and personnel problems mired down
these hopes. The lethargy in mining techniques could not be surmounted
even for a foreign mission, one of whose members described the methods of
Potosi miners as steeped in "... incredible barbarism and ignorance. . . ."
The unhappy lot of the Indian was not improved by the intendant
system. Perhaps the kindest words the author has on the subject are
that the intendants were not indifferent toward the natives but that they
had the very "disconcerting" habit of indulging in theoretical discussions
while practical problems of the encomiendas and mita went unsolved. His
words are sharp for the administrators of the former Jesuit reductions.
Disinterest, inefficiency and desire for profit are pointed out as character-
istics of the new secular administration. While generally critical, Professor
Lynch does not fail to point out those voices crying for justice, such as
that of Viedma in the Cochabamba area who tried to get a fair land
distribution for the Indian, and Gonzalez in Puno who refused to send
the mita quota to Potosi, and Villava of the audiencia of Charcas who
strove unsuccessfully to gain condemnation of the mita. His conclusion
122 BOOK REVIEWS
is that Spain lacked a clear policy and that advances, if any, were made
only by virtue of the quality of the individual.
An interesting phenomenon is presented in the case of the cabildos
and in particular the cabildo of Buenos Aires. Weak and impoverished
before the establishment of the new system, the enhanced commerce, in-
terest in public works, and civic responsibilities, appear to have given them
a new life and a sense of power they had known only rarely in times
past. This advent of strength in the face of a system designed to strengthen
centralization rather than localize authority is explained in part by the hands-
off policy pursued toward cabildo elections, as well as by the increase in
their funds due to the activity of the intendants. Demands made on the
cabildos for statements of accounts as well as for estimates of tax require-
ments seemed to have stimulated the old institutions to new and vigorous
activity. The conclusions are that this reinvigoration at the hands of the
new system prepared the cabildo for its role in the days of revolution.
The author points out that not only did this maturing of the cabildos set
the stage for revolution, but that the whole structure of the intendant system
worked as a divisive force, weakening the colonial administrative structure
prior to the days of Ferdinand VII.
For the most part this study is original, from unpublished documents
of Seville. It is fine history and an eminently worthwhile contribution.
The appendix, glossary, bibliography, and index are excellently done.
Martin J. Lowery
De Paul University
The Making of an American Community. By Merle Curti. Stanford
University Press, Stanford, California, 1959. Pp. vii, 483. $8.50.
"This place [remarked the Reverend Mr. D. O. Van Slyke] used to
be noted for . . . good society, pleasant surroundings, and well defined
moral influences. Has the reverse come to be true? Have we no civil
laws and civil forces? Has Galesville ceased to be America? Have all
or most all the better classes moved away?" This complaint sounds like
many voiced in 1959 but it appeared in the Galesville [Wisconsin] Inde-
pendent on October 3, 1878, nearly eighty-one years ago. The words
seem to assure us that although social conditions may not be ideal at present,
they are at least as good as they were eighty-one years ago. Hence, things
are perhaps not getting worse; they are simply remaining as bad as they
already were.
The above quotation and scores equally pertinent are found in The
Making of an American Community, a microscopic study made of an
"area that experienced transition from wilderness to settled community
with the purpose of determining how much democracy, in Turner's sense,
existed initially in the first phase of settlement, during the process itself,
and in the period that immediately followed." The area studied was
BOOK REVIEWS
123
Trempeleau County, in the central part of western Wisconsin. This county
was not studied because it was considered "typical" of frontiers in general.
It was simply a frontier, and one blessed with good records. Ten news-
papers were available, as were three important collections of private papers,
plus unusually well preserved county records. At least one good history
of the county had already been published. The period studied extended
from the 1850's to the 1880's.
In addition to employing historical research in the ordinary meaning
of the term, Dr. Merle Curti and his four main assistants used quantitative
methods whenever these seemed appropriate and feasible. Using codes,
the members of this research team recorded on cards all householders and
gainfully employed individuals listed in the unpublished federal censuses
of 1850, I860, 1870, 1880. Generalizations were then based on com-
prehensive data, rather than on samples or on impressions based on incom-
plete records.
Chapter titles such as "Social and Economic Structure," "Making a
Living on the Farm," and "Choosing Officials" are indicative of the
results of the research. The one entitled "The Social Creed" seems par-
ticularly illustrative of the community. Samuel Luce, editor of the Gales-
ville Independent, often argued in his editorials that the West, or, the
frontier, contributed in a very real sense to the development of "fine
human beings, people with confidence in themselves." In the issue of
August 1, 1862, he maintained in an editorial that the Westerners were by
no means the incompetent and stupid people that the Easterners considered
them to be. Each individual in the West, Luce maintained, tended to
become an important factor in multiplying " 'the facilities of civilization.' "
Convinced of his own importance and realizing that he could not be
spared, "the pioneer found life more living than his fellows who stayed
in the East and lived their lives under less taxing conditions." However,
crimes did occur in this latter day Eden. The newspapers reported that
some shops had been robbed. One man rightfully complained because
someone had stolen his heifer, killed it and made off with the meat.
Lawsuits involving ownership of land were common, giving employment
to many lawyers. Fights and brawls were frequent but it seems that few
murders took place. Gun fights were not common in this part of the West.
Many helpful tables presenting detailed statistical data concerning such
matters as the farms of the settlers, family income, school attendance,
occupational changes, receipts and disbursements of the county treasurer's
office and the cost of schools are given. For factual information concern-
ing the growth of a community, this study leaves nothing to be desired.
It is strongly recommended to anyone interested in the history of the
American frontier.
Paul Kiniery
Loyola University, Chicago
Notes and Comments
Andreiv Jackson and North Carolina Politics, by William S.
Hoffmann, was published late last year as Volume 40 of The
James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science by The
University of North Carolina Press at Chapel Hill. Hoffmann's
theme is North Carolina politics from 1824 to 1837 in the setting
of defamation and character assassination of the Jacksonian era.
His purpose is to examine the North Carolina segment of the
national political picture, North Carolina's place in the vital de-
velopment of the two party system, and Andrew Jackson's influence
in the formation of North Carolina's political character. Granting
that historians have covered the dramatic clashes between "Old
Hickory" and Biddle, Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, Hoffmann goes
quickly to his study in North Carolina. His work is thoroughly
documented and compressed into 134 pages. In an exceptional
summary, Chapter XII, "Evaluation and Conclusions," Hoffmann
finds that during his first term as President, Jackson satisfied
North Carolina by holding to Jefferson's state rights doctrine.
Needing a low tariff the state turned away from Clay and Webster.
Jackson's dismissal of John Branch, former governor of North
Carolina, from his cabinet helped vastly in gathering together all
anti-Jacksonists into state extremists, who in turn became part of
the Whig party. In general: "The story of North Carolina politics
from 1824 to 1837 is the story of politicians maneuvering to gain
or maintain political power. . . . The majority of the people of
North Carolina loved Jackson." (P. 117)
There should be more books written in the clear, concise, and
penetrating manner of Robert Lansing and Ajnerican Neutrality,
1914-1917, by Daniel M. Smith. This is Volume 59 of the Uni-
versity of California Publications in History, University of Cali-
fornia Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958. Such a study could
not have been written if a new documentary source had not been
opened recently, that is, the Confidential Memoranda of Robert
Lansing. These materials lead Mr. Smith to the positive conclu-
sion "that not only was Lansing's role of supreme importance but
that his tenure in the Department of State has earned for him a
place among the leading American secretaries of state." Eight
124
NOTES AND COMMENTS 125
chapters amply substantiate this general conclusion, while the ninth
chapter is a summary of Lansing's enormous part in the fashion-
ing of American war diplomacy. A new Lansing emerges. The
paper-covered volume is of 241 pages, including an excellent bibli-
ography and index.
In this same series of Publications in History, Volume 62 is
Bondsmen and Bishops, Slavery and Apprenticeship on the Codring-
ton Plantations of Bardados, 1710-1838, by J. Harry Bennett, Jr.
This is an interesting and important study based upon a complete
body of documents newly discovered by Frank J. Klingberg in
the London archives of the Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts of the Anglican Church. By an odd will
Christopher Codrington in 1710 bequeathed his two sugar plan-
tations to the Society with the stipulation that the Society was to
man a college on the island with professors under the vows of
poverty, chastity, and obedience, who were to operate the plan-
tations and take care of the bodies and souls of 300 slaves. How
the committee of Church of England bishops got around the will
and managed the estates for over a century is Mr. Bennett's inter-
esting contribution.
* * * *
Saint Anthony's Century, 1858-1958, by Hilda Engbring Feld-
hake, was published by St. Anthony of Padua Church, Effingham,
Illinois, in commemoration of the foundation and the hundred
years of service of the Church. This is a remarkable example
of local and parochial history and may well serve as a model of
data gathering for local historical societies. By painstaking re-
search and thorough collecting of evidence Mrs. Feldhake amassed
enough historical material to fill a pictorial museum. A great
number of the pictures of individuals and groups are handsomely
printed in the volume. Part One, traces the history of the town
of Effingham and its surroundings from the original settlement
to the present, with the story of the growth of the parish inter-
woven. Genealogies of families, biographical sketches of towns-
men and pastors, charts of land ownership, and origins of civic
and rural institutions are incorporated and suitably illustrated. No
name of a contributor to the growth of Effingham and its Catholic
parish is omitted. Parish statistics and a chronological table of
events complete the first part. Part Two has to do with the parish
and its many services in the community. The contributions of
man power of this German-American town during the Civil War,
126 NOTES AND COMMENTS
the Spanish-American War, and the World Wars were notable.
The primary and secondary schools have long satisfied the educa-
tional needs under the direction of the religious and lay instructors.
Besides carrying out its religious functions the church became the
center of many social, cultural, and civic activities, each of which
has its place in the well-arranged volume. The list price is a very
reasonable five dollars.
* * * *
Scholars are again indebted to The Newberry Library, this
time for the publication of A Catalogue of Printed Materials Re-
lating to the Philippine Islands, 1519-1900, in the Newberry
Library, as compiled by Doris Varner Welsh. This checklist com-
pletes the catalogue of printed materials in the Ayer Collection of
the Newberry and adds many items on linguistics to those listed
in Mrs. Welch's Checklist of Philippine Linguistics, published by
the Library in 1950. Of over 3,000 items in the Philippine col-
lection the Checklist named more than a thousand, while the
present Catalogue lists nearly 1,900, classified under the headings
of political, religious, social, economic, and local history. The
manuscripts in the Ayer Collection were well taken care of by
Paul S. Lietz in his Calendar of Philippine Documents in the Ayer
Collection, published in 1956. Thus, the scholar has the biblio-
graphic tools for investigating in a rich collection of Filipiniana.
The materials listed cover Philippine history and ethnology only,
and are second in this country in volume to those in the Library
of Congress which cover all phases of Philippine life.
Seventy-five Years of Latin American Research at the Uni-
versity of Texas, is Latin American Studies XVIII of the publica-
tions of The Institute of Latin American Studies of the University
of Texas, Austin. Here is a complete and imposing list of 670
doctoral and master's dissertations on Latin American subjects
written between 1893 and 1958, and a second list of publications
between 1941 and 1958. This is definitely a help to libraries
and to professors directing research in Latin American and Texas
history. It is hoped that the 67 page booklet will be an inspiration
to other universities to publish similar lists of their scholarly
productions.
* * * *
NOTES AND COMMENTS 127
Just born: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Volume I, Num-
ber 1, January, 1959. Published by the School of Inter- American
Studies, University of Florida, Gainsville, under a grant from the
Pan-American Foundation, Inc., the Journal is under the General
Editor, Robert E. McNicholl, Associate Editor, A. Curtis Wilgus,
five contributing editors, and three consultants. The Journal pub-
lishes studies on all aspects of the Americas in any of the official
languages of the American countries and offers itself as a new
means for the interchange of scholarly ideas especially in the
humanities and social sciences. The initial number in 102 pages has
stimulating articles by Dantes Bellegarde, C. Harvey Gardiner, Elena
Verez de Peraza, Harold E. Davis, Jose J. Arrom, J. Fred Rippy,
and Aurelio de la Vega. We advise you to obtain it at two dol-
lars for the annual subscription at the address of the Journal of
Inter-American Studies, Box 3625, University Station, Gainesville,
Florida.
ijs SjC 3fC !f!
On January 10, 1612, James I, "By the Grace of Almighty
God, who created Heaven and Earth, Kinge of great Brittaine,
France, and Ireland, Defendor of the Christian Faith, &ct," wrote
a letter "To the High and Mightie, the Emperor of Japan, &ct,"
asking for a treaty of trade and commerce. This letter is in the
James Ford Bell Collection of the University of Minnesota. It has
now been reproduced and put in the latest publication of the
Collection, a beautifully printed brochure of twenty-four pages
entitled A Royal Request for Trade. The brochure has a Foreword
by John Parker, Curator, and the letter is placed in its historical
setting by David Harris Willison. The brochure is a fine addition
to the growing list of similar publications by the James Ford Bell
Collection.
* * # #
The King Can Do No Wrong, by William L. Reuter, is a recent
addition to the Lincolniana in 1958. The little volume of sixty-
two pages tells of the capture of John Wilkes Booth by Colonel
Everton J. Conger and of Booth's death at the hands of Sergeant
Corbett. Fifty-one years after the assassination of Lincoln, Colonel
Conger was asked to dictate the story of his search for the assassin.
Conger did so, but his narrative never found its way into print
until Professor Reuter decided to preserve it in this book. Conger's
own words remain as he dictated them, and Reuter has interspersed
128 NOTES AND COMMENTS
passages descriptive of the times and persons, adding as an
"Aftermath" the trial of the other conspirators and the attempts
to save Mrs. Surratt. The whole is a highly dramatic presentation.
It is published by Pageant Press and its list price is $2.50.
With the peoples of the world insecure in the cold war and in
unsettled domestic conditions two men have come forth with plans
for world peace. The plans begin at opposite points, one with
the renovation of the individual human being and the other with
a super-governmental force capable of enforcing world peace.
Permanent Peace, a Check and Balance Plan, by Tom Slick, pub-
lished by Prentice Hall in 1958, offers a step by step program
whereby the machinery for collective security may be established.
The author is widely known for his vast activities in businesses,
philanthropies and research. The other plan, Toward a New
World, by the Italian Jesuit, Richard Lombardi, translated into
English and published by Philosophical Library, Inc., in 1958, has
been widely announced to vast audiences in Europe for over ten
years. If society is to be renovated and peace established the indi-
vidual member of society must renovate himself according to the
principles of the Gospel. The individual is given practical advice
on establishing peace and security in his own home, with his neigh-
bor, in his community, and his local institutions of government,
politics, business, education, and labor. The local renovation when
multiplied becomes a state, then national renovation and then world-
wide, until a family of nations appears following the great prin-
ciples of the love of God and neighbor.
c7V1ID-cAMERICA
An Historical Review
JULY
1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 3
Published by Loyola University
Chicago 26, Illinois
c7VHD-cXMERICA
An Historical Review
VOLUME 41, NUMBER 3 JULY 1959
oMID-c^MERICA
An Historical Review
JULY 1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 3
CONTENTS
THE NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE
IMPACT OF THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 . Robert Uuhn Jones 131
POLITICAL WEAKNESS IN WISCONSIN
PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 . . . Herbert F. Margulies 154
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND
ARMY REFORM Bernard L. Boylan 173
BOOK REVIEWS 187
MANAGING EDITOR
JEROME V. JACOBSEN, Chicago
EDITORIAL STAFF
WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL RAPHAEL HAMILTON
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA PAUL KINIERY
W. EUGENE SHIELS PAUL S. LIETZ
Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History)
at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.
Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at
Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as
second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in
the United States.
Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should
be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial
offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.
cTVLUD- AMERICA
An Historical Review
JULY 1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 3
The Northwestern Frontier and the
Impact of the Sioux War, 1862
Minne-ha-ha, laughing water
Cease thy laughing now for aye,
Savage hands are red with slaughter
Of the innocent today.
Ill accords thy sportive humor
With their last despairing wail;
While thou'rt dancing in the sunbeam
Mangled corpses strew the vale.
Change thy note, gay Minne-ha-ha;
Let some sadder strain prevail. . . }
Perhaps even Captain Richard Chittenden, reputed composer of
this gruesome parody, was not aware of the extent of the Sioux
outbreak. As swiftly as the sun-kissed falls of his poem, the native
warriors were tumbling across prairie and forest of Minnesota,
Dakota, and Iowa. John G. Nicolay, one of Lincoln's secretaries,
Note: After this paper had been submitted for publication in these
pages, C. M. Oehler's The Great Sioux Uprising was published by Oxford
University Press. The paper remains different from the book in its
approach and perspective, and amplifies Mr. Oehler's work with respect
to causes and effects of the uprising. Professor Jones kindly consented
to write a review of Oehler, which may be found in the book review sec-
tion of this number. Editor.
1 The poem is attributed to Captain Richard H. Chittenden, on
leave from Campany E, First Wisconsin Volunteer Cavalry, and was
composed while riding with a group of Minnesota cavalry to the relief of
Fort Ridgely. Quoted from Nathaniel West, The Ancestry, Life, and
Times on Hon. Henry Hastings Sibley, LL.D., St. Paul, Minnesota, 1889,
250.
131
132 ROBERT HUHN JONES
urgently telegraphed an on-the-spot report to Secretary of War
Edwin M. Stanton:
The Sioux, mustering perhaps 200 warriors, are striking along a line
of scattered frontier settlements of 200 miles, having already massacred
several hundred whites, and the settlers of the whole border are in panic
and in flight, leaving their harvest to waste in the fields as I myself have
seen even in neighborhoods where there is no danger. The Chippewa
are . . . turbulent . . . and the Winnebagos are suspected of hostile intent. . . .
As against the Sioux it must be a war of extermination.2
This full-scale war broke out in Minnesota on August 17, 1862,
a time as unfortunate for the Union as it was propitious for the
Indians. In spite of the savage hands red with slaughter and the
mangled corpses in the vale of the Minnesota River, the war-whoops
and tom-toms and shotguns on the northwestern frontier were
scarcely heard above the rebel yells and drums and din of cannon
fire in the South.
None the less, the noise in the north had an ominous overtone.
The Sioux scarcely were an obscure tribe known just by the French
traders, for they had been allies of the English in the War of 1812,
had helped the United States track down and destroy the remnants
of Blackhawk's tribe, had terrorized the California trail in the
1850's, and as late as 1857 a renegade group had massacred thirty-
two settlers at Spirit Lake, Iowa. The 1862 uprising was on the
largest scale yet, however, and, taking advantage of hindsight, one
may note this proud and untamed people was not to be finally
quieted until after the battle of Wounded Knee, two weeks after
the death of Sitting Bull, in 1890. Individual murders and petty
riots continued for some time even after that. The names of
General George Crook and Colonel George A. Custer have become
almost legendary; but the names of John Pope and Henry H. Sibley,
men who first handled the Sioux problem, have been all but
forgotten.
A number of factors combined to precipitate the savage explosion
in the northwest in August, 1862. Originally, the Mdewakanton,
Wahpeton, and Sisseton tribes of the Sioux nation roamed the
extensive, beautiful, and fertile regions of northwestern Iowa,
western Wisconsin, southwestern Minnesota, and adjoining Dakota
2 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I-IV, Index and Atlas, 74
vols, in 132, Washington, 1895^1901 (1), Ser. I, vol. XIII, 620; hereafter
cited as Official Records. Nicolay was in the Northwest on an assignment
to the Chippewa Indians.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 133
Territory. Herds of buffalo grazed over rolling plains that were
scattered with wooded groves, countless lakes, streams, and rivers;
a vast area with an abundance of wild-fowl and fur-bearing animals
such as otter, mink, beaver, and deer.3 The attraction of this country
was as strong for white settlers as it was for the native Sioux, and
the advance of the white settlers into it was an inevitable as the
expulsion from it was for the Indian. By a series of treaties over
a period of sixty years the Sioux were compressed into an ever-
dwindling reserve that by 18584 had been reduced to a ribbon of
land ten miles wide, located along the south bank of the Minnesota
River and spanning the 150 miles between Lake Traverse and a
point just below Fort Ridgely.5
The Mdewakanton and Wahpekuta6 occupied the lands below
the Yellow Medicine River, called the Lower Reservation, while
the Sisseton and Wahpeton inhabited the area above the Yellow
Medicine, which was termed the Upper Reservation.7 The Indian
agent, whose job included the administration of the treaties, resided
among them and established two places for the transaction of his
business; the Lower or Redwood Agency, located fourteen miles
above Fort Ridgely, and the Upper or Yellow Medicine Agency,
situated at the mouth of the Yellow Medicine River. Around these
agencies were small villages of residences, stores, warehouses,
schools, and churches.8 The missionaries Stephen Return Riggs and
Thomas Smith Williamson had schools and churches a few miles
above the Yellow Medicine; at Lac qui Parle were the house and
school of another missionary, Amos W. Huggins, along with a
government storehouse and blacksmith shop; and at the Lower
Agency was the mission of Samuel W. Hinman. At Big Stone
Lake and at other points on the reservation, trading posts had been
established.9
3 Isaac V. D. Heard, History of the Sioux War and Massacres of
1862 and 1863, New York, 1864, [13], 14.
4 Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, Senate
Document No. 452, 57 Cong., 1 Sess. (Serial 4254, Washington, 1903), vol.
II, 177, 586, 590, 594. Other treaties were: 1830, 218; 1836, 347, 355, 357;
1837, 366, 439; 1851, 437, 438, 440.
5 Heard, Sioux War, 18.
6 The spelling of Indian names varies from writer to writer. Where
questionable the spellings used are those in Appendix I, "Revised Spelling
of Names of Indian Tribes and Bands," in Kappler, Indian Affairs,
vol. I, 1021.
7 Heard, Sioux War, 18.
8 Ibid., 21, 22.
9 Ibid. Also, Stephen R. Riggs, Tah-Koo Wah-Kan, or the Gospel
Among the Dakotas, Boston, c. 1869, 107, 312; cited hereafter as Riggs,
Gospel Among the Dakotas. Henry Benjamin Whipple, Lights and Shadows
of a Long Episcopate, New York, 1912, 61-62.
134 ROBERT HUHN JONES
Living in scattered groups mostly along the Minnesota River,
there were some 6,600 Minnesota Sioux of the several tribes, and
another 3,000 or 4,000 Yanktonai Sioux roaming in nearby Dakota
Territory.10 The treaties meant to bind the Sioux were not much
different from those the government made with other tribes. The
Sioux did not wholly understand them or, with reason, trust those
who administered them. These treaties had a two-fold purpose:
to civilize and to educate the Indians. But the treaties of 1858
with the Sioux on the Minnesota Reservation differed primarily
from those of 185 111 in reducing the area of the reservation by one
half. This divested the ten-mile-wide band on the north bank of
the river from the reservation. This land was sold publicly, and
its proceeds up to $70,000 were paid to the chiefs and headmen.
The remainder was surveyed, eighty-acre tracts were alloted to heads
of families "as soon as practicable," and the rest of the land held
in common. The usual treaty stipulations were included: the right
of the United States to maintain military posts, roads, and the like,
on the reservation; assurances of friendly relations among the
bands of Indians and between them collectively and the United
States; agreements to surrender to justice criminals and offenders;
an article for the enforcing of prohibition, and another giving the
Secretary of the Interior discretionary power over disbursement of
annuities.12 The amounts agreed to in the 1851 treaties were not
changed. Annual interest payments at five per cent drawn from
trust funds totaling over $3,000,000 continued for purposes of
agricultural and educational improvement and for "goods and pro-
visions." The treaties and the annuity allotments were the result
of cession by the Sioux of "all their lands in the State of Iowa;
and all their lands in the Territory of Minnesota. . . ."13
Another section of the treaty, an attempt to convert the Sioux
to a stationary, agricultural people, caused dissatisfaction. The
stipulation allocating eighty acres to a family and disbursing annu-
ities for purposes of education and agriculture was particularly
annoying. Sioux Agent Thomas J. Galbraith states the policy of
refining the Indians in very bold terms:
10 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1863, House Executive
Document No. 1, 38 Cong., 1 Sess. (Serial 1182, Washington, 1864), 410:
report of Thomas J. Galbraith, Sioux Agent, dated St. Paul, January
27, 1863. See also House Executive Document No. 68, 37 Cong., 3 Sess.
(Serial 1163, Washington, 1863), 38: included in this document is another
copy of Galbraith's report plus other papers pertaining to the same subject.
11 Kappler, Indian Affairs, vol. II, 437, 438, 440.
12 Ibid., 590-597.
13 Ibid., 437, 438, 439.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 135
By my predecessor a new and radical system was inaugurated practically,
and in its inauguration he was aided by the Christian missionaries and
by the government. The treaties of 1858 were ostensibly made to carry this
new system into effect.
The theory, in substance, was to break up the community system among
the Sioux; weaken and destroy their tribal relations; individualize them
by giving each a separate home, and having them subsist by industry — the
sweat of their brows; till the soil; make labor honorable and idleness
dishonorable; or, as it was expressed in short, "make white men of
them."1*
This program proved abortive. About 175 "annuity Sioux"
became farmers, but the great majority had not and they manifested
considerable hostility toward those who had. The farmers were
known as "Cut-hair and breeches" Indians (because they adopted
the white men's dress) or "Dutchmen," a name of opprobrium,
while the others were known as "Scalp-lock" or "Blanket" Indians.
The few who were farmers had made considerable progress, in
spite of harassment by the others. They had put almost 3,000
acres under cultivation, two thirds in corn, in the spring of 1862.
They expected a harvest of about 53,000 bushels of turnips, includ-
ing rutabagas, some other vegetables, and a small amount of wheat.
The estimated total value of these crops was about $119, 400. 15
The white men conceded this to be a good beginning.
A second facet of the civilizing of the Sioux was the activity
of the missionaries, though it was even less successful than the
attempt to make farmers of them. "Indeed, wifh quite a large
majority of that people the settled purpose not to change their
religion and the customs of their fathers was manifest. . . ."16 The
lure of getting a feather as the decoration of a warrior and their
reluctance to do such squaw's work as farming, showed the hold of
tribal customs, on occasion even upon Indians who were supposed
to be civilized. The tribal affiliation was so strong among many
that they participated in the Sioux outbreak of 1862, although they
realized the futility of such an action.17
The proud nature of the Sioux was a powerful factor in their
14 House Executive Document No. 68, 25-26; "Chief Big Eagle's Story
of the Sioux Outbreak of 1862," Collections of the Minnesota Historical
Society, vol. 6, St. Paul, 1894, 384.
15 House Executive Document No. 68, 15-16, 26, 34.
16 Riggs, Gospel Among the Dakotas, 391; Whipple, Lights and
Shadows, 62. In the nine months after the opening of the first mission
at the Lower Agency, Rev. Hinman was able to confirm only seven of
the several thousand that lived nearby.
17 "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 387, 390.
136 ROBERT HUHN JONES
arrogance toward the whites. This certainly stood behind the
mosaic of causes that influenced the outbreak of warfare on the
northwestern frontier. Chief Big Eagle, thirty-two years after his
participation in the uprising, gave reasons for the war similar to
those noted by Galbraith, substituting for his dim view of the
Indian an equally dim view of the white man. Big Eagle spoke
disparagingly of the presence of traders at the annuity payment
(which they attended to collect their debts, just or unjust) and also
told of the Indian distrust of them. The Sioux were also irritated
by the superior attitude of the white man (because "the Dakotas
did not believe there were better men in the world then they")
and by the white man's abuse of Indian women. He blamed the
"Blanket"-versus-"Farmer" controversy on the whites. When Gal-
braith enlisted a volunteer company of half-breeds at the agencies
the Sioux were convinced the North was desperate in its struggle
with the South. Big Eagle also criticized the change in administra-
tion in 1861, and the appointment of new agents and a new Super-
intendent of the Northern District, Clark Thompson, and their
innovations in the management of Sioux affairs. He spoke of the
weakened condition of the frontier, which seemed to present the
redmen with a good opportunity to recover their lands. Many
Sioux hoped a war might once again unify them. They believed
the Chippewa, as well as the Winnebago, would assist them.18
Apparently there was much discussion of these matters among
the Sioux, who substituted temper and pride for reason and became
belligerent that summer. On June 25, as the payment of annuities
usually took place about then, they made a demonstration about
the Upper Agency, and inquired about their money. Galbraith
told them he did not expect the payment to arrive before July 20,
issued them some provisions, and sent them home.19 On July 14,
about 4,000 annuity Sioux and 1,000 Yanktonai (who were not
included in the payments, but who claimed a share) came down to
the Yellow Medicine to collect their money. Galbraith was puzzled
as to how to deal with them since the money still had not arrived,
but he managed to put them off and keep them fed until August
1, when his supplies were nearly used up.20 On August 4 the
Sioux surprised the agency and the troops on guard and forcibly
18 Ibid., 384-387.
19 Ibid., 388; Heard, Sioux War, 44-46; House Executive Document
No. 68, 16; House Executive Document No. 58, 38 Cong., 1 Sess. (Serial
1189, Washington, 1864), 11-12.
20 Heard, Sioux War, 47; House Executive Document No. 68, 17.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 137
broke into the government warehouse.21 The troops succeeded in
restoring order, and Galbraith, in the presence of Captain John F.
Marsh, of Company B, Fifth Minnesota Volunteer Infantry, and
of the missionary, Riggs, issued the "annuity goods and a fixed
amount of provisions, provided the Indians would go home and
watch their corn, and wait for payment until they were sent for."22
The Indians withdrew, and for the time being a serious incident
was avoided.
Even so, it was clearly evident that the Sioux were aggressively
inclined. Accounts other than Chief Big Eagle's agree that the
major causes of discontent were the treaty and the annuity delay,
in combination with the opportunity the Indians thought they had
found to retake the land they had bartered away.23 The previous
fall, Galbraith and Thompson had unjudiciously attempted to
substitute goods for money in the annual payments, and Thompson
foolishly encouraged the Sioux to expect "a further bounty" without
telling them this would be a part of their 1862 allowance. In
order to come in and get this "great gift" the Indians skipped
their annual hunt, which would have brought them more benefits
than the goods did. When the Sioux finally learned that this
bonus was an advance on the next year's annuity, they became
"greatly exasperated."24
Stories of the Civil War seemed to have a psychological effect
on them also. One observer reflected that the effect of war stories
21 Ibid.; also, the Board of Commissioners, Minnesota in the Civil
and Indian Wars 1861-1864, 2 edn., St. Paul, 1891, 246-247. Agent Gal-
braith claims that the Indians broke into the warehouse at gunpoint. His
statement agrees with that made by Lt. Thomas B. Gere in the work
above, but Stephen R. Riggs, in Mary and I, Forty Years with the Sioux,
Chicago, c. 1880, 151-152, claims that the Sioux were unarmed. These
volumes are cited hereafter as Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars,
and Riggs, Forty Years.
22 House Executive Document No. 68, 17; Executive Documents of the
State of Minnesota for the Year 1862, St. Paul, 1863, [415]-416. Here-
after cited as Minnesota, Executive Documents, 1862.
23 House Executive Document No. 68, 16-17, 28, 29; Minnesota in the
Civil and Indian Wars, 728; Heard, Sioux War, 41-42; Riggs, Gospel
Among the Dakotas, 328-329, 329-331; Adrian J. Ebell, "Indian Massacres
and War of 1862," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, vol. XXVII, June,
1863, 7; Samuel J. Brown, "In Captivity: the Experience, Privations, and
Dangers of Samuel J. Brown and Others while Prisoners of the . . . Sioux
During the . . . War of 1862. ..." Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 28,
56 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 4029, Washington, 1900), 2 (hereafter cited as
"In Captivity"). According to Riggs, the annuity payment was delayed
because the Sioux would not accept the fact that the payment the previous
fall was deductable from 1862 annuity, causing the delay. The money
was on the way to St. Paul by August 13 and reached Fort Ridgely on
August 18, the day after the outbreak began.
24 Riggs, Forty Years, 147-148.
138 ROBERT HUHN JONES
"operates very powerfully upon the warlike Indians,"2^ while
another remarked that "the war for the Union, has been a fruitful
source for trouble among the Sioux, exciting inquiry, restlessness,
and uneasiness. . . .The effect . . . upon the savage and superstitious
minds of the Indians can be easily imagined."26 Perhaps "If there
had been no Southern war, there would have been no Dakota up-
rising and no Minnesota massacres!"27
There were rumors that Confederate agents fomented the trouble
but, though this was given some credence, it was never proved.
Also the English in Canada were thought to have implicated them-
selves to some extent in the outbreak.28 This too was never satis-
factorily demonstrated, although the Indians in the following years
did receive supplies from north of the border.29 Certainly, the
Sioux seem to have had sufficient provocation for war without
urging from the Confederates or the English.
There were also rumors rumbling along the frontiers that the
Sioux were not alone in their intent to evict or kill the white man.
A simultaneous uprising of the Chippewa was narrowly averted,
and the Winnebago were virtually forced into the affair. The
Winnebago had been relatively quiet, since they were in no position
to be otherwise. Their reservation was in the heart of very good
land, and as a result they were hard pressed by the settlers, who
coveted this land and who scarcely needed the excuse of a war to
take it. The Winnebago lived in double jeopardy after the outbreak,
fearing the Sioux, who threatened to exterminate them unless they
joined in, and apprehensive of the whites, who bore them more
animosity than ever, just because they were Indians, and because
it was rumored that some of them had joined the uprising. Their
agent, St. A. D. Balcombe, swore to their loyalty, and had two
companies of troops stationed "in their midst, which . . . allayed
their fears" apparently. Balcombe admitted the presence of Winne-
bago at the massacre of the Lower Agency, however, and was not
sure that some did not take part.30 Little Priest and a few of his
25 Riggs, Gospel Among the Dakotas, 330.
26 House Executive Document No. 68, 29.
27 Riggs, Gospel Among the Dakotas, 331.
28 House Executive Document No. 68, 2, 8, 29; Minnesota in the
Civil and Indian Wars, 729; Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862,
8, 9, 232; John G. Nicholav, "The Sioux War," The Continental Monthly,
vol. Ill, January, 1862, 197.
29 Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Supplemental Report
of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Washington, 1866,
"Report of Major General John Pope," vol. II, 198.
30 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 174-176, 177, 227-231,
236-237.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 139
warriors of that tribe were said to have actively participated in
the outbreak31 and probably did so. But in the main, the Winne-
bago were at peace.
The Secretary of the Interior saw an even larger pattern, involv-
ing nearly all the Indians west of the Mississippi, with some evi-
dence seemingly supporting it.32 The Indian agent in Utah had
written on August 5 that the Shoshone were attempting to organize
"the Cum-um-bahs, the Gros Utes, and the Shoegars, or Bannack
Diggers" in a war against the whites and were in fact already
committing depredations; an agent of the overland mail company
informed the Postmaster General that "a general war with nearly
all the tribes east of the Missouri river is close at hand;" the acting
Commissioner of Indian Affairs on September 19 in a public adver-
tisement warned of the danger of crossing the plains; and a mission-
ary, Peter J. DeSmet, warned of the excited attitude of the Gros
Ventre, the Ariccaree, the Mandan, the Assinaboine, and the Black-
foot, and strongly suspected that traders from north of the border
were exciting them. He also had heard that the Missouri Sioux were
agitated.33 Captain James L. Fisk, who took an expedition to the
mines in the northern Rockies, reported that the Assinaboine were
saucy, and that "their conduct convinced me that they were knowing
to the raid of the Sioux Indians."34 While this seemed to the Sec-
retary of the Interior to indicate a general conspiracy in the West,
its existence in more than coincidence is doubtful.
There is, however, some tenuous evidence to sustain a belief in
a premeditated plan in the case of the Sioux, Chippewa, and Winne-
bago of Wisconsin. As mentioned previously, some Winnebago
almost certainly took active part, even though most of them did not.
Of Hole-in-the-day, an influential Chippewa chief, Thompson said
that, "He [Hole-in-the-day] also carried on a correspondence with
Little Crow, leader of the Sioux raid,"35 although evidence against
31 House Executive Document No. 68, 8; Riggs, Forty Years, 153;
"Chief Big Eagle's Story," 392.
32 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 8-9, 171.
33 Ibid., 357, 358, 359; Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 590, 592,
645.
34 House Executive Document No. 80, 37 Cong., 3 Sess. (Serial 1164,
Washington, 1863), 2.
35 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 201; Official Records,
Series I, vol. XLI, pt. Ill, 127; George W. Sweet, "Incidents of the
Threatened Outbreak of Hole-in-the-Day and Other Ojibways at the Time
of the Sioux Massacre of 1862," Collections of the Minnesota Historical
Society, vol. 6, St. Paul, 1894, 401; hereafter cited as Sweet, "Incidents";
Brown, "In Captivity," 11. Ojibway and Chippewa were used synono-
mously.
140 ROBERT HUHN JONES
this is strong. Both Big Eagle and Galbraith admit that the tribes
were enemies; and, for this reason, the general belief seems to be
with coincidence rather than collusion.36
Coincidence or collusion, general or local, the Indian situation
in the whole West was incendiary. On the part of the Minnesota
Sioux, the "spark of fire, upon a mass of discontent" was "one
of those accidental outrages at any time to be anticipated on the
remote frontier."37 On August 17, 1862, a small hunting party
murdered several settlers at Acton, Minnesota, after a quarrel among
themselves over some hen's eggs. Accounts vary as to whether
or not they were drunk, but it is almost certain that the slaying
of the whites was not premeditated.38 Since the Indians expected
trouble over the homicides anyway, they apparently decided to wage
a preventive war.39 This so-called "accidental outrage" began one
of the worst massacres in the history of the United States.
In this same section of the frontier the United States Army
maintained four garrisons: Fort Abercrombie, Dakota Territory, on
the Red River of the North, roughly fifty miles above Lake Traverse;
Fort Ridgely, Minnesota, about twelve miles northwest of New
Ulm on the north bank of the Minnesota River; Fort Ripley, Min-
nesota, on the Mississippi River about forty miles above St. Cloud;
and Fort Randall, Dakota Territory, on the southwest side of the
Missouri River about forty-five miles west of Yankton. The mili-
tary Department of the West, which then embraced this area, re-
ported to the Adjutant General's Office, January 1, 1861, that
fourteen companies of the regular army with a total of 879 men
were on duty at those posts.40
With the secession of the Southern states beginning in Decem-
ber, 1860, and continuing on through the winter and spring of
1861, along with the raising of an army in those states, it seems
hardly inconceivable today that professional troops of the regular
army were not replaced by local militia sooner than they were.
Lincoln's government acted within a month of the inauguration to
36 House Executive Document No. 68, 24; Sweet, "Incidents," 401;
"Chief Big Eagle's Story," 387.
37 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 204-305, report of
Lieutenant Governor Donnelly of Minnesota.
38 Minnesota, Executive Documents, 1862, 4; House Executive Docu-
ment No. 68, 31; Heard, Sioux War, 54-56; Riggs, Forty Years, 152-153;
Senate Report No. 1362, 54 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 3475, no publication
note), 10-11.
39 House Executive Document No. 68, 31; Heard, Sioux War, 58-61;
Riggs, Forty Years, 153; "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 389-390.
40 Official Records, Series III, vol. I, 23.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 l4l
concentrate these forces, however, and the regulars began to with-
draw eastward on April 13. With the exception of one group, they
had departed by the following August. The last unit went east
in January, 1862.
The void created by the removal of regulars from the frontier
posts was filled by the local volunteer troops. Those of the Minne-
sota volunteers who were assigned to the frontier, even though these
assignments were at first brief, were disappointed to draw such
unglamorous duty. Only nine companies were now deemed nec-
essary. Forts Ripley and Ridgely were garrisoned by Companies A,
B, and G of the First Minnesota Volunteer Infantry on May 28
and 29, 1861, and their compatriots in Company E joined them on
June 6. Companies C and D of the same organization reached
Fort Abercrombie June 10, 1861, but they were ordered south along
with the rest of the regiment eleven days later. For a few days
Abercrombie and Ripley apparently were unmanned until the ar-
rival of companies from the Second Minnesota Volunteer Infantry
in July. Fort Randall was garrisoned by Companies A, B, and C
of the Fourteenth Iowa Volunteer Infantry, which was mustered
into service in September and October of 1861. Fort Randall was
occupied only by Co. H, Fourth Artillery, from August 1861 until
the Iowa troops arrived later in October that year.
Six companies of the Second Minnesota were stationed at Aber-
crombie, Ridgely, and Ripley until October 14. Garrison duty on
these posts over the winter fell to detachments of the Fourth Minne-
sota Volunteer Infantry, who were relieved in the spring of 1862
by detachments of the Fifth Minnesota. That spring only seven
companies were used to hold the frontier; of the Fifth Minnesota,
Co. B garrisoned Ridgely, C Ripley, and D Abercrombie; the same
three companies of the Fourteenth Iowa remained at Randall; and
Co. A, Dakota Cavalry was mustered into United States service on
April 29, 1862, and was stationed in detachments at various posts
along the Missouri River in Dakota Territory. Also at Ridgely in
United States service was an ordinance sergeant to look after the
six pieces of artillery left there by elements of the Second, Third,
and Fourth Artillery Regiments that departed in the preceding
spring, and also an Indian interpreter, a sutler, and a post surgeon.41
41 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 5, 79, 198, 243, 244; Minne-
sota, Executive Documents, 1862, 206; Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII,
376; Report of the Adjutant General and Acting Quartermaster General of
Iowa 1862, Des Moines, 1863, vol. I, xiii, vol. II, 323-324; Senate Miscel-
laneous Document No. 241, 58 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial 4591, Washington
1904), 10.
142 ROBERT HUHN JONES
On June 18, 1862, Captain Francis Hall, Commanding Officer
at Fort Ripley, sent Lieutenant Timothy J. Sheehan and fifty men
of Co. C to Fort Ridgely.42 On June 30, Sheehan
with detachment of fifty men of Company C and one Lieutenant [Thomas
P. Gere] and fifty men of Company B. . . j proceeded] forthworth . . .to
the Sioux Agency on the Yellow Medicine River, and . . . [reported] to
Major Thomas Galbraith, Sioux Agent at that place, for the purpose of
preserving order and protecting United States property during the time
of the annuity payment for the present year.
In addition, Sheehan's command of fifty men included a twelve-
pounder mountain howitzer and rations for fifteen days. They
arrived at the Upper Sioux Agency on the Yellow Medicine on
July 2.43 Since the annuity payment failed to arrive after the ex-
piration of about two weeks, Sheehan sent a detail to Fort Ridgely
for another fifteen days' rations. Since there were about 779 lodges
of Indians encamped about the Agency, including Yanktonai and
Cut-Heads, not entitled to annuities, Sheehan also sent back to Fort
Ridgely for a second mountain howitzer, which arrived on July 21.
Following the altercation at the warehouse, and after the Indians
were sent back to their homes to await the payment, Sheehan was
ordered to return to Fort Ripley with his detachment, since Captain
Marsh did not anticipate any further danger. On August 17 Shee-
han and his men left for Fort Ripley. On the same day, Lieutenant
Norman K. Culver and six men of Co. B were detached to St.
Peter to provide transportation to Fort Snelling for the company
of fifty recruits Galbraith enlisted at the agencies. Remaining at
Ridgely were Captain Marsh, Lieutenant Gere, and seventy-six
men.44
On August 17, the day of the murders at Acton, the troops on
frontier duty were disposed in the following manner: Co. B, Fifth
Minnesota, at Fort Ridgely (minus one officer and six men en route
to St. Peter) ; Co. C, Fifth Minnesota, garrisoned at Fort Ripley with
about thirty soldiers, as the other fifty men with Sheehan were en
route back from Fort Ridgely. At Fort Abercrombie was Co. D of
the same regiment, with nearly eighty men; at Fort Randall were
Companies A, B, and C of the Fourteenth Iowa with 295 on the
42 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 245 (Special Order No.
30, Fort Ripley, June 18, 1862) ; Minnesota, Executive Documents, 1862,
267 (Special Orders No. 6, Adjutant General's Office, June 14, 1862).
43 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 245 (Special Order No.
57, Fort Ridgely, June 29, 1862).
44 Ibid., 245-248.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 143
roll. Nearby in Dakota Territory was Co. A, Dakota Cavalry, that
mustered ninety- two men. At Fort Snelling, the recruiting and
muster of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Minnesota Volunteer Infantry regiments was in progress, with about
seven companies of the Sixth at full strength, or approximately 550
recruits, and other regiments at various stages of completion.45 But
Fort Snelling was nearly ninety miles from the scene of the out-
break. Fort Randall was even more distant, nearly 200 miles from
Ridgely.
In 1860-1861 the War Department had required nearly 900
regular troops to secure the area. However, in the summer of 1862,
there were on duty at the same frontier posts almost 300 fewer
troops in half the number of organizations previously thought nec-
essary, and these were relatively green recruits. Fort Randall, the
most remote, was garrisoned by more than half the number of men
on duty in this region. In the central Minnesota area, less than
half the number of soldiers occupied the frontier posts as had been
the previous policy. Here, from a military point of view, was a
very weak link in the chain of frontier defense. The raw, unarmed
tioops, mustering at Fort Snelling, constituted a remote and shaky
reserve corps, with any utilization in the frontier district of question-
able value or, in view of the military situation in the South, of
equally questionable assignment there.
News of the disturbance reached the Governor of Minnesota on
August 19, and almost immediately the whole northwestern frontier
was aflame. The Secretary of the Interior, in his annual report
dated November 20, 1862, almost matter-off actly mentioned that
In the month of August last the Sioux Indians in Minnesota most
unexpectedly commenced hostilities . . . with a degree of cruelty and bar-
barity scarcely paralleled by any acts of Indian warfare since the first
settlement of this country. ... A large extent of country, in an advanced
stage of improvement, was rendered utterly desolate. It is estimated that
the number of lives destroyed by the savages is not less than 800. This
outbreak was so sudden and unexpected that the settlers were taken by
surprise, and were found without the means of resistance or defence. . . .
The Sioux Indians are connected with kindred tribes, extending ... to the
Rocky mountains. The various tribes, united, can bring into the field ten
thousand warriors. They are supplied with arms and ammunition to a
considerable extent. They have it in their power to inflict great injury . . .
throughout the whole region.46
45 Ibid., 255, 258, 301-302; Minnesota, Executive Documents, 1862, 228,
236, 256^257.
46 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 7-8.
144 ROBERT HUHN JONES
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in his report of November 26
to the Secretary of the Interior, reported
It is estimated that from eight hundred to one thousand . . . unarmed
settlers fell victim to the savage fury ere the bloody work of death was
stayed. The thriving town of New Ulm, containing from 1,500 to 2,000
inhabitants was almost destroyed. . . . Meantime the utmost consternation
and alarm prevailed throughout the entire community. Thousands of happy
homes were abandoned, the whole frontier was given up to be plundered
and burned . . . and every avenue . . . was crowded with the now homeless
and impoverished fugitives.47
Superintendent Thompson placed the massacre figure at 600 to 800
lives, "the destruction of an immense amount of property," and
"barbarities . . . horrible beyond description."48 Lieutenant-Gover-
nor Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota found the territory between
Fort Ridgely and St. Peter "completely abandoned by the inhabit-
ants; the houses, in many cases, left with the doors open, the furni-
ture undisturbed," but went on to say, "I do not think that, when
all the facts are ascertained, the number actually killed will much
exceed two hundred,"**
In Dakota Territory, the frontiersmen abandoned the inland
settlements, such as Sioux Falls, to retreat to the safety of the
fortified installations along the Missouri River, Fort Randall and
the Yankton Agency. The Indians burned Sioux Falls after it was
abandoned.50 Governor William Jayne of Dakota Territory,
formerly a physician in Springfield, Illinois (later mayor of that
city), and a close friend of Lincoln, wrote General James G. Blunt,
commander of the military Department of Kansas, that as a result
of the situation in Minnesota
and that attack upon our settlement at Sioux Falls and . . . each day's news
of additional butcheries of families ... a general alarm pervades all our
settlements. Family after family are leaving our territory and whole set-
tlements are about to be broken up. We must have immediate aid ... or
else our territory will be depopulated. I have ordered ... all the militia
[to active duty] . . . but we are to a great extent without arms and ammuni-
tion— a few thousand people at the mercy of 50,000 Indians should they . . .
fall upon us.51
Schuyler R. Ingham, acting as agent for Governor Samuel J.
Kirkwood of Iowa, in a report to the governor concerning his visit
47 Ibid., 171.
48 Ibid., 199.
49 Ibid., 202-210.
50 Ibid., 320; Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 613.
51 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 613.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 145
to the northern border of Iowa, said that he "found many of the
inhabitants in a high state of excitement, and laboring under con-
stant fear of an attack by Indians. . . . [Many] families were leaving
their homes and moving to more thickly settled portions of the
state."52 Kirkwood appraised Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
that he had information that the Yanktonai were joining the Minne-
sota Sioux "and threaten our whole northwestern frontier. The
settlers are flying by hundreds. We lack arms. . . . Something must
be done at once."53
Algernon Sidney Paddock, Secretary of Nebraska Territory and
at that time acting Governor (later, in 1868, Governor of Wyo-
ming), notified Stanton that there were "Powerful bands of Indians
returning from Minnesota into northern settlements. Nebraska
settlers by hundreds fleeing. Instant action demanded. . . . Territory
without credit or cent of money."54
Charles Robinson, Governor of Kansas, informed Stanton that
Indians threatened the border, and he requested arms for the state
militia. Robinson further mobilized what organized militia re-
mained after national calls, and also all able-bodied men.55 The
whole northwestern frontier feared a general Sioux war.
While telegraph wires hummed the alarm and panic-stricken
settlers fled, the Sioux ravaged the Minnesota valley. Presumed to
have 1,500 warriors, but never employing more than half that num-
ber at any one time, they were earnestly attempting to exterminate
the white settlers from the Dakota border to the Mississippi River.56
The Indians were divided into two parties; one, the lower party,
attacked major points, such as Fort Ridgely and New Ulm, with
other raids and engagements as those at Redwood Ferry and Birch
Coulie. The upper party raided in the northern counties and at-
tacked Fort Abercrombie. There were also many sorties by indi-
vidual Indians all along the frontier.
52 Adjutant General's Report, Iowa, 1862, vol. II, 861; Official Rec-
ords, Series I, vol. XIII, 638.
53 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 620.
54 Ibid., 621.
55 Ibid., 628.
56 Estimates of the number of warriors vary with each account. See
Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1863, 394: Galbraith estimates a
total of 1,700 (or 850 in each group) ; Report of the Secretary of the
Interior, 1862, 210: Lt. Gov. Donnelly estimates 800-1,000 in the lower
group; Minnesota, Executive Documents, 1862, 10: Ramsey estimates 1,200
warriors total, 350-500 in lower group; Minnesota in the Civil and Indian
Wars, 254: Lt. Gere estimates 1,200-1,500 in the lower group; Heard,
Sioux War, 83, puts 450 in the lower group.
146 ROBERT HUHN JONES
The Sioux had no planned campaign in mind, only the general
desire to reduce Fort Ridgely and New Ulm and to move swiftly
toward the Mississippi, and in the process to bring the whole of
the Winnebago into the war.57 Stubborn resistance at Fort Ridgely,
New Ulm (even though it had been temporarily abandoned), and
Birch Coulie ended any such hope. The organization of the Indians,
although under the over-all command of Little Crow, was in no
way perfected; each band was semi-independent, and many braves
preferred to plunder on their own. This imperfect deployment,
coupled with brave defense by volunteer troops in the beleaguered
area, insured their ultimate defeat. The hope that a war on the
whites would close the breach among them was chimerical, since
some of the farmer Indians helped warn the settlements and pro-
tected individuals from the scalping knives of their brethren. Also,
many chiefs took part half-heartedly, realizing the ultimate futility
of the campaign.58
The extent of the panic occasioned by the descent of the Sioux
warriors down the Minnesota valley can be seen reflected in the
dispatches of the authorities in Minnesota, Iowa, Dakota, Kansas,
and Nebraska quoted above. Preparations went along at a furious
pace to arm in order to ward off any attack, but the frontier settlers
fled for safer ground anyway. The evacuation of the Minnesota
valley and the abandonment of Sioux Falls has already been alluded
to; Bon Homme, Dakota Territory, also was deserted and Yankton,
Vermillion, Elk Point, and Richland were partially depopulated. A
large group of settlers fled from eastern and southern Dakota to
Sioux City, Iowa, in such haste that they left their stock and crops
in the fields. Also many Iowans from Woodbury, Ida, and Sac
counties fled to Sioux City.59 In Nebraska Territory there was a
report of the Brule and Yanktonai grouping to assail the Pawnee
Indians as well as white settlers of that region. Families moved
out of danger areas to the village of Columbus, Nebraska, in antici-
pation of such an attack.60 The conspiracy rumor, the terrible toll,
and stories of the Minnesota valley massacre added to the panic.
Relatively fresh in the minds of Iowans was the Spirit Lake
massacre by Inkpaduta and his band of outlaw Sioux in 1857, who
57 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wa?s, 253.
58 "Chief Big Eagle's Story," 387.
59 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 638; State Department of
History, South Dakota Historical Collections, vol. 8, Pierre, S. D., 1917,
104, note 3.
60 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 644-645. The Brule, as the
Yanktonai, were a Sioux tribe.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 147
had killed about forty persons. The possibility of a reoccurrence of
this on a larger scale was indicated by the carnage in Minnesota,
and particularly by the fifteen settlers (more or less) slaughtered
near Jackson, Minnesota, about twenty miles north of the Iowa
border, and the same number massacred at Lake Shetek only forty
miles north of the line. In Iowa itself, within three miles of Sioux
City, two frontier defenders were ambushed before the Northern
Border Brigade was organized, and bands of Sioux were reported in
the Little Sioux valley. Horses and cattle were also reported
stolen.61
Iowa reacted by commissioning Lieutenant Colonel James A.
Sawyer to command the Northern Border Brigade, five volunteer
companies raised to defend the northwestern border.62 These units
were mustered at Fort Dodge, Webster City, Denison, Sioux City,
and Chain Lakes, and held a continuous line of blockhouses from
Chain Lakes to Sioux City. While some of them had signed for
nine months' duty, most of them served until December 1863.
Divided between Spirit Lake and Sioux City was Captain Andrew
J. Millard's company of Sioux City Cavalry in the United States
service.63 Also in Sioux City for a while were "a squad of artillery
from Council Bluffs and three companies of infantry from Council
Bluffs and Harrison County," which troops, as was the case in
Minnesota, had volunteered for federal service but had not yet
been sworn in. All told, there were apparently about 350 troops
in Sioux City that September.64
In Dakota Territory, the governor ordered "every male citizen
in the Territory between the ages of eighteen and fifty" to "enroll
himself in a company to be formed for home defense in his respec-
tive county, with such arms as he may have in his possession." In
response to this proclamation five companies, totaling 266 men,
were raised. The ninety-two troopers of Captain Nelson Minor's
Company A, Dakota Cavalry, which had been taken into federal
61 Riggs, Forty Years, 139; Heard, Sioux War, 99; Benamin F. Gue,
History of Iowa, New York, c. 1903, Vol. II, 68-69.
62 Adjutant General's Report, Iowa, 1862, vol. II, 869-870. The com-
panies, their positions, and their captains were: Co. A, Estherville, William
H. Ingham; Co. B, Iowa Lake, William Williams; Co. C, Peterson, Harvey
W. Crapper; Co. D, Cherokee, James M. Butler; Co. E, Correctionville,
Jerome W. White. Companies C, D, and E also had detachments at Oche-
yedan, Ida, Sac City, West Fork, Little Sioux, and Melbourne.
63 Ibid., 862-866; Captain William H. Ingham, "The Northern Border
Brigade of 1862-1863," Annuals of Iowa, 3rd Series, Vol. 5, October, 1902,
481-523.
64 Dan Elbert Clark, "Frontier Defense in Iowa 1850-1865," Iowa
Journal of History and Politics, Vol. XVI, July, 1918, 376.
148 ROBERT HUHN JONES
service on April 29, 1862, were already in frontier service. They
were stationed in Dakota Territory at Yankton, Vermillion, and
Sioux Falls; and, according to some accounts, the company, or part
of it, was driven from Sioux Falls before the city was burned.65
Other depredations in Dakota, combined with the Minnesota Mas-
sacre, lent much justification to the arming there. Two farmers
were murdered within a mile of Sioux Falls, a mailcarrier was shot
down between Yankton and Sioux Falls, a stage driver on the Fort
Randall road was shot, and two unarmed citizens were killed in
a wagon at a ferry within three miles of Yankton. In addition,
in Yankton County, "farmers were driven from their fields and
shot at in their doorways, until forced to retreat to the town
[Yankton] for safety."66
In contrast to Minnesota, or Iowa and Wisconsin, Nebraska
Territory's pressing problem was a nearly defenseless frontier. A
string of settlements on the Dakota side and Fort Randall protected
her northeastern frontier along the Missouri; but west of the
Missouri there was little cover. A thin line of troops guarded the
central mail route and the Oregon trail from Fort Kearney west.
Brigadier General James Craig, whose duty it was to protect the
routes, wrote Stanton on August 23 from Fort Laramie:
Indians from Minnesota to Pike's Peak, and from Salt Lake to near Fort
Kearney, committing many depredations. I have only about 500 troops
scattered on the telegraph and overland mail lines. Horses worn by
patrolling both roads. . . ,67
Too many Indians and too few troops had been Craig's problem
since the preceding April when he had been put in charge of the
mail route from its eastern terminus to the continental divide.68
But the Indian problem was important in another way also. Ben-
jamin F. Lushbaugh, agent for the Pawnee, reported on September
13 that
Before leaving Nebraska much apprehension prevailed among the settlers
65 Senate Executive Document No. 241, 58 Cong., 2 Sess. (Serial
4591, Washington 1904), 9-10, 12, 24, 81; Doane Robinson, "A History of
the Dakotas or Sioux Indians," South Dakota Historical Collections, vol. 2,
Aberdeen, S. D., 1904, 301. The Dakota troops, their captains and num-
bers were: A, under the command of Capt. F. M. Ziebach, 79 men; B,
under the command of Capt. Daniel Gifford, 32 men; C, under Capt. A.
W. Puett, 83 men; E, under Capt. Mahlon Gore, 50 men; F, a company of
mounted rangers under Capt. A. G. Fuller, 22 men. Capt. A. J. Bell
headed a phantom Company D, which existed only on paper.
66 Senate Executive Document No. 241, 81, 82.
67 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 592.
68 Ibid., 362, 451, 459, 466, 468.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 149
there that the existing Indian troubles in Minnesota might extend to the
former Territory. ... I have received information from my agency that an
attack of a serious character had been made upon it by the Brule and
Yankton Sioux.69
The Secretary of the Interior then reported to Stanton:
.... it will be seen that the Sioux Indians, now in open hostility to the
United States have commenced hostilities upon the Pawnees of Nebraska
as well as upon the white settlers in that Territory. . . . There is danger that
great sacrifice of life, as well as of property, will be incurred ... in
Nebraska.70
Because the "frontier people" were "much alarmed," the gover-
nor asked for, and was denied, authority to raise a regiment for
the defense of the Nebraska border. As of the preceding April,
Nebraska had no active home guards and no volunteer troops in
United States service except two regiments in the east. Until
Nebraska Territory was transferred to another department in
November, apparently there was no change in this status.71
Edward Salomon, Governor of Wisconsin, wrote Stanton on
September 2:
There is very great apprehension in the northwestern and central
portions of the state on account of the Indians. . . . Families are leaving
their homes for fear of the wandering bands. . . . The people must be pro-
tected . . . more arms must be forwarded immediately. . . . Our Lake Superior
settlements, surrounded by large numbers of Indians, are entirely defense-
less.
Salomon received no arms, but after a sharp verbal duel with Stan-
ton, did get some ammunition.72 As Wisconsin had no adequate
law sanctioning militia or military organization, Salomon had to
entrust the arms he sent to the frontier "to some reliable men in
different localities." Apparently this was enough.73
The Sioux caught the frontier at a time when they knew it was
weak, suddenly creating for the local agencies the problem of find-
ing troops and arms to secure themselves. The people of Minnesota
felt this problem most urgently, since the attack began before the
69 Ibid., 645; Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 267.
70 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 644.
71 Ibid., Series III, vol. II, 26, 457, 510, 521.
72 Ibid., Series I, vol. XIII, 508, 511, 515, 518, 522-523.
73 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Civil War Messages and Proclamations
of Wisconsin War Governors, Wisconsin History Commission, 1912, 138-
139.
150 ROBERT HUHN JONES
state could prepare. Ramsey acted quickly upon notice of the
uprising. The news reached him August 19, and after stopping
at Fort Snelling to see what troops were available, he hastened to
Mendota to put his old political foe, Colonel Henry Hastings
Sibley, in command of an expedition against the Sioux. Along with
the commission, Ramsey gave Sibley a free hand in the conduct
of the campaign. Sibley knew the Sioux, having lived among them
and traded with them for twenty-eight years. Sibley and four com-
panies of the Sixth Minnesota, not yet mustered into United States
service, began to move up the Minnesota and on August 22 reached
St. Peter. There Sibley waited for supplies and equipment to
catch up with him. On August 24 some 200 mounted men called
the Cullen Guard under William J. Cullen, a former superintendent
of Indian affairs, arrived, and on that day six more companies of
the Sixth Minnesota appeared, along with several squads of mounted
men and volunteer militia. Colonel Samuel McPhail commanded
the irregular cavalry, and Colonel William Crooks succeeded regular
army Captain Anderson D. Nelson in charge of the Sixth Minne-
sota. Sibley's force now numbered nearly 1,400.74 Sizeable as this
was, it was utterly inexperienced, from the green infantrymen of
the Sixth to the horses of the mounted men. However, there were
men of experience among the leaders, such as Sibley the frontiers-
man, and Crooks, who had spent two years at West Point.
On August 23, Sibley moved to the relief of New Ulm, and
on the 26th toward Fort Ridgely, where the main force arrived
on August 28. A reconnaissance and burial party sent to the Lower
Agency on August 31 was ambushed at dawn of September 2 in
their camp at Birch Coulie. It took the whole of Sibley's force
to lift the siege, and cost the reconnoitering group twenty-two dead
and sixty wounded. The appearance of Sibley's army frightened
off the Sioux before they could be engaged, and Sibley waited
another two weeks before resuming operations up the Minnesota.
Charles E. Flandrau, an associate justice of the State Supreme
Court and militia Colonel, hero of the defense of New Ulm, was
given command of the Blue Earth country of Minnesota, from the
Iowa border north to New Ulm. He headed a force of volunteer
citizens, militia, and elements of troops from Fort Snelling, origi-
nally intended for federal service.
Above the Minnesota River Captain Richard Strout's Co. B,
Ninth Minnesota, held Forest City, and Companies F and H of the
74 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 735; West, Sibley, 254.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 151
Ninth Minnesota, under Lieutenant O. P. Stearns and Captain W.
R. Baxter respectively, remained at Glencoe along with a company
of citizens under Captain A. H. Rouse.75
On August 21, J. H. Baker, Secretary of State in Minnesota,
wrote C. P. Wolcott, the Assistant Secretary of War, that "a most
frightful insurrection of Indians" had broken out and that the
Governor had ordered out infantry, which Baker knew was of little
use in chasing Indians. He wanted authority to raise 1,000 mounted
men. The same day Ramsey telegraphed Stanton that "The Sioux
. . . have risen," and reported that he had ordered up the Sixth
Minnesota and made Sibley a colonel. Henry W. Halleck, the
General-in-Chief, wrote Ramsey that as soon as the Third Minne-
sota Volunteer Infantry was paroled it would be sent to him. On
August 25 Ramsey wired Stanton and tried to get the draft post-
poned, but Stanton did not accede. Ramsey then telegraphed Presi-
dent Lincoln:
With the concurrence of Commissioner Dole I have telegraphed the
Secretary of War for an extension of one month of drafting, etc. The
Indian outbreak has come upon us suddenly. Half the population of the
state are fugitives. It is absolutely impossible that we should proceed.
The Secretary of War denies our request. I appeal to you, and ask for an
immediate answer. No one not here can conceive the panic in the state.76
Lincoln replied on the following day: "Yours received. Attend to
the Indians, if the draft cannot proceed of course it will not pro-
ceed. Necessity knows no law. The Government cannot extend
the time."77 There were no further references to the draft. Even
though the government would not extend the time, the draft did
not proceed. For one thing, Ramsey needed the Minnesota troops
mustering at Snelling, and for another, with some fleeing and others
fighting on the frontier, volunteers or draftees would be hard to
come by.
Ramsey continued to look for federal military assistance. The
same day he wired to Lincoln, he also asked Halleck: "Could not
Minnesota and Dakota be organized into a military department and
General W. S. Harney be sent to chastise the Sioux?" On August
29, three days later, Halleck replied: "The War Department is not
prepared at present to create a new military department in the
75 Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 739-803; Minnesota, Ex-
ecutive Documents, 1862, 370-374.
76 Official Records, Series I, vol. XIII, 590, 595, 596, 597.
77 Ibid., 599.
152 ROBERT HUHN JONES
west."78 Halleck doubtless was much more interested in the opera-
tions of the Army of Virginia at that date.
Despite the desperate struggle before Washington, the frantic
appeals from the frontier along with the news of the atrocities and
the extent of the Sioux uprising apparently caused Stanton to see
differently from Halleck the necessity of federal military interven-
tion in the Northwest. And then, after the first few days of Sep-
tember, Stanton had a general without a command who could most
conveniently be used in the Northwest.
The United States officially recognized the seriousness of the
problem by creating the military Department of the Northwest on
September 6, 1862. Major General John Pope was ordered to take
command of this area, which embraced at first the states of Wiscon-
sin, Iowa, Minnesota, and the Territories of Nebraska and Dakota.79
By the time Pope was able to set up his headquarters at St. Paul,
Minnesota, on September 16, Sibley had the situation in hand. By
September 23, Sibley defeated the Sioux at the battle of Wood
Lake, Minnesota,80 and except for annoying raids along the frontier
from Dakota to Minnesota by small groups, the major campaigning
was over for the 1862 season.
Fortunately, the volunteer response and the availability of num-
bers of men in some stage of organization was enough to blunt the
edge of the Sioux drive and wrest the initiative from them. The
Department of the Northwest conducted campaigns into Dakota
Territory in 1863, 1864, and 1865, with varying degrees of success.
The Sioux continued to be a formidable opponent throughout the
Civil War years and beyond.
The massacre of 1862 has received its share of superlatives, in-
cluding the rather ambitious statement that it was "the most serious
Indian massacre the frontier had yet seen."81 It does indeed rank
with blood-lettings such as Opechancanough's of 1644 in the Tames
River (Virginia) area, and the infamous Fort Mims affair that
began the Creek War just forty-nine years before. Actual casualties
are difficult to determine, with contemporary estimates such as 382
killed and missing, 737 dead, 800 dead, and later studies vaguely
78 Ibid., 597, 605.
79 Ibid., Series I, vol. Ill, 617.
80 Ibid., 278-279; Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 159-160,
311-312, 351-352, 743-744.
81 Frederick Logan Paxson, The Last American Frontier, New York,
1922, 235.
NORTHWESTERN FRONTIER AND THE SIOUX WAR, 1862 153
noting between 477 and 800. Sibley's biographer claims that 1,000
people perished, 2,000 more were maimed sufferers, an additional
8,000 became paupers, and 30,000 became fugitives.82 Regardless
of the veracity of these statements, the fact remains that the alarm
and the reaction to it was not a local affair. The entire north-
western frontier was vitally concerned, and the disturbance was
serious enough to trouble the federal government for years to come.
Yet compared to the awesome slaughter in the war to the south,
the dead in the first campaign of the Sioux War seemed few enough.
In the light of greater pain throughout the country, it is easy to
see how the country at large, other than the frontier, paid little
heed to the troubled Northwest.
Robert Huhn Jones
Kent State University
82 Report of the Secretary of the Interior, 1862, 210; Report of the
Secretary of the Interior, 1863, 408; Heard, Sioux War, 243; Whipple,
Lights and Shadows, 105; Minnesota, Executive Documents, 1862, 9-10;
West, Sibley, 249; William Watts Folwell, A History of Minnesota, St.
Paul, 1911, vol. II, 391-393.
Political Weaknesses in Wisconsin
Progressivism, 1905-1908
Students of the history of American reform must look to the
local and state level. For the Progressive era, study of Wisconsin
politics should be of more than ordinary interest. The reform im-
pulse in turn-of-the-century America was probably nowhere so well
expressed as in Wisconsin.1 From 1900 through 1914 Wisconsin
reformers introduced effective regulation of railroads, insurance
companies and other public service corporations, modernized the
tax structure, assisted farmers and laborers, launched a conservation
movement in the state, and enacted civil service and the direct pri-
mary. Their leader, Robert M. La Follette, served as governor and
senator from 1901 until his death in 1925. Later, his sons, Philip
and Robert, served as governor and senator, the latter defeated only
in 1946, by Joseph R. McCarthy.
Even in Wisconsin, however, progressivism had its tribulations.
The Wisconsin Progressives experienced their most resounding and
momentous defeat in the election of 1914. That defeat and the
factors contributing to it have been discussed elsewhere.2 But this
was not the first setback they had suffered. With the primary
election of 1906, in fact, they began to sustain a series of discourage-
ments that did not end until the spectacular Progressive resurgence
of 1910. Study of Wisconsin politics in the period from 1905
through 1909 reveals at least three major political limitations which
must be considered if an oversimplified picture of the Progressive
rationale is to be avoided.
Beginning in 1901, when Robert M. La Follette became gover-
nor, after a decade of struggle, the Progressives scored a series of
legislative and political victories. By the end of 1905, a direct
primary, ad valorem railroad taxation, railroad regulation, civil
service and other reforms had been enacted. Passage of these
measures had required both bare knuckled political fighting and
astute compromising. On one question, however, neither method
could be wholly successful. A vacancy in the Senate of the United
1 See, especially, Robert S. Maxwell, ha Follette and the Rise of the
Progressives in Wisconsin, Madison, 1956, 40-173.
2 Herbert F. Margulies, "The Decline of Wisconsin Progressivism,
1911-1914,"Mid-America, XXXXIX (July, 1957), 131-155.
154
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 155
States had to be filled in 1905. Among the influential supporters
of La Follette, more than one aspired to the honor. The politically
ambitious could be defeated, but at a price; they could be placated,
but only in part, and again at a price.
The two leading contenders for the coveted Senate seat were
William D. Connor and Isaac Stephenson. Connor was a capable
and vigorous lumberman. Though a late-comer to politics and
the Progressive ranks, by dint of energy, skill, and business position,
he became Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee in
1904. He did not conceal his senatorial ambitions. Though a
very much older man, seventy-six in 1905, Isaac Stephenson had
several things in common with Connor. He too was a lumberman,
though much wealthier. He too came late to the Progressive
cause. Like Connor, his assistance, chiefly in the form of cash,
was vital. Like Connor also, he was unashamedly covetous of the
Senate seat. In fact, he broke with the Old Guard leaders of the
party and threw his support to La Follette on this very question,
after the party leaders failed to reward him for long service in
1899.3
La Follette later claimed that his decision to accept the Senate
post himself was made in order to compromise the differences
between Connor and Stephenson.4 If so, the effort failed. Neither
was placated. Connor immediately broke with La Follette and, in
so doing, weakened the Progressive coalition greatly. Stephenson
moved away more warily, but his resentment was nevertheless evi-
denced in important ways in 1905 and 1906.
Connor's declaration of war came in December, 1905. La
Follette had called the legislature into special session to act on a
bill to permit a second choice vote in primary elections, such votes
to be counted when the recipient of the first choice vote was
eliminated. The purpose of the bill was to overcome the danger
of a Stalwart being nominated because of division in Progressive
votes. Connor, however, wielded his full influence against the
bill and was generally credited with causing its defeat.5 Mean-
3 Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette,
New York, 1953, I, 130-131.
4 Ibid., 187-189.
5 Elisha Keyes to John C. Spooner, December 16, 1905; Elisha Keyes
Letterbooks; Robert M. La Follette to Isaac Stephenson, June 23, 1906,
Robert M. La Follette Papers; Herman Ekern to Nicolai Grevstad, Decem-
ber 17, 1905, Herman L. Ekern Papers. All manuscripts cited in this
article are on deposit at the Wisconsin Historical Society Library, Madi-
son, Wisconsin.
156 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
while, he planned to abandon La Follette and pursue his political
fortune independently in the 1906 primaries.
At first Connor set his sights on the governorship. It soon
became apparent to him, however, that another rebel against the
La Follette forces had the stronger chance. Perhaps disappointed,
but seeing some long-range advantages in any successful anti-La
Follette candidacy, Connor joined forces with James O. Davidson.
With Davidson running for the Republican nomination for gover-
nor, Connor sought the nomination for lieutenant governor. In
all parts of the state, Connor organized Davidson-Connor clubs. On
the surface, both men appealed for Progressive votes, calling them-
selves true Progressives. Undercover, however, Connor bargained
effectively with the die-hard anti-La Follette Stalwarts and, as it
turned out, secured their support.6 The enmity of W. D. Connor,
then, was no small thing.
Connor's ally, James O. Davidson, had come to Wisconsin in
1872, a poor Norwegian immigrant of eighteen. He worked as a
farm laborer, tailor, clerk, and finally proprietor of his own general
store in Soldiers Grove, a small town in southwestern Wisconsin.
Davidson had little formal education, but he won many friends,
especially among his fellow Norwegians, and was respected for
his shrewdness and honesty. In 1892 Davidson was elected to
the state legislature. As an assemblyman, he joined in the fight
against the railroad pass and sponsored legislation to regulate sleep-
ing car, telephone, and telegraph corporations. Davidson emerged
as a representative of the increasingly potent Norwegian element
within the Progressive wing of the Republican party. In 1898
he was nominated and elected state treasurer, which office he held
through 1902. In that year, he was shifted to lieutenant governor.
Davidson was reelected in 1904 and, after La Follette went to
Washington, filled the unexpired portion of his term as governor.7
As the incumbent, and a tried and true Progressive, Davidson
was the logical choice of the La Follette men for the governorship
in 1906. He felt that the nomination was his due, and many
6 Elisha Keyes to John C. Spooner, December 16, 1905; Keyes to H.
C. Adams, December 16, 1905; Keyes to Henry Casson, February 17,
1906; Keyes to H. A. Taylor, May 29, 1906, Elisha Keyes Letterbooks;
David Atwood to James O. Davidson, January 24, 1906; W. A. Jones to
Davidson, March 9, 1906; D. C. Owen to Davidson, May 5, 1906, James O.
Davidson Papers; Robert M. La Follette to Perry Wilder, June 25, 1906;
W. H. Dick to La Follette, June 18, 1906; Edward E. Browne to La
Follette, July 16, 1906, Robert M. La Follette Papers.
7 Wisconsin State Journal, February 17, 1920.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 157
other Progressives agreed. La Follette and his closest intimates
had other ideas; they felt that the mild-mannered Davidson was
too little qualified by temperament, ability or education for the
office.8 Their support went instead to the dynamic young Speaker
of the Assembly, Irvine Lenroot. Despite tremendous pressure to
drive him from the field, however, Davidson persisted in his candi-
dacy, though it meant breaking with La Follette.
The role of Isaac Stephenson in assisting the Davidson rebellion
was less evident than that of W. D. Connor, but no less important.
The old lumber baron was very disgruntled at the way he had
been treated in 1905. First, he had been passed over for the
Senate. Later, he had not been consulted in the decision to bring
out Lenroot against Davidson. Was this his reward for founding
and sustaining the chief La Follette organ in the state, the Milwau-
kee Free Press? Stephenson was not in a position to break openly
with La Follette in 1906, for he still hoped to get the next Senate
vacancy. But he did go so far as to impose a policy of neutrality
on the Free Press despite the pro-Lenroot feelings of the editor.9
Moreover, he provided no financial support for the Lenroot cam-
paign. In this policy he was doubtless encouraged by Davidson's
flattering personal and political attentions, which he increasingly
reciprocated.10
The money problem was always a difficult one for La Follette.
According to Stephenson's calculations, denied by La Follette, half
a million dollars was spent by the lumberman in the Progressive
cause, through the years. Regardless of the exact sum, it is clear
that money was vital to campaigning and, without Stephenson, La
Follette's supply was inadequate. This became very evident during
the primary campaign of 1906. La Follette could find only two
weeks for Lenroot, for he had to spend the rest of the time from
July through November on the Chautauqua circuit. Late in June
he wrote an old friend:
I am almost desperate . . . You see my lecturing begins June 30th out in
Iowa. Al and Belle write me ev[er]y day that I must spend some day or
so with the party work[e]rs in Milwaukee & as much more in Madison . . .
8 Milwaukee Free Press, July 21, 1906; Printed letter by A. T. Rogers,
n.d., Herman L. Ekern Papers; La Follette to John J. Blaine, May 30,
1906, La Follette Papers.
9 H. C. Myrick to La Follette, July 11, 1906; La Follette Papers.
10 J. A. Van Cleve to James 0. Davidson, February 5, 1906; J. H.
Stout to Davidson, March 16, 1906; F. H. Magdeburg to Davidson, March
27, 1906, Davidson Papers; Davidson to Elmer Grimmer, May 26, 1906,
James O. Davidson Letterbooks.
158 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
That I must open headquarters in Madison and prepare a circular address
to the Republicans &c. They are nearly wild at thought of my leaving
the state. But the only way a dollar can be raised for Lenroot's campaign
is for me to go out on the lecture platform & earn it. We are in hard
times for money.11
But money was by no means La Follette's only problem. For
James O. Davidson was more than a figurehead for disgruntled
politicians. He was a political power in his own right. Otherwise
Connor and the Stalwarts would certainly have gone their own
way, instead of subordinating their ambitions to his candidacy. In
any consideration of the limitations of Wisconsin progressivism
Davidson is, from many points of view, the key figure.
The factor that made Davidson an independent political force
in the state was this: He was the chief representative of the Nor-
wegian-Americans in Wisconsin politics. Though not the most
numerous nationality group in the state, since they were surpassed
by the Germans, the Scandinavian element, especially the Norwe-
gians, had been vital to La Follette since 1894. 12 In the midst of
the 1906 primary fight against Davidson, Alfred T. Rogers, La
Follette's law partner and political lieutenant, warned "Bob": "It
has always been your mainstay to line up the solid Scandinavian
elements and it's like having a broken arm to fight without
them. . . ,"13
Despite prodigious efforts by the pro-Lenroot leaders of Nor-
wegian descent,14 Davidson retained the loyalty of his countrymen.15
It was this ability that made possible his candidacy.
Davidson's success in winning Norwegian votes did not demon-
strate that the Norwegians of Wisconsin were never true Progres-
sives. On the contrary, Stalwart candidates of Norwegian descent
almost invariably failed to win nominations and elections. David-
son understood this very well, and made a great point of his Pro-
11 Belle Case and Fola La Follette, Robert M. La Follette, I, 211.
12 Twelfth Census of the United States, Washington, 1901, I:clxxxii,
xviii.
is A. T. Rogers to La Follette, January 11, 1906, La Follette Papers.
14 F. A. Walby to La Follette, November 14, 1905; Henry Johnson to
La Follette, November 20, 1905; August Lehnhoff to La Follette, Novem-
ber 13, 1905, La Follette Papers; Herman Ekern to Nicolai Grevstad,
December 17, 1906, Ekern Papers.
16 Henry Pitusa to James O. Davidson, June 26, 1905; P. Oscar
Thompson to Davidson, August 30, 1905; Ed Emerson to Davidson,
October 29, 1905; James Thompson to Davidson, December 1, 1905; C. L.
Nelson to Davidson, December 21, 1905, Davidson Papers; Andrew Dahl
to Herman Ekern, November 3, 1905, Ekern Papers; James A. Stone to
Irvine Lenroot, May 22, 1906, James A. Stone Papers.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 159
gressive ties throughout the 1906 campaign and after. The Nor-
wegians, after all, had strong national traditions of veneration for
liberty and self government. They were predisposed to sympathize
with La Follette's campaign against "machines," "bosses," "trusts,"
and "interests." Largely farmers, mainly from the hilly and rela-
tively less fertile western part of the state, their Progressive tradi-
tions were reinforced by economic circumstances.
Within the general context of progressivism, however, strong
national pride motivated Norwegian-American voters. Like all
recently arrived immigrant groups, they sought recognition through
political office. La Follette understood this well. When he
launched his reform drive by backing congressman Nils P. Haugen
for governor, in 1894, he was counting on the "national pride"
of Haugen's fellow Norwegians to give him "very strong sup-
port."16 Davidson, in seeking the nomination for treasurer in 1898,
very frankly appraised the nationality question in a letter to an-
other Norwegian Progressive:
While I do not believe in making nationality a point, that question does
and will enter in the making up of the state ticket, and if our people are
given the usual representation I shall be proud of being their choice. I
became a candidate for the office of state treasurer because it seemed to
me that our people ought to hold the high position they have attained.17
The events of 1906 demonstrated that while Norwegians re-
mained firmly "Progressive," they were not so devoted either to
the person or the viewpoint of La Follette as to deserf a Progressive
leader who was one of their own.
The defection of Davidson, Connor and Stephenson from the
La Follette ranks was a serious blow to Wisconsin progressivism,
as events were to show. But the underlying roots of these rebel-
lions, the factors that made them politically possible, were even
more serious, in the long run. So long as these underlying weak-
nesses were present, there would surely be similar rebellions till
there remained nothing against which to rebel. The actions of
these three men apparently had diverse roots. Yet in one respect
they were similar: Their defection was the result of divided loyalty.
Even when they were part of the La Follette coalition, Davidson,
Connor and Stephenson were loyal to their own ambitions as well.
16 Robert M. La Follette, La Follette's Autobiography: A Personal
Narrative of Political Experiences, Madison, 1913, 288.
17 James O. Davidson to Andrew Dahl, March 29, 1898, Davidson
Letterbooks.
160 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
But personal ambition, even selfishness is not unusual. The divided
loyalty of these three was rendered dangerous to La Follette only
because of a second factor that these men had in common: inde-
pendent strength. Doubtless few of La Follette's partisans were
completely selfless, but how many were strong enough to oppose
their leader and survive politically, in 1905? Even Stephenson, a
millionaire with statewide political and business connections, had
to move cautiously. But with his assets, he had some bargaining
power. He had, in other words, not only the inclination to wander
from the reservation, something not unusual, but also the ability
to do so. The same is true of Connor and Davidson. They too
had the independent political power needed to convert an inclina-
tion into an actuality. The significant weakness in Wisconsin pro-
gressivism that their successful rebellion illustrates is the degree to
which it depended upon independent forces such as these. The
remarkable political abilities of La Follette, together with certain
other factors, such as the unique role of the University of Wis-
consin, favorably influenced the character of Progressive legislation
in the state and obscured this point. Actually, however, even at
its height, progressivism depended to a high degree on extraneous
sources of strength, on the money and effort of men whose motives
were primarily personal ambition, on voters who were interested in
nationality recognition.
The general factor discussed above is closely related to a second
major element of weakness in the Progressive political situation,
a weakness that also became apparent in 1905 and 1906. The
Progressives were not in agreement among themselves as to the
meaning of the term "progressivism." Hence the coalition was
easily divided, in elections and on matters of legislation. This
dangerous weakness partly explains the excessive dependence on
extraneous sources of support that has been noted. For La Follette
could not always count on full backing from even the sincerest
and most devoted "Progressives."
Many, probably most Progressives took a far more conservative
view of the needs of their time and the meaning of progressivism
than did La Follette and his closest associates. La Follette himself,
it might be noted, was far from being a radical when he launched
his battles against the Stalwarts in 1894. Awakened to the need
for reform by what he considered to have been an attempt by
Senator Philetus Sawyer to bribe him, he rallied young alumni of
the University of Wisconsin and others to his cause with the quite
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 161
reasonable and moderate demand for honesty in politics and govern-
ment.18 As the movement developed, equitable taxation, favorable
treatment for dairy farmers, and greater popular control in govern-
ment emerged as powerful reform issues. Progressives loyally fol-
lowed La Follette in gaining these ends. But by the end of La
Follette's third administration, after the early goals had been reached,
many of his followers wondered whether there was need for a con-
tinuation of the reform movement at the same fast pace, marked as
it was by intensely bitter factionalism within each party.
La Follette parted company with the doubters at this point.
His answer was distinctly in the affirmative. It was well stated
in a letter that he wrote to a young political lieutenant early in 1906,
with the Davidson question in mind:
We have accomplished much in Wisconsin toward the restoration of
representative government. That is just what we have accomplished. We
have not been fighting all these years for this or that particular legislation,
as some are wont to believe. It is wrong to say that the contest is ended
because we have been successful in this respect. The reforms which have
been written into the laws of our state indicate merely that we are going
back to the clean form of government established for us in the beginning.
The enemies of good government must also be active. No backward step
must be taken. The ground we have gained must be held.19
In his Autobiography, \.2l Follette wrote that the supreme issue,
involving all others,
is the encroachment of the powerful few upon the rights of the many. It
is my settled belief, that this great power over government legislation can
only be overthrown by resisting at every step, seizing upon every occasion
which offers opportunity to uncover the methods of the system.20
Not content with achieving any single reform or group of re-
forms, La Follette had come to focus his efforts and thought on the
single fundamental idea of keeping the predatory interests out of
public office. To achieve this purpose it seemed necessary that the
one weapon in the hands of the people, their numbers, be fully
utilized. Complacency was the menace to be feared above all.
The role of the Progressive leader, then, was to keep people vigi-
lant, mobilized. The great reform leader would raise ever new
issues, that would dramatize the existence of the fundamental con-
is The best account of the years of La Follette's emergence as a
Progressive are Belle Case La Follette and Fola La Follette, La Follette,
I, 1-135, and Robert M. La Follette, Autobiography.
19 Robert M. La Follette to Otto Bosshard, January 6, 1906.
20 La Follette, Autobiography, 21.
162 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
flict between people and special interests; he would simplify issues,
to make them readily comprehensible; he would publicize them, by
speeches and articles; he would personalize them, for most people
think in personal terms.
Issues, for La Follette, were weapons; they were means more
than ends in themselves. Handling of one of the early Progressive
measures, the railroad commission bill, illustrates this. The idea of
a strong commission had been popularized during the nineties, and
La Follette and his friends heartily backed it. Yet La Follette
persuaded A. R. Hall, veteran crusader for railroad reform, not to
raise the issue in 1900 or 1901. He preferred not to scatter his
fire too widely, as A. O. Barton put it.21 In the 1903 legislative
session, the La Follette men did raise the commission issue, but as
a political tool. "The regulation bill did not pass at that session,
nor did we expect it to pass," La Follette later wrote. However
the main purpose was accomplished; Stalwart rejection of it "stirred
the people of the state as they had never been stirred before."22
According to George Hudnall, a State Senator allied with the Pro-
gressives in 1905, a similar strategy was unsuccessfully attempted
by Andrew Dahl, one of La Follette's "inner circle," in connection
with a bill to tax street railways. Dahl's hope was to block the
bill in order to blame Stalwarts for its defeat during the 1906
campaign, when a new issue would be badly needed.23
La Follette always contended that he was concerned with prin-
ciple, not personalities. Yet his recitation of the voting record of
candidates in their own districts, his crusading manner of campaign-
ing, his bitterness and irony, his interference in contests for office
high and low, his undisguised factionalism, all combined to make
the political strife of his time intensely personal.24 His opponents
responded in full measure to La Follette's techniques, setting as
their highest goal his political obliteration. In so doing, they actu-
ally helped La Follette in his effort to keep the battle simple and
dramatic, intensely warm and with just two sides.
21 Albei't O. Barton, La Follette's Winning of Wisconsin, Des Moines,
1924, 178.
22 La Follette, Autobiography , 70.
23 George B. Hudnall to John J. Esch, August 6, 1912, John J.
Esch Papers.
24 See particularly Carroll P. Lahman, "Robert M. La Follette as
Public Speaker and Political Leader," unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1939 and Wallace Sayre, "Robert M. La Follette:
A Study in Political Methods," unpublished doctoral dissertation, New
York University, 1930.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 163
Obscured and unheard beneath the sound and fury of the
Progressive and Stalwart big guns, many men of both sides grew
restive over the constant turmoil and looked to the day of renewed
peace in the Grand Old Party. James O. Davidson was such a
man. Isaac Stephenson was another. And they represented thou-
sands of nameless voters and leaders of lesser prominence. More
than any other factor, the viewpoint of such men was a brake for
the Progressive express. Stephenson expressed the widely shared
view when he wrote:
In Wisconsin the old railroad-corporation crowd, the inner ring which con-
trolled party affairs to the exclusion of all others, had been fairly routed
and some good laws were placed on the statute books. There the task
ended for me.25
James O. Davidson was the rallying symbol for Progressive
dissidents during these years. Though a leading Progressive, he
saw no need for perpetuating the bitter factionalism of Republican
politics. He regarded division among Republicans as undesirable,
not as a useful and necessary adjunct to reform. Furthermore, he
believed in 1905 that after the previous years of turmoil and change,
the time had come for consolidation of gains and "a business admin-
istration." A naturally friendly man, Davidson prided himself on
the amiable relations that he had always maintained with persons
of all factions. Under the "business administration" that he
planned, there seemed no reason why these relations could not
be continued, he wrote a Stalwart early in 1906. 26 Later that year
he wrote optimistically to his ally Connor: "If I may judge of the
situation, a very good proportion at least of the people, are willing
to have a rest from the turbulence that has been with us in the
past, but none are willing to sacrifice a single principle that we
have contended for."27
Most Stalwarts appreciated the difference in thinking between
La Follette and Davidson. They would have supported any formi-
dable opponent of La Follette in 1906, but they were especially
pleased over the Davidson candidacy, for they saw in the amiable
Norwegian a man of peace. Old Elisha Keyes, once party boss
and still influential, wrote confidently to Senator Spooner that
Davidson was "a peaceable man, . . . not belligerent or aggressive.
25 Issac Stephenson, Recollections of a Long Life, Chicago, 1915, 239.
26 James O. Davidson to John Gaveney, January 19, 1906, Davidson
Letterbooks.
2? James O. Davidson to W. D. Connor, June 22, 1906, Davidson
Letterbooks.
164 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
He is the kind of man the party needs in this state. . . ."28 Henry
Casson, former Secretary of State of Wisconsin and in 1906 Ser-
geant at Arms of the House of Representatives, was equally con-
fident of Davidson's intention to bring peace. Casson had known
Davidson for thirty years.29 A number of Stalwarts wrote with
the same confidence directly to Davidson.30
Probably a majority of the Progressives took the less subtle
approach espoused by Davidson. Ex-Governor William D. Hoard,
for example, sided with him. Always a "good Republican," Hoard
wrote bitterly in 1911 "Never in all the fifty-three years of my
experience in Wisconsin politics have I seen developed so malign
and selfish a spirit as La Follette has infused his present day fol-
lowers with."31 An equally prominent Progressive, Nils Haugen,
the man La Follette enlisted as candidate for Governor in 1894
when he launched his reform campaign, and later the guiding spirit
behind vital tax reforms, came to share some of Hoard's views.
In his later years he regarded La Follette as surly, contentious and
vituperative.32
A great many Progressives supported Davidson on other
grounds. But in so doing, they tacitly rejected La Follette's dynamic
approach. Davidson's pacific views were well known, and those
who backed him themselves endorsed the return to party unity.
For these, political custom dictated Davidson's retention of the
office La Follette's resignation had given him.33
Some Progressives in the Davidson camp went further. State
Senator McGillvray, for example, took sharp exception to La
Follette's idea that a lawyer like Lenroot was needed for governor-
ship. Foreshadowing an argument that became increasingly embar-
rassing to Progressives in later years, McGillvray said that the state
needed a businessman to effect economies, not a theorist.34 More
28 Elisha Keyes to John C. Spooner, January 10, 1906, Keyes
Letterbooks.
29 Henry Casson to Keyes, February 5, 1906, Keyes Papers.
30 E. E. Sherwood to James 0. Davidson, December 4, 1905; A. H.
Strange to Davidson, December 21, 1905; Walter J. Benedict to Davidson,
January 3, 1906; O. W. Arnquist to Davidson, May 9, 1906; A. H. Reid to
Davidson, May 17, 1906, Davidson Papers.
31 William D. Hoard to Lucien Hanks, February 1, 1911, Lucien
Hanks Papers.
3 2 Nils P. Haugen, Political and Pioneer Reminiscences, Madison,
1930, 113-114.
33 Milwaukee Free Press, July 24, 1906, August 30, 1906; Oshkosh
Northwestern, August 25, 1906; George Cooper to James O. Davidson,
May 12, 1906, Davidson Papers.
34 Milwaukee Free Press, July 25, 1906.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 165
graphically, a correspondent to the Milwaukee Free Press wrote: "It
is said the Governor of Wisconsin should be a lawyer. Buckle up
your coat when they tell you a lawyer will make the best governor.
Your pocketbook is in danger."35
The moderation, even conservatism, of so many of the "Pro-
gressives" in the 1906 campaign and later, was probably related in
part to economic circumstances. The state was not beset with the
kind of distress that might have brought to La Follette devoted
majority support for his dynamic political approach. The reform
movement in the state had never been based on extreme economic
discontent.36 Wisconsin agriculture was making a successful ad-
justment from wheat to dairying at the turn of the century. The
dairyman, because his product was light and his production condi-
tions stable, had fewer complaints about freight rates and credit
than did the wheat growers. Thus, the typical Wisconsin farmer
had proved impervious to the appeal of Populism. The dairyman
had more limited demands, for low taxes, protection against sub-
stitutes and research help.37
While doctors, lawyers, merchants, journalists, and bankers
were prominent in the Progressive movement in the state, laboring
men or their leaders were not. Labor, organized and unorganized,
was beginning to catch up with agriculture at the turn of the
century, in terms of numbers.38 However, industry, and the labor
force, was highly decentralized during the first decade of the new
century. Lumber manufacturing, flour milling and paper milling
were chiefly located outside the populous and industrial lake shore
region. Much of the labor in small enterprises scattered around
the state was not firmly rooted in the class called "labor," for men
of this class retained strong agricultural connections, shifting, typi-
cally, from farm to city and back again.39 Another segment of
labor, employed in the growing machine tool industry, malting,
leather and dairy products, and working in Milwaukee, mainly, or
35 Thomas J. Ford to the editor, Milwaukee Free Press, August
27, 1906.
36 Herbert F. Margulies, "Issues and Politics of Wisconsin Progres-
sivism, 1906-1920," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wis-
consin, 1955, 1-62.
37 Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in
the Middle West, 1900-1939, Madison, 1951, 12.
38 See especially J. H. H. Alexander, "A Short Industrial History
of Wisconsin," Wisconsin Blue Book, 1929, Madison, 1930, 39, and Gertrude
Schmidt, "History of Labor Legislation in Wisconsin," unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1933, 16.
39 Schmidt, "Labor Legislation in Wisconsin," 13-14.
166 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
in Racine or Kenosha, was reform-conscious, but inaccessible to the
Progressives. The Social Democratic party had achieved remark-
able success in winning the allegiance of organized labor in Mil-
waukee, under the astute direction of Victor Berger. Following
the political approach that was congenial to the German workers
who provided a bulwark for the socialist party, a tight party disci-
pline prevented the socialist workers from participating in the
factional affairs of the Republicans or Democrats.40 Thus, La
Follette had no mass support from labor for his anti-corporation,
anti-Stalwart appeal.
The Progressives that remained to La Follette were a disparate
group, many of whose views of progressivism were far more con-
servative than his. Whether their views or his were sounder is
of course an open question. Clearly, though, quite apart from the
merits of the two views, the simple fact of ideological disunity was
a major source of weakness to the movement.
A third serious limitation to progressivism exhibited in this
period was the democratic ideology to which the La Follette forces
had committed themselves. La Follette and his allies had fought
stoutly against "bosses," and "machines." Government must be
restored to the people, they urged. From 1897, major attention had
been focussed on the primary, which La Follette finally helped to
secure over strong Stalwart opposition.
The campaign against bossism had some obvious advantages,
of course. Votes were won with the popular Jeffersonian theme;
and in party primaries, progressive Republicans might get help
from "fair minded" Democrats.41 Still, there were some grave dis-
advantages, too. Leadership proved essential. If the Progressives
steered faithfully on their anti-boss, direct democracy course, they
would be wrecked on the rocks of disunity. Concensus on candi-
dates and programs would not occur automatically. But if the
Progressives tried to achieve unity through caucuses, conventions or
the dictation of La Follette they would become targets for the
democratic shafts they themselves had forged. Aggravating the
situation for Progressives was the fact that the law recognized
neither factions nor devises for achieving factional unity. Organi-
40 See Frederick I. Olson, "The Milwaukee Socialists, 1897-1941,"
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1941, for a full
discussion of this.
41 Interview with Craig Ralston, January 11, 1953. Mr. Ralston had
been political reporter for the Milwaukee Journal.
42 Milwaukee Sentinel, August 2, 25, 1906.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 167
zational efforts would have to be extra-legal and therefore doubly
difficult and suspect. In practice, the Progressives vacillated be-
tween both unsatisfactory approaches. They were hurt by each.
Davidson took full advantage of this weakness in the 1906
campaign. La Follette contradicted the spirit of democracy and of
the primary and was engaging in the same kind of boss-rule that
he had once campaigned against, the rebel charged.42 A host of
prominent Progressives broke with La Follette and backed David-
son on the basis of this argument. The well respected attorney
Robert M. Bashford attacked La Follette for bossism and violation
of the spirit of the primary, as he announced support for David-
son.43 Many lesser lights echoed the view. "I feel that I have
just as good a right to dictate who should be Governor, as Bob
La Follette or any other man," a Davidson supporter wrote. "And
I find nearly every one feels about the same way. He taught us
how to do up the bosses and we did it, and he need not now expect
that he can act as our boss."44
Davidson's preemption of the democracy issue, combined with
his other advantages, led to La Follette's first major defeat since
his faction took power in 1900. Davidson trounced Irvine Lenroot
by a vote of 109,583 to 61,178. Connor won the nomination for
Lieutenant Governor at the same time.
The primary election results confirmed the importance of three
major political limitations in the Wisconsin Progressive movement.
First, the Progressives had depended strongly on men and groups
whose loyalties were divided and who were powers in their own
right, independent of La Follette. Wealth and nationality appeal
chiefly underlay their independence. Second, the Progressives were
deeply divided ideologically. The faction included a large number
of Republicans who did not share La Follette's belief that constant
factional warfare was desirable, but instead wanted peace in the
party after certain reforms had been won. The economic circum-
stances of the state probably contributed to this ideological division.
Finally, the Progressives were seriously embarrassed by their com-
mitment to an anti-boss ideology, which made it difficult and costly
for them to achieve organization and unity.
In the years that followed the election of Davidson as governor,
these same factors continued to work against the La Follette men.
For a time, indeed, many astute politicians foresaw an end to La
43 Ibid., August 29, 1906.
44 J. D. Stuart to Davidson, November 14, 1905, Davidson Papers.
168 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
Follette's senatorial career and to the Progressive movement in the
state in the election of 1910.
In 1907, the payoff to Isaac Stephenson at last came due.
Senator Spooner resigned two years before the expiration of his
term and a united Progressive bloc in the legislature had the power
to at last reward "Uncle Ike" for his services. The wisdom of
placating the old gentleman was not lost on La Follette and chief
legislature lieutenants, especially Speaker of the Assembly Herman
Ekern. Unfortunately for them, instead of patching up old wounds,
the event served only to worsen them.
La Follette expressed a preference for Stephenson early in the
legislative session, but he did not or could not prevent three other
Progressives entering the contest. Seven weeks later, the legislature
was still deadlocked and La Follette wired Ekern, "Stephenson
must win. Fight hard."45 Stephenson did win, but he emerged an
embittered victor. The crusty old lumber baron later recalled:
The La Follette influence . . . appeared to be very ineffective at this
time, for it brought about no appreciable change in the situation. To what
extent it was exercized others may surmise for themselves. Senator La
Follette himself said that he could do no more than he had, because the
men generally recognized as his followers or supporters were his friends.
A sudden delicacy of feeling, I suppose, forbade any zealous attempt to
influence the action or mold convictions of these men whom the outer
world had erroneously regarded as parts of a well organized political
machine.46
And the editor of Stephenson's newspaper, the organ of the Pro-
gressives until that time, confided to Elisha Keyes that he was bitter
over the treatment that La Follette had accorded his employer. He
saw little hope for Progressive harmony in the future.47
Again in 1908, La Follette had to choose between dictation and
disunity. Stephenson was hopelessly lost to the Progressives by
this time, so the problem was to find a single Progressive candidate
to oppose him in the preferential primaries. Apparently still fear-
ing the boss-rule charge and another major schism, La Follette
refused to commit himself publicly. The result was that two Pro-
gressives, William Hatton and Francis E. McGovern, divided Pro-
gressive support. Important La Follette men did meet in Madison
early in the summer. They decided to give Hatton quiet backing,
45 Robert La Follette to Herman Ekern, May 15, 1907, Ekern Papers.
46 Stephenson, Recollections, 101.
47 H. P. Myrick to Keyes, May 21, 1907, Keyes Papers.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 169
but feared to go further.48 Thousands awaited the word from La
Follette, but it never came. Nor was his law partner, Alfred T.
Rogers, forthright on the subject, even in private conversation.49
La Follette, Lenroot, Ekern, James Stone and others of the "inner
circle" distrusted McGovern, the ambitious young Milwaukee Dis-
trict Attorney, but they lacked the organization and the ideology
to oppose him successfully. There was no legal mechanism by
which they could formally choose Hatton as their candidate. In-
formal organization against McGovern would open the door once
again to the boss-rule charge. With strong support in the Milwau-
kee area, McGovern was in a good position to duplicate Davidson's
successful revolt, if provoked. Perhaps caution was the wiser course
in 1908. But the result was that McGovern and Hatton divided
over seventy-eight thousand votes while Stephenson won out with
59,839. The support of the Milwaukee Free Press and use of over
a hundred thousand dollars, incidentally, helped Stephenson win
those votes.50
Such experiences led a number of sincere and thoughtful Pro-
gressives to acknowledge the weaknesses of the primary system
and seek some modification of it. State Senator A. W. Sanborn
and Herman Ekern favored a Progressive organization within the
primary system in 1908. 51 The plan received support from other
Progressives from time to time, but was long delayed. Opposition
came from such men as McGovern, who had stronger support
outside the ranks of the leadership than in it. Equally important,
though, was the continuing fear of the boss-rule charge.52 In
1909 La Follette himself gave some support to the idea of an
organization, but as the 1910 election campaign developed, he
squashed plans for an organization or even a factional meeting
48 R. Ainsworth to Herman Ekern, July 23, 1906, Ekern Papers.
49 W. J. McElroy to Herman Ekern, July 25, 1908; W. W. Powell
to W. H. Dick, July 31, 1908; W. H. Dick to Ekern, August 14, 1908,
Ekern Papers.
50 Herbert F. Margulies, "The background of the La Follette-Mc-
Govern Schism," Wisconsin Magazine of History, Autumn, 1956, 21-29.
51 Herman Ekern to A. W. Sanborn, October 27, 1908, Ekern Papers;
A. W. Sanborn to James Stone, October 8, 1909; Stone to Sanborn, October
13, 1909, Stone Papers.
52 A. W. Sanborn to Ekern, October 24, 1908; Minutes of the Pro-
gressive Organization Meeting in Madison, June 3, 1909, Ekern Papers;
James Stone to Edward F. and Julius T. Dithmar, June 4, 1909; Stone
to Sanborn, October 13, 1909; Sanborn to Stone, October 16, 1909, Stone
Papers; Theodore Kronshage to Tom Morris, May 21, 1910, La Follette
Papers.
170 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
that might resemble a convention.53 Finally, after division had
contributed to the defeat of the Progressives in the gubernatorial
contest of 1914, an organization was formed. Even then, how-
ever, it was unable to mobilize complete Progressive support.54
The embarrassments associated with the direct democracy com-
mitment, along with the other elements of weakness exhibited
earlier, combined to produce further difficulty for La Follette fol-
lowing the 1908 primaries. The La Follette men did not dare
contest the popular Davidson's renomination in 1908. Even so,
they sustained another defeat at his hands at the Republican plat-
form convention that met in Madison shortly after the primaries.
Senator La Follette had battled William Howard Taft for the
Republican presidential nomination. At the national convention,
Wisconsin had backed its own draft platform to the last. The La
Follette forces now asked the state platform convention to endorse
their proposals rather than the more conservative planks of the
national party platform. In this they were opposed by the Governor.
Davidson had walked a tightrope up to this time, hoping to patch
up relations with La Follette as much as possible, without, how-
ever, surrendering ouright to him. The sharply drawn issue of the
platform convention forced him to take a stand, however, and
showing vigor and ability that surprised many, he spoke and worked
forthrightly for the national Republican platform and against
La Follette's.55 Davidson and his forces won again. The con-
vention rejected the second choice primary and a tariff plank more
liberal than the one in the national platform, by votes of seventy
to fifty-one and seventy-nine to forty-three. Then it chose Stephen-
son's campaign manager Chairman of the State Central Committee
and adjourned.56 "The La Follette crowd was cleaned out, horse,
foot and dragoon, with Edmonds as Chairman and the platform
just as the conservatives wanted it," veteran Stalwart leader Elisha
Keyes exulted.57
53 John Hannan to James Stone, October 8, 1909; Charles Crownhart
to A. W. Sanborn, May 26, 1910, La Follette Papers.
54 By 1920, such prominent Progressives as former State Senator
A. W. Sanborn, Legislative Reference Librarian Charles R. McCarthy and
Professor John R. Commons felt that the primary system had done much
harm. See Sanbom to McCarthy, August 5, 1920 and McCarthy to San-
born, August 10, 1920, Charles R. McCarthy Papers.
55 Elisha Keyes to John Gaveney, September 23, 1908, Kayes Letter-
books.
56 Milwaukee Free Press, September 24, 1908.
57 Elisha Keyes to John Gaveney, September 23, 1908, Keyes Letter-
books.
WEAKNESSES IN WISCONSIN PROGRESSIVISM, 1905-1909 171
In the general election contest that followed, La Follette and
Davidson again crossed swords. During the primaries young
Herman Ekern met defeat in his bid for renomination to the
Assembly. Charging corruption, Ekern entered the general election
as an independent. La Follette came into rural and heavily Nor-
wegian Trempealeau county to stump for his loyal and able protege.
Davidson, standing on the principle of party regularity and the
sanctity of the primary, toured the littler Trempealeau towns for
Albert Twesme. In this highly publicized clash of titans, Davidson
again won.58
A final political reverse in the 1906 through 1909 series was
inflicted on the La Follette men during the 1909 legislative session.
Despite Stephenson's victory in the primaries, the Progressives, led
by State Senator John J. Blaine, hoped to deny him the legislature's
designation on the grounds that he had corrupted the primary
election. A joint committee investigated the charges, but the
more conservative assembly members predominated over the Pro-
gressive senators and, after much delay, Stephenson was returned
to the United States Senate.
The deterioration of Progressive fortunes in the period 1905
through 1909 had real consequences. For one thing, the 1909
Assembly was conservatively inclined and, for the first time since
1901, failed to pass a single major reform proposal. Secondly,
the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Isaac Stephenson, increasingly
divorced himself from the lead of La Follette and the Midwestern
Republican "Insurgents," voting instead with Nelson W. Aldrich
and the "Standpatters." Again, some of Governor Davidson's
appointments, especially to the University Board of Regents, ma-
terially lessened Progressive influence in state administration.
In 1910, the erosion of Progressive fortunes dramatically ended
and a new wave of reform in the state was launched. La Follette
was reelected to the Senate; McGovern, representing an advanced,
urban oriented version of Progressivism won the governorship;
Progressives dominated the elections for congress and legislature.
New factors, especially the backwash from the swelling national
Progressive tide, were at work. Midwestern Insurgents, including
La Follette, had led a well publicized and immensely popular fight
against the conservatives on such issues as the Payne-Aldrich tariff,
the Ballinger-Pinchot conservation controversy, and the rule of
58 Milwaukee Journal, October 28, 30, 31, 1908.
172 HERBERT F. MARGULIES
Speaker Joe Cannon in the House. These issues, easily related in
the oratory of Progressives to Wisconsin's own earlier struggles
against "the interests" and bosses, gave new vitality to the move-
ment in the state.
To the historian, the Progressive resurgence in 1910 has been
a confusing and complicating event. For it gave rise to the myth
that the Progrossives ruled in Wisconsin from 1901 through 1914
without interruption. It perhaps caused exaggeration of the
strengths of the Wisconsin Progressives and obscured the weak-
nesses. Since Wisconsin was a showcase for Progressivism in its
time, misunderstanding about Wisconsin may have contributed to
misinterpretations of Progressivism as a national phenomenon.
The fact is that very serious weaknesses were present, even in the
heyday of Progressivism. Some of them were revealed clearly in
the period 1905 through 1909. Others did not show themselves
that soon. Taken in combination, these limitations proved potent
enough to cripple and finally destroy the movement in the state.
To ignore or misconstrue them is to misunderstand a vital phase
in the history of American reform.
Herbert F. Margulies
Iowa State Teachers College
Cedar Falls
The Forty-Fifth Congress and
Army Reform
In January of 1878 the Washington Post noted the need for
"the general purification of the service from the blights of favorit-
ism, flunkyism and extravagance."1 This was a fitting remark in
the beginning of a year which was to see Congress make a major
attempt to rid the Army of these and other abuses. In that year
the Forty-fifth Congress attempted unsuccessfully to reorganize and
reform the service. Because the effort was abortive, most standard
treatments of the post-Civil War era seldom mention this episode;
yet it was a matter which occupied the attention of a special joint
committee of Congress and aroused the champions and opponents
of the Army in the last weeks of 1878 and in the early months of
the following year. If the proposed changes had been carried out
the Army would have undergone a major reorganization which
would have affected virtually every branch of the service.
Had Congress been able to undertake this matter in a quiet, dis-
passionate fashion without such things as partisan and sectional
opposition, considerable external pressure by interested parties, and
a backlog of attempts to redefine the size and purpose of the Army
from the end of the Civil War to 1878, the problem might have
been solved in a satisfactory manner. But this was not the case and
the efforts of Congress were understandably a continuation of frus-
trations that dated back to 1865. To appreciate more fully the
efforts of the lawmakers of the Forty-fifth Congress it is necessary
to summarize briefly the ubiquitous Army problem from Appomat-
tox to 1878.
It should be noted that the size of the Army was seldom con-
stant from the end of the war, and it tended to decrease or increase
depending on the whims of Congress and the Indian situation.2 Con-
gress had shown no inclination to maintain the Army by adequate
1 Washington Post, January 8, 1878.
2 It has been estimated that in April, 1865, there were more than
one million Northern men in the field. By 1870 the Army had been re-
duced to 32,788 officers and men, and in 1874 to 25,000. An increase of
2,500 was allowed during- the Sioux War, 1875-76. In the spring of 1878
a bill was being considered which would have reduced the Army to 20,000
officers and men. Charles Francis Atkinson, "Army," Encyclopedia
Britannica (1910), II, 623.
173
174 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
appropriations, and in 1876 the Democratic controlled House of
Representatives attached a rider to the Army appropriation bill
which provided that no federal troops be used to uphold the Repub-
lican government in Louisiana.3 In July, 1876, Congress created a
commission of two Senators, two Representatives and two Army
officers and the Secretary of War as member ex-officio. This com-
mission failed to submit a report because the term of its service
expired before it completed its work.4 In the next session the
House attached a rider to the Army appropriation bill forbidding
the use of federal troops at the polls of any federal election. When
the Republican-controlled Senate refused to accept the House rider,
the Forty-fourth Congress adjourned without appropriating any
money for the Army.5
In the spring of 1878, Congress was still undecided as to what
to do about the bill, though it did not lack proposals. Senator
Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, for example, offered to in-
sert twenty-six new sections into the bill, replacing sections 2 through
27. His proposals covered a range of subjects in the bill, but the
Senate was no more interested in this amendment than in others
that had been offered earlier, and the amendments failed in the
Senate.6 Another proposal was made by Representative Abram S.
Hewitt of the House Appropriations Committee who offered his
own version which included reducing enlisted personnel from
25,000 to 20,500 with a corresponding decrease in the number of
officers.7 The House accepted the reduction of enlisted personnel
to 20, 500, 8 but the Senate rejected the bill because of the unpopu-
larity of the reduced figure and in part because of the rule that no
legislation could be attached to appropriation bills.9
In spite of the Senate's action Hewitt believed that the question
of Army reform and reorganization should be raised on the basis
3 Edwin E. Sparks, National Development, New York, 1907, 125.
Congressional Record, 45th Cong. 2d sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 1 (February
1, 1879), 902.
4 James A. Garfield, "The Army of the United States," North Amer-
ican Review, March-April, 1878, 196.
5 William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army, New
York, 1942, 348-349.
6 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 2d sess. Senate, vol. 7, pt. 5 (June 6, 1878),
4180. Benjamin Poore, The Life and Public Services of Ambrose E. Barn-
side. Providence, R. I., 1882, 335.
7 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879),
897.
8 New York Times, May 28, 1878.
9 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 1, (February 1,
1879), 897-898.
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND ARMY REFORM 175
of economy. Fearful that the Army might again be used for politi-
cal reasons as in the election of 1876, he obtained from the chairman
of the Judiciary Committee the Posse Comitatus amendment, which
resulted in one of the more lengthy debates of that congressional
session. The Army appropriation bill was subjected to extremely
rough handling by its foes, and during the spring of 1878 was sent
back to the House no fewer than four times.10
The impasse created by the Democratic House and the Republi-
can Senate was temporarily broken on May 15 with the introduction
of a Joint Resolution creating a Joint Commission to explore the
question of reform and reorganization of the Army.11 The Com-
mission was to meet as soon as possible and to proceed to the con-
sideration of the matter with which it was charged. After a second
reading the Resolution was referred to the Committee on Military
Affairs. This resolution was modified in the Committee and when it
emerged as S.R. 30, it provided for a membership of two Senators
and five Representatives. No Army personnel were specifically in-
cluded but one or more officers were to be assigned to the Com-
mittee as secretaries. The committee, with Burnside as chairman,
was formed on June 18 and was to have its business completed by
January, 1879. Five thousand dollars was appropriated to defray
expenses.12
The effect of creating the Commission was temporarily to take
the vexatious problem of Army reform from the halls of Congress
and to allow the matter to be considered by a less partisan and more
professional group. Until the Commission's findings were made
public, Congress could turn its attention to other business at hand.
The Committee requested that heads of various Army departments
as well as other officers submit recommendations,13 and on June
22 the members met with Secretary of War, George W. McCrary,
and General Sherman for an exchange of views on Army reorgani-
zation.14
The attention of the Committee was concentrated upon four
10 New York Times, April 9, 1878, 4.
11 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 2d sess. Senate, vol, 7, pt. iv (May 15,
1878), 3485. All appointments above the grade of captain were to be
suspended pending the outcome of the Commission's findings.
12 Seriate Reports, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Rpt. No. 555. The members
of the Committee included, Senators Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island
and Preston Plumb, Ohio; Representatives included Horace Strait, Minne-
sota, Henry Banning, Ohio, George Dibrell, Tennessee, Matthew Butler,
South Carolina.
13 Senate Reports, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. rpt. No. 555.
14 New York Tribune, June 22, 1878.
176 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
areas: staff, line, pay, and stations. Members availed themselves
of materials from earlier committees and military boards, and having
solicited information in writing from responsible Army personnel
they hoped it would not be necessary to call many persons to appear
before them for additional information.15 The Committee moved
to White Sulphur Springs on July 22 to August 31 and held its
sessions behind closed doors.16 The members adjourned until late
November and then resumed work in New York City. In the interim
the chairman was instructed to prepare the details of the bill. The
Committee worked in New York about a week and because of
the absence of two members adjourned on November 26. It did
not resume until December 7.17
Up to this time the Committee had considered opinions from
various officers and had received a response almost unanimously
opposed to any reduction in the size of the Army, but on the ques-
tion of interchangeability of line and staff the responses were
sharply divided. Indeed, this was the most controversial matter of
the reforms recommended and with few exceptions, the staff corps
were opposed to any change in the existing organization. Many
appointments were arranged by a Senator or a Representative and
were regarded by recipients as permanent.
Once assigned to Washington these staff officers could look
forward to a comfortable life free from the thought of having to
spend a portion of their military career in any of the more remote
posts in the country. Officers less fortunate, who were assigned
to posts in the West, had little chance to be transferred to Wash-
ington and were understandably resentful of what they regarded
as an unfair system. Most of the men on the staff were satisfied
that the existing system was adequate and they were not willing
to argue for interchangeability of line and staff. Many of the staff
15 Ltr., Secretary of War to Commission on Army Reorganization
(December 10, 1878), 83/974, George W. McCrary, MSS, National Archives.
New York Tribune, June 22, 1878.
16 Neiv York Times, July 30, 1878. Senator Plumb refused to join
the committee when it went to Virginia. He believed that the committee
should have gone to the Far West to observe the Army against the Indians
and in this way gain better understanding of the problem of reorganization.
17 Sen. Reports, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. rpt. No. 555. The New York
Times, July 14, 1878. The latter erroneously reported in July that the
Committee was planning to hold its meetings not only in White Sulphur
Springs, but at West Point, Saratoga, and Niagara, and the Times pointed
out, "The unusual opportunities which will be offered the Commission for
thought and observation on Army matters at the several fashionable resorts
named will doubtless enable them to prepare an elaborate report about
the last week of the next session of Congress."
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND ARMY REFORM 177
officers who wrote to the Committee were emphatic in their belief
in the existing system. Inspector General R. B. Marcy wrote the
Committee, "... the existing organization of the Staff Corps, with
some slight modifications, is well adapted to the requirements of
our service. . . . Hence I would not recommend any changes from the
existing staff organization. . . ,"18 Brigadier General S. V. Benet
wrote Burnside, "In my opinion the organization of both line and
staff should remain undisturbed."19 The Adjutant General, General
E. D. Townsend, informed the chairman that "... a very large num-
ber of disinterested officers would concur in the opinion that the
present system is good enough. . . ."20 Brigadier General A. H.
Terry informed the Committee that, "the present division of duties
among the several staff departments should remain unchanged. The
present staff system has been severely tried, and has endured every
test to which it has been submitted."21
An exception to the preceding opinions came from Major Gen-
eral J. M. Schofield, Headquarters Department of West Point, who
wrote on December 20, 1878, "... I believe the bill merits the cor-
dial support of the Army."22
Pleas for reform from line officers desiring staff duty in Wash-
ington were made known to the Committee, also, but for obvious
reasons the authors were for the most part anonymous. Nonethe-
less the convictions expressed were as definite as those of their
fellow officers in the Capitol.
"The present seems the most favorable time," cne line officer
wrote, "that has, or may soon occur, to attack the staff incubus,
which has fattened upon us till it has grown to be such a monstrous
monopoly."23 Another petition stated,
18 Draft of a Bill by Gen. R. B. Marcy to Joint Committee on Army
Reorganization (no date, 1878), documents to accompany Senate Report
No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Original of printed copy, National Archives.
19 Ltr., Brig. Gen. S. V. Benet, Chief of Ordnance, to Gen. A. E.
Burnside (July 20, 1878), documents to accompany Senate Report No. 555,
45th Cong. 3rd. sess. Original of the printed copy, National Archives.
20 Draft of a bill by Gen. E. D. Townsend, Adjutant General, to Joint
Committee on Army Reorganization (No date, 1878), documents to accom-
pany Senate Report No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Original of the printed
copy, National Archives.
21 Ltr., Brig. Gen. A. H. Terry to Senator Burnside (November 11,
1878), documents to accompany Senate Report No. 555, 45th Cong. 3rd
sess. Original of the printed copy, National Archives.
22 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879),
905.
23 Petitions to the Committee of Army Reorganization in Senate Re-
ports, 45th Cong., 3rd sess. No. 555, vol. I, 488.
178 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
All of the General Staff are provided at considerable expense with far
greater assistance and office, as well as personal conveniences and comforts,
than line officers, who perform similar duties. This because they have
control of the money appropriated, and they naturally provide first for
themselves.24
Another anonymous officer wrote the Committee, "We believe that
all staff duties, except the medical and chaplains; should be per-
formed by officers temporarily detached from the lines, and that
no officer should remain on staff duty in time of peace over two
years."25
The task of reconciling, if possible, these divergent views as
well as devoting time to other matters on its agenda was aided by
the secrecy which prevailed during the Committee's period of study,
a secrecy imposed so that pressure from interested individuals and
groups could be avoided.
On December 12 the Burnside Committee submitted its report
to the Senate. The findings as reported to the Upper House con-
tained over seven hundred sections, the bulk of which dealt with
Army code and regulations.26 The Committee reported out the
following list of reforms:
1. A codification of all laws relating to the Army in one act.
2. Reorganization and disposition of the Army in time of peace
as a frontier and Indian police, and its disposition as a nucleus of
offensive and defensive force for foreign war.
3. The reduction of enlisted personnel to 20,000, exclusive of
the Signals Corps.
4. Consolidation of the Artillery branch with the Ordnance
Corps and reorganization of the Artillery from regimental formation
to batteries or companies.
5. Consolidation of the Quartermaster General's and Commis-
sary-General's staffs.
6. Abolishment of the Staff Corps as a distinct group.
7. Introduction of interchangeability of line and staff.27
On the question of the future size of the Army there was some
difference of opinion. Some favored reduction to 20,000; others
advocated a figure above the existing 25,000. The Committee had
24 Ibid. 493.
25 Ibid., 495.
26 New York Tribune, December 13, 1878.
27 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 1 (December
19, 1878), 297-299.
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND ARMY REFORM 179
no warrant to change the size of the Army, for that had been fixed
by the last session of Congress.28
Turning to the more controversial question of the staff, the
report stated, ". . . the staff as it now exists is a relic of the rebellion,
and has outlived its usefulness."29 The Committee recommended
that interchangeability of line and staff be established by making
all officers of the staff below the rank of major detailable from
the line of the Army. It also recommended that the number of field
officers in staff departments be reduced to a figure consistent with
the needs of the staff.30 This recommendation was, of course,
directly contrary to the general tenor of the letters and drafts which
the Committee had received from most of the staff officers, and
it was expecting too much to believe that the latter would not make
great effort to defeat these proposed changes. On December 19,
the Senate unanimously consented to reconsider the Committee's
report. After reviewing some of the major portions of the bill in
broad terms, Burnside declared, speaking of the need to revise the
rules and regulations of the Army,
Nearly all of the troubles between the staff and the line — and they have
been numerous, have arisen from uncertainty as to the meaning and authority
of regulations and customs of the services. For this reason many of the
regulations and customs of the service have been ingrafted upon this bill,
and if it meets with favorable action from Congress they will become law,
and cease to be subjects of discussion and discord.31
At the conclusion of his remarks, Burnside answered questions
raised by the Senators and the Vice-President ordered the bill re-
turned to its place on the calendar.32 Once the bill had been pre-
sented to the Senate, those groups interestd in changing the portions
unfavorable to their own interests lost little time in using various
devices and practices to achieve their ends.
Indications of the staff's attitude were reflected by the Com-
manding General of the Army, Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheri-
dan, who wrote to the Committee,
As to the reorganization of the army under the bill, I cannot give it my
cordial support. I think the present organization is good and well suited
28 New York Tribune, December 13, 1878.
29 Ibid.
30 Poore, Burnside, 342.
31 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 1 (December
19, 1878), 297.
32 Ibid., 300.
180 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
to our western frontier, and I am not willing to give my consent to any new
and untried organization.33
On January 6, 1879, the New York Tribune reported from
Washington that "A number of prominent Army officers in this
city have published in pamphlet form their objections to the radical
changes proposed by the Burnside Bill in regard to the staff de-
partment."34 According to the Tribune, the pamphlet cited author-
ities on army reorganization to show that inefficiency would result
if the proposed changes were made and that the Burnside Bill would
not only reduce greatly the number of line and staff officers, but
stop promotions of line officers for a number of years.35 Nor
were interested staff officers content with merely a printed state-
ment of their opposition to the bill. The battle was carried to the
solons through social gatherings where it was hoped this more
pleasant form of campaigning would aid the attacked officers and
carry the day on their behalf.36
On January 9, the Army Reorganization Bill was scheduled for
special consideration in the Senate, but the death of a Senator
caused the bill to be placed with others without a fixed place on the
calendar. When Senator Burnside attempted to regain a place for
it and failed, he notified the Senate that he would bring it up soon
for consideration.37 On January 22 Burnside presented a tabular
statement comparing the existing Army with the Committee's pro-
posed changes. This was to accompany the Committee's report on
the bill (SB 1491). It was then ordered to be printed.38 Late in
January, the New York Times reported that the Commission for
the reform and reorganization of the Army had met with the Presi-
dent and exchanged views with him.39
The degree of opposition to which the committee was exposed
and the press of time to adjourn forced the Burnside Committee
to change its plans. On instructions from the Committee, Burnside
33 Misc. Docs, of the Senate of the U.S., 46th Cong. 1st sess. No. 14
(January 4, 1879). Papers relating to the reorganization of the Army.
34 New York Tribune, January 6, 1879.
35 Ibid.
3 6 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 1 (February
1, 1879), 909.
37 New York Times, January 10, 1879.
38 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 1 (January
22, 1879), 621. (A Bill to Reduce and Reorganize the Army of the United
States.)
39 New York Times, January 28, 1879.
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND ARMY REFORM 181
asked the President of the Senate to allow him to submit a change
in the bill. The amendments stripped the original bill of all its parts
except the first eighteen pages which dealt with reorganization and
reduction of the Army. The deleted portion of the bill dealt with
the revised code of regulations and articles of war.40 Late in the
day, on a point of order, it was agreed that the Senate would per-
mit Burnside to withdraw part of the bill. There was no objection
and the Senate ended the day's session.41
The debate in the House on February 1, was the most lengthy
and candid which the bill's supporters offered in its behalf. They
summed up the merits of the bill and bitterly assailed those who
opposed it. The attack was led by Representative Henry Banning,
who told of old captains and lieutenants reporting for duty in com-
mand of one non-commissioned officer and no private soldiers, of
companies that did not contain a corporal's guard or a regimental
band. Speaking of the staff, he declared:
. . . our large and expensive staff, that feeds, clothes, and transports our
little Army, has grown to such huge proportions that it takes more money
to pay them and the commissioned officers of the line than it takes to pay
the entire Army of enlisted men, non-commissioned officers, and private
soldiers !
Banning added pointedly: . . .
our military organization is not only (as shown by our best military critics)
a weak and ridiculous one, but according to its size the most expensive
one upon the face of the earth.42
This reform is, of course, warmly opposed by the fortunate gentlemen
now filling what the General of the Army calls 'the soft places.' These
gentlemen have many friends upon this floor; they are courteous, attentive,
and generous hosts, as many of you can testify; no doubt they have warned
you of the dire consequences that will follow the adoption of this measure.43
Banning insisted that the reforms as proposed in the bill met
with support from men of the line, but declared that the bill was
opposed by "the staff who have lobbied long and hard and earnestly
to prevent its passage — not in the interests of the Army, nor the
country — but for the sole and only purpose of preserving and sav-
40 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 1 (January
30, 1879), 714. Ibid., (February 1, 1879), 849-850.
4i Ibid.
42 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 1 (February
1, 1879,) 902.
43 Ibid., 903.
182 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
ing for themselves the fat, comfortable, useless, extravagant, and
expensive positions they now fill.44
Representative George Dibrell of Tennessee, also on the Com-
mittee, told his colleagues, "No proposition is ever made in Congress
to reorganize or modify the military establishment in any way with-
out encountering the charge of premeditated injustice and unfairness
to a large class of individuals." He declared that nearly ninety per
cent of the amount of almost a million dollars annually appropriated
for commutation in the Army was absorbed by the General Staff,
whose officers were usually assigned to duty in the populous centers
of the country.45
Dibrell insisted that the deliberations of the Joint Committee
were free of politics and selfishness and that the individual members
looked alone, "... to the good of the service and the efficiency and
economy in the administration of the Army." Speaking of the op-
position which the bill had encountered, he candidly declared:
That there is an organized opposition to the bill none will deny. This
organization is strong and will bring to bear a powerful influence upon Con-
gress to defeat the bill; and why? Is it because they propose a better bill?
Is it because it is against the interests of the taxpayer of the country who
pay the money to support the Army? I answer, emphatically, No. It is
not because they propose a better plan, not because they want to lessen
the expenses of the Army below that proposed in this bill. No, sir: all
of this organized opposition comes from interested parties with selfish
motives.46
Impassioned as was the defense of the bill, the probability of
Congress passing it was not apparently greater than before the de-
bate on February 1, but at least the proponents had exposed on the
floors of both houses the degree of opposition the bill encountered.
On the 4th of February the House discussed the Army Appro-
priation Bill and considered the amendments which would have re-
duced the Army to 15,000, 17,000, and 20,000, but these proposals
were defeated.47
44 Ibid., 904-905. For a denunciation of the existing line and staff
arrangement, see Letter to the Editor, New York Times, February 3, 1879.
The original House Bill for the reform of the Army (HR 5499) contained
724 sections and comprised largely a rewriting of the Army regulations.
The Joint Committee had agreed on a shortened version which Burnside
introduced in the Senate. Banning offered this latter version to the
House as the Banning-White Bill. See also Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd
sess. House vol. 8, pt. 1 (February 1, 1879), 909.
45 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 1 (February
1, 1879), 909.
46 Ibid., 914.
47 Harper's Weekly, vol. XXIII (February 22, 1879), 143.
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND ARMY REFORM 183
Just before the crucial vote in the House on February 5, Ban-
ning declared:
I know, Mr. Chairman, that to stand here and fight for this organiza-
tion which line asks and which the staff opposes, is to fight against all
that society has to offer a member of Congress. But while I know that,
I know what it is to stand up in behalf of the people and endeavor to
make their Army what General Hancock says in his evidence before a
committee of this House, it should be — a small, complete, compact, vigorous
organization. . . .4S
That same day, by a vote of 96-90 the reorganization bill in its
entirety was defeated by the House.49 Yet, there was perhaps,
something that could be saved.
The following day, Mr. Thomas Ewing, in debate, forced out
of the reform bill such items as code of regulations, the question
of power between the Secretary of War and the General of the
Army, and provisions relating to the manufacture of arms. With
these parts deleted the House was asked to vote only on that part
of the bill relating to reorganization. Again the vote was against
the bill.50
Mr. Banning came to the defense of the bill and asked the
House to consider only the first eighteen pages of the original report
(the same version which Burnside had introduced in the Senate).
The key section of this modified bill which Banning now offered
to the House was the proposal for interchangeability of line and
staff.51 By a vote of 101 to 91 this Banning- White amendment
was added to the Army Appropriation Bill. In spite of the House
action many believed the Senate would strike the amendment.52 On
February 8, the House version of the Army Appropriation Bill was
passed with the Banning- White amendment by a vote of 116 to
92.53
The Senate was notified that the bill had succeeded in the House
and on the following day the measure was sent to the Senate Com-
mittee on Appropriations.54 This committee reported out its own
48 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February
5, 1879), 1041.
49 Ibid.
50 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. House, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February 6,
1879), 1061.
51 New York Times, February 7, 1879.
52 Ibid.
53 New York Times, February 9, 1879.
54 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February
10, 1879), 1151.
184 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
version of the Army Appropriation Bill and omitted all parts of
the House version pertaining to Army reorganization except the
portion giving the Secretary of War authority to modify Army regu-
lations. This action was taken because the Senate would not allow
the Banning- White amendment included in an appropriation bill.55
Senator James Blaine, speaking for the Committee on Appro-
priations, explained the bill to the Senate, including why the com-
mittee decided to strike out the reorganization sections since there
was not time to review adequately various sections of the bill.06
When Burnside attempted to have the Senate consider the portion
which the committee had deleted, he was overruled on the grounds
that the idea was improper and that time did not allow for such
a discussion.57
Senator William Windom of the Appropriations Committee ex-
plained that the House Appropriation Bill came to the Senate com-
mittee at a time when it was overwhelmed with work and did not
have time to explore all aspects of the bill in order to judge its
merits. He told his colleagues that the committee considered the
question of the expediency of attempting to reorganize the Army
under existing conditions, but did not report out the House version
favorably.58
Burnside bitterly replied:
There has been a hue and a cry against this bill from the very moment
it was reported. Where has that cry come from? Much of it from the
staff bureaus of the Army. I surely have no disposition to injure the staff
officers; on the contrary, I have a great desire to benefit them, as well
as other officers of the Army. I know of no officer to whom I would
not rather do a personal service than to do harm; but I must say that
some of these officers have gone beyond the line of duty, particularly in
one of the staff bureaus in Washington, which has almost turned itself into
a bureau of newspaper correspondence. Articles instigated by them go all
over this country. Not satisfied with attacking the bill, these articles make
personal attacks upon me as the originator of the bill. I received papers
containing these attacks in great numbers.59
In spite of this impassioned confession, the key vote taken on
the motion to strike out sections dealing with Army reorganization
55 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February
21, 1879), 1708. New York Times, February 21, 1879.
5 6 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February
21, 1879), 1708.
57 Ibid., 1709.
58 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February
22, 1879), 1757.
59 Ibid., 1758.
THE FORTY-FIFTH CONGRESS AND ARMY REFORM 185
was 45 to 18 and with it the work of the Committee and the hopes
of its members were defeated.60
The Senate then sent its version to the House only to have it
rejected and a joint committee was formed to attempt to formulate
a compromise. This committee could not agree on a solution and
two other joint committees were formed, but these, too, reached an
impasse.61 Thus the Forty-fifth Congress adjourned without appro-
priating funds for the Army.62 President Hayes called a special
session of Congress and persuaded it to provide him with funds
for the operation of the Executive branch of the government.63
Though the story of the Burnside Committee's efforts ends in
failure, reasons for this are not difficult to ascertain. The recent
election of 1876 was still fresh in the minds of many Congressmen
and the role the Army had played in that controversial election re-
sulted in strong suspicions of the service by Democrats who were
eager to challenge its position by reducing its power and or
reorganizing it.
Among the more immediate causes for the failure of the bill
was the less than skillful way in which Burnside, particularly, repre-
sented it in the Senate and the hostility shown by members of the
Appropriations Committee. The GAR and the GOP had much to
benefit by maintaining the close association they had known since
the days after the Civil War. With powerful friends in the halls
of Congress the entrenched interests of the staff would understand-
ably be reluctant to give up their more privileged positions for
assignments in less appealing posts throughout the country. The
fact that the Union Army had emerged victorious was reason enough
for many in Congress who honestly believed the present organiza-
tion was adequate for the tasks before it. Outside of the Capitol
60 Ibid., 1759-1760. Burnside and Plumb voted for the Bill; 15 Demo-
crats voted against it; Walter Millis, Arms and Men, New York, 1956,
140-141.
61 Cong. Record, 45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 2 (February
20, 1879), 1622.
62 Harper's Weekly, vol. XXVII (March 22, 1879), 223. Cong. Record,
45th Cong. 3rd sess. Senate, vol. 8, pt. 3 (March 3, 1879), 2339. Among
the difficulties which confounded the task of agreeing on an appropriation
bill was the Democratic action of the House to make it unlawful to use
Federal troops at polling places, carrying with it a fine of $5,000 and
imprisonment of three to five years. The attempt to amend the revised
statutes was defeated in the Senate by a straight party vote of 35 to 30.
New York Times, February 23, 1879.
63 James E. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789-1897, vol. VII, 520-521. Harper's Weekly, March 22, 1879.
186 BERNARD L. BOYLAN
the business groups such as the Commercial Exchange of Philadel-
phia and the Boards of Trade in Cincinnati and Chicago opposed
Army reduction.64
In addition, the railroad strike of 1877 had made the business
community uneasy about any decrease in the size of the Army. Nor
were many Congressmen in any mood to reduce the size of the
Army for any reason: those Senators and Representatives whose
states would suffer the loss of military establishments could hardly
be expected to treat lightly or indifferently the question of Army
reduction, though reorganization would be settled on other bases.65
The question of the Army Appropriation Bill, even stripped of
the problems of reorganization and reform, was one which taxed
the patience and temper of the lawmakers because of the various
attempts to attach unacceptable riders to the bill. With the ques-
tion of reform added to the already charged atmosphere surrounding
the Army Appropriation Bill, chances for the Burnside reforms be-
ing passed were already reduced.66 The final vote taken to strip the
Appropriations Bill of the reorganization sections illustrate the
partisan feeling toward the issue.
With the defeat of the measure proposed by the Burnside Com-
mittee the question of major Army reform was set aside until after
the turn of the century when the reforms of Elihu Root introduced
changes in the Army which far exceeded those proposed in 1878.
Bernard L. Boylan
Western Washington College
of Education, Bellingham
64 New York Times, June 8, 1878.
65 New York Times, March 26, 1878.
66 Appleton's Cyclopedia, 1879, 231.
Book Reviews
The Wisconsin Business Corporation, By George J. Kuehnl. University of
Wisconsin Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 284. $6.50.
In 1840 the population of Wisconsin Territory was 31,000. By 1870
it had passed a million and was still growing rapidly. During these years
of rapid growth Wisconsin, and indeed all America, underwent a social
transformation that was little short of revolutionary. In that change the
modern business corporation played a key role. Prior to 1800 there had
been but 335 private business incorporations in the whole of American
history. The Wisconsin legislature alone ground out three times that many
special charters in the period from 1848 to 1871. Indeed, in one busy
year, 1866, it turned out 177 special charters. The evolution of the business
corporation during that period is complicated, and no one investigator can
tell more than a small portion of it. Added to the similar work of Dodd,
Davis, Handlin, Hartz and others, this illuminating essay helps to pro-
vide insight into the relations between the law and the economy in the
formative years of our industrial society. But the surface has only been
scratched, as yet. An enormous amount and variety of work remains to be
done before the full story can be told.
This kind of historical research is in its infancy. Some is being done
by lawyers, like Kuehnl, who may lack expertise in historiography, but
have their own special contribution to make to the understanding of the
institutional arrangements of the past. The most significant work of this
kind now being done is incorporated in the Wisconsin legal history project
conceived and supervised by Williard Hurst. The present book is one of
at least four to be published from that project within little more than a
year. These four, supplemented by other books yet to come out of the
project and capped by Professor Hurst's own work on Wisconsin law, will
provide an incomplete but many-dimensioned and impressive picture of the
way in which the law has implemented the social needs in the history of
one interesting state.
Kuehnl has told part of his story in a chronological and descriptive
way. He deals first with the fumbling beginnings of the territorial period,
then with the special concern for corporate problems in the constitutional
conventions of 1846 and 1848. In 1846 a controversy over banking policy
dominated the convention, and an extreme hard-money constitutional pro-
vision adopted by the convention on the vehement urging of future Chief
Justice Edward G. Ryan was fatal to the final adoption of the constitution
by the people. In 1848 the redoubtable Mr. Ryan was not in the conven-
tion, and the more moderate resulting document became the basic law of
the state. After the constitutional conventions, Kuehnl shifts to a rather
loosely conceived analytical organization. He discusses first the promotion
of economic development, and then the growth of regulatory activity. In
both he is especially interested in the roles of the various legal agencies.
187
188 BOOK REVIEWS
In the former he also treats at length one of the interesting problems of
this period: why was there for so long a dual system of incorporation, partly
by general act and partly by special charter? Even more striking, why did
corporations continue to be formed almost exclusively by special chartering,
even when fairly adequate general laws were available? In the second part
of his analytical survey, Kuehnl talks of the regulation of the economy;
he notes especially a shift from regulation by the legislature to control by
the courts. The administrative agency as a means of public control over
the economy came later.
Kuehnl's organization exhibits many provocative relationships and much
information that will be useful to those who seek to understand the growth
of American law or of the American economy. However, it is a striking
characteristic of this kind of investigation that the facts are numerous and
complex, and have many stories to tell. Another investigator, working with
the same materials, could organize them differently and provide many
different and equally valuable insights. This is not to assert that another
organization would be better, but rather that much still remains to be said
about the rise of the corporation, even in Wisconsin. For one illustration,
Kuehnl, mentions in at least fifteen brief passages the pervasive limitation
on the acquisition of land by corporations. Thus the general incorporation
law of 1798 (for the Northwest Territory), limited corporations to acquisi-
tion of land the income of which did not exceed $1500 annually. Later,
banks and insurance companies were severely restricted to land necessary
for the operation of the business, plus land acquired in the bona fide
enforcement of rights against debtors. The latter had to be disposed of
within five or six years after acquisition. One special insurance charter
even enforced the disposal requirement by providing for escheat to the
territory of any land acquired in the enforcement of rights against debtors
and not disposed of after six years. Other charters and general incorpora-
tion acts contained similar restrictions. Nor was this pattern limited to
Wisconsin. In Massachusetts, insurance company charters customarily
limited real estate acquisitions to a fixed sum. In Pennsylvania it was more
common to limit real estate by the annual income it produced. In New
York the limit was the land "necessary" to the business^ In one Virginia
charter real estate acquisitions were limited to two acres. The ubiquity of
the limitation on real estate acquisitions, geographically, temporally, and
as to the kind of corporation involved, and the variety of techniques for
setting the limit, suggest pervasive policy reasons that are independent of
the kind of corporation and of the relative scarcity of land. One sug-
gestion that has never been explored adequately is that this limitation
represents the persistence of the ancient mortmain policy of English law,
of keeping real property out of the "dead hand" of the medieval corpora-
tion. Kuehnl's organization tends to mask the very existence of a per-
sistent policy, and certainly fails to seek an explanation for it. A more
analytical approach to his material would have thrown such problems into
sharper relief.
A defect that is not necessarily inherent in his organization, but which
may bear some relationship to it, is the fact that Kuehnl has never felt
it necessary to make quite clear what a corporation is and why it is so
BOOK REVIEWS 189
useful. We are so accustomed to thinking of limited liability as the reason
for incorporation, if not as the defining characteristic of the corporate form,
that it may come as a shock to some to learn that many corporations did
not have limited liability in earlier days. Moreover, the limited partner-
ship was already available as a way to limit liability. The sharp modern
distinction between the corporation and the partnership misleads us; we
forget the intermediate forms that were tried and found wanting. The
corporation is, in a sense, the end product of an evolutionary process — it
was the survivor! Why? Kuehnl makes some suggestions but never ade-
quately answers the 'question why incorporation caught on — why it had
advantage enough to achieve its present level of development. The answer
would not be simple. One reason for its capacity to survive in the forma-
tive era may have been the stock note technique for semi-compulsory mobili-
zation of scarce capital. Capital stock was sold for a cash down payment
plus an assessable stock note. If additional capital was needed there was
an assessment by the officers. An examination of insurance company char-
ters and general acts in Wisconsin leads one to suspect that this technique
for capital mobilization played a significant role, not only in encouraging
the use of the corporation itself, but also in continuing the use of the
special charter long after a suitable general act was available. Though
there was such a general insurance incorporation act in Wisconsin from
1850 on, by 1871 only two companies had been organized under it, while
the legislature had ground out ninety special insurance charters. One
apparent reason for continuance of special chartering and for failure of
the dual system of incorporation in insurance, was the scarcity of capital
in early Wisconsin. The general act required paid in capital of $100,000,
while the special charters were satisfied by a limited payment in cash,
coupled with the assessable stock note.
The critical paragraphs above are intended to suggest ways in which
Kuehnl might have done some things he did not do with his material —
not to suggest that he should have done them. This is such a complex
story that it needs to be worked on by people with varying approaches.
This book makes real and valuable contributions to our knowledge. Among
its many contributions, it will help to bury the hydra-headed myth of the
laissez faire nineteenth century. No one can hold this false belief who
spends some time in plowing through the state materials and sees the
extent of government intervention in the economy at the state and local
level. What needs more exploration now is the varying pattern of govern-
ment intervention. For example, this book provides a nice contrast to
Hartz' excellent book, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsyl-
vania, 1776—1860. Hartz documents, among other things, the substantial
public investment in enterprise, especially transportation, in Pennsylvania.
Kuehnl tells of the reluctance to engage in the same kind of activity, which
was even embedded in the Wisconsin Constitution of 1848. The two stories
are related, for Wisconsin reluctance in the 1840's was in part a product
of bad Pennsylvania (and other eastern) experience in earlier decades.
Thus it becomes especially interesting to learn from Kuehnl of the legal
techniques for evasion of the constitutional prohibition. The practical
190 BOOK REVIEWS
demands of the social life were difficult to oppose in the name of abstract
principle, as any thoughful practicing politician can tell you.
In short, though there are ways in which Kuehnl might have done
different things, and perhaps some very important different things, through
a different organization of his material, this may be merely to say that
another person could have thrown the light of his own special insights on
the material. In any case, this book seems to the reviewer to be a real
contribution to the small but growing body of literature which seeks
to understand in some depth the legal institutions of the past and their place
in the making of modern America.
Spencer L. Kimball
University of Michigan
Law School
The Great Sioux Uprising, By C. M. Oehler. New York, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1959. Pp. xvi, 272. $5.00.
It has been no simple job for Mr. Oehler to uncover a facet of history,
virtually forgotten, neglected except in local folk lore and state histories,
for over ninety years. The Sioux outbreak of 1862 did not result in the
bloodiest massacre committed by Indians in North America, but it ranks
well among the worst, and certainly it was more fearsome than any that
followed. Yet the slaughter in Minnesota remained obscure, because, as
the author rightly observes, it was "dwarfed by even grimmer events of
the Civil War's second year."
In language almost terse, the author deftly chronicles the immediate
causes of the uprising, the madness of the massacre, and Minnesota's quick
reaction. Frequent quotations are skilfully woven into the text and serve
to spice the narrative, while short paragraphs, often no more than a sen-
tence long, underscore the excitement. Little Crow, the Sioux chieftan,
is given considerable and sympathetic attention, and Henry Hastings Sibley
emerges as an Indian fighter who should rank with the more pretentious
Custer. One of the fine contributions of the book is the expert handling
of the politics of the Indian tribes.
The occasional minor error is usually one of judgement and not of
fact, but William Winthrop in Military Law and Precedent could have ex-
plained a military commission for Mr. Oehler, although Oehler's treatment
of the trial of over 400 Sioux, especially his analysis of the crimes of the
thirty-nine unfortunate Indians Lincoln did not spare, is smoothly done.
The author's associates at the Chicago office of Batten, Barton, Durstine,
and Osborne, as well as the reading public, might do well to note the
diligence Mr. Oehler displayed in sifting numerous memoirs, reminiscences,
and secondary material. He carefully notes that "Newspapers, magazines,
Army, Indian Bureau, or Congressional publications . . . are generally fully
identified in the notes," when in fact he refers to only three government
documents (a Secretary of the Interior Report, a House Report, and a
BOOK REVIEWS 191
Minnesota Executive Document) . It would have been profitable for the
author to have used the Official Records, various House Executive Docu-
ments, and to have made more use of the Reports of the Secretaries of
Interior and War, Minnesota's Executive Documents, and other pertinent
material such as the Collections of the Historical Societies of the Dakotas
and Wisconsin. The chapter notes are the greatest deficiency. No citation
is made to specific page, and in the case of the Collections of the Minnesota
Historical Society, not even to volume or year. Quite justly, Oehler relied
heavily on Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, which contains source
material unobtainable elsewhere.
This compact account is a needed footnote to general history, as well
as to the history of Minnesota, appropriately celebrating its centennial this
year. One could wish to know more about the amount, kind, and effective-
ness of the federal government's assistance in 1862 and subsequent years,
in view of its other military obligations, and more detail concerning the
effect of the uprising on the rest of the northwestern frontier, but perhaps
such additional consideration would have robbed the volume of its con-
ciseness and effectiveness.
Robert Huhn Jones
Kent State University, Ohio
Prescott and his Publishers. By C. Harvey Gardiner. Southern Illinois
University Press, Carbondale, 1959. Pp. x, 342. Illustrated. $5.95.
The commemorations of the centenary of the death of William Hickling
Prescott began fittingly with a symposium during the Washington meeting
of the American Historical Association at the end of 1958. Prescott died
on January 28, 1859, at the age of sixty-three, and during 1959 suitable
tributes are being published in various historical reviews. Professor
Gardiner has been prominent as a contributor to the centennial anniversary
celebrations finding place for his articles on phases of Prescott's life in,
among others, this quarterly (April, 1959). Last year he prepared his
William Hickling Prescott: An Annotated Bibliography of Published Works
for publication by the Library of Congress, and this year he has brought
to light the present volume. He is now off to Europe on a research pro-
ject to complete his studies on the blind historian.
This volume does not have the purpose of describing Prescott as a
stylist or literary historian, nor is it a critique of Prescott's historical
objectivity or interpretive writing. Its aim is to reveal the historian's
business acumen in his relations with his publishers here and abroad. The
result is a new and lively portrait of the author of three best sellers,
acting in practically all of the capacities known to the modern book trade —
book designing, publicity, sales promotion, distribution, copyright pro-
tection, financing, and legalities. His agreements and contracts were made
with four American and two British book firms, and his dealings were
192 BOOK REVIEWS
many in view of the numerous reprints, chiefly of his Ferdinand and
Isabella, Conquest of Mexico, and Conquest of Peru. However, Pro-
fessor Gardiner points out, Prescott was no common haggler. He was
ever "a scholarly gentleman of aristocratic temperament" in contrast with
"money-grubbing booksellers and publishers of a different social world,"
and he found "the most agreeable part" of his correspondence to be that
with his publishers, (p. 15).
Hewing to the line of author-publisher relations Professor Gardiner
writes his interesting story in eight chapters. The first of these is a
survey of "Prescott and the Slippery Trade," and the last is "The Per-
sonal Side" of Prescott's relations with the individual publishers, as
gathered from exchanges of letters. The intervening chapters describe
Prescott's adoption and use of stereotype plates, his publishing agreements,
the problem of book pirates and copyrights, the author's role in book
designing, promotion and distribution, and the financial sheet showing the
author's income. There are thirty pages of appendices containing Pres-
cott's publishing contracts and agreements, followed by a bibliography
and suitable index. The illustrations are chiefly pictures of the publishers
and happily a contemporary portrait of Prescott at his noctograph. All in
all, this is a book worth reading and a credit to the printer.
Jerome V. Jacobsen
Loyola University, Chicago
tTWID-cAMERICA
An Historical Review
OCTOBER
1959
VOLUME 41 NUMBER 4
Published by Loyola University
Chicago 26, Illinois
c7V!ID-cAMERICA
An Historical Review
VOLUME 41, NUMBER 4 OCTOBER 1959
c7HID-cylMERICA
An Historical Review
OCTOBER 1959
VOLUME 41
NUMBER 4
CONTENTS
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY:
THE PROGRESSIVE AS MUNICIPAL REFORMER . Roy Lubove 195
A PROFESSOR IN FARM POLITICS . . . Richard S. Kirkendall 210
THE FIRST MISSOURI EDITORS'
CONVENTION William H. Lyon 218
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN
WITH A MORAL Robert W. Sellen 223
BOOK REVIEWS 241
INDEX FOR VOLUME XLI 245
MANAGING EDITOR
JEROME V. JACOBSEN, Chicago
EDITORIAL STAFF
WILLIAM STETSON MERRILL
J. MANUEL ESPINOSA
W. EUGENE SHIELS
RAPHAEL HAMILTON
PAUL KINIERY
PAUL S. LIETZ
Published quarterly by Loyola University (The Institute of Jesuit History)
at 50 cents a copy. Annual subscription, $2.00; in foreign countries, $2.50.
Entered as second class matter, August 7, 1929, at the post office at
Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry as
second class matter at the post office at Effingham, Illinois. Printed in
the United States.
Subscription and change of address notices and all communications should
be addressed to the Managing Editor at the publication and editorial
offices at Loyola University, 6525 Sheridan Road, Chicago 26, Illinois.
cJMID- AMERICA
An Historical Review
OCTOBER 1959
VOLUME 4l NUMBER 4
The Twentieth Century City: The
Progressive as Municipal Reformer
John Adams once warned that "none but an idiot or madman
ever built a government upon a disinterested principle." The Pro-
gressives were neither idiots nor madmen, certainly, but they did
expect to build an "organic city" based upon a disinterested prin-
ciple. Historians have not always recognized the importance of
the organic concept as a factor in Progressive thought. Speaking
of Progressivism in Memphis, William D. Miller has written:
The movement in Memphis — and this was true of progressivism generally —
had been largely a reorganization of externals, a pragmatic social patching.
In keeping with its pragmatic character, it possessed no unifying philosophy.
Progressivism never bothered much with defining the basic values out of
which the reform movement developed, and it is this fact that accounts for
its lack of penetration and its inconsistencies.1
The assertion that Memphis Progressivism lacked a "unifying phi-
losophy" may be correct, but this does not justify the generalization
that Progressives elsewhere ignored the quest for "basic values."
On the contrary, Progressivism was often distinguished by its vision
of the city as an organism which, if properly directed, would enable
men to attain the good life.
I
Lincoln Steffens, whose influential book The Shame of the Cities
was published in 1904, did not suddenly reveal to Americans that
civic virtue was absent from New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis and
other cities. He simply documented what they had known for
1 William D. Miller, Memphis During the Progressive Era, 1900-1917,
Madison, 1957, 190-191.
195
196 ROY LUBOVE
many years — that the people ruled in name only, while the political
machine ruled in fact. Apres-moi, le deluge, Steffens might have
cried after The Shame of the Cities. In countless magazine articles
and books, his successors muckraked the American city, searching
for evidence of "invisible government."
The reformers discovered, much to their horror, that the worst
enemy of reform was the "respectable businessman":
Now, the typical American citizen [Steffens had written] is the business-
man. The typical businessman is a bad citizen; he is busy. If he is a 'big
businessman' and very busy, he does not neglect, he is busy with politics,
oh, very busy and very businesslike. I found him buying boodlers in St.
Louis, defending grafters in Minneapolis, originating corruption in Pitts-
burgh, sharing with bosses in Philadelphia, deploring reform in Chicago,
and beating good government with corruption funds in New York. He is
a self-righteous fraud, this big businessman. He is the chief source of
corruption, and it were a boon if he would neglect politics.2
The big businessman opposed reform because good government
might prove incompatible with "good" business. He needed special
privileges, such as a fifty-year street car franchise or a monopoly
over the city's construction projects. The "boss," who controlled
the political machine, could provide such bonanzas at terms more
favorable to the privilege-seeker than to the city. Fred Howe's in-
dictment of Boss Cox is a typical Progressive broadside describing
the alliance between politics and privilege:
Today, Boss Cox rules the servile city of Cincinnati as a medieval baron
did his serfs. He rose to this eminence by binding together and to himself
the rich and powerful members of the community, for whom he secured
and protects the franchises of the street-railway, gas and electric lighting
companies. They in turn, became his friends and protectors, and through
him, and for him, controlled the press and organized public opinion.3
Privilege governed the American city in the name of the people.
What could be done? The Progressives rejected the Mugwump
solution for corrupt politics. It was not enough to "turn the ras-
cals out" and elect "good" men in their place. The Progressives
knew that spasms of civic virtue since the 1870's had indeed "turned
the rascals out" in different cities. Unfortunately, the "rascals" did
not stay out long, nor could the reformers accomplish much while
in office. The Progressives, however, who denounced "invisible
2 Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, Sagamore Press: New
York, 1957, 3.
3 Frederic C. Howe, The City, The Hope of Democracy, New York,
1905, 80.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 197
government" in the name of the people, could hardly conclude that
the people did not want good government. They concluded, in-
stead, that the people wanted it but could not get it.4 The people
must be taught how to become free.
The Shame of the Cities symbolized for a generation of re-
formers the corrupt alliance between politics and privilege. Pro-
gressives, deeply conscious of the poverty and the class divisions
which belied the American dream of a classless, prosperous society,
had a second symbol in Jacob Riis's How the Other Half Lives.
Riis described the life of the urban poor and warned his contem-
poraries of a coming day of judgement:
The sea of a mighty population, held in galling fetters, heaves uneasily in
the tenements. Once already our city, to which have come the duties and
responsibilities of metropolitan greatness before it was able to fairly measure
its task, has felt the swell of its resistless flood. If it rise once more, no
human power may avail to check it. The gap between the classes in
which it surges, unseen, unsuspected by the thoughtless, is widening day
by day.5
The Progressives warned their generation that the problem of
urban poverty must be solved. If not, blood would wash the streets
of the city. The poor were sure to rise one day in their righteous
wrath and destroy their exploiters. "We are standing at the turning
of the ways," Walter Rauschenbusch proclaimed:
We are actors in a great historical drama. It rests upon us to decide if a
new era is to dawn in the transformation of the world into the kingdom of
God, or if Western civilization is to descend to the graveyard of dead
civilizations and God will have to try once more.6
It is not surprising, given such apocalyptic visions, that Progres-
sive urban reformers rejected the traditional American response to
poverty. Poverty was too extensive to be ignored in the expectation
that "progress" would automatically dispose of the problem. Simi-
larly, urban poverty had become too ubiquitous for private charity
to handle. Americans of the Progressive period had finally caught
up to Henry George. They realized that poverty was not an oc-
casional and temporary by-product of industrial capitalism. In
4 For municipal reform in the 1890's see William H. Tolman, Muni-
cipal Reform Movements in the United States, New York, 1895.
5 Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half Lives: Studies Among the
Tenements of New York, Sagamore Press: New York, 1957, 226.
6 Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis, New
York, 1909, 210.
198 ROY LUBOVE
order to achieve social justice they insisted that it was necessary
for the community to regulate industrial activity.
The Progressives argued that the war against poverty was im-
measurably complicated by the close relationship between poverty
and immigration. Economic reform and "Americanization" of the
immigrant were inseparable. Immigrants, particularly newcomers
from southern and eastern Europe, had to become Americanized
before they could begin to lift their economic status. Conversely,
something had to be done about their poverty before they could
be successfully Americanized.
Poverty and immigration, political corruption and privilege —
these were the evils which Progressives thought were bringing ruin
upon the American city. In order to meet the challenge of the
city, Progressive urban reformers were forced to reject much of the
nineteenth century liberal tradition. In place of this tradition, with
its emphasis on property rights, individualism and economic laissez-
faire, many Progressives substituted a new urban ethic which I shall
define as the concept of the organic city.
II
Despite the prevalent political corruption and social injustice,
the Progressives responded optimistically to "the challenge of the
city." In the words of Richard Ely:
... if we look back upon past history, and ask ourselves whence the sources
of the highest achievements in the way of culture and civilization, we shall
find much to give us hope in the prospect of the domination of the city
in the twentieth century. . . . The city is destined to become a well-ordered
household, a work of art, and a religious institution in the truest sense of
the word 'religious.'
Josiah Strong agreed that America's rapid urban expansion
marked the beginning of a new era:
The sudden expansion of the city marks a profound change in civilization,
the results of which will grow more and more obvious; and nowhere prob-
ably will this change be so significant as in our own country, where the
twentieth century city will be decisive of national destiny.
The ultimate significance of the twentieth century city, as Fred Howe
suggested, was that "never before has society been able to better
its own conditions so easily through the agency of government."
"The ready responsiveness of democracy," Howe claimed, "under the
■Tim—miiMMiiiraiiiMHftMnii
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 199
close association which the city involves, forecasts a movement for
the improvement of human society more hopeful than anything the
world has known."7
Jeffersonians, Jacksonians and Populists had all looked upon the
city with suspicion, if not hatred. For Bryan the city was an evil
and unnatural excresence — simply a place where the grass would
grow in the absence of vigorous farm and village life. "Virtue,"
Jefferson had earlier warned, would exist in America only "so long
as agriculture is our principal object." "When we get piled upon one
another in large cities as in Europe," Jefferson admonished, "we
shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another
as they do there."8
The Progressives, on the contrary, were the first group in the
American liberal tradition to embrace the city lovingly. They ac-
cepted the city as the potential "torch-bearer of civilization, the
priestess of culture, the herald of democracy."9 The problem of the
city," the Progressives insisted, was "the problem of civilization."10
If the disruptive forces of urban life such as poverty and class divi-
sion could be eradicated, twentieth century man could achieve a
civilization superior to any in the past.
Why was the rise of the city so profound a crisis in American
life? Why were the Progressives so certain of chaos and catastrophe
if we failed to meet the challenge of the city? In large measure
the answer lies in the fact that the Progressives straddled two worlds.
One was in the process of disintegration. The other had not yet
emerged in the form which they desired. The Progressives would
insure a safe and orderly transition from the old order to the new —
from rural, agrarian America to urban, industrial America:
One of the keys to the American mind at the end of the old century and
the beginning of the new [Richard Hofstadter has written] was that Ameri-
can cities were filling up in very considerable part with small town or rural
people. ... To the rural migrant, raised in the respectable quietude and the
high-toned moral imperatives of evangelical Protestantism, the city seemed
7 Richard Ely, The Coming City, New York, 1902, 71-72; Josiah
Strong, The Twentieth City, New York, 1898, 32; Howe, The City, 301.
8 Saul K. Padover (ed.), The Complete Jefferson, New York, 1943,
123.
9 Delos F. Wilcox, "The Inadequacy of Present City Government," in
Edward A. Fitzpatrick (ed.) Experts In City Government, New York,
1919, 33.
10 In the words of Delos F. Wilcox: " . . . if democracy fails here [in
the city], the story of America will be a closed chapter in the annais of
freedom." The American City, A Problem ;n Democracy, New York, 1904,
416.
200 ROY LUBOVE
not merely a new social form or way of life but a strange threat to civili-
zation itself.11
Our choice, the Progressives argued, lay between further disintegra-
tion and ultimate chaos, or the creation of a socially integrated and
physically beautiful city.
In defining a new urban ethic compatible with their vision of
the role of the city, the Progressives were forced to re-examine tra-
ditional theories concerning the relationship between the individual
and society. Nineteenth century liberalism had relied upon the hand
of Providence to insure social order. Americans had often assumed
that unrestricted pursuit of economic self-interest would result in
optimum individual happiness and social harmony. The promise of
American life was automatic. Communal regulation of the divine
mechanism would upset the guaranteed equilibrium.
The Progressives, however, had lost faith in the liberal creed.
They challenged the assumption that "progress" was a necessary
accompaniment to the unregulated pursuit of private profit. Con-
fronted by what they thought was the disintegration of the American
way of life, they could hardly embrace the doctrine of automatic
equilibrium. The divine mechanism was not only upset, it was
shattered. A new instrument of control was needed to replace bene-
ficent Providence. This could only be the community.
Rejecting liberal individualism, the Progressives forged an ethic
more appropriate to an industrial-urban society. They first at-
tempted to define the nature of the city which for them was both
the hope and possible nemesis of democracy. Basic to an under-
standing of the nature of city life, the Progressives argued, is the
fact of "specialization." The city lived by the division of labor.
Men developed special skills and used them to satisfy the needs of
other men. No one, in urban life, was self-sufficient. The Pro-
gressives often contrasted the relatively self sufficient and inde-
pendent life of the farmer against the highly specialized and depend-
ent existence of the city dweller. Because of the inter-depend-
ent character of city life, mutual aid and cooperation were im-
perative. "The very nature of city life," Delos Wilcox wrote, "com-
pels manifold cooperations." "The individual cannot 'go it alone';
11 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.
New York, 1955, 175. Fred Howe, Jane Addams and Richard Ely, to
name just three of the most prominent Progressives, emerge from the
rural-Protestant background. Most important, all three are highly con-
scious of the fact.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 201
he cannot do as he pleases ; he must conform his acts in an ever in-
creasing degree to the will and welfare of the community in which
he lives."12 Fred Howe, surveying The Modem City and Its Prob-
lems, concluded that:
The city can only live by cooperation; by cooperation in a million unseen
ways. Without cooperation for a single day a great city would stand still.
Without cooperation for a week it would be brought to the verge of starva-
tion and be decimated by disease.
The city has destroyed individualism. It is constantly narrowing its
field. And in all probability, cooperation, either voluntary or compulsory,
will continue to appropriate an increasing share of the activities of society.13
The modern industrial city, built upon a foundation of speciali-
zation and cooperation, could survive only by carefully regulating
the economic activities of the individual. The amassing of popula-
tion and industry in the city meant that a single individual held
magnified potentialities for good and evil. The slum landlord, for
example, who refused to meet minimum health standards in his
tenements, caused untold misery. Under such circumstances, the
Progressives concluded that "we must combine more and more and
compete less and less; life is not possible to us on any other terms."14
The Progressives sanctioned communal control over the property
and profits of the individual, not only because men were inter-de-
pendent, but also because the city fostered irresponsibility. Men
were remote from one another; they did not always calculate the
consequences of their actions. When a man bought a coat made in
a sweatshop, he unwittingly supported a barbaric system of economic
exploitation. The food manufacturer who adulterated his product
felt no guilt because he did not see the consequences of his handi-
work. The widows and orphans who owned stock in a corporation
were interested only in dividends. They did not concern themselves
with the possibility that their dividends were created through the
exploitation of other widows and orphans.
Adherents of the liberal creed had regarded government as a
necessary evil at best, fit only for the role of policeman. The Pro-
12 Delos F. Wilcox, Great Cities in America: Their Problems and
Their Government, New York, 1910, 12 ; also Charles Zueblin : "The
characteristic note of the new era is social. Individual effort is sanctioned
because it promotes social welfare." "The New Civic Spirit," The Chautau-
quan, 38 (1903-04), 56.
13 Frederic C. Howe, The Modern City and Its Problems, New York,
1915, 4.
14 Washington Gladden, Social Facts :znd Forces, New York, 1897,
165.
202 ROY LUBOVE
gressives swung to the opposite extreme and embraced government
as a positive good. They emphasized the beneficent possibilities of
government to a degree unprecedented in American history. Gov-
ernment was the community's major instrument of control. It would
protect the community against individual or group exploitation. It
would actively promote the interests of all the people.
Many Progressives enthusiastically favored municipal ownership
of public utilities. They justified municipal ownership on the
grounds that a conflict of interest existed between the community
and monopolistic capitalism. The directors of a street railway, for
example, were interested in profits, not service. The right of the
people to cheap and safe transportation was subordinated, under
private ownership, to the right of the stockholders to maximum
profits. Furthermore, private ownership of public utilities was the
offspring of privilege. In order to operate a sewerage or gas plant,
a special franchise had to be acquired from the city council. The
efforts of businessmen to win these franchises and keep them se-
cure from regulation was regarded by Progressives as the root of
corruption in municipal government. Thus the struggle for munic-
ipal ownership was closely connected to the broader Progressive
campaign against monopolistic capitalism based on privilege and
political corruption.
Many of the municipal reformers, such as Tom Johnson and
Fred Howe, were single-taxers. The single-taxers agreed that pri-
vate ownership of utilities created a conflict of interest between the
public and stockholders. They agreed that municipal ownership
was necessary in order to clean up municipal government. The
single-taxer also insisted, however, that the community had a right
to the "unearned increment" which private monopoly gobbled up.
The "unearned increment," springing from the mere growth of the
community, ought to return to its source; it should enrich the
community rather than a few private individuals.
The revolt against liberalism, the revised theory of the indi-
vidual's relationship to society and government which I have been
discussing, is the intellectual basis for the Progressive ideal of the
organic city. Every community, of course, is organic in the sense
that all the parts are related in some fashion. Few communities,
however, are organic in the sense that all the parts work together
to achieve a common goal, as the organs of the human body co-
operate to maintain life. The latter concept of organic, which im-
plies purposive cooperation and not merely random relationship,
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 203
was what the Progressives had in mind. In the organic city, men
would define common goals and cooperate to realize them. Indi-
vidual and group activity would be judged in relation to their con-
tribution to the common good. "But always the people remain,"
Brand Whitlock once wrote, "pressing onward in a great stream up
the slopes, and always somehow toward the light. For the great
dream beckons, leads them on, the dream of social harmony always
prefigured in human thought as the city."15
In the organic city, the community was to be consciously and
deliberately "organized for the higher and more comprehensive pur-
pose of promoting the convenience, the comfort, the safety, the hap-
piness, the welfare, of the whole people."16 America had blindly
stumbled into urban life. This urban civilization held great promise
for good if controlled and directed. It threatened destruction if
left to itself. In short, the organic community was the essence of
the new urban ethic. Government, transformed from "an agency
of property" into an "agency of humanity," would translate the de-
sire for an organic city into action:
The life of the individual must be brought into organic and vital touch with
the life of the community. The citizen must think of the city as far
more than a protector of person and property. In his mind, the city must
be associated with a large group of services upon the efficiency of which
the maintenance of his standard of life depends.
All this involves a wide extension of municipal functions: the creation
of a new city environment.17
The organic city, devoted to the service of all the people, would
restore the social harmony once guaranteed by the invisible hand of
Providence.
Ill
The American Institute of Social Service published, in 1906, the
results of a survey concerning the church affiliations of social re-
formers. Questionnaires were sent to 1,012 individuals. Of this
number, 401 were connected with charity work, 339 with settlements,
272 were connected with various national reform organizations.
Eight hundred and seventy-eight of the 1012 reported on religious
affiliation. Significantly, only fifteen per cent of these were non-
Protestant.18 In order to understand more fully the Progressive
15 Brand Whitlock, Forty Years of It, New York, 1914, 374.
16 Gladden, Social Facts, 163.
17 L. S. Rowe, Problems of City Government, New York, 1908, 93, 94.
IS W. D. P. Bliss, "The Church and Social Reform Workers," Out-
look, 82 (1906), 122-125.
204 ROY LUBOVE
vision of the organic city, it is necessary to examine in detail the
religious ethos which inspired it.
Fred Howe, in his Confessions, tried to explain the moral im-
pulse which guided the conscience of his generation. "Physical
escape from the embraces of evangelical religion," Howe wrote,
"did not mean moral escape."
From that religion my reason was never emancipated. By it I was con-
formed to my generation and made to share its moral standards and ideals.
It was with difficulty, that realism got lodgment in my mind ; early as-
sumptions as to virtue and vice, goodness and evil remained in my mind
long after I had tried to discard them. This is, I think, the most character-
istic influence of my generation.19
Although the agrarian, Protestant world of the Progressives was
dissolving, it is important to understand that the Progressives did
not reject the agrarian, Protestant values. Their object was to adapt
those values to urban life — to insure the safe transition of these
values from one environment to another.
Progressive municipal reformers complained that an exaggerated
"materialism" had betrayed Americans into neglecting their higher
responsibilities and endangering their secular souls. They had wor-
shipped Mammon and had forgotten their obligations to their fellow
men. A necessary prelude to the creation of the organic city was a
renaissance of moral instinct. Men's latent moral idealism would
effect an inner transformation, a transvaluation of values. The
spirit of service and sacrifice would replace the will-to-power and
the will-to-profits. The fundamental brotherhood of man would be
revealed as men subordinated superficial differences and proved
their essential unity by cooperating to substitute order for chaos in
the city. In the words of Josiah Strong:
Society is beginning to arrive at self consciousness; that is, it is beginning
to recognize itself as an organism whose life is one and whose interests are
one. . . .
There are two laws fundamental to every living organism, which must be
perfectly obeyed before society can be perfected; one is the law of service,
the other that of sacrifice.20
There was a third law still more important — the law of love. The
law of love "vitalizes the other two." "To him who loves,"
19 Frederic C. Howe, The Confessions of a Reformer, New York,
1925, 16-17.
20 Josiah Strong, The Twentieth Century, 117, 123.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 205
Strong announced, "service is its own reward, and sacrifice is
e.
■21
privileg
In striving to create a "union of all the people, seeking in
conscious ways the betterment of human conditions,"22 the Pro-
gressives exemplified the Protestant "moral athlete." Teach men
21 Ibid., 127; Progressive literature is replete with appeals for service,
sacrifice and love. I will quote just a few such appeals in order to cap-
ture the spirit of Progressive municipal reform:
1. Delos Wilcox: "The real character of our national mission is
inconsistent with mere self seeking. Freedom, democracy, equality
of rights, all speak of brotherhood and cooperation and prophesy
that human nature, so cruel and selfish in its ancient and primi-
tive manifestations, is being changed to something benevolent and
social." The American City: A Problem in Democracy, 3.
2. Brand Whitlock: "He [Mayor Jones of Toledo] saw that the
law on which the Golden Rule is founded, the law of moral action
and reaction, is the one most generally ignored. Its principle he
felt to be always at work, so that men lived by it whether they
wished to or not, whether they knew it or not. According to his
law hate breeds hate and love produces love in retui-n; and all
force begets resistance, and the result is the general disorder and
anarchy in which we live so much of the time." Forty Years of It,
149.
3. Richard Ely: "And this development of human powers in the
individual is not to be entirely for self, but it is to be for the
sake of their beneficent use in the service of one's fellows in a
Christian civilization. It is for self and for others; it is the
realization of the ethical aim expressed in that command which
contains the secret of all true progress, "Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself. . . ." "It is in this duty to love and serve our
fellows that I find the most convincing proof of the divinity of
Christ." Ground Under Our Feet: An Autobiography, New York,
1938, 67, 74.
4. Washington Gladden: "This battle for good government in our
cities will not be won without a great deal of heroic, costly, conse-
crated service. It is because you and I have been so busy with our
mills and our mines and our merchandise, with our selfish schemes
and our trivial enjoyments and our narrow professionalism . . . and
have left our one main business of ruling the city in the fear of
God to those who feared not God nor regarded man, that such a
great hour of darkness rests now upon our cities. Social Facts
and Forces, 190.
5. Frank Parsons: "There is no quarrel between true individ-
ualism and the cooperative philosophy. The savage individualist
of the primeval forest has of course no use for government or
cooperation of any sort. But the developed individualist of a
highly civilized society is naturally cooperative to a large degree
in his conduct and thought, no matter what sort of nonsense he
may talk. Primitive individualism expressed itself in absolute
independence; ennobled individualism just as naturally expresses
itself in cooperation and mutual help; and the noblest individu-
alism would necessarily express itself in complete mutualism or
universal cooperation." The City for the People, Philadelphia,
1899, 237.
22 Howe, Hope of Democracy, 312.
206 ROY LUBOVE
the truth about politics, poverty and other urban evils, the Progres-
sives preached. Once the truth was known and conscience aroused,
then man's instinctive moral idealism would rouse his will to action.
By sheer force of will, he could generate the internal reformation
so basic to the creation of the organic city.
The Progressives did not believe that social disorder and misun-
derstanding developed from limitations in man's nature. Conflict
and chaos could not be ascribed to "inherent defects" in man. In-
deed, social disequilibrium was a departure from the "wisdom of
God's plan." "Is there not truth," Howe asked, "in the sugges-
tion that society itself is responsible for the wreckage which industry
has cast upon our shores ? Are not poverty and the attendant evils
of ignorance, disease, vice, and crime the children of our own
flesh and blood."23 If there was tumult in the city, then we alone
were the "architects of our own misfortunes." We had worshipped
Mammon, and thus sanctified a sordid commercialism oblivious of
human rights and needs. It was not surprising that our cities grew
unplanned and impervious to the comfort and happiness of the
people. The philosophy of entrepreneurial "individualism" had
protected the "rights" of the tenement landlord, but not those of
his poverty striken tenants. "Individualism" insured to the direc-
tors of a street railway the right to exploit their employees and the
public, while the city looked on helplessly. We had, in short, per-
mitted an irresponsible commercial ethos to govern our activity and
shape the institutions which now exploited us. By force of will,
we could alter both the ethos and the institutions.
The Progressive organic city, characterized by the spirit of ser-
vice, sacrifice and love, was nothing less than God's Kingdom-on-
Earth. Just as ante-bellum Protestant reformers had called for the
eradication of evil in order to hasten the millennium, so also the
Progressives preached a millennial gospel. The evils which the
Progressives faced were often different, but the apocalyptic spirit
was the same. Urban reform, like abolition, was a great moral
drama. In Act I the participants must become conscious of their
personal guilt for the evils which surrounded them. In Act II
this sense of guilt must merge with a conviction of personal re-
sponsibility for the eradication of evil. Act III would witness the
transvaluation of values — consumation and salvation.
23 Frederic C. Howe, Privilege and Democracy in America, New
York, 1910, x.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 207
IV
Protestant moral idealism is a most important explanation for
the millennial aura which envelops the organic city. Also very
significant in explaining the aspirations of municipal reformers
was the influence of the European municipality. Most Progressive
municipal reformers were conscious of the efforts of European, and
especially German and English cities to meet the problems created
by rapid population growth and industrialization.
Progressive reformers like Fred Howe and Albert Shaw were
greatly impressed by the European municipality. They were in-
spired by what they thought was the spectacle of cities dedicated to
the "service of humanity." Albert Shaw's description of the Ger-
man city is typical:
The practical management of German cities proceeds in harmony with the
German conception of the municipality as a social organism. ... It is enough
for us to understand that in Germany the community, organized centrally and
officially, is a far more positive factor in the life of the family or the
individual than in America. The German municipal government is not a
thing apart, but is vitally identified with every concern of the municipality;
and the municipality is the aggregation of human beings and human inter-
ests included within the territorial boundaries that fix the community's area
and jurisdiction. There are, in the German conception of city government,
no limits whatever to municipal functions. It is the business of the munic-
ipality to promote in every feasible way its own welfare and the welfare of
its citizens.24
Shaw was correct in saying that the German city was a "far more
positive factor" in the individual's life than in America. More de-
batable was his assumption that such interference developed prima-
rily out of a tender concern for the happiness of all the people.
Given their desire for order and harmony in place of ruthless
economic individualism, I suspect that the Progressives confused
German administrative control with the organic city. In fact, Pro-
gressive studies of the European city reveal more about the Pro-
gressives than about the European city. For this very reason, how-
ever, such works are valuable to the student of Progressive municipal
reform.
The Progressives assumed that the European city illustrated the
organic city in action, not only because it was ostensibly an "agency
24 Albert Shaw, Municipal Government in Continental Europe, New
York, 1895, 323.
208 ROY LUBOVE
of humanity," but also because it relied so much on administrative
expertise and science. Fred Howe admiringly reported that:
The German city is a cross section of the nation. It is Germany at her
best. Here, as in the army, in the navy, and the civil service, one finds
the most highly organized efficiency and honesty. . . . The higher municipal
offices are filled with men prepared for the profession of administration
by education, long experience and achievement.25
Clearly, if Protestant idealism was the heart and nervous system of
the organic city, then science was its brain. Talent and intelligence
would rule, they were the instruments by which the municipality
would serve the people. Howe revealed:
I cared about beauty and order in cities — cities that chose for their rulers
university men, trained as I was being trained. Possibly because I was
disorderly myself, I wanted order. And I hated waste. That I had been
taught to esteem a cardinal sin, and American cities, I was told, were waste-
ful because they were ruled by politicians, whose only interest was in jobs.26
Sometimes, as with E. A. Ross, this Progressive faith in expertise
emerged as an anti-democratic elitism:
Politically, democracy means the sovereignty, not of the average man — who
is a rather narrow, shortsighted, muddle-headed creature — but of a matured
public opinion, a very different thing. 'One man, one vote,' does not make
Sambo equal to Socrates in the state, for the balloting but registers a public
opinion. In the forming of this opinion the sage has a million times the
weight of the field hand. With modern facilities for influencing mind,
democracy, at its best, substitutes the direction of the recognized moral and
intellectual elite for the rule of the strong, the rich, or the privileged. . . .
Let the people harken a little less to commercial magnates and a little more
to geologists, economists, physicians, teachers and social workers.27
There are two important explanations for the Progressive infatu-
ation with the expert. First, only trained intelligence could suc-
cessfully cope with the complexity of an urban-industrial civiliza-
tion. Science alone could transform the idealism of the new
urban ethic into reality. The day of the well-rounded Jacksonian
democrat was over. He was an anachronism, in government and
elsewhere. The future belonged to the specialist.
In the second place, the expert was "disinterested." Remote
from the mart of commerce, and the stench of the all-mighty dollar,
he was devoted to his work alone. He would not promote only
25 Frederic C. Howe, Socialized Germany, New York, 1915, 265.
26 Howe, Confessions, 6.
27 Edward A. Ross, Changing America, New York, 1912, 4-5, 106.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 209
his interests or those of his class, but the general interest. The ex-
pert, in his selfless dedication to his work and to the commonweal,
was a key figure in the organic city. The Progressive believed that
this reign of "disinterested" talent typified the European city. As
Shaw explained:
The conditions and circumstances that surround the lives of the masses of
people in modern cities can be so adjusted to their needs as to result in the
highest development of the race, in body, in mind, and in moral character.
The so-called problems of the modern city are but the various phases of
the one main question, How can environment be most perfectly adapted to
the welfare of urban populations. And science can meet and answer every
one of these problems.
[This reliance upon the services of the expert] would seem to rest so palpably
at the bottom of all that is encouraging and inspiring in the recent progress
of municipal life in Europe that a discussion from any more restricted point
of view would be well-nigh useless.28
The European city, supposedly devoted to the service of all the
people and drawing upon the skill of the expert, offered visible
proof to the Progressives that their millennial hopes were not in
vain.
In summary, then, the Progressive period witnessed the growth
of a new urban ethic which interpreted the city as an organism and
which redefined the relationship between the individual and society.
The Progressives demanded politics which were moral and disin-
terested, and politicians who were "social engineers." They de-
manded a moral consensus which stressed the spirit of service, sac-
rifice and love. Once such a consensus was achieved, the city would
become an "agency of humanity" instead of the nemisis of democ-
racy. In the organic city men would transcend class and ethnic
differences. They would perceive and fulfill all human needs —
biological, cultural, social, economic. Progressive municipal reform
failed, not so much because it lacked a philosophy, but because it
wove a reform program around the fragile possibility that men could
transcend their "superficial" differences and cooperate in the build-
ing of the organic city, the city devoted to the deliberate "culture of
life."
Roy Lubove
Cornell University
28 Albert Shaw, Municipal Government in Great Britain, New York,
1898, 3, 4.
A Professor in Farm Politics
George Peek — businessman, farm leader, political administrator
— looked out at a strange Washington scene in the grim yet hopeful
year 1933. What appeared to him to be an "entirely new species"
had moved into "high places." The "species" included college pro-
fessors who were "wholly without experience" in what this politi-
cally active businessman regarded as "larger affairs."1 Peek was
not the only man who felt uneasy. Other farm leaders insisted that
"the job of getting agriculture back on its feet calls not for well
meaning theorists, but for double fisted practical men who still have
faith in our institutions."2 Other businessmen urged the President
to replace the professors with "men who have hustled up pay
rolls."3
Such rhetoric enlivened the political debate of the 'thirties and
convinced many observers that the political experiences of the pro-
fessors testified to a strong anti-intellectual strain in American cul-
ture. Those experiences, however, actually testified even more
strongly to the accommodation that had taken place between intel-
lectuals and their culture. Large numbers of them had fitted them-
selves into their culture and were accepted by many of America's
economic and political leaders. Not the intellectuals as such but
only certain of their values disturbed these other men. The values
Author's Note. For a more thoroughly developed and documented
treatment of this subject see the author's "The New Deal Professors and
the Politics of Agriculture" (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin,
1958), especially chapters 1, 3, 4 and 6. As the thesis reveals this study
has benefitted greatly from the impressive work that has been done by a
number of historians of farm politics. The study rests largely upon a
number of manuscript collections, especially the papers of M. L. Wilson,
George Peek, George Warren, Franklin Roosevelt, and the office of the
Secretary of Agriculture. Also helpful have been the publications of the
major farm organizations and the Journal of Farm Economics. The latter
is a rich source for the student of farm policy. The Journal contains
many articles by participants in policy making and by outstanding students
of the politics of agriculture, such as Charles M. Hardin. I am grateful
for the critical attention that this study has received from a number of
scholars, especially Professor Merle Curti of the University of Wisconsin
and Professors Carl E. Schorske, Joseph C. Palamountain and Loren
Baritz of Wesleyan University.
1 George N. Peek (with Samuel Crowther), Why Quit Our Own, New
York, 1936, 112.
2 William Hirth to George N. Peek, August 25, 1936; Peek Papers— ■
MSS in Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri,
Columbia, Missouri.
3 Sibley Everitt to Franklin Roosevelt, April 15, 1935; Roosevelt
Papers, Official File 1-Misc. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
210
imriHininminnTii
A PROFESSOR IN FARM POLITICS 211
of the intellectuals determined their relations with these leaders.
Anti-intellectual rhetoric usually only obscured a basic conflict, a
conflict between business and democracy, for example.
Professor M. L. Wilson's experiences in farm politics provided
evidence on these themes. Though he was an intellectual he enjoyed
strong support from many business and farm leaders. And why not ?
He sympathized with their business values. This professor's out-
look, to be sure, ranged well beyond business values. Wilson held
democratic values as well. It was this particular combination in his
world view that made his political experiences so meaningful to
the historian of intellectuals in New Deal politics. The successful
opposition to Wilson's policies did not grow out of distrust of intel-
lectuals. Success came to Wilson when he pushed a business pro-
gram for agriculture. Failure came when he moved beyond to
democratic programs that threatened the business orientation of
farm politics and the power of that orientation's most militant repre-
sentative.
Wilson represented a special type of intellectual, a type that can
be called a "service intellectual." The service intellectual is quite
unlike the "ivory tower" and "alienated" intellectuals who figure so
prominently in the popular magazines and literary histories. He fits
into major concerns of the culture and identifies with one or more
of its major sets of values. He devotes the life of the mind to
problems of pressing practical importance and often works on them
in cooperation with leaders of economic and political affairs. Amer-
ican universities had been producing an abundant supply of such
people since the late nineteenth century. Franklin Roosevelt recog-
nized their utility and encouraged their political activity.
Many of the major contributors to the development of the ser-
vice intellectual had shaped Wilson's growth. Agricultural colleges
had provided most of his formal education and teaching opportu-
nities. Leading exponents of the "Wisconsin Idea," such as John
R. Commons, had guided the Montana professor's graduate studies.
Further graduate work had been taken with James H. Tufts, a
philosopher who, as Wilson has described him, "was as much con-
cerned in how he applied ethics in labor industrial relations as he
was in the theoretical side of ethics."4 Tufts had enjoyed close
association with the philosopher of the service intellectual — John
Dewey. Dewey had advised intellectuals to break down the barriers
4 Louis Finkelstein, ed., American Spiritual Autobiographies, New
York, 1948, 16.
212 RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL
that divided them from other people. Wilson developed institu-
tions, especially the farmer committee system, that brought intellec-
tuals and other people into close contact in the shaping of policy.
Where were the origins of the production control program with
which Wilson was most closely associated? The program did not
originate with the farm organizations that one expects to shape farm
policy. Those organizations had their own price raising schemes in
1932, ranging from export "dumping" to simple price-fixing. Wil-
son worked hard to get "hooked up with the National Farm Bureau
and the National Grange."5 Some of their leaders, however, resented
the fact that he had introduced a competing program. All of them
tried to get Franklin Roosevelt to accept one of their own programs.
Roosevelt listened to the farm leaders, but at the same time he
listened to the alternative proposal that Wilson and other social
scientists had been developing. Wilson did more than anyone else
to develop the alternative, but his close associates, especially W. J.
Spillman, Beardsley Ruml, and John D. Black, had also made im-
portant contributions. The idea that agricultural production should
be controlled had been around for a long time. These men at-
tempted to devise ways to make it possible for the farmers actually
to control their production.
These social scientists believed that a business practice must
form the basis of the farm program. Farmers should imitate a
practice that urban businessmen had long been using for their own
purposes. With help from the government the commercial farmer
should behave more like these other businessmen and control his
production in order to realize the business goal of profitable prices.
With intellectuals offering the businessman as the model for
the farmer, it can hardly astonish us that Wilson gained more help-
ful support from business than from farm leaders in 1932. Men
such as Henry Harriman, the president of the Chamber of Com-
merce, and R. R. Rogers, a top official of the Prudential Life In-
surance Company, provided some of the most important support
that Wilson received in that crisis year. "You would be surprised,"
he informed a friend, "how much the business interests are now het
up over so-called farm relief."6 The professor used their financial
support to wage a vigorous propaganda and lobbying campaign.
Both economic and political factors had drawn these businessmen
into farm politics. Better farm prices would help those businesses
5 Wilson to Beardsley Ruml, May 18, 1932; Wilson Papers— MSS in
Montana State College Archives, Bozeman, Montana.
6 Wilson to Joseph Davis, November 20, 1932; Wilson Papers.
A PROFESSOR IN FARM POLITICS 213
that were "vitally dependent upon the farmer's income."7 The
many millions that the life insurance companies had invested in farm
loans, Wilson pointed out, had given the companies "some little
interest in what is prosaically called the agricultural situation."8
And improvement in the farmer's economic situation would make
him a conservative political force. Wilson warned business leaders
"that we must have elevation in prices or else we are going to have
debt repudiation on a scale which will ruin the moral fiber of
millions of people and terribly disrupt if not ruin the financial
structure."9 Many business leaders agreed that farm relief could
help both to preserve the business system and to restore it to pros-
perity.
This farm program, then, revealed that an intellectual could
hold business values. Wilson's program drew upon more than one
set of values, however. Democratic values found a place in the
program, especially in the farmer committee system. Farmers were
to elect some of their fellows to serve on community and county
committees. These committees would function like the corporation
functioned in industry to keep production in line with demand.
Wilson believed strongly in this feature for above all he saw it as
a democratic system of administration. The agrarian democratic
tradition, as well as business practices, thus lay behind this pro-
fessor's program.
It was Roosevelt who got the farm leaders to accept the pro-
fessor's farm scheme. Not that F.D.R. clearly told the farmers
that this was the program they should accept. He merely let it be
known in a rather vague way during the campaign that he liked the
plan. Though Professor Tugwell brought Wilson to Roosevelt and
urged him to force the farm leaders to line up behind the plan and
though Wilson played the leading role in drafting the key speech on
farm policy, F.D.R. 's commitment remained rather vague. He did
not want to antagonize any of the farm groups. The farm leaders
got the point, however, and agreed to include production control
in the farm bill.
The bill, though, contained the farm organizations' proposals as
well and thus forced the administrators to decide how much empha-
sis should be given to Wilson's plan. The professor and his associates
moved into jobs that could help to shape that decision. He, Tug-
well, Mordecai Ezekiel, Howard Tolley and other intellectuals who
7 Wilson to C. R. Hope, July 22, 1932; Wilson Papers.
8 Wilson to Joseph Davis, May 18, 1932; Wilson Papers.
9 Wilson to R. R. Rogers, July 22, 1932; Wilson Papers.
214 RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL
favored production control took important administrative posts. And
the man in the top post — Henry A. Wallace — had been working
with Wilson for several years.
Only one major enemy remained in the way — the agricultural
processors and distributors and a businessman in farm politics who
shared their point of view. Roosevelt and Wallace chose George
Peek as the administrator of the AAA because of his good relations
with farm and business leaders. (He later complained that he had
been mere "window dressing."10) Peek was a former farm machin-
ery manufacturer who had led the McNary-Haugen fight of the
'twenties. He and the "middlemen" fought the efforts to make
production control the chief feature of the New Deal farm pro-
gram. Programs that would sell the surpluses, by dumping if nec-
essary, struck these men as better ways to make farming profitable.
Production control was not a form of farm relief that would enlarge
the profits of businessmen whose profits depended upon full-scale
agricultural operations.
By late 1933, however, Wilson and his colleagues had gained
the support they needed to make production control the chief feature
of the New Deal farm program. The Farm Bureau had become
an especially strong supporter when the AAA started to raise income
to commercial farmers and to help that farm organization to increase
its power. Thus when the conflict between Peek and the intel-
lectuals reached a crisis, Wallace and Roosevelt stood behind pro-
duction control. When the processors in 1936 persuaded the Su-
preme Court to invalidate this program, the professors worked with
the farm leaders to seek new ways to control production.
In the late 'thirties, however, the Farm Bureau began to turn
against Wilson's program and to join the other business-minded
groups that had become New Deal critics. The recession of 1937
strengthened old doubts about production control and strengthened
old interests in marketing devices as ways to get higher prices. Bet-
ter means seemed needed to achieve business goals. More than
that, means were needed that did not threaten the political power
of the Farm Bureau. The institutional expression of Wilson's
democratic values had begun to worry this organization. The com-
mittees seemed capable of becoming a new farm organization that
could replace the Farm Bureau as the leading representative of the
commercial farmer in the development of policy.
Farm Bureau criticism troubled the professors for they hoped
10 Peek, Why Quit Our Own, 155.
— — » mini
A PROFESSOR IN FARM POLITICS 215
that production control would accomplish more than business pur-
poses. Wilson hoped that the program might "stimulate a great
lot of discussion and talk about planning and agricultural readjust-
ment."11 It was not enough to make farming more profitable for
commercial farmers. Farm policy must consider broader interests,
such as the interests of consumers, of low-income groups in agri-
culture, and of future generations of Americans. In short, the plan-
ning program that was developed reflected doubts that the general
welfare could be realized if business considerations alone dictated
land use.
An institutional development showed how the professors used
the business program as a stepping stone to programs with broader
goals. In 1934, a Program Planning Division was established with-
in the AAA. A professor who was one of Wilson's closest associ-
ates, Howard Tolley of the University of California, headed up the
new Division. It devoted itself to the development of an impres-
sive list of plans.
Then in 1938 the intellectuals made their strongest bid to real-
ize their long-run social goals, a bid that soon led to conflict between
democratic and business values. The Bureau of Agricultural Econ-
omics with Professor Tolley as its chief was the chosen instrument.
The Bureau became the general planning agency for the Depart-
ment of Agriculture in hopes that all of the activities of the Depart-
ment would be coordinated and directed toward the fulfillment of
the bold purposes.
The BAE planning venture rested in part upon the professors'
democratic values. The most conspicuous expression of those values
came in the role that was opened up for farmers. Wilson's farmer
committee idea was applied to the planning field so that intellectuals
and farmers could work together to plan ways to improve the use
of the land. The hope was that large numbers of farmers would
actively participate. Wilson dreamed of "economic democracy in
action . . . farmers, experts and administrators cooperating in the
different phases of policy formation. . . ."12 He and his associates
thus not only moved beyond business goals. These intellectuals also
rejected elitist conceptions of planning. It was not to be the func-
tion solely of a specially trained group of men.
11 Wilson to E. A. Duddy, March 11, 1932; Wilson Papers.
12 Wilson, "The Place of the Department of Agriculture in the
Evolution of Agricultural Policy;" MS in National Archives, Records
Group 83, General Correspondence, Division of Statistical and Historical
Research.
216 RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL
The democratic planning program barely got off the ground
before the Farm Bureau shot it down. Anti-intellectualism did not
explain this action for the Farm Bureau got along very well with
many service intellectuals. It, unlike some other organizations, had
not distrusted production control because intellectuals had developed
it. After all, the major political support for the nation's agricultural
colleges came from this representative of the commercial farmer.
The attack grew out of Farm Bureau concern about the impli-
cations of the democratic values of these particular intellectuals.
The organization feared that the committees might possibly free
the policy-makers from political dependence upon the Bureau. Such
freedom might put farm policy-making into the hands of men whose
outlook was not limited to the business perspective of the Farm
Bureau. The plans of Tolley's BAE frequently showed a distressing
concern for the interests of consumers and lower income groups in
agriculture as well as the interests of the rural businessman. The
Farm Bureau had the power needed to do the job. The attack began
in 1940. By 1946 little remained of the planning program.
The war contributed to Farm Bureau success. During the de-
pression President Roosevelt and especially Secretary Wallace had
been the most vigorous supporters of the intellectuals' interest in
planning. But when the attack got under way, Roosevelt had
already turned his attention to other matters. Wallace, now the
Vice President, had left the Department in the hands of Claude
Wickard, whose concentration on the war needs for expanded pro-
duction and close ties with the AAA left Tolley's BAE with no
real support. Thus, the Farm Bureau and its spokesmen in Congress
had little trouble in destroying the democratic planning program.
Obviously intellectuals in politics needed more than ideas. The
professors needed power that ideas alone could not provide. The
committees thus had potential importance as means as well as ends.
The professors valued broad participation in politics for its own
sake and also as a way to get support for planning. Events proved
that planning could only live if it had a new farm organization
behind it. The established farm organizations provided almost no
support against Farm Bureau attacks. Only a new mass-based organ-
ization could have competed effectively against the Farm Bureau.
Here, however, the professors' ties with business-oriented power
groups played a crucial role. Those groups had enabled the planners
to get their programs under way. In establishing the committees,
the planners worked with an ally of those groups, the county agents.
A PROFESSOR IN FARM POLITICS 217
With those agents playing such a large role, the inevitable happened.
The lower income groups in the communities had little representa-
tion on the committees. With the kind of farmer that the Farm
Bureau represented dominating the committees, it is not surprising
that they did not come to the defense of the program.
The established power structure in farm politics created large
difficulties for the intellectuals who hoped to move beyond business
programs. Perhaps nothing Wilson and his associates could have
done would have produced a genuine democratic social movement
that would support planning. But perhaps more could have been
accomplished if the intellectuals had been more militant in their
efforts to promote broad and active political participation. How-
ever, militant efforts would have involved a direct challenge to the
very business-minded groups that had brought the professors their
early successes. An effort to build new programs slowly and in
cooperation with established groups failed because a leading group
scented danger in the air. A more vigorous effort to democratize
policy-making in the farm field might only have aroused the op-
position even more quickly.
Thus, intellectuals such as Wilson failed in their efforts to serve
democratic as well as business values in farm politics. Obviously
the two sets of values were not in perfect harmony with one another.
Obviously business values had greater power. The depression situ-
ation had helped the professors to move forward along democratic
as well as along business lines. But the war situation, with its
emphasis upon the immediate expansion of output, favored business
values. Under the aegis of war, a militant representative of those
values in farm politics destroyed the democratic planning program
and taught the New Deal professors a lesson about the nature of
the politics of agriculture. "... the sweep of the business spirit
and of the machine," Max Lerner has written, "has caught up the
whole enterprise of farming and transformed it in the image of
industrial enterprise."13 The professors had contributed to the trans-
formation, thus showing that intellectuals could fit into business
America. But the change also contributed to their political frustra-
tion. Intellectuals with democratic values did not fit so easily.
Richard S. Kirkendall
University of Missouri
13 America as a Civilization; Life and Thought in the United States
Today, New York, 1957, 140. Compare John H. Davis and Kenneth Hin-
shaw, Farmer in a Business Suit, New York, 1957.
The First Missouri Editors'
Convention, 1859
During its first decades Missouri journalism struggled against
the hardships of such intense political and economic rivalry, that
its fraternity of editors had neither the respect of the citizens, nor,
for that matter, regard for each other. So many editors entered the
arena ready for combat, that abuse and billingsgate, and even street
fighting and pistoling, marred the relationships of the editorial
brethren. Newspapers were so numerous and competition so great
that subscription rates tended to decline in frontier Missouri while
costs of publication went up, all of which made journalism a pre-
carious enterprise. Failure to band together in the interest of dignity
and profits cost them so much public esteem, that the editor, aware
of his lack of status, lamented his beleaguered condition. Pioneer
journalism, in short, wanted an esprit de corps to bind it together
into harmonious community, and it was to this task of professional-
ization that a number of editors devoted a great deal of earnest
consideration.
The first signs of true professionalization came exactly one hun-
dred years ago with the meeting of the first editors' convention in
Missouri in 1859, later to be known as the Missouri Press Associa-
tion. Calls for such a convention had been made at a very early
date. Abel Rathbone Corbin of the Missouri Argus was not the
first to propose a meeting when, in 1837, he suggested that editors
and publishers of papers and masters of job offices from Illinois,
Missouri, and Wisconsin meet in St. Louis to restore harmony among
the group, for, as he put it, "we have been clawing each other's
eyes out quite long enough."1 Again in 1839, the Argus proposed
a convention of proprietors in St. Louis to adopt regulations and
secure their enforcement against delinquent subscribers.2 This
meeting, however, did not come off, and the Argus, convinced that
a convention of printers and publishers of the state was impossible,
determined to go it "solitary and alone" to eliminate the credit
system. The press of the whole country was kept poor, dependent
and contemptible because publishers were too liberal and accom-
modating to their friends.3
1 Missouri Argus, St. Louis, April 14, 28, 1837.
2 Ibid., August 29, 1839; The Western Emigrant, Boonville, Septem-
ber 5, 1839.
3 Missouri Argus, St. Louis, December 12, 1840.
218
THE FIRST MISSOURI EDITORS' CONVENTION, 1859 219
Throughout the 1840's, futile efforts to bring together a state-
wide convention continued. William F. Switzler of the Missouri
Statesman pointed to the benefits of a uniform tariff established
among the St. Louis press. He and F. M. Caldwell of the Boonville
Observer especially desired agreements on advertising rates, which,
though they appeared equable throughout the state, varied with every
office because the printer took any copy he could get. A recognized
tariff of prices would be of great benefit to the craft, and would
raise the editor — "emaciated from incessant toil . . . out at elbows
and out of money!" — from his low status in society.4
In 1853 a regional meeting of editors did take place in Savannah.
Lucian J. Eastin of the St. Joseph Gazette was made chairman, and
James A. Millan of the St. Joseph Cycle was appointed secretary.
William Ridenbaugh, also of the Gazette, made an address in which
he spoke of the "Profession of Printing" as the "noblest profession,"
but one that was left like the "weed cast from the rock, on ocean's
foam to float where e're the waves might roll or the winds pre-
vail." The solution to the problem of competitive prices, as in the
other professions, was to unite to protect themselves from ruinous
competition. A date — the second Monday in October — and a place
— St. Louis — was chosen for an editor's convention to fix rates for
printing.5
Nothing came of this, but the next year, 1854, new proposals
were made for a state editors' convention, which like all other
attempts, proved abortive. The Hannibal Journal made suggestions
for a meeting place, Hannibal, Boonville, Glasgow, or some other
point of easy access, but A. W. Simpson of the Boonville Observer,
recognizing the wisdom of the adoption of uniform measures by
the "craft," thought the only place where general attendance was
possible was St. Louis.6 He noted that in the newspaper business
the overweening idea had been to get a circulation, and, conse-
quently, subscriptions had been reduced to as low as one dollar a
year, while costs had advanced ten to twenty per cent. Under this
type of enterprise no publisher could make a living, no matter how
large the circulation. Whatever was circulated, was circulated for
glory.
Switzler also believed that all that the publishers had to do was
band together to raise their status, and, like Simpson, saw a con-
4 Boonville Observer, February 17, March 31, 1846.
5 Jefferson Inquirer, Jefferson City, August 13, 1853.
6 Boonville Observer, April 29, 1854.
220 WILLIAM H. LYON
vention as a means of improving camaraderie. Serious efforts had
been made to meet during the State Fairs in Boonville in 1853 and
1854, and in the latter year a few editors made their appearance,
but the convention of 1854 failed because attendance was too small.
While valuable suggestions were interchanged, the editors had no
hope of adopting any resolutions which would win general accep-
tance. Those loudest in advocating a convention, complained Switz-
ler, remained at home, and so discouraged was he that he regarded
the subject as dead and buried for years to come.7
But it was not so. His discouragement was premature. A
successful convention finally met in Jefferson City in 1859 under the
aegis of Switzler. We have seen how editors stressed the dignity
of the profession, a uniform tariff of rates, and fellowship as de-
sirable objects for a conclave of editors. The editor of the Louisi-
ana Herald announced he would be there, and urged other editors
to attend by asking them how long they intended to be slaves of
quack doctors, one-horse politicians, and non-paying subscribers.
The country printers, he asserted, knew they were doing wrong in
publishing long columns of quack nostrums at starvation prices, or
too frequently for no price at all, and lawyer-editors too often made
their columns pack-horses of the shallow-pated orator. In a vein of
humor he drew up an agenda in the form of an interrogatory.
Fellow countrymen, did you ever know
1. a prompt-paying patent pill peddlar?
2. an honest Eastern advertising agent?
3. a menagerie man without multilated money?
4. an office seeker that wouldn't lie?8
A sufficient number of editors in the state met on June 8, 1859,
elected Switzler their first president, and drew up an effectual code
of publishing ethics and business operations.9 The Convention, in
drafting its code, had two objects in mind: the elimination of abuse
and billingsgate among its members, and the establishment of a
workable set of business regulations to be observed by all in the in-
terest of good profits.
Moderation, fairness, dignity, courtesy — these were the virtues
which would bring honor to the profession and restore the public
esteem of the press. And the punishment for the transgressor who
disregarded these virtues? Censure by the other members of the
7 Ibid., April 29, July 29, September 2, 1854; Boonville Weekly Ob-
server, November 4, 1854.
8 Liberty Weekly Tribune, May 27, 1859.
9 Ibid., June 24, 1859.
THE FIRST MISSOURI EDITORS' CONVENTION, 1859 221
profession, and for the repeated violator, forfeiture of the usual
courtesies of the pen.
Twenty years earlier such a code postulating moderation and
courtesy would have been impossible, for then the virtues were firm-
ness, manliness, independence, an obligation to speak out bluntly on
all issues. An editor regarded his fellow editor with no particular
courtesy, indeed any wrongheaded ideas of one editor must be com-
batted with impunity, for how else could truth be established against
error of opinion. Now, in 1859, members of the press were mellow-
ing. Manliness was giving way to moderation. Esprit de corps was
replacing ruthless competition, the craft was giving way to the pro-
fession. The Missouri press fraternity now wanted status, and to
get status they needed respectability, and to be respectable they must
be courteous.
To rise up from the "degradation of the press," the editors
needed an agreement whereby they would not undercut one an-
other's prices. So their code contained a set of business regulations
which struck at the competition, the ruthless competition which
had caused poverty for most and profits for only a few. To have
an adequate subscription list and a good number of advertisers was
the great desideratum of all editors. Without the sources of income
which the subscriber and advertiser provided the newspaper would
perish, as many of them did.
The pioneer editor so ardently desired the patronage of these
men that he continually lowered his prices over the years until a
newspaper was a precarious enterprise indeed. Sam Clemens re-
ports that his brother Orion, when he took over the Hannibal Jour-
nal, lowered the price to one dollar a year, two dollars below the
price asked by Joseph Charless, the pioneer editor. And, of course,
Orion became bankrupt, and never even paid Sam his wages.10
Editors also agreed to accept other media than money. In the hope
of getting something for their labor, the editors agreed to accept
produce — flour, pork, vegetables, also Spanish dollars, wood, and
one of them, Joseph Charless, accepted old brass and copper at the
rate of one bit per pound.11
But editors were so eager to maintain subscribers and provide
services for advertisers that they gave much of their labor free, by
the overextension of the credit system. This was the bane of all
10 Mark Twain, Mark Twain's Autobiography, New York, 1924, II,
285-286.
11 Missouri Gazette, St. Louis, April 19, December 19, 1810, January
9, 1811, January 2, 1813; The Weekly Tribune, Liberty, December 17,
1847.
222 WILLIAM H. LYON
the editors. Rather than eliminate delinquent subscribers, rather
than refuse job work unless paid for on delivery, rather than re-
quire payment from the advertiser on first encounter, rather than be
hard-fisted about the matter, the editor kept extending the credit,
and charged no interest, and most of the time his hope that his
debtors would pay were vain. He kept on "wwking for glory and
printing on trust."12 Collections, of course, were most difficult
from out-of-town subscribers and transient advertisers, such as the
slippery patent medicine advertiser.
No wonder pioneer journalism was studded with the failures of
frontier editors, editors who failed to make a living in one establish-
ment after another. No wonder editors were known for their itin-
erancy, their rootlessness, their wanderlust. Somehow the Conven-
tion of 1859 must attempt to promote stability in the profession.
After addressing itself rather briefly to courtesy and moderation,
the Convention devoted the largest part of its statement to the mat-
ter of profits. Out-of-county subscribers and transient advertisers
must pay in advance; book and job work must be paid for on
delivery; yearly advertisers must settle their accounts periodically;
patent medicine and lottery advertisements must be paid for in ad-
vance or guaranteed by a responsible local agent. The square, the
unit of measurement for paid insertions in the newspaper, was de-
fined so that it would contain no more nor no less than in any news-
paper in the state. Furthermore, legal advertisements, a very lucra-
tive form of advertisement, were to be paid for by the square.
Further to discourage credit, a ten per cent interest would be charged
on all accounts after they became due.
Thus the Missouri Editors' Convention of 1859 pulled at the
strings of pioneer journalism, seeking to end the time of roughness
and crudeness, and of loose financial methods and meager returns,
and to bring professional status to a beleaguered occupation. But
it was the fate of this organization to suffer from the depredations
of the Civil War, and regular meetings could not be held again
until after the conflagration was over. The War brought great
tribulation to the Missouri press — censorship, suspension, suppres-
sion, confiscation — and it was not until normal times returned that
progress toward professionalization could continue.
William H. Lyon
Arizona State College
Flagstaff
12 Boonville Observer, March 17, 1846.
Theodore Roosevelt: Historian with
a Moral
One day in January, 1904, Theodore Roosevelt composed a vig-
orous letter to Sir George Trevelyan, denouncing the "noxious belief
that research is all . . ., that accumulation of facts is everything, and
that the ideal history of the future will consist not even of the work
of one huge pedant but of a multitude of articles by a multitude of
small pedants." Roosevelt vented considerable wrath in colorful
language on "a preposterous little organization" known as the
American Historical Association,1 being a man not given to timidity.
Not only did he face Spaniards, lions, and the Pope with fortitude
and self-assurance, but he had no qualms whatever about expressing
plainly, or even bluntly, his candid opinion on any subject under
the sun. Whether he made an impassioned political speech (of
course, nearly everything he did was impassioned) or wrote a
magazine article or a biography of Oliver Cromwell, his innermost
thoughts were certain to appear.
Probably the chief characteristic of Roosevelt, the writer, is
making a point. In attempting to stimulate the martial spirit during
the first World War by claiming that ancient Egypt fell because
the Egyptians did not raise their boys to be soldiers2 or in telling
the National and International Good Roads Convention that the
"great difference between the semi-barbarism of the Middle Ages
and the civilization which succeeded it" was the difference between
poor and good means of communication,3 he was constantly drawing
lessons from history. Let it be granted that in magazine articles
and speeches he was deliberately trying to make a particular point;
yet, history was his natural weapon in argument.
"A nation's greatness," he wrote in 1895, "lies in its possibility
of achievement in the present, and nothing helps it more than the
consciousness of achievement in the past."4 It was not only Roose-
velt the polemicist but also Roosevelt the historian, though the two
are often difficult to separate, who believed in the use of history
1 Elting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols.,
Cambridge, 1951-1954, III, 707-708.
2 Theodore Roosevelt, Literary Essays, New York, 1926, 167.
3 Theodore Roosevelt, American Problems, New York, 1926, 445.
4 Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals, New York, 1910, 30.
223
224 ROBERT W. SELLEN
to teach lessons. He uttered a cry of pain and rage when, during
the first World War, some public school teachers in Chicago pro-
posed to forbid in the teaching of history any mention of war and
battles.5 He also used his biographies of Thomas Hart Benton and
Oliver Cromwell as platforms to advocate that the United States
be better prepared for war.6
Roosevelt was a man of his time. He shared the general opti-
mism of the western world at the end of the nineteenth century,7
saw himself as a moralist.8 His favorite word was "righteous" and
the derivations thereof, and he had so far digested a version of Dar-
winism as to believe in the superiority of Europeans and their cul-
ture over "barbarism."10 He reflected in his writings not only his
basic ideas but also his problems and passions of the moment. In
1884, though disgusted by the Republican Party's nomination of
Blaine, he stuck with the party11 and two years later in writing the
life of Benton turned loose his hatred of the Mugwumps.
The men who took a great and effective part in the fight against slavery
were the men who remained within their respective parties. . . . When a new
party with more clearly defined principles was formed, they, for the most
part, went into it; but like all other men who have ever had a really great
influence, whether for good or bad, on American politics, they did not act
independently of parties, but on the contrary kept within party lines. . . .12
His description of the forces which elected Polk in 1844 sounds sus-
piciously like an embittered Republican taunt at Cleveland in 1884.
These forces included: "rabid southern fire eaters," "the almost
solid foreign vote, still unfit for the duties of American citizenship,"
the "vicious and criminal classes in all the great cities of the North,"
the "corrupt politicians, who found ignorance and viciousness tools
5 Theodore Roosevelt, America and the World War, New York, 1917,
91-92.
6 Theodore Roosevelt, Life of Thomas Hart Benton, Boston, 1887,
37-38; Theodore Roosevelt, Oliver Cromwell, New York, 1900, 64-65, 91.
7 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 291.
8 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, New York,
1954, 229.
9 Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Addresses and State Papers and
European Addresses, New York, 1910, 2302-2304; Roosevelt, American
Problems, 310-311, 343; Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, New York,
1910, 28-29, 38.
10 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, 4 vols., New York,
1910, III, 264-265; Roosevelt, American Ideals, 254, 333; Roosevelt, The
Stremious Life, 28-31.
11 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, New York, 1931, 85-91.
12 Roosevelt, Life of Benton, 295-296.
13 Ibid., 290-291.
14 Ibid., 79, 219, 231.
15 Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life, 34-35.
16 Ibid., 106.
17 Ibid.; Theodore Roosevelt, Social Justice and Popular Rule, New
York, 1926, 106.
18 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 371.
19 Roosevelt, Oliver Cromwell, 19-20.
20 Roosevelt, Life of Benton, 145; Winning of the West, IV, 122-124.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 225
ready forged to their hands, wherewith to perpetrate the gigantic
frauds without which the election would have been lost. . . ."13
In the same book he turned on the Jacksonian Democrats for
having originated the "spoils system"14 which naturally outraged
any zealous reformer of the 1880's. On another tack, he later
pointed the way to American overseas expansion by asserting that
nations which expanded and nations which did not might both
ultimately fall, but the former left behind "heirs and a glorious
memory" while the latter left nothing.15 One may assume that
Roosevelt expected the American legacy to be grander than that of
either Rome or England.
Foremost among the lessons which Roosevelt tried to teach was
that "alike for the nation and the individual, the one indispensable
requisite is character. . . ."16 He constantly preached that the an-
cient empires fell because of their moral corruption,17 and warned
this country not to "lose the virile, manly qualities, and sink into
a nation of mere hucksters. . . ."18 A readiness to fight for the
national honor was evidently the pathway to salvation, for Roose-
velt described the peace enjoyed by England during the first forty
years of the seventeenth century as "an ignoble and therefore an
evil peace" with its result "a gradual rotting of the national fibre
which rendered it necessary for her to pass through the fiery ordeal
of the Civil War in order that she might be saved."19 To take
advantage of this somewhat stiff cure for dry rot in the national
character one had to be armed, and Roosevelt continually preached
preparedness, whether inspired by writing of a surplus in the federal
treasury under Jackson, campaigns against the Indians, or his tradi-
tional whipping-boy, the War of 1812. 20
It might be supposed that a man of Roosevelt's personality held
interesting ideas on great men in history and their effect upon
events, but the result of investigation is disappointing on this score.
The one outstanding figure about whom he wrote at length was
Oliver Cromwell, and though he did say that some strong man was
bound to emerge from a welter of factions to save them from des-
226 ROBERT W. SELLEN
troying one another by "laying his iron hand on all," he saw the
masterful Cromwell as pushed along by events, "whether he would
or not," and ended by moralizing about the overturning of established
governments and about Cromwell's inability to rise to "the Wash-
ington level" of statesmanship.21 His chief opinion of the great
men of the past appears to have been the importance of their ex-
ample for future generations, "the immense but indefinable moral
influence produced by their deeds and words."22
Roosevelt was primarily concerned with his own country and it
was in the history of the United States that his ideas were drawn
most clearly and systematically. In the late 1880's he saw the
nation's tasks as: taming the wilderness, defying outside foes, and
solving the problem of self-government.23 A few years later he
had expanded these three facets to seven "really great matters of
American history," which were: the conquest of the continent by the
white race, which branch of the white race should win the right to
make this conquest, the struggle between Britain and France in
America, the establishment of national independence, the building
of the national government, the long contest over slavery, and the
war to preserve the union.24 Apparently he was too close to events
after the Civil War to find significance in the growth of cities and
industry.
To Roosevelt the most dramatic, and hence the most interesting,
of these matters was the conquest of the continent. This peopling of
North America, he stoutly maintained, dwarfed all the European
wars of the past two hundred years and was "the most striking
feature in the v/orld's history."25 He noted as the most significant
aspect of the expansion of the United States its admission of its
western colonies into the union on an equal footing with the old
states, avoiding both the disunity of the Greek cities and the over-
centralization of the Roman Empire.26 It might be added that
Roosevelt felt sorry for the people of British Columbia, Saskat-
chewan, and Manitoba, who had missed becoming part of the
glorious enterprise.27
21 Roosevelt, Oliver Cromwell, 54, 99, 118-119, 132, 190.
22 Roosevelt, American Ideals, 17-18.
23 Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, I, 221.
24 Roosevelt, Literary Essays, 247.
25 Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, I, 15, 28; Roosevelt, Life of
Benton, 263; Roosevelt, American Ideals, 298-299.
26 Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders and Men of Action, New
York, 1926, 317-318, 320.
27 Roosevelt, Life of Benton, 266.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 227
In evaluating Roosevelt as an historian one must look at two
sides of the question: first, his ideas about the writing of history
and how it should be done; second, how well he lived up to those
ideas, or how good his own work really was.
As to the first, he wrote in the Outlook in 1912 that "scholar-
ship is of worth chiefly when it is productive, when the scholar not
merely receives or acquires, but gives."28 What form should this
giving take? He noted in his address at Oxford in 1910 the in-
fluence of science on history, the demands having been made that
history be treated as a science and that the history of man be con-
sidered in connection with the knowledge of biologists. Roosevelt
was willing that history be treated as a branch of science, but only
on the condition that it remained a branch of literature also. Fur-
thermore, he asserted, literature should encroach upon science, to
make the latter more readable.29
This interest in readable, literary, history had led Roosevelt to
comment on the works of an earlier historian that "Parkman would
have been quite unequal to his task if he had not appreciated its
romance as well as its importance."30 It led Roosevelt in 1912,
when president of the American Historical Association, to entitle
his presidential address "History as Literature." This was almost a
manifesto of revolt against Von Ranke-ism and the supposedly de-
tailed, scholarly, but also presumably dull monograph. Roosevelt
granted that history must be based on patient, laborious research
if one were not to produce merely a "splendid bit of serious romance
writing," but objected that many hardworking historians had grown
to feel that complete truthfulness was incompatible with any color
whatever, and that "the dryness and the grayness" were themselves
meritorious. To this he took vigorous exception. He refused to
accept the severance of literature from history merely because both
had become specialized. Literature he defined as that writing which
has permanent interest because of its substance and its form, and
the first element in any great work of literature was imaginative
power. Such imaginative power he found not only compatible with
minute accuracy but indeed necessary to a real and vivid presenta-
tion of the past. The historical work of real literary quality might
be "a permanent contribution to the sum of man's wisdom, enjoy-
28 Roosevelt, Literary Essays, 85.
29 Roosevelt, Presidential . . . and European Addresses, 2259-2260.
30 Roosevelt, Literary Essays, 247.
228 ROBERT W. SELLEN
ment, and inspiration." History must be didactic but only, as great
poetry, unconsciously so, possessing
that highest form of usefulness, the power to thrill the souls of men with
stories of strength and craft and daring, and to lift them out of their
common selves to the heights of high endeavor. The greatest historian
should also be a great moralist.31
History must make a point.
Roosevelt's works of history as such comprise a history of the
naval side of the War of 1812, a history of New York City, The
Winning of the West, and biographies of Thomas Hart Benton,
Gouverneur Morris, and Oliver Cromwell. To these can be added
two historical lectures in Europe in 1910.
Roosevelt began work on The Naval War of 1812 while a senior
at Harvard, having decided that no adequate history of that war's
naval battles existed and that he could remedy this difficulty. The
work appeared in 1882, was favorably reviewed in the New York
press, and was in a third edition within a year.32 Roosevelt's list
of secondary sources was longer than that of primary sources, but
the latter included, for example, the American naval captains' logs
and reports, of which he made good use. He apparently used every
decent source he could find and showed a keen awareness of the
faults and values of the various materials,33 making every effort
to be fair. For instance, he was willing to admit that though the
United States warred for "the right" it was not because it was the
right but because it agreed with our self interest, and even granted
that the American victories at sea "attracted an amount of attention
altogether disproportionate to their material effects."34 For all
that, Roosevelt rejoiced in the American successes35 and may have
limited his book to the war at sea in part because it was much more
likely to "thrill the souls of men with stories of strength and craft
and daring" than was the rather miserable fighting on land.
Apropos of the feebleness of the American war effort, this book
contained the first public flogging which Roosevelt administered to
Jefferson and Madison, the former being called "perhaps the most
31 Theodore Roosevelt, "History as Literature,*' The American His-
torical Review, XVIII (January, 1913), 473-489.
3^ Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 36, 46-47, 62; Theodore Roosevelt, TJie
Naval War of 1812, 2 vols., New York, 1910, I, 5, 22.
33 Ibid., I, iii-iv, 39-40, 44-45.
34 Ibid., I, 32, 53.
35 Ibid., I, 131-136, 149-150, 174-175, II, 195-197.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 229
incapable Executive that ever filled the presidential chair. . . ."36
Roosevelt also found room for his first public plea that the United
States rebuild its navy into a first class fighting force.37 Andrew
Jackson he saw as the avenger of American honor, and though Old
Hickory later "did to his country some good and more evil" no true
American could think of the battle of New Orleans without "pro-
found and unmixed thankfulness."38 Roosevelt was willing to ad-
mit that the war left matters in "almost precisely the state" in which
it had found them, yet "morally the result was of inestimable value
to the United States." There could be no question that his country
had emerged from the struggle with the greatest credit in warships
taken or sunk, and consequently it had gained much honor.39
Roosevelt held an interesting view of the War of 1812, regarding
it as the last Anglo-Indian attempt to stop the march of American
civilization across the continent.'10
Some of the author's belief in nordic superiority crept out in a
passage praising the fighting qualities of the American and British
sailors as contrasted with those of the Portuguese and Italians, who
were accused of being "treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready
with their hands, and likely to lose either their wits or their courage
when in a tight place."41 On the whole, however, it was not a
bad book, if one wanted a detailed though occasionally dramatic
account of the single ship duels and the fighting on the Great
Lakes between the American and British navies.
Roosevelt's next work was his biography of Benton, written in
three or four months while he was at his ranch in the Dakotas. At
the end of March, 1886, he had finished the first chapter, but com-
plained that writing was "horribly hard work" and that progress
was slow.42 Yet, by early June, he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge:
I have pretty nearly finished Benton, mainly evolving him from my inner
consciousness; but when he leaves the Senate in 1850 I have nothing what-
ever to go by; and, being by nature both a timid, and, on occasions, by
choice a truthful man, I would prefer to have some foundation, no matter
how slender, on which to build the airy and arabesque superstructure of
my fancy-especially as I am writing a history. Now I hesitate to give him
a wholly fictitious date of death and to invent all of the work of his later
36
Ibid., II, 210-211.
37
Ibid., I, 175-176.
38
Ibid., II, 216-217.
39
Ibid., I, 34, II, 194-197.
40
Ibid., II, 212-213.
41
Ibid., I, 64-65.
42
Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 95
230 ROBERT W. SELLEN
years. Would it be too infernal a nuisance for you to hire some one ... to
look up, in a biographical dictionary or somewhere, his life after he left
the Senate in 1850?... I hate to trouble you; don't do it if it is any
bother. . . .43
Toward the end of June Roosevelt believed that a week's work in a
library, "with authorities to consult," would allow him to finish the
book, but in August he sent it directly from his ranch to John T.
Morse, Jr., editor of the American Statesmen Series.44 Roosevelt
said in his book that Benton prepared an abridgment of the debates
in Congress from 1787 to 1850 and also wrote Thirty Years' View,
a history of the working of the federal government between 1820
and 1850. 45 When one looks closely at the story told in the Life
of Benton the suspicion becomes inescapable that Roosevelt used
as sources only these two works by Benton and a general history of
the United States.
A work written in such a way was not likely to be a definitive
biography or to present a challenging new thesis. The two chief
trends in the work were national expansion and the struggles over
nullification and slavery, certainly obvious choices. Roosevelt's per-
sonality unavoidably colored his treatment of those matters. He
was fairer in the first than in the second. Typically, he announced
the monumental importance of the job of conquering the North
American continent, and seized the chance to lecture his readers on
the evils of pacifism.46 He justified the frontiersmen's conquest of
Texas on the ground of their racial superiority to the weaker Mexi-
cans, comparing them to the Norsemen of old, and even claimed
that Sam Houston himself, "who drank hard and fought hard, who
was mighty in battle and crafty in council, with his reckless, boastful
courage and his thirst for changes and risks of all kinds, his pro-
pensity for private brawling . . . might . . . stand as the type of an
old-world Viking. . . ,"47 This somewhat strained analogy was
probably due less to a search for American roots in the Germanic
past than to the future Rough Rider's innate romanticism.
Believing that the Oregon dispute was certain to be settled by
strength alone, Roosevelt was sorry that the United States had not
fought England for possession of the entire territory. He went so
4 3
Ibid., I, 102.
44
Ibid., I, 104, 108.
45
Roosevelt, Life of Benton, 356-358
46
Ibid., 34, 37-38, 263.
47
Ibid., 175-179.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 231
far in the Life of Benton as to compare American with British gen-
erals and decided that we would have won, concluding his treatment
of the topic with a typical phrase: "Wars are, of course, as a rule to
be avoided; but they are far better than certain kinds of peace."48
He did, however, understand the westerners and was well aware that
they "felt themselves created heirs of the earth, or anyway North
America." "This . . . piratical way of looking at neighboring ter-
ritory," said Roosevelt in one of his sounder passages, "was very
characteristic of the West, and was at the root of the doctrine of
'manifest destiny.' "49
In his treatment of slavery Roosevelt displayed the attitude one
might expect of a northern Republican in the 1880's. He traced the
intellectual background of secession to Jefferson's part in the Ken-
tucky Resolutions of 1798, "an unscrupulous party move," launched
a blow against slavery as the real cause of the South' s lagging in
the race for prosperity, and labelled Calhoun's views on slavery in
the territories "monstrous." In Roosevelt's judgement the slave-
holding interests caused the annexation of a part of Mexico along
with Texas, and hence the War with Mexico which was thus the
only unrighteous war the United States had ever fought. Slavery
was chiefly responsible for "the streak of coarse and brutal barbar-
ism which ran through the Southern character," and it was "am-
bitious and unscrupulous" southern politicians who used the slavery
issue for their own gain and precipitated the secession crisis of
I860. Jefferson Davis was worthy of comparison only with Bene-
dict Arnold.50
Immediately after his return from Europe (and his second mar-
riage's honeymoon) in the spring of 1887, Roosevelt agreed to
write a biography of Gouverneur Morris, also for the American
Statesmen series. He had not yet begun work in mid-May when he
learned that the Morris family would not allow him to use Morris'
papers "at any price." But he wrote the book anyway. It was one
fourth done by the end of June and he sent the manuscript to the
publisher at the first of September. While he worked on the life
of Morris the restless Roosevelt was also involved in various other
literary ventures and in organizing a polo club on Long Island.51
48 Ibid., 261-262, 267-269, 289.
49 Ibid., 17, 41.
50 Ibid., 90-91, 95, 161-163, 289, 306-314, 326-327, 352-353.
51 Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 128-129, 131; Pringle,
Theodore Roosevelt, 116-117.
232 ROBERT W. SELLEN
Again he must have used almost nothing but secondary sources,
for nothing emerged of Morris the man beyond quotations from his
speeches and some of his letters. The book was filled with what
passed for the history of the times. One learned that the American
colonies stood toward England
as the Protestant peoples stood towards the Catholic powers in the sixteenth
century, as the Parliamentarians stood towards the Stuarts in the seventeenth,
or as the upholders of the American Union stood towards the Confederate
slave holders in the nineteenth; that is, they warred victoriously for the
right in a struggle whose outcome vitally affected the welfare of the whole
human race.52
The patriots were not only right but the superior men, while the
loyalist side included "the large class of timid and prosperous peo-
ple; the many who feared above all things disorder, also the very
lowest sections of the community, the lazy, thriftless, and vicious,
who hated their progressive neighbors," and, almost an after-
thought, "the men who were really principled in favor of a kingly
government." Naturally there was no hope of compromise when
such scoundrels were involved. Roosevelt was indignant not only
at the existence of opposition to the patriot cause, but also at the
suggestion that independence might have been achieved with help
given by allies from abroad, for our own strength had brought the
final triumph and we were then not even as good at fighting as
we were to be in the American Civil War!53
The life of Gouverneur Morris contained a paean to Washing-
ton: "not only the greatest American; he was also one of the great-
est men the world has ever known. Few centuries and few countries
have ever seen his like." In it also were an indictment of French
"fickle ferocity," and the customary condemnation of Jefferson and
Madison because of American unpreparedness for war in 1812. 54
However, there was an almost equally strong condemnation of the
Federalist Party for distrusting the people's management of their
own affairs, "for ... in the long run the bulk of the people have
always hitherto shown themselves true to the cause of the right."55
Unfortunately, there was not a notable amount of information about
Gouverneur Morris.
5 2 Theodore Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, Boston, 1898, 5.
53 Ibid., 25-26, 28, 42-43, 102-103.
5 4 Ibid., 44, 210, 302-303.
55 Ibid., 280, 309.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 233
Shortly after publishing the biography of Morris, Roosevelt pro-
duced a history of New York City, a volume slender both in size and
merit. Stating in his preface that limited space precluded the use
of the vast mass of manuscripts available, Roosevelt set forth as his
object to draw from the store of facts already collected and trace
the causes which gradually changed a little Dutch trading town into
a huge American city. The tome which emerged bore no resem-
blance to twentieth century urban history and carried a suitably
Rooseveltian moral: "the necessity for a feeling of broad, radical,
and intense Americanism, if good work is to be done in any direc-
tion."56
Weighting his story heavily toward the earlier years, for only
seventy-seven of the 216 small pages dealt with the period after
1800, Roosevelt was concerned more with revelling in the deeds
of sailor heroes of Hudson's day, with condemning James II of Eng-
land or the loyalists of the American Revolution, and with telling
the tale of the march of liberty against oppression than he was in-
terested in the commercial development of the city.57 While he
did find it possible to mention the transportation factors (the Erie
Canal and railroads) which helped to make New York great, and
noted the change in the city with the increased and different immi-
gration of the nineteenth century, Roosevelt emphasized the growth
of machine politics, "a perfect witches' sabbath of political corrup-
tion," from the time of Aaron Burr to the 1880's. The book ended
as a moral-political tract urging the citizens of the city to take an
active part in government.58
In January, 1888, Roosevelt wrote to a friend, "I should like
to write some book that would really rank as in the very first class,
but I suppose this is a mere dream." Four years later he wrote
that his chance of making a permanent literary reputation depended
on how well he did with The Winning of the West, which he was
working on at the time. However grand the author's scheme, the
work was not to be a startling new interpretation. As Roosevelt
wrote to Frederick Jackson Turner in 1895, he ignored almost com-
pletely the two points which Turner was studying, the reaction of
the West upon the East and the history of institutions, for his aim
was "to show who the frontiersmen were and what they did, as
56 Theodore Roosevelt, New York, London, 1891, vii-ix.
57 Ibid., 1-2, 38, 44, 56, 104-109, 137-138.
58 Ibid., 173, 176-178, 201, 206-207, 210.
234 ROBERT W. SELLEN
they gradually conquered the West."59 With this aim in mind
Roosevelt produced what is in essence a history of the Indian wars
from the 1760's to about 1800. Of the forty chapters in the four
volumes only ten were not concerned directly with either the Indian
wars or the war for independence (and in the latter the emphasis
was on fighting against the Indians), and half of the ten dealt with
western intrigues with France and Spain.60
Roosevelt spent more effort and care on The Winning of the
West than on all the rest of his historical works put together. He
sought all the original sources he could find, in Washington, D.C.,
Nashville, Louisville, and even Ottawa, Canada. He used the
papers, among others, of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe,
Robertson, the Campbell family, Sevier, Jackson, and George Rogers
Clark, ransacked the national archives, and looked up what news-
papers had existed at the end of the eighteenth century. C1 The re-
sult was a first rate account of the Indian wars and the separatist
intrigues of the westerners.
Turner, reviewing the fourth volume, found four strong features:
the use of widely scattered sources, the advance of the pioneers por-
trayed with "graphic vigor," the question of the Indians handled in
a "courageous and virile way," and a good account of the intrigues
of the western leaders with France and Spain. But Turner noted
that Roosevelt was interested only in the dramatic and picturesque
aspects of the story, that he impressed his own views on the reader,
was far too hard on Jefferson and, finally, that "the special student
must regret that Mr. Roosevelt does not find it possible to regard
history as a more jealous mistress, and to give more time, greater
thoroughness of investigation, . . . and more sobriety of judgement
to his work."62 The comment was eminently fair. Roosevelt wrote
to Turner, agreeing that he should find history worthy of more time
and explaining his duties as Civil Service Commissioner and Police
Commissioner.63 Since much of The Winning of the West was
written while he held those jobs one would expect to find greater
defects than did in fact appear.
Several Roosevelt characteristics could be found. One was, of
course, the use of history to point out a moral. If Americans com-
59 Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 136, 211, 367, 440.
60 Roosevelt, Winning of the West, I, 3, II, iii, III, iii, IV, iii.
61 Ibid., I, 5-11.
62 American Historical Review, II, 171-176.
63 Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 571.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 235
pared what they had done with what they might have done, "it
may make us try in the future to raise our ambitions to the level of
our opportunities." One lesson to be learned was that it is power
that counts in national life, and another was that Americans had
"erred far more often in not being willing to fight than in being
too willing."64 Jefferson and Madison were pilloried once again
for their part in American unpreparedness in 1812, and Roosevelt
admitted to Turner that his attitude was not a wise one but found
the cause for it. "I meet so many understudies of Jefferson in
politics," he wrote, "and suffer so much from them that I am
apt to let my feelings find vent in words!"65 Perhaps this was
where Turner had seen the need for "more sobriety of judgement."
Though Roosevelt saw the importance of the new states' being
admitted to the union on an equal footing with the old, he asserted
that the most important feature of the Norhwest Ordinance of
1787 was its anti-slavery clause and found an occasion in writing of
the frontier to damn the southerners for maintaining slavery, "the
one evil which has ever warped their development."66 He showed
his interest in natural life by devoting some ten pages to that found
by Lewis and Clark on the Missouri River,67 and possibly reflected
his own experiences in the West in a description of western charac-
ter. He wrote:
All qualities, good and bad, are intensified and accentuated in the life of
the wilderness. The man who in civilization is merely sullen and bad-
tempered becomes a murderous, treacherous ruffian when transplanted to the
wilds ; while ... his cheery, quiet neighbor develops into a hero, ready un-
complainingly to lay down his life for his friend.68
Roosevelt regarded British colonial policy in the eighteenth cen-
tury as an attempt to keep the interior of North America a wilder-
ness for the benefit of fur traders and English merchants. Con-
sequently, the war of the American Revolution had a two-fold
character, a struggle for independence in the East and in the West
a war to establish "the right of entry into the fertile and vacant
regions beyond the Alleghenies." Success in this paved the way for
the conquest of the continent, not only the greatest feature in the
64 Roosevelt, Winning of the West, I, 220-221, III, 61, IV, 122.
65 Ibid., IV, 123-124, 229-230; Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt,
I, 571.
66 Roosevelt, Winning of the West, III, 11, 354-355.
67 Ibid., IV, 349-358.
68 Ibid., I, 153-154.
236 ROBERT W. SELLEN
nation's history but also one which "utterly" dwarfed all European
wars of the preceding two centuries.69
This acquisition of western lands brought the pioneers into con-
flict with hostile Indians. To Roosevelt "every such armed settle-
ment or conquest by a superior race . . . meant the infliction and suf-
fering of hideous woe and misery," "a sad and dreadul thing."
The wrongs done could not be ignored, yet they must not be allowed
to obscure the results achieved for the benefit of mankind. Civili-
zation's march had to continue, for "the most ultimately righteous
of all wars is a war with savages. . . ."70 After all, the Indians
had no ownership of land as civilization knows it. "Every good
hunting ground was claimed by many nations" and where one tribe
had an uncontested title "it rested not on actual occupancy and
cultivation, but on the recent butchery of weaker rivals."71 Roose-
velt did not add that the frontiersmen's claim was nothing more
than this butchery of weaker rivals.
For all Roosevelt's seeing the Indian as an ignoble savage,
"filthy, cruel, lecherous, and faithless," and his assertion that the
red man was treated with abundant generosity, being over-paid for
his shadowy claim to the soil, he recognized the hardness of the
backwoodsmen. In an interesting passage he stated that those
frontiersmen who were religiously inclined were believers in an Old
Testament creed, laying slight stress on mercy. "They looked at
their foes as the Hebrew prophets looked at the enemies of Israel"
and "had read in The Book that he was accursed who . . . kept his
sword back from blood." Roosevelt saw that neither side could
restrain its extremists, and that war was inevitable since the desires
of the two parties could not be reconciled. Treaties and truces
could never be permanent remedies when the whites were bent on
seizing the land which the Indians were determined at all costs to
keep free from settlements.72 Roosevelt seems harsh toward the
Indians, but if one wishes to contend that the present size and
strength of the United States are good rather than evil his viewpoint
is inescapable.
While Roosevelt was not greatly concerned with the develop-
ment of insitutions, he did write some passages which are interesting
in the light of Frederick Jackson Turner's attitude toward the search
69 Ibid., I, 28, 52-53, III, 53-54, 83, 138.
70 Ibid., Ill, 130, 264-265.
71 Ibid., I, 109.
72 Ibid., II, 195-197, III, 117, 126-127.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 237
for American origins in the Germanic past. Roosevelt wrote in the
first volume of The Winning of the West, which appeared in 1889,
that the settlers of Watauga elected a "small parliament or 'witan-
agemot.' ' This remark drew a mild jeer from a reviewer said to be
Turner, and five years later Roosevelt wrote to Turner that the lat-
ter's ideas were "first class" and would be used in the third volume.73
In that volume Roosevelt quoted Professor Alexander Johnson of
Princeton as inclined to regard frontier governments "as reproduc-
tions of a very primitive type of government indeed," but he could
not agree with Johnson. Roosevelt then regarded frontier govern-
ment as copied by the "eminently practical" frontiersmen from that
under which they had grown up and applied to their new condi-
tions of life.74
Interesting in the light of Roosevelt's later realism in foreign
affairs is his prideful account of the Louisiana Purchase. Louisiana,
he wrote, was obtained "by a purchase, of which we frankly an-
nounced that the alternative would be war." In a later volume
this was modified to France's having been unable to hold its colony
in the face of the peopling of the western wilderness. Fortunately,
the author was willing to admit that Napoleon's disappointment in
his attempt to reconquer Haiti and his fear of a British descent upon
New Orleans had something to do with the matter.75
The Winning of the West may be summed up as a good, even
thrilling, account of Indian wars, of western separatism, and of some
western explorations. Beyond this it did not go.
Roosevelt's last major historical work was a biography of Oliver
Cromwell. Apparently a political career proved to be expensive, for
while governor of New York he contracted with Charles Scribner's
Sons to write a sketch of Cromwell to appear first in six issues of
Scribner's Magazine and then as a book. The author was to be paid
$5,000 and to receive fifteen per cent on the book's sales.76 The
work appeared in 1900, hastily done by a busy governor. It was
ill-treated in the American Historical Review, the reviewer finding
Roosevelt guilty of ignoring the recent work of Gardiner and Firth
and of viewing the seventeenth century in terms of religious and
73 Ibid., I, 212; The Saturday Review, LXVIII (1889), 466-467;
Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, I, 363.
74 Roosevelt, Winning of the West, III, 25, 63, 65n.
75 Ibid., I, 34, IV, 130, 309-311.
76 Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 2 vols., New York, 1925, I,
418.
238 ROBERT W. SELLEN
political liberty, contrasting Cromwell and his contemporaries with
Washington or even Lincoln.77
As a matter of fact, Washington's name appears on more pages
than does that of Ireton, and Roosevelt made it clear that Cromwell
was not the man Washington was.78. The book was a tale of good
men against bad, for the Stuart kings "clung to absolute power for
the sake of . . . carrying out policies that were hostile to the honor
and interest of England," and Laud was but "a small and narrow
man." At one point Roosevelt asserted, more truthfully than usual,
that the Puritans though warring in the name of religious liberty
meant it only for themselves. His real feelings must have been
what appeared much more often, that the English Civil War was
fought for the same principles which motivated the Glorious Revo-
lution of 1688, the American Revolution of 1776, and the American
Civil War, to wit, "political, intellectual, and religious liberty."79
The biography of Cromwell contained most or Roosevelt's
characteristics as an historian. He was obviously more interested
in the military aspects of the English Civil War than any other
side,80 lectured his readers on the necessity of preparedness for war
and on war as a good thing for the "national fibre,"81 and was
completely without mercy for Charles I or understanding of what
was involved in killing the anointed king.82 Yet he could point
out the folly (his own in this case) of judging men of the seven-
teenth century by the canons of the twentieth,83 just as he saw the
danger in Puritanism, however well-meaning it might be, of its ad-
herents' treating "not only their own principles, but their own
passions, prejudices, vanities, and jealousies, as representing the
will ... of Heaven."84 This was probably not his own idea but at
least he recognized its validity.
Most of Roosevelt's writings and speeches were for the sake of
political argument, and they tended to become increasingly violent
as the years passed, especially the years of the first World War.
In 1910 he delivered two addresses in Europe which marked the
end of his career as any sort of historian. The first, at the Uni-
77 American Historical Review, VI, 564-565.
78 Roosevelt, Oliver Cromwell, 53-54, 190-191, 251, 260.
79 Ibid., 6, 11, 53, 211, 234.
so Ibid., 58-60, 64-73, 79, 81-83, 86-91, 95-98, 124-128, 130-131, 152-
155, 166-172, 174-176.
81 Ibid., 19-20, 64-65, 91.
82 Ibid., 136-137, 139.
83 Ibid., 129.
84 Ibid., 46-47.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: HISTORIAN WITH A MORAL 239
versity of Berlin in May, 1910, was entitled "The World Move-
ment" and turned out to be a tedious statement of the fact that
whereas formerly civilization had been local, specialized, and hence
easily destroyed, it had become worldwide in range, more varied in
its activities, and hence was less likely to collapse. Roosevelt's pre-
sumed friend, the Kaiser, was said to have been disappointed.85
To Roosevelt the most important of his European speeches was
the Romanes Lecture at Oxford in June, 1910, and he put much
time and thought into "Biological Analogies in History." Fortu-
nately, he had sent a draft of the manuscript to his friend, Henry
Fairfield Osborn of the Museum of Natural History, and Osborn
prevented embarassment if hardly a war by deleting passages where-
in Roosevelt had compared reactionary European states to extinct
animals.86
The idea of the lecture was that
we see strange analogies in the phenomena of life and death, of birth,
growth, and change, between those physical groups of animal life which
we designate as species, forms, races, and the highly complex and composite
entities which rise before our minds when we speak of nations and civili-
zations.
Roosevelt developed this idea in pointing out that as species died,
so did nations. Some nations, like some animals, vanished without
a trace; others, like Rome, left a culture and bloodline, changed but
recognizable. Why, asked Roosevelt, did great empires show periods
of extraordinary growth and then decay? A spirit of particularism
might make government impossible, as in Poland. Or, the popula-
tion might have lost its fighting edge, as in Rome. Some, like
Holland, achieved a brief prominence beyond their capacity. Roose-
velt asked himself if modern western civilization, too, was doomed,
and saw certain ominous signs in the growth of luxury, the love of
ease and frivolous excitement, and, worst of all, the declining birth
rate. Still, all civilization had not crashed with the revolutions early
in the nineteenth century Malthus' fears had proved groundless, and
there was still hope.87
What, then, is the verdict on Roosevelt, historian with a moral ?
Obviously, it was his name which made the biographies sell, and
85 Roosevelt, Presidential ... and European Addresses, 2227-2255;
Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 519.
8P Ibid.
87 Roosevelt, Presidential . . . and European Addresses, 2257-2258,
2264-2296.
240 ROBERT W. SELLEN
his vigorous personality contributed what interest there is in them.
He was not an original thinker. He was capable of an enormous
amount of work, but usually did not put it into his historical writ-
ings. As a result, only The Naval War of 1812 and The Whining
of the West are of any real merit, and their merit is highly special-
ized. Roosevelt could tell a good story well, and he enjoyed tell-
ing stories about fighting and intrigue. The rest of history, one
feels, was simply in the way
As the Archbishop of York recalled years after 1910, "In the
way of grading which we have at Oxford, we agreed to mark the
lecture 'Beta Minus' but the lecturer 'Alpha Plus.' While we felt
that the lecture was not a very great contribution to science, we
were sure that the lecturer was a very great man."88 That in itself
is a fair judgement of Roosevelt the historian.
Robert W. Sellen
Baker University
Baldwin, Kansas
SS Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 520.
Book Reviews
Republicans Face the Souther?! Question. By Vincent P. DeSantis. The
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959. Pp. 283. $4 paper, $5 cloth.
This is a scholarly work for scholars, prepared in the best tradition of
scientific, historical research. It contains volumnious documentation drawn
principally from contemporary newspapers, magazines, diaries, and personal
papers. The Southern Question is defined as being those Reconstruction
controversies related to the Negro, the Civil War, and the military occupa-
tion of the South, and as the subsequent efforts of the Republican Party
to reestablish itself in the states of the ex-Confederacy. In order to ac-
complish the latter, the Republicans practically abandoned the Negro and
shifted their appeal to the southern white. The study concentrates upon
the period called by DeSantis the new departure years, 1877-1897. In
spite of repeated efforts and frequently changed tactics, the party met with
no success in solving its southern problem. Even though the Republicans
broke the Solid South in 1928, 1952, and 1956, they are still a sectional
party and still have a southern question, so the author concludes.
Necessary to an understanding of the task which faced the Republican
Party, beginning in 1877, is a brief review of what had taken place there-
tofore. In 1867, abolitionists, business interests, and partisan politicians of
the North had joined together to Republicanize the South through the en-
franchisement of the freedom and the disfranchisement of the native whites.
The height of their powei was reached in 1872 when they captured eight
southern states. Meantime, a reaction had set in. Conservative, upland,
and lower class whites of the South, hostile to the Republican Party and
fearful of Negro supremacy, became united in a consolidated whole.
Northern Democrats were openly sympathetic towards them. When, as early
as 1870, numerous other northerners and Republicans began to desert the
Radicals and to embrace Liberal Republicanism, the Carpetbag governments
were doomed. The last of these were over thrown in 1877, the Solid South
emerged, and the Republican Party faced the necessity of finding other means
if the South was to be Republicanized. Between 1877 and 1897, Repub-
lican leaders were especially confident that they could find the proper
solution.
The first of these leaders was President Hayes, who made the decision
to abandon the Negroes and Carpetbaggers. However, he tried to let them
down gradually, and placate them by giving a few of them federal appoint-
ments. This practice of individual appointments, followed by succeeding
Republican presidents, was largely responsible for keeping the southern
Negro loyal to the Republican Party until the time of the New Deal.
The white southern element which Hayes wished to attract into Re-
publican ranks was that of the regular Democratic conservatives. He would
have nothing to do with Independents, such as William Malone, the Vir-
ginia Readjuster, for he considered them economic radicals. The Presi-
dent's first move to ingratiate himself and the party with the southern con-
servatives was to remove the last of the occupation troops from South
241
242 BOOK REVIEWS
Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana. In this respect, DeSantis departs from
the traditional interpretation which is to the effect that the removal of the
troops was part of a bargain struck with the Democrats whereby they, in
turn, yielded the presidency to the Republicans. Hayes' second move was
to appoint southern Democrats to numerous federal offices, one to a Cabinet
post. And finally, in order to divide the southern people along economic
rather than the existing racial lines, he proposed a program of internal im-
provements for the South at federal expense. This proposal, however, came
to nothing.
The testing of Hayes' policy was the elections of 1878 and 1880. The
South emerged more Democratic than ever, and Hayes' high hopes were
dashed to the ground. However, he had committed his party to a policy of
the repudiation of Radical Reconstruction and to the strategy of redeeming
the South. His successors used other methods, but kept the same goal
unalterably in mind. In spite of the outcries of former abolitionists, Stal-
warts, Carpetbaggers, and southern Republicans, a majority of Republican
Party members, especially the business interests, favored the new southern
policy and gave it their support.
Garfield was intimately familiar with his predecessor's southern pro-
gram. He continued the policy of attempting to divide the southern whites
and convert a majority of them to Republicanism. However, his method
was different. In the South, numerous Democrats were rebelling against
entrenched Bourbonism and were organizing as Independents who might be
persuaded to cooperate with or become Republicans. It was this situation
which Garfield decided to exploit. The test case was that of William
Malone and the Virginia Readjusters, or the Repudiationists, as they were
called by the regular Democrats. Obviously, Garfield had to move care-
fully, for he was embarrassed by the fact that his party enjoyed the sup-
port of the conservative financial interests of the Northeast, and to ally him-
self with a movement tainted with repudiation might alienate their support.
However, when Garfield's untimely death occurred, limited cooperation
came to an end.
Arthur entered the White House with the reputation of a spoilsman
and a Stalwart. The Reconstructionists were overjoyed, for they expected
a return to Grantism. Their consternation was complete when it became
clear that Arthur intended to reestablish the Republican Party in the South
through a policy of complete cooperation with Independent movements.
Where Hayes cultivated the conservative white, Arthur cultivated the In-
dependent white; where Garfield embraced limited cooperation, Arthur em-
braced complete cooperation. In order to bring about the political regenera-
tion of the South and overthrow southern Democracy, Arthur strove to
unite Republicans, Readjusters, Greenbackers, Independents, and Liberals.
The opposition to his program, led by Blaine, was widespread and bitter.
Nevertheless, his policies prevailed. The factor of the necessity of white
supremacy in the South was his undoing. Whereas there were Independent
gains in 1882, election results in 1884 reveal that Arthur came no nearer
than Hayes in his attempt to find a formula for the breakup of the Solid
South.
Republican hopes to rejuvenate the South reached their lowest point in
BOOK REVIEWS 243
the mid-eighties. A dramatic change came, however, with the elections of
1888, when they captured the White House and both houses of Congress
for the first time since 1872. They could now reach their desired goal
through the enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
which southern Democrats had successfully negated. In order to effect this,
with Harrison's blessing Henry Cabot Lodge introduced the Force Bill of
1890 into the House. This bill fared well and was approved by the
House. However, in the Senate, it collided with the silver interests of the
West, the tariff interests of the Northeast, and the determination of big
business to let nothing interfere with the improving happy relationship
between North and South. Northern opinion turned against the bill, so,
once again for the third time, the Republican Party abandoned the Negro
and returned to the search for a two-party South through the winning of
native white converts.
The agrarian resurgence which took place in the South during the
1890's, paralleling a similar movement in the West, gave to the Republi-
cans, so they thought, the opportunity for which they had been seeking.
Southern Populists attempted to win control of the Democratic Party, state
by state, by working from within. Many of these and the Republicans
immediately saw the advantage of fusion, even though it was nothing more
than a matter of expediency. In the elections of 1892, 1894, and 1896, the
fusionists entered combined tickets in the southern states. Only in North
Carolina in 1894 did they succeed. Memories of the Force Bill, the economic
and social pressure which southern Democrats brought to bear upon southern
Populists, and Harrison's lukewarm attitude account for their failure.
And so a twenty year period ended. The Republican Party, in spite of
all of its efforts and methods used, was weaker in the South in 1897 than
it had been in 1877. They had not let the South become Democratic by
default, they had fought for it. But they had failed.
The story of and reasons for this failure is the theme of Republicans
Face the Southern Question. The author has marshalled a tremendous
amount of detailed research material, has organized it well, and apparently
drawn the correct conclusions. Occasionally, however, he confuses the reader,
and seems to beome confused himself, by the wealth of minutiae. The
forest is often lost sight of because of the trees. The continuous use of
quotations often makes reading difficult. Typographical errors occur too
frequently. Some terms are not clearly defined and their use is open to
question. The one basic explanation for the southern question which is
not made completely clear and which is known to those who have lived
for long periods of time in the South is that it is a matter of bitterness
left by the Civil War and the excesses of Reconstruction, and of the un-
changing determination of southern whites never again to permit Negro
supremacy.
The work fills a very great need and void which have existed too long
in the area of historical literature. It is hoped that Professor DeSantis, or
some other equally well-prepared specialist, will carry the study into the
twentieth century and down to the present.
Kenneth M. Jackson
Loyola University, Chicago
244 BOOK REVIEWS
Third Parties in American History. By Howard P. Nash, Jr. Public Af-
fairs Press, 1959. Pp. ix, 326. Illustrated. $6.00.
About twenty American minor political parties move in and out of
this chronicle. The study is limited, for all practical purposes, to those
Presidential elections in which, in the author's judgement, minor parties
played a significant role. The term "third" parties, incidentally, is some-
what misleading because in some Presidential elections more than three parties
have been of some significance.
Minor parties have influenced American Presidential and even Congres-
sional elections in two ways. They have sometimes affected the results.
In 1844, for example, Polk, a Democrat, won New York's thirty-six electoral
votes and the Presidency because, it seems, the Liberty party drew enough
votes away from Henry Clay to leave him a little over 5,000 votes shy.
If one assumes, as does Mr. Nash, that nearly all of Van Buren's 120,000
votes in New York as the Free-Soiler nominee in 1848 were at the ex-
pense of Lewis Cass, the Democratic nominee, it was the Free-Soilers who
enabled Taylor, a Whig, to win that election. Everybody knows that "Teddy"
Roosevelt's bolt from the G.O.P. in 1912 cleared the way for Wilson's
victory. The biggest upset in American Presidential elections, on the other
hand, was Truman's victory in 1948 despite the "Dixiecrat" and Wallace
Progressive defections from the Democrats.
The sound effect of minor parties, as Mr. Nash points out, has been
the way in which they have forced major parties to adopt their programs
and perhaps even their nominees in order to head them off. A striking
example, of course, was the Populist effect on the Democrats from 1896
on.
Although this history is interesting, partly because of the copious re-
productions of political cartoons and handbills, and fairly adequate, one
senses a lack of clear-cut purpose in the assembling of data. This impres-
sion is re-enforced by the way the author lets his study trail off at the
end without drawing any conclusions. One wishes, too, that he had adopted
a consistent practice in reporting each candidate's popular and electoral vote
in the Presidential elections selected for analysis. The State-wide "winner-
take-all" method we use in choosing Presidential electors and the influence
of woman's suffrage after the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted in 1920
might have been analyzed in connection with third-party votes. An oc-
casional slip in proof-reading appears such as Henry Clay's being identified
in a caption on p. 29 as the winner in 1844. The bibliography, without
pretending to be exhaustive, is ample, though the absence of Edward A.
Stanwood's two-volume History of the Presidency, which is really a history
of Presidential nominations, campaigns and elections, is somewhat surprising.
Robert C. Hartnett
Loyola University, Chicago
INDEX
cTVIID-c^lMERICA
VOLUME XLI
indexer's note
Names of the contributors are in small capitals; titles of articles in
this volume are in quotation marks; titles of books and periodicals reviewed
or mentioned are in italics. Book reviews are entered under author and title
of book, and under the name of the reviewer; no entries are made for sub-
ject of the book except in the case of biographies. The following abbrevia-
tions are used: tr., translator; ed., editor; revs., reviews; revd., reviewed.
Acton, Minn., massacre in, 140-142
Adams, Henry, 38
Adams, John, 195
Agriculture, and New Deal, 210-217
Albert, Dr. Heinrich, 42
Aldrich, Sen. Nelson W., 171
Allen, Gov. William, 30, 31, 33, 35,
38
American Historical Association,
223, 227
American Historical Revieiv, 237
American Institute of Social Ser-
vice, 203
American Quarterly , contents noted,
63
American Revolution, 49-51, 233,
235, 238
American Protective Association, 41
Andrew Jackson and. North Carolina
Politics, by William S. Hoffman,
noted, 124
Ann Arbor Signal of Liberty, 116
APA, see American Protective As-
sociation
Army Appropriations Bill, 182-186
Army Reorganization Bill, 180-185
A Royal Request for Trade, by
James I, noted, 127
Baker, I. P., 107
Baltimore Deutsche Correspondent,
44
Banning, Rep. Henry, 181-183
Baring, Evelyn, Lord Cromer, 89
Barton, Albert O., 162
Bashford, Robert M., 167
Bathgate Pink Paper (No. Dak.),
107, 108
Belgium, 1914 invasion, 45-48
Benet, Brig. Gen. S. V., 177
Bennett, Jr., J. Harry, Bondsmen
and Bishops, Slavery and Appren-
ticeship on the Codrington Plan-
tations of the Barbadoes, 1710-
1838, noted, 125
Bentley, Richard, 73-76, 84, 85
Benton, Thomas Hart, 224, 228-231
Berger, Victor, 166
Big Eagle, Chief, 136-137, 140
Binney, John, 31
Blackhawk, Chief, 132
Black, John D., 212
Blaine, Sen. James, 184
Bonadio, Felice A., "The Failure of
German Propaganda in the United
States, 1914-1917," 40-57
Bondsmen and Bishops, by J. Harry
Bennett, Jr., noted, 125
Book Reviews, 58-61, 120-123, 187-
192, 241-244
Boonville Observer (Mo.) 219
Boston Courier, 77
Boutwell, George S., 34
Boutros Ghali Pasha, 90, 96, 99, 100,
102
British-Egyptian relations, 88-103
Brvan, William Jennings, 109-111
Buifinch, Thomas, 78, 85, 86
Bundesrat, 52, 53
Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
215-217
Burnside, Sen. Ambrose E., 174-175,
177-186
Burton, David H., "Theodore Roose-
velt and Egyptian Nationalism,"
88-103
245
246
INDEX TO VOLUME XLI
"Business and Currency in the Ohio
Gubernatorial Campaign of 1875,"
by Irwin Unger, 27-39
Cairo, Egypt, National University
of, 93-95, 98, 100-101, 103
Calderon de la Barca, Madame, Gi-
ll, 85, 86
Caldwell, F. M., 219
Cary, Samuel F., 29, 33, 36
Catalogue of Printed Materials Re-
lating to the Philippine Islands,
1519-1900, in the Newberry Li-
brary, by Doris V. Welsh, noted,
126
Cass, Lewis, 114-119
Casson, Henry, 164
Charless, Joseph, 221
Chapman and Hall Co., 70-71, 82
Chicago Abendpost, 43
Chicago Times, 38
Chicago Tribune, 31
Chittenden, Capt. Richard, 131
Cincinnati Commercial, 29, 30, 35, 36
Cincinnati Convention of 1856, 117
Cincinnati Enquirer, 32-33, 37
Cincinnati Gazette, 36
Civil War, 137-138, 173, 222, 225
Cleveland Leader, 36
Coleman, John, Authors of Liberty,
noted, 64
Commons, John R., 211
Connor, William D., 155-160, 163
Conquest of Mexico, W. H. Prescott,
67-69, 82
Conquest of Peru, W. H. Prescott,
72, 80
Corbin, Abel R., 218
Craig, Brig. Gen. James, 148
Cromer, Lord, see Baring
Cromwell, Oliver, 223, 225-228
Crook, Gen. George, 131
Crooks, Col. William, 150
Cullen, William J., 150
Currency question in Ohio, 27-39
Curti, Merle, The Making of an
American Community, revd., 122-
123; cited, 41
Custer, Gen. George A., 131
Dahl, Andrew, 162
Dakota Territory, Sioux in, 131-153
Davidson, James O., 153-160, 163-
164, 167, 170, 171
Davis, Jefferson, 231
de Beaumont, Gustave, 15-16
Debs, Eugene, 111
Democrats, in No. Dak., 106-113; in
Ohio, 27-39
Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard, 42, 44
DeSantis, Vincent P., Republicans
Face the Southern Question, revd.
241-243
DeSmet, Fr. Peter, 139
Detroit Advertiser, 115
Detroit Collegian, 114
Detroit Free Press, 116, 117
Devils Lake Free Press (No. Dak.),
106
Dewey, John, 211
Dibrell, Rep. George, 182
Dickens, Charles, 70
Die Waclit am Missouri (No. Dak.),
107
Donnelly, Ignatius, 144
Dumond, Dwight L., 119
Efforts of Raymond Robins Toward
the Recognition of Soviet Russia
and the Outlawry of War, 1917—
1933, Sister Anne V. Meiburger,
revd. by Gilbert C. Kohlenberg,
60-61
Egyptian Nationalism, 88-103, 223
Ekern, Herman, 168-169, 171
Eliot, Samuel, 72, 85
Eliot, William H., 72
Ely, Richard, 198, 205
Encyclopedia Britannica, 49
England, World War I, 45-50
Ewing, Rep. Thomas, 183
Ewing, Jr., Thomas, 29-30, 32-34, 36
Ezekiel, Mordecai, 213
Farm Bureau, 211-217
Feldhake, Hilda Engbring, Saint
Anthony's Century, 1858-1958,
revd., 125
"Failure of German Propaganda in
the United States, 1914-1917," by
Felice A. Bonadio, 40-57
Ferdinand and Isabella, W. H. Pres-
cott, 69, 78
"First Missouri Editors' Convention,
1859," by William H. Lyon, 218-
222
Financier (N. Y.), 31
Flandrau, Judge Charles E., 150
Fort Abercrombie, 140-142, 145
Fort Randall, 140-144, 148
Fort Ridgely, 133, 140-146, 150
Fort Ripley, 140-143
Fort Snelling, 142, 143, 150
French Revolution, 5-6, 10, 14, 16
From Community to Metropolis, A
Biography of Sao Paulo, by Rich-
ard M. Morse, revd. 59
INDEX TO VOLUME XLI
247
Gabriel Richard, Frontier Ambassa-
dor, by Frank B. Woodford and
Albert Hyma, revd., 58-59
Galbraith, Thomas J., 134-137, 140,
142
Gardiner, C. Harvey, "William
Hickling Prescott: Author's
Agent," 67
Gargan, Edward T., "Some Prob-
lems in Tocqueville Scholarship,"
3-23
George, Henry, 197
German-American Alliance, 42, 49,
55
Germans, in North Dakota, 105-113
German propaganda, 1914-1917, 40-
57
German-Russians, in North Dakota,
105-113
Girouard, Sir Percy, 90
Good Roads Convention, 223
Gorst, Sir Eldon, 97, 100, 101
Great Britain, see England
Greenback party, 27-39
Guildhall, T. Roosevelt in, 102-103
Hall, A. R., 162
Hall, Capt. Francis, 142
Halleck, Gen. Henry W., 151, 152
Handlin, Oscar, cited, 57
Hannibal Journal (Mo.), 219, 221
Harpers Weekly, 116
Harriman, Henry, 212
Hartnett, Robert C, revs. Third
Parties in American History, 244
Hatton, William, 168-169
Haugen, Nils P., 159, 164
Hayes, Rutherford B., 31, 33-38, 185
Hewitt, Rep. Abram S., 174-175
Hewlett, Richard G., 115-116
Hexamer, Charles L., 44, 49
Hillard, George S., 77-78, 85-86
Hillsdale Gazette (Mich.), 116
Hoard, Gov. William D., 164
Hoffman, William S., Andrew Jack-
son and North Carolina Politics,
revd., 124
Hofstadter, Richard, 199
Hosmer, James K., 40
Howe, Frederick, 196-208
Hudnall, Sen. George, 162
Hyma, Albert, and F. B. Woodford,
Gabriel Richard, revd., 58
Illinois Internal Improvements,
1818-1848, by John H. Krenkel,
revd., 120
Immigration, 41, 104-113, 198
Immigration Restriction League, 41
Institute of Latin American Re-
search, University of Texas, noted,
126
Iowa, Sioux Indians in, 131-153
Irving, Washington, 80
Jackson, Andrew, 114, 229, 234
Jacksonians, 199, 208, 225
Jackson, kenneth M., revs. Repub-
licans Face the Southern Question,
241-243
Jackson, Minn., massacre of, 147
Jacobsen, Jerome V., Ed. Revs. R.
M. Morse, From Community to
Metropolis, 59-60; revs. C. H.
Gardiner, Prescott and His Pub-
lishers, 191-192; Notes and Com-
ments, 62-64, 124-128
James Ford Bell Collection, Univer-
sity of Minnesota, noted, 127
Jayne, Gov. William, 144
Jefferson, Thomas, 199, 228, 235
Johnson, Tom, 202, 237
Jones, Robert Huhn, "The North-
western Frontier and the Impact
of the Sioux War, 1862,"; revs.
C. M. Oehler, The Great Sioux
Uprising, 190-191
Journalism in Missouri, 218-222
Journal of History of Ideas, noted,
63
Journal of Inter-American Studies,
noted, 127
Kelley, William, 33, 36
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, 231
Kerr, Michael, 29
Keyes, Elisha, 163, 168, 170
Khartoum, 88, 93, 96, 98, 101
Kimball, Spencer L., revs. G. J.
Kuehnl, The Wisconsin Business
Corporation, 187-190
Kiniery, Paul, revs. Merle Curti,
The Making of an American Com-
munity, 122-123
Kirkendall, Richard, "A Professor
in Farm Politics," 210-217
Kohlenberg, Gilbert C, revs. Sis-
ter A. V. Meiburger, Efforts of
Raymond Robins Toward Recogni-
tion of Soviet Russia, 60-61
Konta, Alexander, 44
Krenkel, John H., Illinois Internal
Improvements, 1818-1848, revd.,
120
Kuehnl, George J., The Wisconsin
Business Corporation, revd., 187-
190
Kuhnemann, Prof. Eugen, 43
248
INDEX TO VOLUME XLI
La Follette, Robert M., 154-172
Lake Traverse, Minn., 133
Lakota Herald (No. Dak.), 106
Lenroot, Irvine, 157-158, 164, 167,
169
Lerner, Max, 217
Leutz, Ferdinand, 108
Lewis and Clark Expedition, 235
Lewis, Gene D., revs. J. H. Kren-
kel, Illinois Internal Improve-
ments, 120
Life of Thomas Hart Benton, 231
Lincoln, Abraham, 151
Little, Brown and Co., 69
Little Crow, Chief, 139, 146; see
Sioux
Loco Focos, 115
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 229
Lombardi, Fr. Richard, Toward a
New World, noted, 128
Louisiana Herald (Mo.), 220
Louis Philippe, 8, 16
Lowery, Martin J., revs. J. Lynch,
Spanish Colonial Administration,
1782-1810, 120
Lubove, Roy, "The Twentieth Cen-
tury City: The Progressive as Mu-
nicipal Reformer," 195-209
Lukacs, Prof., J. A., 4
Lynch, John, Spanish Colonial Ad-
ministration, 1782-1810; The In-
tendant System in the Viceroyalty
of the Rio de la Plata, revd., 120-
122
Lyon, William H., "The First Mis-
souri Editor's Convention, 1859,"
218-222
McGovern, Francis F., 168-1G9
McKinley, Pres. William, 109-111
Madison, Pres. James, 228-235
Marcy, Gen. R. B., 177
Margulies, Herbert F., "Political
Weaknesses in Wisconsin Progres-
sivism, 1905-1908," 154-172
Marsh, Capt. John F., 137, 142
Mayer, Prof. J. P., 4
Meiburger, Sister Anne Vincent, Ef-
forts of Raymond Robbins Toward
the Recognition of Russia and the
Outlawry of War, 1917-1933,
revd., 60-61
"Midwestern Immigrant and Poli-
tics : A Case Study," by D. Jerome
Tweton, 104-113
Millard, Capt. Andrew, 147
Miller, William D., 195
Milwaukee Free Press, 157, 164, 169
Minnesota, Sioux in, 131-153
Minor, Capt. Nelson, 147
Missouri, editors convention in, 218-
222
Missouri Argus, 218
Missouri Press Association, 220
Missouri Statesman, 219
Morgan, George W., 32-33
Morgan, John P., 51, 54
Morris, Gouverneur, 231-233
Morse, John T., 118, 230
Morse, Richard M., From Commu-
nity to Metropolis, revd., 59-60
Motley, John Lothrop, 79-82, 85, 86
Motley, Thomas, 81
Nairobi, 90
Napoleon, Luis, 13, 14
Nash, Howard P., Third Parties in
American History, revd., 244
National Farm Bureau, 212-217
National Grange, 212
Nelson, Capt. Anderson D., 150
Nelson, Sen. Knute, 108-109
New Deal, 210-217
New York, T. Roosevelt, 228, 233
New York Times, 38, 180
New York Tribune, 180
New Ulm, Minn., 145-146, 150
Nicolay, John G., 131
Norona, Delf , Wheeling : A West
Virginia Place-Name of Indian
Origin, noted, 63
North American Review, 71, 78, 83,
84
North Dakota, immigrants, 104-113
Northwest Ordinance, 235
Norwegians, in North Dakota, 104-
113
Notes and Comments, 62-64, 124-
128
Oehler, C. M., The Great Sioux Up-
rising, revd., 190-191
Ohio, campaign of 1875, 27-39
Oliver Cromwell, by T. Roosevelt,
237-238
Osborn, Henry F., 239
Outlook, 227
Paddock, Gov. Algernon S., 145
Palfrey, John Gorham, 83-86
Parkman, Francis, 74, 85, 86, 227
Peek, George, 210, 214
Pendleton, George, 32, 36
Permanent Peace, a Check and Bal-
ance Plan, Tom Slick, noted 128
Philip the Second, W. H. Prescott,
81-84
Pierson, Prof. George W., 3, 6
INDEX TO VOLUME XLI
249
"Political Weaknesses in Wisconsin
Progressivism, 1905-1908," by
Herbert F. Margulies, 154-172
Polk, James K., 114-115, 224
Pope, John, 132
Pope, Maj. Gen. John, 152
Populism, 165, 199
Prescott and his Publishers, C. H.
Gardiner, revd., 191
"Professor in Farm Politics," by
Richard Kirkendall, 210-217
Progressivism, 46, 154-172, 195-209
Protestantism, 40, 203-208, 237-238
Quaife, Milo, cited, 114, 119
Rauschenbusch, Walter, 197
Ramsey, Gov. Alexander, 150, 151
Republican party, in Ohio, 30-39 ; in
No. Dakota, 106-113
Republicans Face the Southern Ques-
tion, V. P. DeSantis, revd., 241-
243
Reuter, William L., The King Can
Do No Wrong, noted, 127
Revue des deux Mondes, 7-8
Ridenbaugh, William, 219
Riggs, Rev. Stephen R., 133, 137
Riis, Jacob, 197
Robert Lansing and American Neu-
trality, 1914-1917, by Daniel M.
Smith, noted, 124
Robinson, Gov. Charles, 145
Rogers, R. R., 212
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 210-217
Roosevelt, Theodore, 47, 88-103, 223-
240
Root, Elihu, 186
Ross, E. A., cited, 208
Rowe, L. S., 203
Ruml, Beardsley, 212
Saint Anthony's Century, 1858-1958,
Hilda E. Feldhake, noted, 125
St. Joseph Cycle (Mo.), 219
St. Joseph Gazette (Mo.), 219
Salomon, Prof. Albert T., 3
Salomon, Gov. Edward, 149
Sawyer, Lt. Col. James A., 147
Sawyer, Sen. Philetus, 160
Schilling, Robert 29
Schofield, Maj. Gen. J. M., 177
Schurz, Carl, 33, 36-38, 51
Scribners Magazine, 237
Sellen, Robert W., "Theodore
Roosevelt; Historian with a
Moral," 223-40
Senior, Nassau W., 14
Seventy-five Years of Latin Ameri-
can Research at the University of
Texas, noted, 126
Shaw, Albert, cited, 207-209
Sheehan, Lieut. T. J., 142
Sheridan, Gen. Philip H., 179
Sherman, Gen. William T., 175
Shiels, W. Eugene, revs. Gabriel
Richard, Frontier Ambassador,
58-59
Shoshone Indians, 139
Simpson, A. W., 219
Sibley, Henry H., 132, 150
Sioux City, 147
Sioux Falls, Dakota Ter., 144, 148
Sioux war, 1862, 131-153
Sitting Bull, Chief, 132
Slatim Pasha, 99, 100
Slick, Tom, Permanent Peace, a
Check and Balance Plan, noted,
128
Smith, Daniel M., Robert Lansing
and American Neutrality, 1914-
1917, noted, 124
Social Democratic party, 166
"Some Problems in Tocqueville
Scholarship," by Edward T. Gar-
GAN, 3-23
Southard, Milton I., 34
Sparks, Jared, 74, 83
Spillman, W. J., 212
Stanton, Edwin M., 132, 145, 149,
151, 152
Steffens, Lincoln, cited, 195-197
Stephenson, Isaac, 155-157, 159-160,
163, 168-171
Stevens, Walter W., "The Waning
Prestige of Lewis Cass," 114-119
Stowe, Harriet P.., 77, 85
Strong, Josiah, 198, 204-205
Sudan, see Egypt
Switzler, William F., 219, 229
Taft, William H., 170
Terry, Brig. Gen. A. H., 177
The Fatherland, 44-57
The Great Sioux Uprising, C. M.
Oehler, revd., 190
The Making of an American Com-
muyiity, Merle Curti, revd., 122
The National Whig, 115
The Naval War of 1812, T. Roose-
velt, 228-229, 240
"The Northwestern Frontier and the
Impact of the Sioux War, 1862,"
by Robert Huhn Jones, 131-153
"Theodore Roosevelt and Egyptian
Nationalism," by David H. Bur-
ton, 88-103
250
INDEX TO VOLUME XLI
"Theodore Roosevelt: Historian with
a Moral," by Robert W. Sellen,
223-240
The Shame of the Cities, 195-197
"The Twentieth Century City: The
Progressive as Municipal Re-
former," by Roy Lubove, 195-209
The Winning of the West, 233-237,
241
The Wisconsin Business Corporation,
G. J. Kuehnl, revd., 187-190
Thiers, Adolph, 8
Third Parties in American History,
H. P. Nash, revd., 244
Thompson, Clark, 136-137, 139-140,
144
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 3-17; Bibli-
ography of, 18-26; 47
Tolley, Howard, 213, 215
Toward a New World, R. Lombardi,
noted, 128
Townsend, Adj. Gen. E. D., 177
Trevelyan, Sir George, 223
Tufts, James H., 211
Tugwell, Prof. Rexford G., 213
Turner, Frederick Jackson, 233, 235-
237
Tweton, D. Jerome, "The Midwest-
ern Immigrant and Politics; A
Case Study," 104-113
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 75-76, 85
Unger, Irvin, "Business and Cur-
rency in the Ohio Gubernatorial
Campaign of 1875," 27-39
University of California Press, pub-
lications noted, 124-125
University of Wisconsin, 160
Veretow, Dr. Rudolph, 54
Viereck, George S., editor, The Fa-
therland, q.v.
Von Ranke-ism, 227
Wade, Sen. Benjamin, 35
Wallace, Henry A., 213, 214, 216
Wall Street, 51, 52
War of 1812, 225, 228, 229
Washington, George, 234, 238
Washington Post, 173
Webster, Daniel, 85
Welsh, Doris Verner, A Catalogue of
Printed Materials Relating to the
Philippine Islands, 1519-1900, in
the Newberry Librarv, noted, 126
White, Gov. Frank, 109
Whitlock, Brand, 203, 205
Wickard, Claude, 216
Wilcox, Delos, 200-201, 205
William and Mary Quarterly, noted,
61
"William Hickling Prescott: Au-
thor's Agent," by C. Harvey Gar-
diner, 67-87
Wilson, Prof. M. L., 210-217
Wilson, T. Woodrow, 41, 52
Windom, Sen. William, 184
Wingate, Sir Reginald, 101
Winnebago Indians, 138-139
Wipperman, Max, 107, 109, 110-111
"Wisconsin Idea," 211
Wisconsin, Sioux in, 132
Wittke, Carl, cited, 42
Wood, Gen. Leonard, 47
Woodford, Frank B. and A. Hyma,
Gabriel Richard, Frontier Ambas-
sador, revd., 58-59
Youssef, Ali, 94, 95
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